In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"EVERY MARITAL ACT OUGHT TO BE OPEN TO NEW LIFE'': TOWARD A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING I. INTRODUCTION NE FREQUENTLY encounters misinterpretations of the statement " Every marital act ought to be open to new life " and similar statements in recent Catholic teaching concerning contraception.1 There are two common misinterpretations. One is: No couple may engage in marital intercourse without the intention to procreate. The other is: No couple may (...) engage in marital intercourse at times when they think procreation is impossible. As interpretations of the Church's teaching, these must be mistaken. For the Church teaches that contraception is always wrong and that natural family planning (NFP) is not always wrong. But NFP facilitates intercourse without the intention to procreate at times when procreation is thought to be impossible. Moreover, the Church has never taught that marital intercourse is good only if the couple desires to procreate; indeed, couples known to be sterile have never been forbidden to marry. We think that the only plausible interpretation of "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" is: It is wrong for those who engage in marital intercourse to attempt to impede the transmission of life which they think their act otherwise might bring about. For if they do try to impede that to which their act of itself might lead, they choose to close it to new life. 1 The proposition is formulated somewhat differently by Paul VI, Humanae vitae, 11, AAS 60 (1968), 488 (with references to Gasti connubii and to Pius XII's.Allocution to the Society of Italian Catholic Midwives); and by John Paul II, Familiaris consortia, 29, AAS 74 (1982), 115, following proposition 22 of the 1980 session of the Synod of Bishops. Moreover, the different formulations also are translated diversely. We do not think these differences matter for our present purpose. 365 366 GRISEZ, BOYLE, FINNIS AND MAY Un.derstood in this way, "Every marital act ought to be open to new life" expresses the same proposition as " Contraception is always wrong." Nevertheless, the affirmative formulation helps to clarify what contraception is, for it indicates the precise object of the contraceptive act. "Contraception" signifies only the prevention of conception, but the contraceptive act seeks to impede the beginning of the Zife of a possible person. The distinction is only conceptual, but we think it important, for the explicit reference to new life calls attention to the fact that contraception is a contralife act. The characterization of contraception as a oontralife act is one major element of the unbroken Christian tradition condemning contraception as always wrong. For example, a canon, Si aliquis, concerning contraception was included in the Church's universal law from the thirteenth century until 1917: " I£ anyone for the sake of fulfilling sexual desire or with premediated hatred does something to a man or to a woman, or gives something to drink, so that he cannot generate, or she cannot conceive, or offspring be born, let it be held as homicide." 2 This canon does not say that contraception is homicide ; the tradition made no such mistake. The canon rather says that contraception sihould be regarded as homicide is regarded. To regard contraception as homicide is regarded is not only to make it clear that.contraception is wrong, but also to point to its being contralife as the reason why it is wrong. When contraception is regarded as contralife, it is seen as evil outside marriage as well as within. Historically, contraception probably was more common among the unmarried than the married, and much of the tradition condemned contraception without distinguishing between its uses in and outside mar2 Deoret. Greg. IX, lib. V, tit. 12, cap. v; Oorpus iuris oanonioi, ed. A. L. Richter and A. Friedberg (Leipzig: Tauchnitz, 1881), 2, 794: "Si aliquis causa explendae libidinis vel odii meditatione homini aut mulieri aliquid fecerit, vel ad potandum dederit, ut non possit generare, aut concipere, vel nasci soboles, ut homicida. tenea.tur." Some transla.te "ca.usa explendae libidinis," which is broad enough to cover all motivation by sexual impulse, "to satisfy lust," which unnecessarily limits the motive to habitual vice. " OPEN TO NEW LIFE " 367 riage. But. Casti oonnubii dealt with contraception... (shrink)

Modern thinking about the ground tends to take it as a purely material base for the unfolding of history and ideas emerging on its surface. In this article, I question above-ground visions of city building by drawing on both the history of ground engineering and ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Paris with geotechnicians. I address the difficulties that theorists have faced over past centuries in modelling soils, and the contemporary practice of building piles underneath buildings to anchor them. From this (...) unfolds an understanding of the ground as produced through an equilibrium between forces and materials in which buildings become participants, rather than a solid base upon which they stand. Looking at the activities of foundation builders, we find that the inertia of the urban soil no longer betokens an absence of activity or movement, but is rather a continuous achievement, a slow and dangerous process of balancing tensions. (shrink)

