Discussions of the evidential argument from evil generally pay little attention to how different models of divine providence constrain the theist's options for response. After describing four models of providence and general theistic strategies for engaging the evidential argument, I articulate and defend a definition of 'gratuitous evil' that renders the theological premise of the argument uncontroversial for theists. This forces theists to focus their fire on the evidential premise, enabling us to compare models of providence with respect to how (...) plausibly they can resist it. I then assess the four models, concluding that theists are better off vis-à-vis the evidential argument if they reject meticulous providence. (shrink)

A book on the problem of evil, focusing on alleged gratuitous suffering.

In his article, 'Gratuitous evil and divine providence', Alan Rhoda claims to have produced an uncontroversial theological premise for the evidential argument from evil. I argue that his premise is by no means uncontroversial among theists, and I doubt that any premise can be found that is both uncontroversial and useful for the argument from evil.

In his article “The Existence and Irrelevance of Gratuitous Evil,” Kirk R. MacGregor has argued that the Christian theist need not demur at the existence of gratuitous evil. In fact, we are told that Christian theists have ample philosophical, theological, and biblical evidence in favor of the existence of gratuitous evil. In this brief note I examine both the general structure of his argument as well as several of his more central arguments in favor of gratuitous evil and the compatibility (...) of such evil with Christian theism. (shrink)

The standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil makes the prevention of gratuitous evil a necessary condition on moral perfection. I argue that, on any analysis of gratuitous evil we choose, the standard position on moral perfection and gratuitous evil is false. It is metaphysically impossible to prevent every gratuitously evil state of affairs in every possible world. No matter what God does—no matter how many gratuitously evil states of affairs God prevents—it is necessarily true that God coexists with (...) gratuitous evil in some world or other. Since gratuitous evil cannot be eliminated from metaphysical space, the existence of gratuitous evil presents no objection to essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, essentially morally perfect, and necessarily existing beings. (shrink)

One major theme in Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical Caritas in Veritate is the “Principle of Gratuitousness.” The point of this essay is to begin a reflection on what it actually means and its possible relevance. By comparing the “Principle of Gratuitousness” and its normative assumptions about “the logic of gift” with anthropological studies focused on the same phenomenon, I hope to show, not only the relevance of the encyclical’s normative vision but also where and how it needs further (...) clarification. The findings of empirical anthropology provide qualified support for the encyclical’s focus on generating and replenishing “social capital” in order to sustain both markets and politics in an effort to “civilize the economy.” In order to put the “Principle of Gratuitousness” into more effective practice, the encyclical highlights the creative role of “civil society” and calls for the creation social enterprises whose goals are broader and deeper than maximizing profits. Assessing the realism of Benedict’s proposal will require further research and reflection on innovative entrepreneurial ventures designed to address social problems on a commercial basis, for example, Muhammad Yunus’ concept of a “social business” and its development in a series of joint business ventures involving the Grameen Bank and related organizations. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Le thème de l’argent est loin d’être anodin pour les usagers comme pour les professionnels du secteur médico-social. Certes, il n’y a pas de manipulation d’argent entre le service éducatif et soignant et ses bénéficiaires ; la Sécurité sociale assujettie à la décision de la MDPH (maison départementale pour la personne handicapée) prend en charge la quasi-totalité des frais afférents aux prestations proposées par le service. Pourtant, à travers des attitudes, des remarques, des évitements, on perçoit combien la « gratuité (...) symbolique de l’aide ou du soin » accompagne les familles tout au long de la prise en charge. S’ensuit un sentiment de culpabilité qui peut être travaillé au niveau d’une prise en charge thérapeutique mais aussi à travers la participation au projet institutionnel, comme les derniers textes de lois nous y invitent. (shrink)

