This article examines the role and reputation of Ellen Terry, the most eminent British Shakespearean actress of the late-Victorian period, and the extent to which she interrogated her function on the eminently spectacular stage of London’s Lyceum theatre. The article contends that in her writing – her autobiography, annotations of playscripts and lectures – Terry self-consciously and deliberately repositions herself as a Shakespeare commentator, and hence as one no longer subject to the temporal and visual limitations of the spectacular stage.

According to L.A. Paul, conscious experiences can be transformative. But can unconscious experiences also be transformative? After a preliminary clarification of what it means to have an unconscious experience, we marshal three cases of unconscious experiences to support the idea that unconscious experiences can be transformative: one inspired by Anna Karenina, another by a case of Freud’s, and a third by the medical condition hemispatial neglect. Such examples, we argue, suggest not only that you may have had more transformative experiences (...) than you are aware of, but also that the sphere of the authentic subject, from a first-person perspective, outstrips what is in her consciousness at any time. A full account of transformative decision making, we suggest, must take this into consideration. (shrink)

We outline some ways in which motor neglect (the underutilization of a limb despite adequate strength) and hysterical paralysis (failure to move a limb despite no relevant structural damage or disease) may throw light on the pathophysiology of catatonia. We also comment on the manifold inadequacies of distinguishing too firmly between symptoms of “neurologic origin” and of “psychiatric origin.”.

J D Marshall; The Concept of Teaching, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 9, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 105–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.19.

This paper seeks to advance our thinking about values and justice by studying the relationship between these constructs at the organizational level. We hypothesize that collective perceptions of moral values in organizational settings will influence collective perceptions of justice. Survey results from 619 individuals in 108 departments strongly support our hypothesis that collective values influence perceptions of both procedural and overall justice climate. We discuss these results, and their implications for thinking about relationships between moral values and justice at even (...) higher levels of analysis such as society overall. (shrink)

The idea that there are some things which we should not talk about is most commonly dealt with in the context of debates about rights to free speech, and other contexts in which the value of talking is typically understood in instrumental terms. This paper explores ways of grounding that idea which do not depend upon instrumental values, in particular in the context of self-revelatory and confessional talk.

[Anne:] “I can't, I'm in the depths of despair. Can you eat when you are in the depths of despair?”“I've never been in the depths of despair, so I can't say,” said Marilla.“Weren't you? Well did you ever try to imagine you were in the depths of despair?”” No, I didn't.”“Then I don't think you can understand what it's like. It's a very uncomfortable feeling indeed. When you try to eat a lump comes right up in your throat and you (...) can't swallow anything, not even if it was a chocolate caramel.”—L.M. Montgomery, Anne of Green Gables.Emotion, as a “suprarational” property, transcends rationality in that it can be thought of as a group, contextual rather than as a solely individual trait, and thus is a higher order property, as the above quote suggests. This proposal arises from a metatheoretical analysis of models available to broach questions of emotion. I use metatheoretical in the sense of both the context of theory production and the theory of theory. From the first arose the idea that emotion, through the use of irrationality, has surfaced as a working equivalent to inexplicability or rational relativity, and can be modelled more adequately as suprarational, with a unique nature in its own right. The latter led me to propose that the concept of emotion as contextual, a higher order group level property, is possible and tentatively profitable. (shrink)

Lately, several commentators have argued that there are significant differences between ancient and modern skepticism. For example, it has been argued that ancient skeptics disavow belief, whereas the moderns disavow only knowledge. It has also been argued that the scope of ancient skepticism is considerably less radical than that of modern skepticism: unlike the moderns, the ancients do not question whether they have bodies or whether there is an external world furnished with the sorts of objects we generally take there (...) to be. They do not suspend judgment as to whether, for example, honey exists, but only as to whether it is sweet. One explanation that has been given for the allegedly modest scope of ancient skepticism is its practical concern: ancient skepticism is a way of life, one that is supposed to secure the skeptic’s happiness. But, according to Myles Burnyeat, “[s]uch being his primary concern, he cannot doubt in a completely general way his ability to act in the world.” Modern skepticism, by contrast, is said to be “a strictly methodological affair,” with the result that, unlike ancient skeptics, modern ones can act in the face of radical skepticism. (shrink)

