This paper discusses thepractical impact of a non-materialistic cultureon sustainable farm management.Two elements are discussed: first, how deeplyrooted religion is in this culture; second,the feasibility of using both human knowledgeand experience, so-called tradition and divineguidance in management. Finally, theimplications of the fusion of these twoelements are drawn. The outcome is thecapability of man to integrate ethical valuesinto decisions and actions. This integration,when applied by skilled farmers, leads to amanagement of natural resources in analtruistic fashion and not merely to economicends. Moreover, (...) it makes agriculture meaningfuland sustainable. (shrink)

Between the 1870s and the 1920s, the dye industry was at the center of claims about the productivity of organic chemistry. Dyestuffs were widely represented as the most complex molecules to find commercial application, and positioned at the center of nationalist projects to establish chemical industry, especially in Britain and the United States. By the later twentieth century, the complex of scientific hopes which surrounded dyestuffs had largely disappeared. In Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s terms, they had changed from “epistemic things” to, (...) at best, “technical objects,” and lost their future-bearing status as the lynchpin of organic chemistry. Although developments in dyeing continue, dyestuffs have vacated the scientifically and culturally dynamic position that they once occupied; any restoration of this status would require a radical change in economic and material conditions. This paper considers the senses in which this change of status should be considered as the death of dyestuffs as a scientific object. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Drawing upon a distinction between epistemically and metaphysically motivated notions of a concept, I consider the insurmountable problems of theories that appeal to our epistemic capacities to address the problem of the nature of concepts satisfactorily. Prominent theories of concepts hold that primitive concepts must have internal structure if they are to account for the explanatory functions that cognitive scientists have attributed to such constructs as prototypes, exemplars, and theories. Vindicating the role of non-experimental philosophy in the critical examination (...) of empirical theories, I argue that the explanatory effectiveness of those constructs is orthogonal to an argument concerning the structure of primitive concepts. Conceptual atomism provides an alternative approach to individuating primitive concepts the precise formulation of which has yet to be worked out. Despite its unpopularity, the atomist alternative is still in a better position to face the question of what concepts are than its competitors. RESUMEN Haciendo una distinción entre nociones de concepto epistémica y metafísicamente motivadas, considero las dificultades insuperables que enfrentan las teorías que apelan a nuestras capacidades epistémicas para abordar el problema de la naturaleza de los conceptos. Las teorías de conceptos más importantes sostienen que los conceptos primitivos deben poseer una estructura interna para cumplir aquellas funciones explicativas que científicas y científicos cognitivos les han atribuido a constructos tales como prototipos, ejemplares y teorías. Reivindicando el aporte de la filosofía no experimental en la evaluación de teorías empíricas, planteo que un argumento a favor de la estructura de los conceptos primitivos es independiente del poder explicativo de dichos constructos. El atomismo conceptual proporciona un enfoque alternativo para individualizar conceptos primitivos cuya formulación precisa aún no se ha elaborado. Pese a su impopularidad, la alternativa atomista está en una mejor posición que sus rivales para enfrentar la pregunta acerca de qué tipo de cosas son los conceptos. (shrink)

Antallet sultne i verden har økt, selv om det kan diskuteres om det i dag er en høyere eller lavere andel som lider under sult enn for seks år siden – før matprisøkningen. Alle er uansett enige om at det samlet sett produseres nok mat i verden til at alle kan få dekket sine ernæringsbehov. Artikkelen viser at to hovedretninger i debatten om matproduksjon står mot hverandre. Den dominerende retningen fokuserer primært på matsikkerhet, forstått som økt matproduksjon og økt handel (...) med mat. Den andre retningen argumenterer for at interessene og rettighetene for de mest sårbare må ha forrang i politiske prioriteringer, og at de sårbare sikres best med en strategi basert på menneskerettigheter. Artikkelen drøfter landfordeling, økt bruk av genteknologi i landbruket og nedbygging av handelshindre for landbruksprodukter. Industrialisering av landbruket og liberalisering av handelen med landbruksvarer kan gi gode resultater på makronivå – på kort sikt. Dersom målet er å fremme situasjonen for de mest sårbare og samtidig møte klimautfordringene er løsningen en nedenfra-tilnærming, som til nå er blitt ignorert av de fleste stater.Nøkkelord: retten til mat, matsikkerhet, klima, Verdens handelsorganisasjon, FNs tusenårsmålEnglish summary: The struggle over food intake and food productionThe number of hungry persons in the world has increased – although it is debatable whether there is currently a higher or lower proportion of suffering from hunger than six years ago – before the food price increases. All agree that the overall production of food in the world is adequate for everyone's nutritional needs. The article demonstrates that there are two main approaches in the debate on food production. The dominant approach focuses primarily on food security, understood as increased food production and increased food trade. The other approach argues that the interests and rights of the most vulnerable must prevail, and that improvements for the vulnerable are best ensured with a strategy based on human rights. The article analyzes land distribution, increased use of genetic technology in agriculture and reduction of trade barriers for agricultural products. Industrialization of agriculture and the liberalization of trade in agricultural products can provide good results at the macro level – in the short term. If the goal is to promote the situation of the most vulnerable and at the same time addressing climate change, the solution is a bottom-up approach, which until now has been ignored by most states. (shrink)

