Christopher Caudwell’s The Crisis in Physics is a stylish and readable analysis of the lines of connection between scientific theories and economic realities. Caudwell provides a trenchant critique of mechanism and positivism. In the words of J.B.S. Haldane, The Crisis in Physics offers a “quarry of ideas” for future philosophers: a wealth of insights and arguments that demands continuing critical reflection.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This paper examines the effects of a decrease in auditor litigation risk in a setting that isolates a change in auditor litigation risk from changes in auditor reputation. _StoneRidge Investment Partners v. Scientific Atlanta_ is a 2008 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that restricted secondary actor liability in class action suits, resulting in a decrease in class actions that listed auditors as defendants. We document that the _StoneRidge_ decision is associated with a negative CAR for clients of Big 4 auditors and (...) industry specialist auditors, in particular those associated with high-litigation risk, low cash, and past incidences of modified going concern opinions. These findings are consistent with investor perception of lower potential payoffs from secondary defendants in class action suits, in particular auditors, following the _StoneRidge_ decision. We also document that auditors are more (less) likely to accept (reject) risky clients and charge lower audit fees to risky clients after _StoneRidge_, consistent with a decrease in auditor litigation risk that increases auditor risk tolerance. Finally, we provide evidence that audit firms issue fewer going concern opinions following _StoneRidge_, consistent with a decrease in litigation risk leading to lower audit quality_._ Our results are relevant to policy makers as they consider the disciplinary role of litigation on audit markets. (shrink)