Machine awareness is a disputed research topic, in some circles considered a crucial step in realising Artificial General Intelligence. Understanding what that is, under which conditions such feature could arise and how it can be controlled is still a matter of speculation. A more concrete object of theoretical analysis is algorithmic iteration for computational intelligence, intended as the theoretical and practical ability of algorithms to design other algorithms for actions aimed at solving well-specified tasks. We know this ability is already (...) shown by current AIs, and understanding its limits is an essential step in qualifying claims about machine awareness and Super-AI. We propose a formal translation of algorithmic iteration in a fragment of modal logic, formulate principles of transparency and faithfulness across human and machine intelligence, and consider the relevance to theoretical research on -AI as well as the practical import of our results. (shrink)

According to Bem’s self-perception theory, people know their own minds in the same way that they know those of others: they infer their own minds by observing their own behavior and the circumstances in which this behavior takes place. Although Bem’s theory seems anti-introspectionistic, it claims that people infer their minds by observing their own behavior only when internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or un-interpretable. This has led some to argue that Bem does not rule out a priori introspective access (...) to the mind and thus introspection as a research method. This paper will discuss self-perception theory and its influence over recent research and will argue that introspection is not an autonomous research method. This is so because of its radical behavioristic outlook, according to which all methods and data of psychology must be public and not private. Then, the paper will discuss the epistemological implications of this behavioristic attitude on psychology. Finally, it will argue in favor of introspection as an autonomous research method and an independent source of data for psychology. (shrink)

In the present paper I shall investigate how far the employment of the vocative in Apollonius Rhodius' Argonautica and in Callimachus' Hymns i–iv complies with the Homeric usage as elucidated by Scott. For Apollonius, the relevant attestations have been listed, but hardly analysed, by Gildersleeve and Miller in A.J.P. xxiv , 197–9; the Callimachean material has never been examined, as far as I know. First of all, however, it will be useful to fill a gap in our knowledge and supplement (...) Scott's data by surveying the use of the vocative in the Homeric Hymns i–v. My survey has led me to the following results. (shrink)

This article considers the function and value of the mythos in Plato's Statesman. As first, I recall the context of the story and its function within the framework of diairetic inquiry about the definition of the real politician. Secondly, I point out that the formulation of the myth is based on a series of traditional stories to which a historical-reconstructive method is applied. I then highlight the ways of reasoning used by the characters in order to reconstruct a rational and (...) plausible account from the mythical tradition. Finally, I try to show that the story, even though it cannot reach the truth of the most stable objects of knowledge, displays a certain degree of plausibility, based on the internal coherence, on the respect of a series of principles admitted as true and, eventually, on its correspondence with the mythical tradition. (shrink)

Henri Bergson (1859–1940), the most prominent member of nineteenth-century French spiritualism, is the first philosopher who explicitly defined philosophy as a practice which consists in posing problems anew and in creating concepts. In this article, I will try to reconstruct the progressive importance acquired by the terms ‘problem’ and ‘concept’ in nineteenth-century French philosophy and how they combined in Bergson’s theories about creativity, invention and novelty. I will argue that Bergson’s conception of philosophy as a creative intellectual practice was the (...) result of a negotiation, inside a pre-existent spiritualist framework, between, on the one hand, neo-Kantianism and, on the other hand, evolutionism which strongly influenced empirical psychology and the emerging social sciences. Bergson’s solution, influenced by the evolution of mathematics and literary theory, was just one of the possible options, and the main alternative to a new form of transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

No paradox exists in the fact that, in the Special Relativity, for the mass of a material body, considered in motion at constant speed, whose measure is u, the formula: m = m0/√ can be written, while for a photon the same formula holds, when between its source and the observer a state of relative motion at constant speed, whose measure is u, exists and it is observed along the direction perpendicular to the direction of his speed.

