In order to prove the validity of logical rules, one has to assume these rules in the metalogic. However, rule-circular ‘justifications’ are demonstrably without epistemic value. Is a non-circular justification of a logical system possible? This question attains particular importance in view of lasting controversies about classical versus non-classical logics. In this paper the question is answered positively, based on meaning-preserving translations between logical systems. It is demonstrated that major systems of non-classical logic, including multi-valued, paraconsistent, intuitionistic and quantum logics, (...) can be translated into classical logic by introducing additional intensional operators into the language. Based on this result it is argued that classical logic is representationally optimal. In sec. 6 it is investigated whether non-classical logics can be likewise representationally optimal. The answer is predominantly negative but partially positive. Nevertheless the situation is not symmetric, because classical logic has important ceteris paribus advantages as a unifying metalogic. (shrink)

Der Wissenschaftsbegriff kann nicht einseitig auf den Begriff von "science" eingeengt werden. Eine strenge Scheidung in naturwissenschaftliche und geisteswissenschaftliche Methoden ist nicht möglich. Paradigmatisch für die Naturwissenschaften ist die hypothetisch-deduktive für die Geisteswissenschaften die hermeneutische Methode. Praktisch sind beide Methodenschemata immer ineinander verschränkt. Da die hermeneutische Methode auch nicht-wissenschaftlich verwendet wird, ist es notwendig Kriterien ihrer Wissenschaftlichkeit anzugeben. Der Vergleich beider Methoden zeigt, daß beide hypothetisch sind. Konkurrierenden Modellen entsprechen konkurrierende Deutungen. Die naturwissenschaftliche Methode kann im allgemeinen Entscheidungen erzwingen, da (...) sie immer neue Erfahrungen erzeugen kann. Demgegenüber ist das Erfahrungsmaterial in den Geisteswissenschaften vorgegeben und nicht beliebig vermehrbar. Entscheidungen zwischen konkurrierenden Deutungen sind daher nicht erzwingbar. (shrink)

White (2015) proposes an a priori justification of the reliability of inductive prediction methods based on his thesis of induction-friendliness. It asserts that there are by far more induction-friendly event sequences than induction-unfriendly event sequences. In this paper I contrast White's thesis with the famous no free lunch (NFL) theorem. I explain two versions of this theorem, the strong NFL theorem applying to binary and the weak NFL theorem applying to real-valued predictions. I show that both versions refute the thesis (...) of induction-friendliness. In the conclusion I argue that an a priori justification of the reliability of induction based on a uniform probability distribution over possible event sequences is impossible. In the outlook I consider two alternative approaches: (i) justification externalism and (ii) optimality justifications. (shrink)

Although I agree with Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) criticisms of is-ought and ought-is fallacies, I criticize their rejection of normativism on two grounds: (1) Contrary to E&E's assumption, not every normative system of reasoning consists of formal rules. (2) E&E assume that norms of reasoning are grounded on intuition or authority, whereas in contemporary epistemology they have to be justified, primarily by their truth-conduciveness.

Two major works in recent evolutionary biology have in different ways touched upon the issue of cultural replicators in language, namely Dawkins’ Selfish Gene and Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s Major Transitions in Evolution. In the latter, the emergence of language is referred to as the last major transition in evolution, a claim we argue to be derived from a crucial property of language, called Duality of Patterning. Prima facie, this property makes natural language look like a structural equivalent to DNA, (...) and its peer in terms of expressive power. We will argue that, if one takes seriously Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s outlook and examines what has been proposed as linguistic replicators, amongst others phonemes and words, the analogy meme-gene becomes problematic. A key issue is the fact that genes and memes are assumed to carry and transmit information, while what has been described as the best candidate for replicatorhood in language, i.e. the phoneme, does by definition not carry meaning. We will argue that semiotic systems with Duality of Pattering force us to reconsider either the analogy between replicators in the biological and the cultural domain, or what it is to be a replicator in linguistics. (shrink)