This essay focuses on Husserl’s conception of the natural attitude, which, I argue, is one of his most important contributions to contemporary phenomenology. I offer a critical exploration of this concept’s productive explanatory potential for feminist theory, critical race theory, queer theory, and disability studies. In the process, I draw attention to the rich, multi-faceted, and ever-changing social world that can be brought to life through this particular phenomenological concept. One of the most striking features of the natural attitude, as (...) Husserl describes it, is that it is not natural at all, but rather, is a developmental phenomenon that is acquired through, and profoundly influenced by, specific socio-cultural practices. To de-naturalize the natural attitude, then, is to recognize that the natural attitude is not fixed or innate but relative to a particular time period and culture, and therefore always capable of being changed. (shrink)

The essays presented here by Olkowski and Weiss attempt to situate Merleau-Ponty in the larger context of feminist theory, while impartially evaluating his contributions, both positive and negative, to that theory.

Considered the most original thinker in the Italian philosophical tradition, Giambattista Vico has been the object of much scholarly attention but little consensus. In this new interpretation, David L. Marshall examines the entirety of Vico's oeuvre and situates him in the political context of early modern Naples. He demonstrates Vico's significance as a theorist who adapted the discipline of rhetoric to modern conditions. Marshall presents Vico's work as an effort to resolve a contradiction. As a professor of rhetoric (...) at the University of Naples, Vico had a deep investment in the explanatory power of classical rhetorical thought, especially that of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Yet as a historian of the failure of Naples as a self-determining political community, he had no illusions about the possibility or worth of democratic and republican systems of government in the post-classical world. As Marshall demonstrates, by jettisoning the assumption that rhetoric only illuminates direct, face-to-face interactions between orator and auditor, Vico reinvented rhetoric for a modern world in which the Greek polis and the Roman res publica are no longer paradigmatic for political thought. (shrink)

Spellman argues that Aristotle developed his views about substance in response to Plato’s theory of forms. In particular, she argues that Aristotelian substances are as much like Platonic forms as possible, minus the latter’s separation. Whether ASs are like PFs depends, of course, not only on what one takes ASs to be like, but also on what one takes PFs to be like; accordingly, Spellman provides accounts of both. She argues that ASs are what she calls specimens of natural kinds. (...) A specimen of a natural kind is not Socrates, but Socrates-qua-human-being: Socrates insofar as he is a human being. She argues that Socrates, and Socrates-qua-human-being are numerically the same, but not identical. They are not identical, because not everything true of Socrates is true of Socrates-qua-human-being. Socrates, for example, is snub-nosed, but Socrates-qua-human-being is not; for the latter has all and only the properties contained in the definition of human being. (shrink)

The interplay between emotion and learning is a continuing source of debate and inquiry in organization studies, attracting an increasing number of important contributions. However, a detailed understanding of the interaction between emotion and learning remains elusive. In an effort to extend the existing debate, this article offers an alternative approach that draws on the tradition of pragmatist philosophy, where emotion and learning can both be defined as dynamic processes that emerge in the relational context of social transactions. The mutually (...) constructing interplay between these two processes is then illustrated with an example of a collaborative project in which anxiety, love, guilt, and hostility are all entangled in the learning process. (shrink)

