Statistical learning (SL) involving sensitivity to distributional regularities in the environment has been suggested to be an important factor in many aspects of cognition, including language. However, the degree to which statistically-learned information is retained over time is not well understood. To establish whether or not learners are able to preserve such regularities over time, we examined performance on an artificial second language learning task both immediately after training and also at a follow-up session 2 weeks later. Participants were exposed (...) to an artificial language (Brocanto2), half of them receiving simplified training items in which only 20% of sequences contained complex structures, whereas the other half were exposed to a training set in which 80% of the items were composed of complex sequences. Overall, participants showed signs of learning at the first session and retention at the second, but the degree of learning was affected by the nature of the training they received. Participants exposed to the simplified input outperformed those in the more complex training condition. A GLMM was used to model the relationship between stimulus properties and participants’ endorsement strategies across both sessions. The results indicate that participants in the complex training condition relied more on an item’s chunk strength than those in the simple training condition. Taken together, this set of findings shows that statistically learned regularities are retained over the course of 2 weeks. The results also demonstrate that training on input featuring simple items leads to improved learning and retention of grammatical regularities. (shrink)

A critical analysis of Alfred Schuetz' conception of rationality based upon Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.

An approach to phenomenology, by D. Cairns.--Husserl's critique of psychologism: its historic roots and contemporary relevance, by J. Wild.--The ideal of a presuppositionless philosophy, by M. Farber.--On the intentionality of consciousness, by A. Gurwitsch.--The "reality-phenomenon" and reality, by H. Spiegelberg.--The phenomenological concept of "horizon", by H. Kuhn.--Phenomenology and logical empiricism, by F. Kaufmann.--Phenomenology and the history of science, by J. Klein.--Phenomenology and the social sciences, by A. Schuetz.--Art and phenomenology, by F. Kaufmann.--The relation of science to philosophy in the light (...) of Husserl's thought, by L. O. Kattsoff.--Husserl and the social structure of immediacy, by C. Hartshorne.--A materialist approach to Husserl's philosophy, by V. J. McGill.--Outline-sketch of a system of metaphysics, by W. E. Hocking.--Men and the law, by G. Husserl.--The ghost of modality, by H. Weyl.--Supplement: Grundlegende untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen ursprung der räumlichkeit der natur, by E. Husserl. (shrink)

We note in Section I that an acceptable formulation of Presentism must preserve its consistency with Transient Time and inconsistency with Static Time. After arguing in Section II that certain formulations of Presentism are unacceptable, we offer in Section III a formulation of Presentism that we defend against the charge of triviality.

This paper defends a 'punctivist' conception of consciousness from recent attacks by Ian Phillips and Matthew Soteriou. As we intend it, 'punctivism' is the view that a subject's experience over some interval is determined by their experiential states at each instant during it. Phillips and Soteriou both offer ingenious arguments purporting to show that the punctivist is unable to make sense of motion perception; and that only by adopting an 'holistic' conception -- whereby a subject's instantaneous experiences are determined by (...) their experience over the interval -- can we make sense of the puzzles such phenomena pose. We contend that both arguments invoke dubious claims, their proffered solutions come with highly controversial commitments, and, if we take punctivism seriously, it is difficult to see why the so-called puzzles should be puzzling in the first place. A punctivist model of motion perception is proposed in response, and objections anticipated. (shrink)

Plutarch's Timoleon has received little attention from scholars who in recent years have studied the sources of his Lives and sought to determine the methods which he followed in their composition. The reasons for this neglect are obvious: the Timoleon is a simple Life, contains few citations, and is universally and justifiably believed to be founded, together with the Timoleon of Cornelius Nepos, upon the tradition established by Timaeus. Scholars of the nineteenth century agreed in further concluding that both authors (...) derived their material directly and almost exclusively from Timaeus. This conclusion does not appear to have been challenged in spite of the well-known contention of Eduard Meyer, which has won considerable approval, that neither biographer was accustomed to use primary historical authorities, each relying mainly upon biographies of the Hellenistic period which have not survived. The validity of Meyer's theory as a general principle of source-criticism will not be expressly discussed in this paper. My purpose is rather to examine the Timoleon only, especially in relation to the Timoleon of Nepos, and to suggest a method of composition here adopted by Plutarch, who, I believe, based his Life upon a secondary biography and supplemented this from a primary historical authority. (shrink)

Articles; chiefly on Islamic ethics and conveying non Muslims for Islam.

The author considers two arguments concerning the nature of space which occur in Berkeley and which he thinks are not sufficiently discussed. The first one concerns the phenomenology of space, the second the physics of space. The first one is the “mite” argument, while the second draws from Newton’s two thought experiments concerning absolute space: the “bucket” experiment and the “balls” experiment. The author’s aim is to support the idealist approach to space.

I summarize Jaegwon Kim's (2001/5) paper on the detrimental affect 'mental causation' has on physicalism.

Branner, H.C. Humanismens krise.--Hansen, Martin A. Eneren og massen.

There has always, apparently, been a strangely persistent belief among scholars in the existence of Knights of Senatorial rank, and though the definition of these has varied from time to time, their existence seems to be universally accepted.The first form of this idea is to be found in the view that the phrase ‘equitesillustres’ used by Tacitus refers to Knights possessing Senatorial rank. In a recent article the writer has dealt with this question, and tried to show how Mommsen definitely (...) disposed of this theory. But in spite of his masterly refutation of it, it has found acceptance among more recent scholars, such as Furneaux, Pelham, Cagnat, and others. (shrink)

We review the organization and contents of the 20th Gatherings in Biosemiotics. As the organizers, we share our insights from organizing a community research project in the year where the Covid-19 pandemic halted international travel. We try to describe the challenges of putting together the yearly conference on Biosemiotics and the main content that was presented by the research community.

In the for 1952 , pp. 33 ff., Nikolaos M. Kontoleon published a most interesting inscription from the shrine of Archilochos on Paros. It was inscribed, as preserved, on two orthostats, which probably formed part of the structure of the hearth or bothros where offerings to the hero were made. There is much of interest to scholars in this new discovery, which is very fully and carefully interpreted by Kontoleon, and has been further discussed by Werner Peck . In this (...) article the present writer wishes to confine himself to some comments on the new evidence about responses of the Delphic oracle supplied by the inscription. This material is all found on the first of the two orthostats, and falls into two categories: responses connected with the setting up of the shrine, and responses connected with the life of Archilochus. (shrink)

Peirce claims in his Lectures on Pragmatism [CP 5.196] that “If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction;” and further “no effect of pragmatism which is consequent upon its effect on abduction can go to show that pragmatism is anything more than a doctrine concerning the logic of abduction.” Plausibly, there is, at best, a quasi-logic of abduction, which properly issues in our best means (...) for the methodological evaluation and ordering of (yet untested) hypotheses or theories. There is always a range of explanatory innovations that may be proposed, from more conservative to less conservative; and it is important, in light of what Peirce has to say on the relation of abduction to pragmatism, that in ruling out “wild guessing,” attention be initially directed to more conservative proposals. Still conservatism, which we might understand in terms of Peircean continuity, is sometimes justly sacrificed for greater comprehension or overall simplicity of approach. This paper explores the relationships among Peircean abduction and pragmatism, the “theoretical virtues” approach to the evaluation of hypotheses, and contextual constraint on the scientific imagination. (shrink)