The purpose of this document is to consider possible industrial policy measures that could be contemplated by the South African Government to provide support for the export competitiveness of the country’s processed fruit products. It follows an earlier analysis by Don Ross, which argued for the conclusion that the industry meets key criteria for economically justifiable industrial policy assistance. That is, it offers a premium product that can be amplified in value by brand strengthening, can be positioned more advantageously than (...) at present in international value chains, and would benefit from an environment made more competitive by liberalization of international trade practices and reduction in management of input prices (chiefly tin plate and sugar). In short: the main factors now limiting the competitiveness of the industry’s exports derive neither from its product characteristics nor from independent market dynamics, but from exogenous constraints that are in principle correctible by policy. (shrink)

This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...) competence into cognitive and volitional capacities, which we treat as equally important to normative competence and responsibility. Normative competence and situational control can and should be understood as expressing a common concern that blame and punishment presuppose that the agent had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. This fair opportunity is the umbrella concept in our understanding of responsibility, one that explains it distinctive architecture. (shrink)

The situationist literature in psychology claims that conduct is not determined by character and reflects the operation of the agent's situation or environment. For instance, due to situational factors, compassionate behavior is much less common than we might have expected from people we believe to be compassionate. This article focuses on whether situationism should revise our beliefs about moral responsibility. It assesses the implications of situationism against the backdrop of a conception of responsibility that is grounded in norms about the (...) fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing that require that agents to be normatively competent and possess situational control. Despite the low incidence of compassionate behavior revealed in situationist studies, situationism threatens neither situational control nor normative competence. Nonetheless situationism may force revision of our views about responsibility in particular contexts, such as wartime wrongdoing. Whereas a good case can be made that the heat of battle can create situational pressures that significantly impair normative competence and thus sometimes provide a full or partial excuse, there is reason to be skeptical of attempts to generalize this excuse to other contexts of wartime wrongdoing. If so, moral responsibility can take situationism on board without capsizing the boat. (shrink)

Hate speech employs discriminatory epithets to insult and stigmatize others on the basis of their race, gender, sexual orientation, or other forms of group membership. The regulation of hate speech is deservedly controversial, in part because debates over hate speech seem to have teased apart libertarian and egalitarian strands within the liberal tradition. In the civil rights movements of the 1960s, libertarian concerns with freedom of movement and association and equal opportunity pointed in the same direction as egalitarian concerns with (...) eradicating racial discrimination and the social and economic inequalities that this discrimination maintained. But debates over hate speech regulation seem to force one to give priority to equality or to liberty. On the one hand, egalitarian concerns may seem to require restricting freedom of expression. Hate speech is an expression of discriminatory attitudes that have a long, ugly, and sometimes violent history. As such, hate speech is deeply offensive to its victims and socially divisive. Though one might well be reluctant to restrict speech, it might seem that the correct response to hate speech, as with other forms of discrimination, is regulation. On the other hand, libertarian concerns may seem to constrain the pursuit of equality. Though one may abhor hate speech and its effects, the cure might seem at least as bad as the disease. Freedoms of expression are among our most fundamental liberties. Offensive ideas are part of the price one must pay to protect these constitutional rights. (shrink)

Some have claimed that there are laws of appearance, i.e. in principle constraints on which types of sensory experiences are possible. Within a representationalist framework, these laws amount to restrictions on what a given experience can represent. I offer an in-depth defence of one such law and explain why prevalent externalist varieties of representationalism have trouble accommodating it. In light of this, I propose a variety of representationalism on which the spatial content of experience is determined by intrinsic features of (...) conscious subjects. I conclude by considering an externalist-friendly reworking of my proposal, but suggest that the success of such a reworking is dubious. (shrink)

Recent research indicates that compensation structure can be used by firms to discourage their employees from whistleblowing. We extend the ethics literature by examining how compensation structures and financial rewards work together to influence managers’ decisions to blow the whistle. Results from an experiment indicate that compensation with restricted stock, relative to stock payments that lack restrictions, can enhance the likelihood that managers will blow the whistle when large rewards are available. However, restricted stock can also threaten the effectiveness of (...) whistleblowing systems without the presence of large financial rewards for whistleblowing. Thus, the large potential rewards for whistleblowing enacted by the Dodd–Frank Act appear timely as firms are moving toward compensation agreements that include greater proportions of restricted stock. (shrink)

The biggest benefit of dual-process theory lies in its role as a benchmark theory that, regardless of its empirical plausibility, serves as a starting point for better and more domain-specific models. In this sense, dual-process theory is the Barbapapa of psychological theory – a blob-shaped creature that can be reshaped and adapted to fit in the context of any human behavior.