This paper studies the capture of organisms and materials in soil construction – a branch of ecological engineering dedicated to making soil in order to compensate for soil degradation. This approach takes all organisms to be ‘ecosystem engineers’, and often refers to earthworms as ‘collaborators’ in making soil. I examine the claim that such a convocation of worms amounts to a redistribution of agency and the underlying assumption that form-taking is the shaping of raw matter according to pre-existing forms. Drawing (...) on processual anthropology, I question the distinction between living and material components of soils, and between growing and making. I elaborate on soil scientists’ description of soil growth as pedogenesis in order to propose a view in which soil materials, along with organisms, participate in soil’s transformative and generative fluxes. I envisage the process as a concrescence, an experimentation that brings humans, worms, and soil materials together in new ways. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the relevance of somatic evolution by natural selection to our understanding of cancer development. I do so in two steps. In the first part of the paper, I ask to what extent cancer cells meet the formal requirements for evolution by natural selection, relying on Godfrey-Smith’s (2009) framework of Darwinian populations. I argue that although they meet the minimal requirements for natural selection, cancer cells are not paradigmatic Darwinian populations. In the second (...) part of the paper, I examine the most important examples of adaptation in cancer cells. I argue that they are not significant accumulations of evolutionary changes, and that as a consequence natural selection plays a lesser role in their explanation. Their explanation, I argue, is best sought in the previously existing wiring of the healthy cells. (shrink)

Certitudes et incertitudes du déterminisme.--La crise de l'esprit.--Le drame.--La tour de Babel.--Le crépuscule.--L'aube.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HISTORY AS ARGUMENT FOR REVISION IN MORAL THEOLOGY: A REVIEW DISCUSSION GERMAIN GRISEZ Mount Saint Mary's College; Emmitsburg, Maryland, JOHN MAHONEY, S.J., forme11ly a professor of moral theology at Heythrop College and now the Frederick Denison Maurice Pro£essor 0£ Moral and Social Theology at King's Col1ege, London, presented the Martin D'Arcy Memorial Lectures in Campion Hall, Oxford, in the spring of 1982. He now has expanded these lectures (...) and published them, with extensive notes, in a book which is both erudite and readable.1 To save space, I shall not summarize Mahoney's book here,2 nor shaH I deal with various interesting ideas in it which deserve discussion among professional theologians. Rather, I shall evaluate the book from a single, rather narrow point of view: its appropriateness for use as a historical introduction to Catholic moral theology. I. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON: SOME COMMENTS AND CLARIFICATIONS DR. BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, C.Ss.R., pays particular attention to some of my early work in his recent article, " The Structures of Practical Reason: Traditional Theories and Contemporary Questions." 1 He plainly tries to present my views accurately. Still, Johnstone has overlooked some important things I said about the questions he considers. Moreover, in some cases he either misunderstands the (...) positions I tried to explain and defend or, at least, puts matters in ways likely to cause others to misunderstand those positions. They still seem sound to me, although no doubt open to refinement and development. Therefore, since Johnstone is.seriously trying to use my work to advance understanding of important questions, I offer these comments and clarifications to help keep open the way to a more adequate theory of practical reason. I. The first question Johnstone considers is: What is the specific truth of practical reason? To explore this question, he compares the theory of practical reason which I articulated with a " traditional" theory, exemplified by the work of Labourdette. E·arly in this comparison, in pointing out differences, Johnstone offers a summary and criticism: If I understand Grisez correctly, he seeks to develop a theory of practical reason such that practical reason, in itself, can be understood -must be understood-without reference to the will FP,2 1 Tkomist, 50 (1986), pp. 417-46. Johnstone's article will be referred to henceforth as BVJ. 2 FP refers to: Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason : A Commentary on the Summa tkeologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," 9t69 270 GERMAIN GRISEZ p. 193). Further, he places such stress on the distinct way of knowing proper to practical reason, that he implies that the two (practical and theoretical reason) are quite disparate. These distinctions, I would suggest, are too sharply drawn. (BVJ, p. 4~5) I agree with Johnstone in rejecting these positions, for, as formulated, neither is what I tried to explain and defend. For practical reason precisely is reason directed to a work, which will not be done without an intervening act of an appetitive power corresponding to reason, and that power is the will. Hence, volition is included in the very concept of practical reason, and so it cannot be understood without reference to the will. But in the place Johnstone cites (FP, p. 193), I did not say that practical reason can be understood without reference to the wilL Rather, having argued that, because practical principles are self-evident truths, they do not presuppose a divine command, I said: "Nor is any operation of our own will presupposed by the first principles of practical reason." The argument for this is: The first operations of will are natural volitions of ends; these volitions presuppose knowledge directing to these ends; the directive knowledge is the principles of practical reason; therefore, the principles of practical reason do not presuppose any operation of our will.3 Moreover, I pointed out: "Of course we do make judgments concerning means in accordance with the orientation of our inNatural Law Forum, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201. Although I personally agreed with all of the propositions asserted in this article at the time I wrote it, and still agree with almost all of them, I did not and do not consider the theory proposed in it to be my theory, but that of St. Thomas (and, even more importantly, a very good theory) which I tried to understand, explain, and defend. Moreover, had the article not been a commentary, I would have put many things somewhat differently, and would have provided arguments for certain positions which can be taken for granted within the Thomistic framework. s In FP, p. 193, this argument is introduced by the sentence: "At any rate this is Aquinas's theory," and accompanied by references to his work, to signal the reader that assumptions are being made here which outside the Thomistic framework would require additional support..Johnstone overlooks the signal. THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON 271 tention toward the end " (FP, p. 193). One essential function of practical reason is to reach such judgments (concerning means), which... (shrink)

