Since heaven is the most perfect state or position possible – namely of loving God perfectly – and sinning is failing to love God, it will not be possible to sin in heaven. However, if freedom is a mark of perfection, and loving God is only possible when one freely loves God, will we be loving God at all if we are not free not to love him? Three cumulative arguments for an affirmative answer are developed. The first is to (...) distinguish the ability to love or sin from the opportunity to do so. In heaven we are loving God in an infinite variety of ways, so we are freely exercising our ability to love, even when God has taken away any opportunities for sinning. However, one might reply that our freedom will only be the freedom to love God in various ways, not the freedom to love God or not. Hence the second argument is that in heaven are only people who have freely chosen to love God while on earth, where there was a real opportunity not to love God. Since the free choice to love God was made before entering heaven, loving God in heaven remains a free choice. Moreover, since in heaven God takes away the opportunity to sin, and stopping to love God would be a sin, you will remain steadfast in that free choice. However, one might reply that also having the opportunity to sin would add an extra possibility for willing something, so one would be 'more free' in heaven, and heaven would be more perfect, if one would also have the opportunity to sin. Hence the third argument is that freedom is a perfection shared by both God and humans, and the freedom of God is in an important respect a freedom to create. Hence, our human freedom is also greater if our creative power is greater. We have no creative power but by participating in God’s creative power, which is necessarily directed towards the good. So by willing what is good we extend and perfect creation and thereby extend and perfect our possibilities for willing, hence we become more free. On the contrary, by sinning we destroy creation and possibilities for willing and we become less free, so an opportunity to sin is not a possibility that increases our freedom. (shrink)

This paper proposes a theological grounding for the possibility of metaphysics. After a brief critique of the seeming contemporary revival of analytic philosophy as characterized by linguisticism, the two main sections give a Christological and ultimately Mariological foundation for the possibility of metaphysics. The Christological section starts with the role of the second person of the Trinity in creation, and subsequently points to the hypostatic union as ensuring that creation is therefore accessible to the human mind. It also implies that (...) reality is fundamentally of a personal nature, and that personal knowledge can be relatively unproblematically acquired by other persons. The Mariological section starts from Plato’s Diotima as a prefigurement of Mary, and subsequently portrays Mary as the perfect metaphysician, guaranteeing the possibility of metaphysics as an enterprise of natural reason. Doing justice to the critique of an at times overly naive pre-modern metaphysics can then be done by advocating a Christological and Mariological turn for the Copernican revolution, e.g. fully taking into account the historicity of being and thinking. In conclusion, Mary as the handmaid of the Lord is analogous to metaphysics as the handmaid of theology, in a relationship of a loving daughter, mother and bride. (shrink)

This paper questions the shifting meaning of the ethical categories of proximity and alterity in the light of the technological and social changes that virtual social worlds went through. It takes Roger Silverstone’s key theme of “proper distance” as a point of departure, and discusses the significance of this concept by linking it up with the more media-theoretical approaches on virtual communication as developed in McLuhan’s and Baudrillard’s body of thought. It is argued that today’s virtual realities ask for both (...) a philosophical and media-sociological reconsideration of the traditional ethical category of alterity. As such, it links up with Feenberg’s idea that “online groups are indeed a qualitatively new medium” (A. Feenberg and M. Bakardjieva, “Virtual Community: No ‘Killer Implication,’” New Media & Society 6(1) (2004): 37–43, 41), but at the same time challenges Feenberg’s reservations about a theory of media centrism. (shrink)

Avec trois entretiens de Jean-Luc Nancy Cosa volante : l'art n'est ni un objet, ni un ensemble de composantes formelles, encore moins schème et substance. L'art les arts plutôt, dans leur pluralité différentielle élève la question d'une forme en formation. Cette forma formans traverse de part en part la pensée des arts de Jean-Luc Nancy où importe surtout l'approche de ce qui, dans l'art, fait sens (sensibilité, intelligence, sensation, sensualité). A travers touches, intensités, vibrations, timbres, tonalités, colorations, grains, résonances, rythmes, (...) il s'agit de voir comment les arts donnent forme au monde. Cet ouvrage explore plusieurs motifs du travail de Nancy : sa réflexion sur l'iconologie "chrétienne" au sein de sa "déconstruction du christianisme", la question de ses "étranges corps étrangers", les modalités de ses ekphraseis, sa poétique cinétique, entre autres. Trois entretiens avec le philosophe constituent des moments privilégiés de cet échange autour de la question de l'art. (shrink)