Suppose that, while you are dreamlessly asleep, the sizes of and distances between all objects in the world are uniformly multiplied. Would you be able to detect this global inflation? Intuitively, no. But would your experience of size remain accurate? Intuitively, yes. On these grounds, some have concluded that our experiences do not represent size and instead represent modes of presentation of size. We are, in this sense, ‘cut off’ from the sizes of things in the external world. Here, I (...) argue for a more modest conclusion: undetectable inflation reveals that our experiences represent only relative size. Call this view austere phenomenal relativism––or austere relativism, for short. I develop a framework to contrast austere relativism with its competitors, give an extended argument for the view, and then defuse a potential dilemma concerning the units in which our experiences represent size. (shrink)

When assessing the cost effectiveness of health care programmes, health economists typically presume that distant events should be given less weight than present events. This article examines the moral reasonableness of arguments advanced for positive discounting in cost-effectiveness analysis both from an intergenerational and an intrapersonal perspective and assesses if arguments are equally applicable to health and monetary outcomes. The article concludes that behavioral effects related to time preferences give little or no reason for why society at large should favour (...) the present over the future when making intergenerational choices regarding health. The strongest argument for discounting stems from the combined argument of diminishing marginal utility in the presence of growth. However, this hinges on the assumption of actual growth in the relevant good. Moreover, current modern democracy may be insufficiently sensitive to the concerns of future generations. The second part of the article categorises preference failures (which justify paternalistic responses) into two distinct groups, myopic and acratic. The existence of these types of preference failures makes elicited time preferences of little normative relevance when making decisions regarding the social discount rate, even in an intrapersonal context. As with intergenerational discounting, the combined arguments of growth and diminishing marginal utility offer the strongest arguments for discounting in the intrapersonal context. However, there is no prima facie reason to assume that this argument should apply equally to health and monetary values. To be sure, selecting an approach towards discounting health is a complex matter. However, the life-or-death implications of any approach require that the discussion not be downplayed to merely a technical matter for economists to settle. (shrink)

This article argues that empirical social scientists can be freed from having to account for “micro-to-macro transitions.” The article shows, in opposition to the (still) dominant perspective based on Coleman’s macro-micro-macro model, that no micro-macro transitions or mechanisms connect the individual level to the macro level in empirical social science. Rather, when considering that social macro entities and properties are micro manifest rather than macro manifest, it becomes clear that the micro-macro move in empirical social science is purely conceptual or (...) analytical. (shrink)

Die Publizistik hat erfolgreich ihre Auffassung durchgesetzt, dass „die Diskussion einer wie auch immer gearteten ‚Zeitschriftentheorie‘“ „wenig ergiebig“ sei, woraus sich auch der schmale, auf die Inhaltsanalyse beschränkte Werkzeugkasten der Zeitschriftenforschung erklärt (dazu historisch fundierte Ergänzungsvorschläge unter Abschnitt 9 und 10). Nach einer Einführung in die Zeitschrift Die Kreatur (Abschnitt 1) scheint es deshalb nötig, das theoretische Objekt – Voraussetzung jeglicher Forschungspraxis – ‚Zeitschriften‘ vorab in aller gebotenen Kürze (Abschnitt 2–4) historisch-systematisch zu skizzieren. Die Kreatur kann dann als eine der (...) Zeitschriften im Rahmen zeitgenössischer Format-Optionen (Abschnitt 5–8) in Netzwerken wie dem um Walter Benjamin situiert werden (Abschnitt 11–13). (shrink)