In Smith’s view, the dédoublement that structures any act of sympathy is internalized and doubled within the self. In endeavoring to “pass sentence” upon one’s own conduct, Smith writes, “I divide myself, as it were, into two persons; and … I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of” . Earlier in his book, Smith claims that in imagining someone else’s sentiments, we “imagine ourselves acting the (...) part” of that person ; here he pictures us trying to play ourselves by representing ourselves as two different characters. “The first,” writes Smith, “is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation.” The second character, according to Smith, is “the agent, the person whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion” . In the version of this chapter that appeared in the first edition, Smith made these roles explicitly by stating that “we must imagine ourselves not the actors, but the spectators of our own character and conduct” . In his final exposition, he makes it clear that we are both actors and spectators of our characters. We are actors not just because we appear before spectators played by ourselves but also because, as Smith describes, we personate ourselves in different parts, persons, and characters. The self is theatrical in its relation to others and in its self-conscious relation to itself; but it also enters the theater because “the person whom I properly call myself” must be the actor who can dramatize or represent to himself the spectacle of self-division in which the self personates two different persons who try to play each other’s part, change positions, and identify with each others. Ironically, after founding his Theory of Moral Sentiments on a supposedly universal principle of sympathy, and then structuring the act of sympathy around the epistemological void that prevents people from sharing each other’s feelings, Smith seems to separate the self from the one self if could reasonably claim to know: itself. In order to sympathize with ourselves, we must imagine ourselves as an other who looks upon us as an other and tries to imagine us. Indeed, calling the spectator within the self the person judged of, Smith writes, “but that the judge should, in every respect, be the same with the person judged of, is as impossible, as that the cause should in every respect, be the same with the effect” . Thus the actor and spectator into which one divides oneself can never completely identify with each other or be made identical. Identity is itself undermined by the theatrical model which pictures the self as an actor who stands beside himself and represents the characters of both spectator and spectacle.14 14. Smith’s depiction of the impartial spectator and the relations it creates within the self suggest that he has been reading Shaftesbury. The characterization of the impartial spectator as the “man within the breast” recalls Joseph Butler’s discussion of “the witness of conscience” in his sermons “Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience” . Hume discusses the moral value of considering how we appear in the eyes of those who regard us: “By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a reputation in the world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us. This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it were, in reflection, keeps alive al the sentiments of right and wrong” . It is Shaftesbury, however, who expounds a “doctrine of two persons in one individual self” as he presents his “dramatic method” …. The terms and figures of theater are clearly inscribed within Smith’s characterizations of sympathy and the impartial spectator but they are clearly informed by Shaftesbury’s meditation on the dramatic character of the self and the problem of theatricality that threatens the self as it appears before the eyes of the world. This interpretation of Shaftesbury is developed at length in my The Figure of Theater. David Marshall, assistant professor of English and comparative literature at Yale University, has written on Rilke and Shakespeare. The present essay is adapted from a chapter of his forthcoming book, The Figure of Theater: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot. (shrink)

In much the same way that genomic technologies are changing the complexion of biomedical research, the issues they generate are changing the agenda of IRBs and research ethics. Many of the biggest challenges facing traditional research ethics today — privacy and confidentiality of research subjects; ownership, control, and sharing of research data; return of results and incidental findings; the relevance of group interests and harms; the scope of informed consent; and the relative importance of the therapeutic misconception — have become (...) important policy issues over the last 20 years because of the ways they have been magnified by genomic research efforts. Research that examines the ethical, legal, and social implications of human genomics research has become a burgeoning international field of scholarship over the last 20 years, thanks in part to its support first by the genome research funding bodies in the U.S. and then by national science agencies in other countries. (shrink)

This study aims to reveal the contributions of teacher education to social sustainability in an African context. The study explored the gaps and connections between multiple layers of policy, global, regional, and national educational targets, and the voices of teacher education tutors and students from a local teacher education college in the Copperbelt region of Zambia. Semi-structured interviews were employed to gather participants’ views on their aspiration, knowledge transformation and professional capacity. Employing a critical realist approach, the study identifies four (...) key ‘moments’ in teacher education (Robertson and Dale, 2015) and reveals dedicated teacher education practices that aim to support national economic development local demands for specialised subject knowledge, along with family and individual human needs within communities. The findings lead to a discussion mapping critical teacher education that promotes social sustainability within the Global South, emphasising the significant roles of teacher education in fostering a comprehensive understanding of societies and human well-being, encouraging reciprocal knowledge exchange within communities, and supporting the continued professional development of teachers. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between organizational size, structure and the strength of organization members'' ethical predispositions. It is hypothesized that individuals in smaller, more flexible, organic organizations will display stronger ethical predispositions. Survey results from 209 individuals across eleven organizations indicate that contrary to expectations, larger, more rigid, mechanistic structures were associated with higher levels of ethical formalism and utilitarianism. Implications of these findings are discussed.