God, who is an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent Creator and Providence, exists and There is evil are logically compatible claims. God exists, If God exists, then He has a morally sufficient reason for allowing any evil that He does allow , and There is evil is a consistent triad of propositions. Thus any pair from that triad is also consistent. Thus God exists and There is evil are logically compatible. But this does not settle the question as to whether the (...) truth of There is evil in the world has such consequences for theism as making it highly improbable that God exists or making it unreasonable to believe that God exists . That propositions P and Q are logically compatible does not entail that one does not provide powerful evidence against the other. In particular, it has seemed that some actual evils are gratuitous or in some manner just could not fit into a God-made world. Thus the simple argument is offered that: There are gratuitous evils; If there are gratuitous evils, then there is no God; so: There is no God. I will call this simple argument the ‘root argument’, for it is this argument and sophistications of it that will occupy us hereafter. (shrink)

Both critics and advocates of evidential arguments from evil often assume that theistic belief is not compatible with gratuitous evil. It is often assumed, in other words, that an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being would not permit an evil unless he had a morally sufficient reason to permit it. However, this cornerstone of evidential arguments from evil has come under increasing fire of late, in particular by Peter van Inwagen. The aim of this paper is to outline and then assess (...) van Inwagen’s attempt to reconcile theism with gratuitous evil. (shrink)

Notre époque de culture sans Dieu, celle du « discours sur la mort de Dieu », provoque la théologie à se concentrer sur la Croix du Christ pour y reconnaître le lieu même de la révélation de Dieu et fonder du même coup le vrai sens de la « mort de Dieu ». Si l’athéisme est né de l’impuissance de la pensée moderne à concevoir la nécessité de Dieu , la théologie de la Croix en apporte la justification ; car (...) la connaissance naturelle de Dieu ne peut se réclamer d’aucune nécessité rationnelle, quand la révélation de Dieu sur la Croix — scandale pour la raison — échappe à toute évidence externe et fait savoir que l’existence de Dieu n’a pas de fondement dans ce monde.La gratuité est donc caractéristique de cette révélation, la marque de son humilité. L’événement de la Croix est l’avènement historique de la liberté de l’homme face à Dieu, liberté de croire et de ne pas croire, d’exister avec Dieu ou sans Dieu. Cette liberté est le don même de la foi et le salut offet à tous ceux qui vivent selon la gratuité de l’amour. En révélant que Dieu est amour, la Croix proclame que la gratuité est son être en soi et pour soi en même temps que son être « pour nous », à la fois existence trinitaire et relation à la créature.Our era of a culture without God, that of “discourse on the death of God”, provokes theology to concentrate on the Cross of Christ in order to recognize the center of God’s revelation and to establish, at the same time, the true sense of the “death of God”. If atheism is born of the weakness of modern thought to conceive the necessity of God , the theology of the Cross brings justification to it. For the natural knowledge of God can not claim for itself any rational necessity, when the revelation of God on the Cross — a scandal to reason — escapes all external evidence and shows that the existence of God has no foundation in this world.Gratuitousness, then, is characteristic of this revelation, the mark of its humility. The event of the Cross is the historical coming of mankind’s freedom before God, freedom to believe or not to believe, to exist with God or without God. This freedom is the very gift of faith and salvation offered to all those who live according to the gratuitousness of love. In revealing that God is love, the Cross proclaims that gratuitousness is his being in itself and for itself at the same time as his being “for us”. It is both Trinitarian existence and relation to the creature. (shrink)

We argue that Michael Peterson's and William Hasker's attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible constitute miserable failures. We then sketch Peter van Inwagen's attempt to do the same and conclude that, to date, no one has shown his attempt a failure.