This fourth part of the 'Materialien zur Geschichte der Ramanuja-Schule' is an attempt to trace in philological and historical terms the theologoumenon's development of the doctrine of the 'Inner Ruler' following the texts handed down to us and to prevent an expose of its theological substance. The doctrine is followed up in the work of Sankara (ca. 800 A.D.), in the Subalopanisad, in Bhaskara's Bhedabhedavada (about 900 A.D.) up to the adoption of Antaryami in the Brahma-doctrine of Ramanuja. Finally, after (...) the exposition of the influence of tantric thought, the doctrine of Antaryami is treated with regard to the late period of the Ramanuja-school. This investigation is of importance not only because of the collection of the relevant texts regarding this doctrine, but also in view of the necessity of examining the emergence and development of this school not only from the standpoint of the Vedantic Brahmadoctrine, but to evaluate this school as what it has become in the sense of 'Sitz im Leben', i.e. one of the significant 'religious traditions' of Vaisnavism, whose Brahma-doctrine has developped into a fully-fledged theological world view. (shrink)

"Was sind epistemische Werte? Welcher Wert aus der Familie: Wissen, Wahrheit, Rechtfertigung, kognitive Leistung usw. ist fundamental, so dass aus ihm die anderen Werte abgeleitet werden können? Oder gilt ein Pluralismus? Welcher Wert wird final, d.h. um seiner selbst willen, geschätzt; welcher dient nur instrumentell der Realisierung eines anderen Werts? Ist, wie die Menon-Intuition nahe legt, Wissen mehr wert als wahre Überzeugung? Die Wertschätzung von Wissen scheint in dem erwarteten Ausschluss von epistemischem Zufall begründet zu sein. Aber welche Arten von (...) epistemischem Zufall können wir überhaupt ausschließen? Welche Rolle spielen dabei rechtfertigende Gründe? Ungeklärt ist auch das Verhältnis, das Werte, Normen und Ziele in unserer epistemischen Praxis eingehen. Ist Wissen und/oder Wahrheit nicht eher als gemeinschaftlich angestrebtes, durch Institutionen reguliertes Ziel unserer Erkenntnispraxis zu begreifen? Die Fragen stehen im Schnittpunkt zweier Debatten: einmal der seit ca. 50 Jahren geführten Debatte um eine Definition des Wissensbegriffs, die den Einwänden standhält, mit denen Gettier das klassische Paradigma von Wissen als wahrer, gerechtfertigter Überzeugung unterminiert hat. Zum anderen der jüngeren, seit ca. 15 Jahren geführten Debatte um den Wertbegriff. Die hier gesammelten Beiträge sind Lösungsvorschläge für die Problemfelder, die sich in der Verknüpfung der beiden Debattenstränge neu herausgebildet haben"--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Heidegger’s account of the anyone is ambiguous. Some interpreters applaud the anyone as the best description of human sociality, while others think of it as an important critique of modern mass society. This chapter introduces the main idea leading up to this volume: Heidegger’s anyone should neither be reduced to its pejorative nor its constitutive dimension. Rather, the ambiguity of the anyone reflects the tension between the constitutive function of norms, rules, and conventions for human action on the one hand, (...) and the critical aspects of conformism on the other. The anyone is the condition of possibility of all human action, but it does not provide its ultimate source of meaning or intelligibility. This evokes the question whether there are standards for our actions beyond the common sense of the anyone. I take this to be the question that Heidegger’s notion of Eigentlichkeit, translated as authenticity or ownedness, wants to address. After distinguishing two controversial dimensions for interpreting authenticity – romantic versus formal and individualistic-atomistic versus pluralistic-social – I will introduce the social dimension of authenticity as the focal point of this volume. In particular, I will identify as the main question whether authenticity can serve as a source of social critique and a motor for social change. (shrink)

Aim of the deliberation is to identify the presuppositions for the analysis of use of language on the level of semantic interpretation. Pragmatics has no self-sufficiency semantic core-theory. The requirements of theories in semantic are discussed ana further the consens and disserts of the approaches in semantic analysis is demonstrated. Special references are the problem of analytic and synthetic (W.v.O. Quine. J.J. Katz, S. Haack, H. Pumam, D. Davidson), the debat about B. Russells analysis of denoting and the critics of (...) P.F. Strawson ana K.S. Donnellan. The non-self-sufficiency of the semantic conceptualization on the level of pragmatics is valid even though semantic is deliminated through pragmatics. (shrink)