Keith Thomas: Gerald Edward Aylmer, 1926-2000 Adrian Hollis: William Spencer Barrett, 1914-2001 Bruce Williams: Charles Frederick Carter, 1919-2002 Malcolm Mackintosh: John Erickson, 1929-2002 J. H .R. Davis: Raymond William Firth, 1901-2002 F. M. L. Thompson: Hrothgar John Habakkuk, 1915-2002 A. W. Price: Richard Mervyn Hare, 1919-2002 Hugh Lloyd-Jones: Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, 1921-2003 Michael Lapidge and Peter Matthews: Vivien Anne Law, 1954-2002 Ann Moss: John Lough, 1913-2000 Terence Cave: Ian Dalrymple McFarlane, 1915-2002 Ludwig Paul: David Neil MacKenzie, 1926-2001 Peter Birks: John (...) Kieran Barry Moylan Nicholas, 1919-2002 Jonathan Shepard: Dimitri Dimitrievich Obolensky, 1918-2001 David Cannadine: John Harold Plumb, 1911-2001 Daniel Waley: Nicolai Rubinstein, 1911-2002 Ian Wood: John Michael Wallace-Hadrill, 1916-1985 R. G. M. Nisbet: William Smith Watt, 1913-2002 G. W. Bernard: Richard Bruce Wernham, 1906-1999. (shrink)

3AM magazine follows up their 2014 publication Philosophy at 3AM: Questions and Answers with a new collection interviews, this time focused on ethics. Interviewer Richard Marhsall presents 26 interviews, balanced both in terms of specialty, gender, and seniority, so that the result is a balanced and engaging portrait of the state of the art in ethics today.

The goal of this study is to discover and critically examine the major influences on the development of Joseph Fletcher's theological and philosophical ethics. Subsidiary investigation will reveal the influence of particular philosophical points of view , theological positions , and the effects of social context and other determinants on Fletcher's thought. Whether Fletcher's ethics remain dependent on social or temporal contingencies, whether they are historically contingent or of lasting practical value will be analyzed. ;This paper will take the form (...) of an intellectual biography. The first two chapters are purely biographical, sketching the social environment and formative personal relationships of Fletcher's youth and early adulthood. Three subsequent chapters chronologically critique the development of Fletcher's theology of social redemption, the personalistic and rights-based approach to an ethic of medical care espoused in Morals and Medicine, and the amalgam of presuppositions that comprises the moral framework of Situation Ethics. The primary foundations of Fletcher's basic ethical premises; control, choice, and responsibility will be analyzed in terms of their origins and place in the evolution of his ethical thought. (shrink)

Fran Brearton: Robert Graves and The White Goddess Joyce Hill: Authority and Intertextuality in the Works of Ælfric Michael Pennington: Barnardine's Straw: The Devil in Shakespeare's Detail David Womersley: Dulness and Pope Terence Cave: Montaigne Lord Moser: The Future of Our Universities Alexander Murray: The Inquisition and the Renaissance Robert Bagley: The Prehistory of Chinese Music Theory Edwin Cameron: Patents and Public Health: Principle, Politics and Paradox Mervyn King: What Fates Impose: Facing Up to Uncertainty Dominic Lieven: Empire, History and (...) the Contemporary Global Order Joan Oates: Archaeology in Mesopotamia: Digging Deeper at Tell Brak Timothy Besley: The New Political Economy Richard Gray: 'They Worship Death Here': William Faulkner, Sanctuary and Hollywood Lord Sutherland: Nomad's Progress James Piscatori: Imagining Pan-Islam: Religious Activism and Political Utopias. (shrink)