Sport occupies a significant role in modern society and has a wide following. In his Leftist Theories of Sport, Morgan examines what he considers to be a degradation of modern sport and the lack of proper critical theory to address this challenge. In the latter part of LTS, Morgan presents a reconstructed critical theory with ‘a liberal twist’ in terms of an analysis of what he sees as the internal ‘gratuitous’ logic of sport, and a call for critical deliberation in (...) sporting practice communities. I depart from Morgan’s ideas of the ‘gratuitous’ logic of sport which, I believe, has significant potential and operative force. I interpret the logic of sport as forms of self-imposed constraints at three levels: in the logic of the rules, in norms for fair play, and in a particular interpretation of sporting excellence as a form of human excellence. Using the practical case of performance-enhancing drugs, I demonstrate how this interpretation can exert operative power. I conclude by pointing to th... (shrink)

Philosophers have long wondered whether God exists; and yet, they have ignored the question of whether we should hope that He exists – call this stance aspirational theism. In this article, I argue that we have a weighty pro tanto reason to adopt this stance: theism offers a metaphysical guarantee against gratuitous suffering. On the other hand, few atheist alternatives offer such a guarantee – and even then, there are reasons to worry that they are inferior to the theistic alternative. (...) Given this difference, we have a strong pro tanto, but not all-things-considered, reason to adopt aspirational theism. (shrink)

The “gift exchange theory” articulated by Marcel Mauss, along with his core concept of a threefold obligation, is the dominant theoretical framework used to explain the majority of gift issues in marketing. This perspective assumes that some interest always lies behind gifts, such that a gift always implies a counterpart of receiving something in return. Despite the relevance of this approach in understanding the day-to-day consumer behavior, this paper presents empirical cases where the consumer is also able to give freely, (...) that is to say without implying a counterpart or even expecting it. To explain those empirical cases, we mobilize a key teaching of the Catholic Church: the “gratuitous gift” and then introduce the concept of the “need to give.” We show that gratuitousness is a relevant concept to understand most of gifts made by consumers, and we develop the normative aspect of gratuitous gift for ethical marketers. We also show that Catholic Social Teaching offers an appropriate anthropology to understand consumer behaviors motivated by this need for gratuitousness. To conclude, we propose further avenues of research. (shrink)

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. (...) The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response—one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. After introducing some key terms, I survey the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. In a follow-up paper, I discuss the attempts of William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively. (shrink)

Since the 1970’s there has been a major increase in adventure sports participation but it seems that engagement in such sports comes with a stigma: adventure sports participants are often regarded as reckless ‘daredevils’. We approach the questions about people’s perception of risk and recklessness in adventure sports by combining empirical research with philosophical analysis. First, we provide empirical evidence that suggests that laypeople tend to assess the danger of adventure sports as greater than more mundane sports and judge adventure (...) sports participants as more reckless than participants in non-adventure sports. We contextualise these findings within existing psychological risk perception paradigms and outline new philosophical explanations of the identified pattern in laypeople’s risk perception. (shrink)

In his recent paper ‘Gratuitous Evil and Divine Existence’. Keith Yandell declares the deductive argument from evil solved. He notes, however, that what persists is a probabilistic version of the argument from evil, one concluding from the evidence of evil that it is ‘highly improbable’ that God exists. Yandell attempts to refute this probabilistic argument from gratuitous evil; as shown below, however, he fails.

Many are unwilling to donate their vital organs in death. To affirm this choice is to prefer the integrity of one's corpse over possibly saving and improving the lives of others. This position enjoys no sound defence. Refusing to donate amounts to a gratuitous moral failure.Export citation.

Many authors assume that Broca's area subserves the functions that are lost in patients with Broca's aphasia. This commentary attempts to clarify the relationship between Broca's area and Broca's aphasia and suggests that statements about the neurology of patients' specific language functions might be better supported by their individual structural neuroimaging data.

