Zwei der bedeutendsten um im Folgenden besonders einflussreichen Hörer des Religionsphilosophen und Theologen Ernst Troeltsch aus der Heidelberger Zeit, die Dichterin Gertrud von le Fort und der Theologe Friedrich Gogarten, die sich 1911/12 begegnet waren, traten nach drei Jahren in einen zunehmend vertrauensvollen Briefwechsel und eine familiäre Beziehung zueinander. Ihre Korrespondenz reicht über die Kriegszeit, krisenhafte Kirchenzustände und die Verhältnisse im untergehenden Kaiserreich mit allen Facetten der Not und Orientierungslosigkeit hin zu den Anstrengungen theoretischer und religiöser Neugestaltung. Während le Fort (...) bis zu Troeltschs Tod und darüber hinaus in geistig enger Beziehung zu dem prägenden Lehrer blieb, versuchte Gogarten im Umgang mit Schweizer Freunden die neuen Wege der sog. ‚dialektischen‘ Theologie mitzubestimmen, auch mit Buber und Guardini in Beziehung zu kommen. Die Dichterin trat mit rasch von der katholischen Öffentlichkeit rezipierten ‚Hymnen an die Kirche‘ hervor und arbeitete gleichzeitig nachdrücklich an der Edition von Troeltschs ‚Glaubenslehre‘. Als sie 1926 konvertierte, schien der Briefverkehr zu erlöschen. In ihm, wie in den beigegebenen Texten bildet sich subtil und eindrücklich ein dramatisches und erregendes Zeitgeschehen im überschaubaren Feld reflexiver Subjektivität ab. (shrink)

1. Im Angesicht der Zeit.--2. Im Umkreis der Kunst.--3. Im Horizont des Absoluten.

In _Professionals’ Ethos and Education for Responsibility,_ Alfred Weinberger, Horst Biedermann, Jean-Luc Patry and Sieglinde Weyringer offer insights into different concepts and applications of professionals’ ethos focusing on teachers’ ethos.

It is difficult to translate the title “Wissen und Glauben” (Knowledge and Faith, see Romans 11:33 and I Corinthians 13:13) into English, because there ist a debate between Kant, Jacobi, Fichte and Hegel behind it. Through Fichtes “Wissenschaftslehre” knowledge has been accepted as the basic element of all scholarship, whereas faith belongs to religion.

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 58 Heft: 4 Seiten: 574-577.

Scepticism has been one of the standard problems of epistemology in modern times. It takes various forms – the most general one being the thesis that knowledge is impossible; but equally prominent are such versions as the notorious doubt about the existence of an external world, inaugurated by Descartes'Meditations, or doubts about the existence of objective values. Philosophers who undertake to refute scepticism – still a very popular exercise – try to show that knowledge is possible after all, or to (...) prove the existence of an external world, and so on. Sceptics, generally speaking, are seen as radical doubters – philosophers who call into question assumptions that are usually taken for granted by ordinary people as well as by other philosophers. Those doubts have to be refuted by showing that they are in some way unjustified. (shrink)

Many virtue epistemologists conceive of epistemic competence on the model of skill —such as archery, playing baseball, or chess. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: epistemic competences and skills are crucially and relevantly different kinds of capacities. This, I suggest, undermines the popular attempt to understand epistemic normativity as a mere special case of the sort of normativity familiar from skilful action. In fact, as I argue further, epistemic competences resemble virtues rather than skills—a claim that (...) is based on an important, but often overlooked, difference between virtue and skill. The upshot is that virtue epistemology should indeed be based on virtue, not on skill. (shrink)

Historically, as well as more recently, women's emancipation has been seen in two ways: sometimes as the `right to be equal' and sometimes as the `right to be different'. These views have often overlapped and interacted: in a variety of guises they have played an important role in both the development of ideas about women and feminism, and the works of political thinkers by no means primarily concerned with women's liberation. The chapters of this book deal primarily with the meaning (...) and use of these two concepts in the context of gender relations, but also draw attention to their place in the understanding and analysis of other human relationships. (shrink)

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...) dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

Por metodologías activas entendemos aquellas propuestas didácticas que orbitan en torno al papel del alumnado como generador de conocimiento y que construye su aprendizaje en base a la interacción con el grupo. Este planteamiento constituye la razón de ser de este trabajo donde Acción e Interacción se convierten en un grito enaltecido que llama al cambio desde la propia aula.

In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.

Seit dem byzantinischen Bilderstreit und dem Bildersturm der Reformation ist nicht mehr in solcher Intensität über Bilder nachgedacht worden wie in den letzten Jahrzehnten. Neben der Archäologie und der Kunstgeschichte haben sich zahlreiche weitere Fächer an Fragestellungen rund um das Bild geradezu festgebissen. Angesichts dessen geht einer der bedeutendsten Kunsthistoriker der Gegenwart der Frage nach, warum Begriff und Geltung sowie Macht und Ohnmacht von Bildern so hartnäckig verfolgte Themen unserer Tage geworden sind.