The creation of transgenic animals by means of modern techniques of genetic manipulation is evaluated in the light of different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value. The zoocentric interpretation, emphasizing the suffering of individual, sentient animals, is described as an extension of the anthropocentric interpretation. In a biocentric or ecocentric approach the concept of intrinsic value first of all denotes independence of humans and a non-instrumental relation to animals. In the zoocentric approach of Bernard Rollin, genetic engineering is seen (...) as a morally neutral tool, as long as the animal does not suffer as a result of it. Robert Colwell who defends an ecocentric ethic, makes a sharp distinction between wild animals and domesticated animals. Genetic manipulation of wild species is a serious moral issue, in contrast to genetic manipulation of domesticated species which is no problem at all for Colwell. Both authors do not take the species-specific nature (or telos) of domesticated animals seriously. When domestication is seen as a process between the two poles of the wild animal and the human construct (which can be patented), the technique of genetic manipulation can only be seen as a further encroachment upon the intrinsic value of animals. At the level of molecular biology, the concept of an animal's telos loses its meaning. (shrink)

Description: Ancient Indian logic by itself is a very vast subject. The ancient Sanskrit term nyaya which was first used in a different or in a much more general sense, was later specifically applied to the Nyaya school. The physics and physiology and psychology of the Nyaya doctrine are not specifically its own, being from the first indistinguishable from those of its sister Sastra, the Vaisesika. What characterizes it specifically is the development of the nyaya or five-membered method of demonstration (...) and its insistence on the four sources of knowledge, corresponding to the first four members of its demonstrative formula, or 'Syllogism.' The importance of Nyaya is in its doctrine of the pramanas, or sources of proof, and in its formulation of the nyaya, or method of demonstration. Indian Logic in its Early Schools by H.N. Randle is an interpretation of Indian logical theory in its historical development based on the study of original texts wherever reference to Nyaya as a method of logic has been made, and thus, covers a very wide field of Indian philosophy. An indispensable work for students of Indian philosophy, it is especially important for those who are interested in Nyayadarsana in its relation to the early logic of other schools. (shrink)

The dominant approach to environmental policy endorsed by conservative and libertarian policy thinkers, so-called “free market environmentalism”, is grounded in the recognition and protection of property rights in environmental resources. Despite this normative commitment to property rights, most self-described FME advocates adopt a utilitarian, welfare-maximization approach to climate change policy, arguing that the costs of mitigation measures could outweigh the costs of climate change itself. Yet even if anthropogenic climate change is decidedly less than catastrophic, human-induced climate change is likely (...) to contribute to environmental changes that violate traditional conceptions of property rights. Viewed globally, the actions of some countries—primarily industrialized nations—are likely to increase environmental harms suffered by other countries—less developed nations that have not made any significant contribution to climate change. It may well be that aggregate human welfare would be maximized in a warmer, wealthier world, or that the gains from climate change will offset environmental losses. Yet such claims, even if demonstrated, would not address the normative concern that the consequences of anthropogenic global warming would infringe upon the rights of people in less-developed nations. As a consequence, this paper calls for a rethinking of FME approaches to climate change policy. (shrink)

We distinguish three different readings of the intuitionistic notions of validity, soundness, and completeness with respect to the quantification occurring in the notion of validity, and we establish certain relations between the different readings. For each of the meta-logicalnotions considered we suggest that the "most natural" reading (which is not the same for all cases) is precisely the one which is required by the recent intuitionistic completeness theorems for IPC.

This essay proposes a re-evaluation of Dewey's work with emphasis upon the ability of his philosophy to effect a realistic reformulation and development of America's tradition of humanistic liberalism. Dewey combines the tough-minded realism (or naturalism), congenial to the scientific orientation of American philosophy, with a firm conviction of the need of values and revaluation in community life. I draw on recent work of Hilary Putnam on Dewey and argue for the viability of Dewey's conception of value inquiry. The value (...) of Dewey's work to American liberalism extends beyond the version of liberalism, from the 1930's and the 1940's with which is name is most closely associated. (shrink)

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

Love's bitter fruits: Martha C. Nussbaum The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics.Max Horkheimer, Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early Writings.