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil, and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. (...) The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response – one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. In the prequel to this paper, I surveyed the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. Here, I survey the attempts due to William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively. (shrink)

The logic of gift and gratuitousness in business activity raised by the encyclical Caritas in Veritate stresses a deeper critical evaluation of the category of relation. The logic of gift in business includes two aspects. The first is considering the logic of gift as a new conceptual lens in order to view business relationship beyond contractual logic. In this view, it is crucial to see the circulation of goods as instrumental for the development of relationships. The second aspect is (...) to qualify the relationships established through the gift, and to think about the motivation in gift-giving, which has an ethical content. We give because we have received, and through gift-giving we develop relationships that have a high ‘bonding value’. Analysing the logic of gift in business management may permit us to gain an understanding of the ambiguity of gift-giving in organizations. Looking at the relationships between organizations and employees, and organizations and customers, we can discover why the logic of gift is often misunderstood or abused in its application, and how it should be applied to be more consistent with the message of Caritas in Veritate. (shrink)

Academic journals are clogged with gratuitous scholarship. This prevents the advancement of the corresponding disciplines in many ways, five of which are identified in this short work.

Kahane introduces two versions of antitheism: impersonal and personal. I deny that impersonal antitheism can be cogently defended, but I accept that the meaningful life argument in favour of personal antitheism is sound. I then argue that the personal form of antitheism reduces to a form of gratuitous evil. Subsequently, I show that instead of denying the existence of gratuitous evil by approving sceptical theism, one can accept the existence of gratuitous evil and show that this sort of evil provides (...) for a special sort of goodness. In line with this, I demonstrate that the existence of personal antitheists makes the world a more valuable place than a Godless world free of antitheists would be. The conclusion is that even for antitheists the existence of God is valuable, because they can thereby find a new meaning for their lives. (shrink)

David O’Connor has criticized my arguments for the conclusion that God’s existence is compatible with genuinely gratuitous natural evil. In this reply, I show that his own arguments fail to achieve their objective; in addition, I point out several respects in which he has misstated my position.

Keith Chrzan claims to have found a flaw in the central argument of my essay, “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil.” I point out that Chrzan misstates my views on several key points, and argue that his comments fail to create any difficulty for my argument.

In a recent contribution to this journal William Hasker rejects the idea, long a staple in philosophical debates over God and evil, that the existence of gratuitous evil is inconsistent with the existence of God. Among his arguments are three to show that God and gratuitous natural evil are not mutually inconsistent. I will show that none of those arguments succeeds. Then, very briefly, and as a byproduct of showing this, I will sketch out how a potentially vexing form of (...) the problem of God and natural evil is facilitated by Hasker’s distinction between types of gratuitous natural evil. (shrink)

We first survey the Catholic social justice tradition, the foundation on which Caritas in Veritate builds. Then we discuss Benedict’s addition of love to the philosophical virtues (as applied to economics), and how radical a change that makes to an ethical perspective on economics. We emphasise the reality of the interpersonal aspects of present-day economic exchanges, using insights from two disciplines that have recognized that reality, human resources and marketing. Personal encounter really is a major factor in economic exchanges in (...) professional services, such as law and medicine. Finally, we examine the prospects for an economics of gratuitousness at a level higher than the individual, that is, for businesses devoted to social ends more than profit. -/- . (shrink)

Entre l’achat de l’éditeur Zynga par Google environ 200 millions de dollars et l’acquisition pour 400 millions de dollars de Playfish par Electronic Arts, le phénomène des jeux sociaux utilisant les réseaux sociaux comme Facebook, quitte le secteur des studios indépendants pour rejoindre les acteurs majeurs de l’industrie numérique. Attirés par l’explosion des usages de ces plateformes participatives et leurs millions d’utilisateurs, ces éditeurs numériques s’intéressent aux marchés des joueurs occasionnels en ligne. Nous proposons dans cet article d’explorer deux phénomènes (...) contemporains émergeant de ces pratiques : la convivialité et la gratuité. Derrière la figure d’un joueur occasionnel apparaît un « joueur-hyperconsommateur » révélateur de nos temps hypermodernes.With Google’s buyout of publisher Zynga for around 200 million dollars and the 400 million dollar purchase of Playfish by Electronic Arts, social gaming on networks like Facebook has moved out of the independent studio sector and joined the digital industry’s big league. Booming use of these participatory platforms, along with their millions of users, are attracting the interest of digital publishers in the casual online gaming market. This article explores two contemporary phenomena that have emerged from online gaming practices: conviviality and free access. Underlying the casual gamer profile is a form of hyper-consumerism that epitomises our hypermodern times. (shrink)