¿Es hoy aún posible pensar la creatividad sin el método, la invención sin la regla? La historia nos enseña que el arte es siempre inevitablemente tanto fantasía como disciplina, tanto creatividad como técnica, tanto genialidad como orden, y allí donde prevalece sólo uno de los dos momentos la creación artística corre siempre el riesgo de degenerar o en un mero delirio creativo sin resultados concretos o en un exasperante formalismo sin inspiración. De las reflexiones barrocas de Baltasar Gracián y de (...) Giambattista Vico nos viene la invitación a concebir la creatividad como ingenio, por lo tanto, a entender la creatividad como la capacidad de captar relaciones inéditas entre las cosas, las ideas o las palabras, o de formular intuiciones imprevisibles e imprevistas para los esquemas de pensamiento habituales o tradicionales, aunque reelaborando y conectando originalmente materiales ya dados. Este diverso modelo de creatividad, un modelo especialmente barroco, trata así de evitar el doble peligro de la exasperación fantástica, por un lado, y de la mortificación creativa, por el otro. Descubrir y profundizar la relación entre creatividad e ingenio, así como fue elaborado por Gracián y por Vico, puede entonces contribuir a arrojar nueva luz sobre la noción misma de creatividad, enriqueciéndola siempre con nuevos y más amplios significados.Palabras clave: creatividad, ingenio, Gracián, Vico. Is it still possible to think about creativity without method, or invention without rule? We can learn from history that art is always, unavoidably, a matter of fantasy as well as of discipline, of creativity as well as of technique, of geniality as well as of order; and that wherever only one of those moments prevails, artistic creation runs the risk of degenerating into mere creative delirium, with no concrete results, or in exasperating formalism, deprived of any inspiration. Baroque reflections of Baltasar Gracian and Giambattista Vico invite us to understand creativity as inventiveness, namely the capacity to grasp unprecedented links between things, ideas or words, or to formulate intuitions that were unpredictable and unpredicted for the traditional schemes of convencional or traditional thought, even if re-elaborated, and connecting well known materials in an original way. It is the aim of this particularly baroque model of creativity to avoid the double danger of fantastic exasperation, on the one hand, and creative mortification, on the other. Discovering and considering the relationship between creativity and inventiveness, as Gracian and Vico devised them, could therefore throw some light on the very notion of creativity, enriching it with new and broader meanings.Keywords: creativity, inventiveness, Gracian, Vico. (shrink)

Even more than for other treatments, great importance must be given to informed consent in the case of electroconvulsive therapy. In a percentage of cases, the symbolic connotation of the treatment, even if mostly and intrinsically negative, may actually be a determining factor in the patient’s motives for giving consent. On an ethical and medicolegal level, the most critical point is that concerning consent to the treatment by a psychotic subject with a severely compromised ability to comprehend the nature and (...) objective of the proposed therapy, but who nonetheless expresses his consent, for reasons derived from delusional thoughts. In fact, this situation necessarily brings to light the contradiction between an explicit expression of consent, a necessary formality for the commencement of therapy, and the validity of this consent, which may be severely compromised due to the patient’s inability to comprehend reality and therefore to accept the proposal of treatment, which is intrinsic to this reality. With the use of an electric current, the symbolic experience associated with anaesthesia, and the connection to convulsions, ECT enters the collective consciousness. In relation to this, ECT is symbolic of these three factors and hooks on to the thoughts, fears, feelings and expectations of delusional patients. These are often exemplified in the violent intervention of the persecutor in the patient with schizophrenia, the expected punishment for the ’error’ committed for which the depressed patient blames himself and the social repression of the maniacal patient’s affirmation of his inflated self-esteem. (shrink)

In the literature there are two well-established but opposite readings of Arendt: as an agonistic theorist and as a deliberative one. In between these two positions a smaller number of scholars have argued that in Arendt these two dimensions can to a large extent be reconciled. This paper follows this third path but tries to bring it one step further. In particular, it defends the idea that those scholars who have proposed this third reading of Arendt have fallen short of (...) revealing the degree to which deliberation and agonism are, for her, interwoven. Through an original reading of Arendt’s views on judgment, persuasion, distinction and Eichmann’s banality, the paper clarifies why, for her, agonism and deliberation are not only compatible but actually mutually dependent. In other words, it clarifies why she believes that there can be no deliberation without agonism and no agonism without deliberation. (shrink)