"La poétique de Celan- a profondément incisé la réflexion de Derrida, lui devenant indispensable pour repenser les questions de la date, de la crypte et du secret. De Schibboleth à Béliers et à son dernier séminaire, La bête et le souverain, Derrida s'est aussi intéressé au poème celanien comme lieu d'une souveraine solitude, d'une souveraineté autre, peut-être, quand il parle de lui-même. Cet essai tente d'analyser la portée du deuil et de la dette contractée par le philosophe à l'endroit du (...) poète. De la rencontre entre Celan et Derrida, nulle archive ne saura témoigner. Le verbe "témoigner" évoque une sorte de mot de passe secret entre eux : "Niemand/ zeugt für den/ Zeugen" et "Die Welt ist fort, ich muss dicte tragen". Ces deux vers, Jacques Derrida incitait ses lecteurs à les apprendre par coeur pour deux raisons : d'abord, pour méditer sans fin le rapport à la langue, à l'idiome plutôt, de Celan, creusant, enibuissant, retournant sa langue dans la langue allemande ; ensuite, pour mesurer relever, dit Derrida la nécessaire et impossible épreuve de la traduction, cette question qui est non seulement l'un des enjeux les plus importants de la "déconstruction" mais aussi le foyer d'une éthique de la lecture."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This article studies the material production and consumption of the national community in 19th-century America. More particularly, it concentrates on the intersection between particular technologies of transportation, representation and dissemination in the spatial and imaginary formation of the American nation in the 1860s. Through an analysis of the contradictory mechanism of placement and displacement, identity and difference at the heart of a particular state-sanctioned field of national production the construction of America's first transcontinental railroad in 19th-century California the essay highlights (...) what tends to remain hidden in narrowly defined `cultural' (textual) approaches to nationhood: its involvement in racial, gendered and class-related divisions between private and public space, home and travel, labour and capital, technology and nature. (shrink)

This paper takes Anscombe, Mumford and Anjum as key interlocutors for an exploration of the causality involved in our understanding of free will. Anscombe tried to disentangle causality from necessary determination in order to make room for free will, and a first section points to the historical and theological background of this entanglement. However, what is also crucially at stake is the relation between time and causality whereby this paper advocates a shift from a diachronic to a synchronic conception. This (...) synchronic conception of the contingency of free will is then argued to be superior to Mumford and Anjum’s dispositional modality in providing the libertarian desiderata of alternative possibilities and ultimate authorship, and gives us a picture of a permanent causal tug-of-war in the present. The final section then points out that this puts persons and their contingent decisions partly in the role of being an explanans for, rather than an explanandum of, any current contingent state of affairs. (shrink)

In the quest for identity and healing, what belongs to the humanities and what to clinical psychology? Ginette Paris uses cogent and passionate argument as well as stories from patients to teach us to accept that the human psyche seeks to destroy relationships and lives as well as to sustain them. This is very hard to accept which is why, so often, the body has the painful and dispiriting job of showing us what our psyche refuses to see. In (...) jargon-free language, the author describes her own story of taking a turn downwards and inwards in the search for a metaphorical personal 'death'. If this kind of mortality is not attended to, then more literal bodily ailments and actual death itself can result. Paris engages with one of the main dilemmas of contemporary psychology and psychotherapy: how to integrate findings and insights from neuroscience and medicine into an approach to healing founded upon activation of the imagination. At present, she demonstrates, what is happening is damaging to both science and imagination. (shrink)

This paper provides a metaphysical framework which enables the possibility of the hypostatic union. More specifically, social ontology will be used to philosophically ground the distinction between nature or substance on the one hand, and person on the other hand, which is crucial to that debate. There are some historical precedents for a juridical approach in christological debates, but the main sections develop a systematic metaphysical account. Relying on a generic version of dispositional realism, and the distinction between the ability (...) space and the liberty space of a person, a person is the locus or nexus of contingent activations of alternative possibilities. This is distinct from the set or range of alternative possibilities open to a person. Persons can therefore function as artificial persons, paradigmatically exemplified in sovereign states. Extending that framework to the supernatural level enables the possibility of a divine person uniting a divine and a human nature. (shrink)

This paper explores and defends an institutional metaphysics for the Trinity as providing us with an inherently interpersonal reality, and provides general and specific methodological arguments in that direction in the first section. The actual argumentation is then first of all directed against Augustine’s rejection of the family as a suitable analogy for the Trinity. It is instead argued that the family does in fact offer an interesting and suitable analogy. Next, several more general and historic precursors to such an (...) institutional analogy are explored and fleshed out, relying on the legal and economic meaning of the term ‘substance’ as an estate, such as the shared inheritance between a father and a son. The main section further develops the outlines and main features of such an institutional metaphysics, relying on both analogies to result in three persons in one numerically identical substance. The final section returns to the methodological issue but now in an explicitly Marian key, culminating in the Holy Family as a key exemplar for the family analogy. (shrink)

John Duns Scotus distinguished the ‘convertible’ transcendentals, from ‘disjunctive’ transcendental pairs The latter are mutually exclusive pairs that together cover all of being. This paper investigates the distinctive modal metaphysical account based on the necessary-contingent pair of disjunctive transcendentals, developed by Scotus in approaching the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents. Although Scotus commented several times on this problem, only in his Reportatio did he explicitly add a succinct exposition distinguishing between two kinds of contingency and two kinds of (...) necessity. This double understanding of the necessary-contingent pair is first of all systematically and schematically presented in the paper. Subsequently, instead of continuing with the problem of divine foreknowledge as such, the implications of this Scotist framework for an adequate metaphysical understanding of the human will and its freedom will be drawn out. Finally, these schemes are compared to recent literature on the central role of contingency in Scotus’s thought, especially to the research of A. Vos on synchronic contingency and J. Söder on operative contingency. (shrink)