In this section we shall publish brief communications commenting on published papers or bringing up special points of interest which can be discussed by correspondence.

Deacon speculates on the origin of interpretation of signs using autocatalytic origin of life models and Peircean terminology. I explain why interpretation evolved only later as a triadic intervention between symbols and actions. In all organisms the passive one-dimensional genetic informational symbol sequences are converted to active functional proteins or nucleic acids by three-dimensional folding. This symbol grounding is a direct symbol-to-action conversion. It is universal throughout all evolution. Folding is entirely a lawful physical process, leaving neither freedom nor necessity (...) for interpretation. Similarly, the initial converse action-to-symbol conversion of sensory inputs also leaves no freedom for interpretation until after the action-to-symbol conversion. (shrink)

The doctrine of the Trinity developed in response to a range of theological interests, among them the project of reconciling claims about the divinity of Christ with monotheism and massaging Christian doctrine into the ambient (largely Platonic) philosophical framework of the period. More recently the Trinity doctrine has been deployed to promote normative claims concerning human nature, human relationships and social justice. During the past two decades analytic philosophers of religion have increasingly engaged with the doctrine. There are, however, a (...) number of foundational questions that have not been addressed in the philosophical literature. The Trinity: A Philosophical Investigation considers the competing accounts of the Trinity doctrine, whether orthodox or heterodox, and aims to respond to objections and explicate their motivations and entailments. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to present a systematic account of F. H. Bradley's philosophy in so far as it is relevant to an understanding of his conception of the nature and criterion of truth. I argue that, for Bradley, the nature of truth is the identity of thought with reality given in immediate experience. There is no absolute separation between thought and its object. Bradley therefore rejects both the correspondence theory and epistemological realism. Thought is not just a (...) mirror which reflects an independently existing reality. ;Concerning the criterion of truth, I argue that his criterion for our ordinary and scientific beliefs is practice, and the criterion for philosophical positions is a kind of coherence based on the doctrine of relative truth. For Bradley, some positions are truer than others, and the best philosophy is a comprehensive system which contains the truth of all different positions. ;Bradley does not accept the coherence theory of justification as it is understood today, since it is based on the standard account of negation and the doctrine of absolute truth. Bradley has a different approach to negation and inconsistency, according to which there are no absolutely inconsistent beliefs. Further, he insists that truth is not absolute but "relative," a matter of degree. All philosophical positions contain some truth, and none is completely false. The truth in philosophy is a position which accounts for the whole of reality and includes all apparently inconsistent positions within it. ;I explain Bradley's place in the history of philosophy and show his connections with the British empiricist tradition. I believe one of Bradley's central concerns is to explain the nature and criterion of truth in philosophy within the constraints of empiricism. I also contrast Bradley's positions on important issues with those of philosophers in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, such as Russell, Moore, Ayer, Tarski, Quine, Churchland, Lehrer and Campbell. I argue that most recent commentators on Bradley overlook the importance of understanding his philosophy as a system constructed according to the doctrine of relative truth. (shrink)

Lately, there has been a lot of talk about the Ghettos, about wayward youths and Instagram rappers that glorify violence. In this piece, a Warsaw-based philosopher contributes to this discussion by examining the music of the ghetto and the culture of riots. Not in opposition to how bourgeois society usually frames such acts of discontent but rather as a reasonable democratic right that minorities are entitled to.

Most of us can easily identify human beings suffering from poverty, but find it slightly more difficult to understand poverty properly. In this essay I want to deepen our understanding of poverty by interpreting the conventional definitions of poverty in a new light. I start with a defence of a claim that poverty is a concept uniquely applicable to humans. I then present a critical discussion of the distinction between absolute and relative poverty. I argue that a revision of this (...) distinction can provide us general standards applicable to humans everywhere. (shrink)