These are two related essays. The first, “Meaning,” defends the so-called reference theory against current criticisms. Exemplification and the intentional tie are two subsistents. Subsistence is a mode of existence; mere possibility is another. That requires two distinctions; one among four uses of 'possible'; one among three uses of 'same' in the phrase 'the same fact'; which in turn permits an adequate account of false belief. The second essay, “Inclusion, Exemplification, and Inherence in G. E. Moore,” displays the impact of (...) the fundamental ontological dialectic on the development of Moore's thought. His notion of nonnatural properties provides the early cue. His eventual failure to account for false belief is traced to his eventual nominalism. (shrink)

Many arguments against naïve realism are arguments against its corollary: disjunctivism. But there is a simpler argument—due to Mehta —that targets naïve realism directly. In broad strokes, the argument is the following. There are certain experiences that are, allegedly, in no way phenomenally similar. Nevertheless, naïve realism predicts that they are phenomenally similar. Hence, naïve realism is false. Mehta and Ganson successfully defend this argument from an objection raised by French and Gomes :451–460, 2016). However, all parties to this dispute (...) have missed the real problem with Mehta’s argument. As I see it, the real problem is twofold. First, despite his claims to the contrary, the experiences Mehta cites are phenomenally similar. Moreover, finding experiences that are in no way phenomenally similar turns out to be a difficult task. Second, there are motivated versions of naïve realism that are immune to Mehta’s argument. The upshot is that even if Mehta’s argument is sound, the most that it can show is that one version of naïve realism is false. (shrink)

The lucidity of Mr. Copilowish's argument makes the task of the reviewer very pleasant, even if he disagrees as completely as I do with the conclusion, which is the main thesis Mr. Copilowish attempts to prove. Only at one minor point does his exposition not quite suit my taste. He chose to preface his argument with a string of quotations supposedly supporting the position he wishes to defend. It seems to me that with the proper historical precautions these passages allow (...) for a very different interpretation. Yet I shall not pursue this matter, partly because I believe that Mr. Copilowish merely followed a literary stereotype, but mainly because the issue ought to be discussed on its merits rather than through the clouds of witness one could adduce on either side. (shrink)

In a paper read before the last Congress for the Unity of Science, Dr. Milton Singer distinguishes three main phases in the recent history of logic. The achievement he considers most characteristic of the first period is the development of the class calculus or so-called Boolean algebra. It begins with the work of Boole and DeMorgan and culminates in Schroeder's Algebra of Logic. In a minimum formulation, the results of this first stage can be summed up as, first, simplification and (...) generalization of the traditional syllogistic machinery by means of a rather efficient new symbolism, and, second, adoption of the axiomatic method. To restate the last point: Boolean algebra was, since Leibniz, the first explicit attempt to construct what we call a formal system or calculus. Not realized at that time, however, or at least not adequately expressed, was the importance of the more recent distinction between scientific calculi on the one hand and purely linguistic or logical calculi on the other. As a consequence of this lack of explicit insight, the class calculus appeared to be on a par with scientific calculi, say, for instance, axiomatized geometry, Euclidean or otherwise. Its analytical character, even if it was seen, could not be formulated. (shrink)

The following remarks have been stimulated by Mr. A. J. Ayer's recent essay “The Terminology of Sense Data.” In this paper Mr. Ayer restates several of the points he has made in his book The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. The context of his argument is that of the traditional distinction between two kinds of things, sense data, percepts, phenomenal or direct given-nesses on the one hand and so-called physical objects on the other. In this context, Mr. Ayer's argument is, to (...) my mind, very admirable; so I do not intend to comment on it. In some other contexts, some of his formulations may, I fear, give rise to misunderstandings; these, naturally, are the points on which I wish to comment. But before specifying them, I had better make sure that we are talking about the same thing by briefly restating several of Mr. Ayer's points. With some of these, if I understand them correctly, I find myself in agreement; the merit of some others I shall presently examine. (shrink)

A recent argument against content internalism bucks tradition: it abandons Twin-Earth-style thought experiments and instead claims that internalism is inconsistent with plausible principles relating belief contents and truth values. Call this the transparency argument. Here, it is shown that there is a structurally parallel argument against content internalism’s foil: content externalism. Preserving the transparency argument while fending off the parallel argument against externalism requires that content-determination and truth-value-determination are implausibly linked together and that eternalism about belief contents is true. Given (...) these requirements, there may be reason to prefer simple, thought-experiment-based arguments against internalism – the sort of arguments that the transparency argument is meant to supersede. (shrink)