De part en part traversé par le mythe, le Commentaire sur la République du Néoplatonicien Proclus accorde forcément une attention soutenue au symbole. Cet article se propose de mettre en lumière deux types de symbolisme que l’on trouve dans ce Commentaire. Le premier, «non imitatif», reconfigure significativement l’héritage des Formes intelligibles platoniciennes; le second, tiré des Oracles chaldaïques, consiste en une «intériorisation» du symbole. Les deux symbolismes se rejoignent en ce qu’ils impliquent une sympathie profonde entre toutes choses, et présupposent (...) la communication préalable des symboles tant dans la genèse que dans l’interprétation du mythe inspiré. (shrink)

This article analyzes the influence of Chinese Neo-Confucianism on the development of German idealism. Information obtained by Leibniz from Jesuit missionaries included key concepts in Neo-Confucian philosophy that not only confirmed Leibniz’s belief in the universality of his organic image of the cosmos but also influenced Leibniz’s later writings. Such influence is also exhibited in Kant’s work, especially in his crucial noumenon-phenomenon distinction, as well as in Hegel’s phenomenology and philosophy of history. Recognition of these influences, unacknowledged by either Kant (...) or Hegel, enhances our assessment of the import of both Neo-Confucianism and German idealism in international religio-philosophical discourse. (shrink)

Le problème du partage des bénéfices liés aux ressources naturelles ne peut faire l’économie de la question territoriale. Cette question est de plus en plus abordée sous l’angle des droits territoriaux sans toutefois reposer sur une théorie générale de la territorialité qui permettrait d’éviter l’écueil de l’ethnocentricité. Nous proposons donc une définition fonctionnaliste de la territorialité permettant de distinguer des territorialités matérielles et idéelles, des territoires formels et fonctionnels, et des conceptions verticale et horizontale du territoire. Ces distinctions nous permettent (...) de formuler une question fondamentale que la philosophie politique a trop peu abordée : comment gérer la concurrence des légitimités territoriales dans un même espace ?The problem of how to share the benefits generated from the extraction of natural resources is directly linked to territorial issues. These issues have been increasingly addressed from a perspective of territorial rights without, however, developing a theory of territoriality that would avoid the risk of ethnocentrism. I thus propose a functionalist definition of territoriality that would allow for a distinction between two types of territoriality , two kinds of territories , and two different conceptions of territory . These distinctions lay the groundwork for formulating a fundamental question that has been neglected by political philosophy — how should concurrent territorial legitimacies be managed ? — and provide us with the conceptual tools to tackle it. (shrink)