The aim of this research project is to shed light on the fundamental nature and mode of being of institutions. Starting from the work of John Searle, the goal is to develop an ontology of institutions that is both better metaphysically grounded than Searle's, and more developed towards applications in the social sciences and social and political philosophy. It relies on a metaphysics of powers and dispositions, as developed in the recent literature in analytic metaphysics, in order to offer an (...) account of institutions as dispositional structures that are ontologically dependent on specific human powers. Specific applications in the social sciences and political philosophy include the ontology of money, banking, marriage, property and the state. (shrink)

The Department of Speculative Facts connects two seemingly contradictory approaches: Speculation which attempts to think and act beyond existing knowledge and structures, and fact-checkers in search for a solid consensus on which our reality can be built. When stretching knowledge and speculating with fiction, what sense of responsibility is needed in times of democratized opinions and fake news? Learning from the other SF--Science Fiction--we think of speculation through facts, and facts through speculation, to situate truth culturally. The backbone of this (...) book is an e-mail exchange between two fact-checkers from the New York Times Magazine, which we handed over to artists to re-write, re-perform, and re-design. The publication includes the original letters, workshop scripts, as well as additional texts by philosophers, journalists, writers, and artists looking at new social contracts, with which we can anchor ourselves in the present. (shrink)

The question of the foreigner remains, as is well known, a pressing issue, now more than ever, even as “we allow the intolerable to happen : not just death, suffering, deportation, nameless woe, but also the imbecilic destruction of Europe and the Mediterranean’s chances in the new world to come,” as Jacques Derrida already noted in August 1995. This article retraces his seminars and public interventions as he calls for another concept of hospitality, thus wresting it away from fantasies of (...) blood and autochthony, even from the notion of a common language. Indeed, his emphasis on hostipitality gives rise to another experience of citizenship and of the political, of responsibility before the other. Lastly, the relationship between unconditional hospitality and non-knowledge also helps explain why a politics that tries to measure up to it necessarily implies poetic invention. More so than other aspects (geopolitics, urban planning, social work, international law) that are affected by the problem of hospitality, hospitality’s poetic dimension may well reveal itself to be the most crucial of all. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question what the fundamental nature and mode of being of institutional reality is. Besides the recent debate with Tony Lawson, Barry Smith is also one of the relatively few authors to have explicitly challenged John Searle's social ontology on this metaphysical question, with Smith's realism requirement for institutions conflicting with Searle's requirement of a one-world naturalism. This paper proposes that an account of institutions as powers or dispositions is not only congenial to Searle's general account, but (...) can also satisfy both the realism and the one world requirements. Searle's worry that such a dispositional account is unable to account for the deontic nature of institutions is countered by an appeal to higher-order powers as well as Searle's notion of the gap and desire-independent reasons for action. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship that Jacques Derrida and Sarah Kofman developed throughout their lifetimes, both as close friends and as philosophers who shared many common research interest...

This paper has been translated from the French by Cosmin Toma. It focuses on Jacques Derrida's very last lecture, given in Rio de Janeiro, on the 16thof August 2004, which Derrida drew from his ‘Le parjure et le pardon’ (‘Perjury and Forgiveness’) seminar held at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), in Paris, from 1997 to 1999. In reference to this final lecture in which Derrida deals with ‘forgiveness,’ ‘truth’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘testimony’ and ‘genre’, the paper also takes (...) up the question of justice as well as of what he calls the ‘worst violence’ via testimonial writings by Sarah Kofman and Antjie Krog so as to rethink forgiveness. (shrink)

"L’écriture philosophique de Sarah Kofman a eu pour enjeu « la vie comme texte ». De L’enfance de l’art (1970) à L’imposture de la beauté (1995, posthume), la philosophe a exploré cette question dans un geste de lecture audacieux par lequel elle confronte philosophes anciens (Empédocle, Héraclite, Platon), modernes (Descartes, Kant, Rousseau, Kierkegaard, Comte, Marx) et contemporains (Sartre, Blanchot, Derrida). Sarah Kofman convoquait aussi dans toutes ses analyses deux interlocuteurs privilégiés, Freud et Nietzsche. La littérature, l’idéologie, le féminin, le rire, (...) les rapports à l’art et à la psychanalyse, l’autobiogriffure furent les « voies de traverse » par lesquelles celle qui, enfant, avait survécu à la Shoah, reconduisit la philosophie « au cœur de la vie ». Plus de vingt-cinq ans après la parution de Rue Ordener, rue Labat et du Mépris des Juifs en 1994, n’est-il pas temps de prendre la mesure de cette œuvre philosophique?Cet ouvrage réunit, dans une perspective transdisciplinaire et internationale, philosophes, littéraires, historiens, historiens de l’art et psychanalystes autour du travail de la philosophe. Multipliant les approches et les interprétations, faisant droit aux questions historiographiques et archivistiques liées à son œuvre, ces lectures entendent donner toute son actualité critique à la voix unique de Sarah Kofman."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)