This paper presents a lengthy unpublished passage by Russell on the attempts by Pythagoras and subsequent mathematicians to deal with continuity and the logical paradoxes, recently discovered in the manuscript of the _History of Western Philosophy_. In the first part, I provide a short introduction to the new material. In the second, I analyze its philosophical content. In the third, I develop some considerations, mainly in the attempt to solve the following problems: can we determine when and for what purpose (...) Russell wrote these leaves? why were they never published? where do we find similar subjects expounded in the History? where does the significance of the discovery really lie? (shrink)

In this commentary, I focus on Jones' suggestion of a close connection between the domain of space and that of kinship. I expand on that suggestion by introducing the concept of frame of reference and show how it can possibly participate to the generation of kinship systems.

Thomas Reid presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764). The axioms of this geometry are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. The ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. In a recent article, James Van Cleve has argued that Reid can secure a non-Euclidean geometry of visibles only at the cost of (...) abandoning his direct realist theory of perception, and reintroducing sense-data. The question will be reexamined by considering two aspects of Reid’s theory of vision: the claim that we do not directly perceive distance by sight and Reid’s characterization of visible figure as a partial notion of an external object. (shrink)

Desde os anos 90, a corporeidade vem ocupando um papel cada vez mais central nas explicações das ciências cognitivas. Com isso, surgiram críticas contundentes, tanto do ponto de vista empírico quanto conceitual, à suposição de que a representação é a marca do mental. Apesar disso, cientistas cognitivos parecem relutar em desfazer- se do vocabulário representacionalista. Este artigo tenta lançar luz sobre a questão do suposto representacionalismo de um dos principais paradigmas das ciências cognitivas, o Processamento Preditivo, revisando argumentos pela interpretação (...) não- representacionalista de alguns de seus pontos, assim resgatando a ideia avançada pelas teorias da cognição corporificada segundo a qual a atividade exploratória de um organismo em seu ambiente não exige a geração de modelos representacionais acerca do ambiente. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the study of the four classical Italian pragmatists: Papini, Prezzolini, Vailati and Calderoni. They are seen more as representatives of a pragmatist movement than as singular systematic thinkers. The center of Italian pragmatism was the periodical, Leonardo, where these authors discussed and presented an original and provocative understanding of pragmatist philosophy. Thier understanding of pragmatist philosophy has often been underestimated by the subsequent literature. They showed a good comprehension of the novelty brought by American (...) pragmatism but, ignoring some of the most important epistemic aspects of Peirce’s and James’s theories, their philosophical proposals often missed consistency. However, even in their misunderstandings, they signaled a need and possibly a weakness of the whole pragmatist movement. Italian pragmatists underlined the importance of the concreteness of individuals in the realization of universal laws of mathematics and logic, physics and psychology. But, this attitude suffered from some serious tensions between metaphysical assumptions and methodological claims. (shrink)

Praxeologism from the napolitan institutionalist phenomenological school is discussed, in the work “Forze, leggi e poteri” by Gino Capozzi, in relation to the Italianius-philosophical tradition. The reflections of the napolitan school center on the individual and his activity, an activity that is..

The article tries to retrace the emergence of kant's "critique of pure reason". Already in the sixties, Kant faced the problem of metaphysics and came to the result that the conclusions of pure reason have only a subjective value. Hereby the material content of transcendental dialectic was reached. Only afterwards kant examined the underlying ontology and came to his transcendental idealism. On this new base kant should have had to revise his former critique of special metaphysics. However, He did this (...) only partially. (shrink)

For God's knowledge in all cultures have, therefore, humans are supposed to be easily understood. However, to find out the exact number of steps, so that we can from this world to make the conclusion that God exists, but why is still very difficult. This paper attempts to point out why the case. Reason to silt, to analyze all human beings are familiar with the cognitive activities of the universality of the difficulties faced, if, to analyze the experience we can (...) get the reality is very difficult, then to analyze our experience outside the awareness of God does it mean even more difficult. Therefore, in this paper should first study our knowledge of the world. The results are as follows: human cognition is for action of a different cognitive structure; each object has its own cognitive activity, and in accordance with certain specifications; and these norms are in our cognitive effort within. All these cognitive operations are located in three levels: 1) experiences, but the object of our knowledge there is "information." 2) As has been seen all the information we obtain one kind of intellectual . Then we have the knowledge to the intellectual to express a concept, and use this concept to think about this object. 3) by judge is correct), we have absolute certainty and understanding provided by the object, to our knowledge there are objects of this object. To our understanding of the world a reality, but reality does not explain why this would exist. For the "existence" of the issues raised by the end lead to the existence of an absolutely transcendent entity of the cognitive, physical such as an infinite intellectual ability to explain his own existence and the existence of the world . Der Artikel versucht zu zeigen, warum, obwohl die Gotteserkenntnis sich in allen Kulturen findet und deshalb fur den Menschen eher naheliegend sein muβ, es dennoch schwierig ist, die Schritte genau zu ermitteln, die uns erlauben, von der Welt her auf die Existenz Gottes zu schlieβen. Der Grund liegt in der allgemeinen Schwierigkeit, die allen, Menschen vertraute Erkenntnistätigkeit zu analysieren. Wenn es schon schwierig ist, unsere Erkenntnis der erfahrbaren Wirklichkeit zu analysieren, urn so mehr ist dies der Fall, wenn es um die Erkenntnis eines höchsten Wesens jenseits unserer Erfahrung geht. Im Artikel wird deshalb zuerst unsere Erkenntnis der Welt untersucht. Das Resultat ist folgendes: Die menschliche Erkenntnis besteht in einer Struktur verschiedener Erkenntnisakte, deren jeder ein eigenes Objekt hat und gemäβ Normen stattfindet, die unserem Erkenntnisstreben innewohnen. Diese Akte verteilen sich auf drei Ebenen. 1) In der Erfahrung erkennen wir ein Objekt als bloβ gegeben, als "Datum". 2) Mit der Einsicht erfassen wir in den Daten ein Intelligibles. Infolgedessen driicken wir das erkannte Intellibible in einem Begriff aus, mit dem wir das Objekt denken. 3) Mit dem Urteil bejahen wir absolut das gegebene und verstandene Objekt und damit erkennen wir es als ein Seiendes. Damit haben wir eine Wirklichkeit der Welt erkannt, aber nieht erklart, warum sie existiert. Die Frage nach der Existenz fuhrt schlieβlich zur Erkenntnis eines absolut transzendenten Wesens, das als ein unbegrenztes Intelligibles imstande ist, die eigene Existenz sowie die Existenz der Welt zu erklären. (shrink)