Une modernité indigène: Ruptures et innovations dans les théories politiques japonaise du xviiie siècle, by Olivier Ansart, is a thoughtful, elegantly written book that offers valuable insights into Japanese political thought in an era that culminated in the Meiji Restoration. Despite the specific characteristics of the rigid centralized feudal structure of Tokugawa society, Ansart argues, political ideas generally associated with the advent of “modernity” in the West were generated indigenously in a context in which knowledge of the West was limited (...) primarily to science and technology.The main focus of the book is the thought of Kaiho Seiryō.1 Seiryō was inspired by two schools of thought that... (shrink)

In response to Germain argument that evolution by natural selection has a limited explanatory power in cancer, Lean and Plutynski have recently argued that many adaptations in cancer only make sense at the tumor level, and that cancer progression mirrors the major evolutionary transitions. While we agree that selection could potentially act at various levels of organization in cancers, we argue that tumor-level selection is unlikely to actually play a relevant role in our understanding of the somatic evolution of (...) human cancers. (shrink)

Le présent article se propose de mettre en lumière non seulement la critique platonicienne de la poésie telle qu’elle se déploie dans les livres II, III et X de la République, mais aussi - et surtout - la lecture qu’en fait le néoplatonicien Proclus dans son vaste Commentaire sur la République. Le principal enjeu de cette lecture est le lien entre le mythe et l’éducation. Nous verrons d’abord comment Platon s’emploie à lier ces deux éléments, puis comment Proclus cherche pour (...) sa part à relativiser ce lien, au point où mythe et éducation en viennent, sinon à s’exclure mutuellement, du moins à n’entretenir qu’un faible commerce. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to analyze the writing of three neo-scholastic writers of the twentieth century -- Marcel Chossat, Pedro Descoqs, and Francis Cunningham -- who happen to dispute the prevailing view of Thomists that St. Thomas Aquinas does indeed hold a doctrine of thereal distinction of essence and existence in created being. The approach utilized will be basically historical: we start with the year 1910, the year in which Marcel Chossat rekindled the ever-smoldering embers of the essence-existence (...) controversy with his claim that Aquinas never held such a doctrine. In order to justify another treatment of what has been called “the endlessly rehashed question”, we try to show that the arguments put forth by the three thinkers in question an are based on considerable and weighty linguistic grounds which others in the debate have tended to dismiss. We conclude by saying that any discussion of the real distinction controversy must take a “linguistic turn” if it is to have any hope of being fruitful. (shrink)

Previous research suggests that social anxiety symptoms are maintained and intensified by inflexible emotion regulation (ER). Therefore, we examined whether trait-level social anxiety moderates ER flexibility operationalised at both between-person (covariation between variability in emotional intensity and variability in strategy use across occasions) and within-person (associations between emotional intensity and strategy use on a given day) levels. In a sample of healthy college-aged adults (N = 185, Mage = 21.89), we examined overall and emotion-specific intensities (shame, guilt, anxiety, anger, sadness) (...) and regulatory strategies (i.e. experiential avoidance, expressive suppression, and rumination) in response to each day’s most emotionally intense event over 6 days. During the study period, we found a positive association between variability in emotional intensity and variability of experiential avoidance in individuals with lower, rather than higher, levels of trait social anxiety after controlling for key covariates (i.e. gender, personality traits, and stress exposure). However, we did not find evidence for the moderating role of trait social anxiety in ER flexibility assessed at within-person levels. Our findings highlight the need to delineate dynamic ER flexibility across everyday events. (shrink)