It is common these days for theists to argue that we aren’t justified in believing atheism on the basis of evil. They claim that neither facts about particular horrors nor more holistic considerations pertaining to the magnitude, kinds and distribution of evil can ground atheism since we can't tell whether any evil is gratuitous.1 In this paper we explore a novel strategy for shedding light on these issues: we compare the atheist who claims that there is no morally sufficient reason (...) for certain evils with the physicist who claims that there is no causally sufficient reason for some events. (shrink)

Background: While numerous studies have shown the positive impact of free healthcare policies, the ethical issues raised by these policies in low-income countries have received little attention. In Burkina Faso, in July 2016, user fees were removed at healthcare facilities for children under 59 months of age and for “mothers”, i.e., for reproductive care. These eligibility criteria are, reportedly, sometimes difficult to comprehend or to enforce. The purpose of this study is twofold: 1) to understand the perceptions and practices of (...) health workers and beneficiaries regarding compliance with eligibility criteria for free care and 2) to explore the ethical tensions that have arisen and possible ways of resolving them. Methodology: In late 2018, a cross-sectional qualitative study was conducted in five rural communities in Boulsa, Burkina Faso. Semi-directed individual interviews were conducted with healthcare personnel (n=10) and mothers of young children (n=10) who were purposefully selected with the assistance of community health workers. Interviews were recorded and transcribed. A thematic content analysis was conducted on all materials. Themes were identified, discussed and reformulated between team members. Results: The study reveals the presence of practices to circumvent strict compliance with the eligibility criteria for free access. Common circumventing practices include hiding the exact age of children aged 60 months or older and using eligible persons for stockpiling drugs or for receiving a free consultation for the benefit of other household members. These practices result from ethical and economic tensions experienced by the beneficiaries. But they also raise ethical dilemmas for healthcare providers since they have to enforce compliance with the eligibility criteria while realizing the financially precarious position of the households. Informal mechanisms are introduced at the community level to reconcile the healthcare providers’ dissonance. Conclusion: The implementation of the user fee abolition policy in Burkina Faso is being carried out through local reinvention mechanisms to overcome ethical tensions related to the compliance with the eligibility criteria. (shrink)

RésuméDe nombreux philosophes ont soutenu que l'existence du mal gratuit est la plus sérieuse objection contre l'existence d'un Dieu absolument parfait. Je soutiens que l'idée d'un dilemme moral (ou, plus précisément, d'un dilemmetragique) peut (1) fournir une justification morale pour que Dieu permette l'existence du mal gratuit, ou (2) offrir une théodicée de la tragédie divine pour expliquer pourquoi les maux de ce monde ne sont pas nécessairement gratuits ou, s'ils le sont, pourquoi ils ne peuvent pas fournir une preuve (...) décisive permettant de rejeter l'existence d'un Dieu absolument parfait. (shrink)

A: Excuse me, but we're just trying to find the right bus that takes us to the boat for Upolu. We were told that it stops here in front of the village store, but we've been waiting since 9 o'clock this morning and we'd like to know if there is going to be a bus before this evening or if we'll have to wait until tomorrow for a bus. I: Yes.

History is composed of a web of innumerable interacting causal chains, many of which are composed of millions of discrete events. The complexity of history puts us in a position of having knowledge of only a minuscule portion of the consequences of any event, actual or proposed. Our almost complete lack of knowledge of the data necessary to know if an event is gratuitous makes it very likely that we would be mistaken about a very large number of events. The (...) complexity of history, therefore, poses a significant challenge to certain types of evidential arguments from evil that begin with our observations of evils that appear to be gratuitous. (shrink)