The paper starts with the distinction between conjunction-of-parts accounts and disjunction-of-possibilities accounts to truthlikeness. In Sect. 3, three distinctions between kinds of truthlikeness measures are introduced: comparative versus numeric t-measures, t-measures for qualitative versus quantitative theories, and t-measures for deterministic versus probabilistic truth. These three kinds of truthlikeness are explicated and developed within a version of conjunctive part accounts based on content elements. The focus lies on measures of probabilistic truthlikeness, that are divided into t-measures for statistical probabilities and single (...) case probabilities. The logical notion of probabilistic truthlikeness can be treated as a subcase of deterministic truthlikeness for quantitative theories. In contrast, the epistemic notion of probabilistic truthlikeness creates genuinely new problems, especially for hypotheses about single case probabilities that are evaluated not by comparison to observed frequencies, but by comparison to the truth values of single event statements. By the method of meta-induction, competing theories about single case probabilities can be aggregated into a combined theory with optimal predictive success and epistemic truthlikeness. (shrink)

L'histoire des fondements des mathématiques du xxe siècle montre qu'il nous faut réviser la signification des notions philosophiques traditionnelles comme « évidence », « existence », « expérience » ou « rationalité ». On expose comment le logicien Paul Bernays, familier des conceptions de la philosophie de Jacob Friedrich Fries et de Léonard Nelson, donne aux résultats techniques une interprétation philosophique dont il s'inspire de plus en plus - à partir du milieu du siècle - de la « philosophie ouverte (...) » de Ferdinand Gonseth. Bien avant Thomas Kuhn, Bernays conçoit la révision envisagée non pas simplement comme une question de vérité ou de fausseté, mais comme un problème exigeant l'introduction d'un nouveau système conceptuel. Cependant, l'affaiblissement du concept de vérité est pour lui une conséquence épistémologique provenant de la théorie de la connaissance adoptée et non une conséquence méthodologique issue d'un changement de paradigme et donc d'une incommensurabilité. (shrink)

Der Autor schlägt zunächst eine prozessual-temporale Lesart von Nicolas Poussins zweitem »Arcadia«-Bild (1638–1640) vor, in der er die drei Hirten als Repräsentanten einer Figur in unterschiedlichen Phasen ­eines Prozesses der emotionalen Erfahrung der eigenen Endlichkeit/Sterblichkeit versteht. Ausgehend von Guercinos gleichnamigem Vorgängerbild wird dann Poussins Übergang von seinem ersten »Arcadia«-Bild (1629–1630) zu »Arcadia II« als Transformation dargestellt. Als zentral erweisen sich hier das Thema der bild­internen Präsenz des Todes und die doppelte Bedeutung der Kunst als Perseus-Schild im Hinblick auf dessen Darstellung: (...) zugleich ermöglichender Blick auf den ­Schrecken und Distanzierung, psychoanalytisch formuliert: Abwehr. Im abschließenden dritten Teil wird Panofskys These referiert, dass »Arcadia II« der Ausgangspunkt für ein neuzeitliches »elegisches Empfinden« des Todes sei. Dies wird kulturpsychoanalytisch im Lichte von Freuds Konzeption der Ichspaltung als Stabilisierung der Abwehr des Todes interpretiert, der kognitiv gewusst und emotional verleugnet wird. (shrink)

Our know-it-alls, the new spirits, assert that faith alone saves and that works and external things contribute nothing to this end. We answer: It is true, nothing that is in us does it but faith, as we shall hear later on. But these leaders of the blind are unwilling to see that faith must have something to believe—something to which it may cling and upon which it may stand. Thus faith clings to the water and believes it to be Baptism (...) in which there is sheer salvation and life, not through the water, as we have sufficiently stated, but through its incorporation with God's Word and ordinance and the joining of his name to it. When I believe this, what else is it but believing in God as the one who has implanted his Word in this external ordinance and offered it to us so that we may grasp the treasure it contains? 1. (shrink)

The 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science will be held on July 19-26, 2011, in Nancy, France . In order to provide some historical background about DLMPS Congresses, we are honoured to have the opportunity to reissue a chapter of Anita Burdman Feferman and Solomon Feferman's Alfred Tarski : Life and Logic, dedicated to the early history of the DLMPS and the organization of the first Congress held in 1960 in Stanford. We are very grateful to the (...) authors and the Cambridge University Press for their kind authorization to reissue this text. (shrink)