As a graduate student in Linguistics at UMass/Amherst in the 1980s, I was fortunate to be exposed to a number of new developments bearing on the relationship between formal semantics and pragmatics. In the 1970s under the influence of Cresswell, Lewis, Montague, and Partee, enormous progress in semantics was made possible by narrowing the focus of the field mainly to the consideration of the conventional, truth conditional content of an indicative utterance, calculated compositionally as a function of the semantic contributions (...) of its parts and its syntactic structure. Context was typically relegated to the background, in the form of indices of evaluation, though occasionally popping out for more serious consideration, as in the work of Kaplan, Karttunen, and Stalnaker. But eventually the nature of the rigorous formal enterprise itself, confronted with phenomena like Geach’s donkey sentences, presupposition projection, and the context-dependence of tense and aspect, forced the field into a more careful, thorough reconsideration of the relationship between context and content. Hence were born the dynamic theories of interpretation, beginning with Hans Kamp (1981) and Irene Heim (1982), who were both at UMass during my stay there, Heim completing her dissertation and Kamp on the faculty in Philosophy. Such frameworks posit a dynamic interchange between content and context, each dependent on the other, even in the course of interpreting a single utterance. Mats Rooth was also a graduate student at UMass at that time, and wrote his influential dissertation (1985) proposing an alternative semantics for the interpretation of prosodic focus, inter alia shedding light on how focus contributes to the contextual domain restriction of various operators. (shrink)

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind and the plural kind are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, (...) attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective. (shrink)

This paper is about the semantic analysis of referentially opaque verbs like seek and owe that give rise to nonspecific readings. It is argued that Montague's categorization (based on earlier work by Quine) of opaque verbs as properties of quantifiers runs into two serious difficulties: the first problem is that it does not work with opaque verbs like resemble that resist any lexical decomposition of the seek ap try to find kind; the second one is that it wrongly predicts de (...) dicto (i.e. narrow scope) readings due to quantified noun phrases in the object positions of such verbs. It is shown that both difficulties can be overcome by an analysis of opaque verbs as operating on properties. This is a strongly modified version of a paper entitled lsquoDo We Bear Attitudes towards Quantifiers?rsquo that I have presented at conferences in Gosen (Gesellschaft für Sprachwissenschaft), Ithaca (SALT I), and Konstanz (Lexikon). I owe a special debt to Hans Kamp and Arnim von Stechow for shaping my views on the subject of this paper during the past ten years or so. Comments from and discussions with the following friends and colleagues have also led to considerable improvements: Heinrich Beck, Steve Berman, David Dowty, Veerle van Geenhoven, Fritz Hamm, Irene Heim, Wolfgang Klein, Angelika Kratzer, Michael Morreau, Barbara Partee, Mats Rooth, Roger Schwarzschild, Wolfgang Sternefeld, Emil Weydert, Henk Zeevat, and three referees. (shrink)

Production of Presence is a comprehensive version of the thinking of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, one of the most consistently original literary scholars writing today. It offers a personalized account of some of the central theoretical movements in literary studies and in the humanities over the past thirty years, together with an equally personal view of a possible future. Based on this assessment of the past and the future of literary studies and the humanities, the book develops the provocative thesis (...) that, through their exclusive dedication to interpretation, i.e. to the reconstruction and attribution of meaning, the humanities have become incapable of addressing a dimension in all cultural phenomena that is as important as the dimension of meaning. Interpretation alone cannot do justice to the dimension of "presence," a dimension in which cultural phenomena and cultural events become tangible and have an impact on our senses and our bodies. Production of Presence is a passionate plea for a rethinking and a reshaping of the intellectual practice within the humanities. (shrink)

In this accessible collection of short meditations on various topics, Blumenberg works as a detective of ideas scouring the periphery of intellectual and philosophical history for clues—metaphors, gestures, anecdotes—essential to grasping human finitude.

avant propos This paper is basically Keenan (1992) augmented by some new types of properly polyadic quantification in natural language drawn from Moltmann (1992), Nam (1991) and Srivastav (1990). In addition I would draw the reader's attention to recent mathematical studies of polyadic quantiicationz Ben-Shalom (1992), Spaan (1992) and Westerstahl (1992). The first and third of these extend and generalize (in some cases considerably) the techniques and results in Keenan (1992). Finally I would like to acknowledge the stimulating and constructive (...) discussions ofthe earlier paper with many scholars, notably Dorit Ben-Shalom, Jaap van der Does, Hans Kamp, Uwe Mormich, Arnim von Stechow, Mats Rooth, and Ede Zimmermann. And I repeat here the acknowledgment in the earlier paper to Jim Lambek, Ed Stabler and two anonymous referees for Linguistics and Philosophy (the latter responsible for substantial improvements in the proofs - see footnote 10). (shrink)

Theories of action tend to require agents to have mental representations. A common trope in discussions of artificial intelligence (AI) is that they do not, and so cannot be agents. Properly understood there may be something to the requirement, but the trope is badly misguided. Here we provide an account of representation for AI that is sufficient to underwrite attributions to these systems of ownership, action, and responsibility. Existing accounts of mental representation tend to be too demanding and unparsimonious. We (...) offer instead a minimalist account of representation that ascribes only those features necessary for explaining action, trimming the “extra” features in existing accounts (e.g., representation as a “mental” phenomenon). Our account makes ‘representation’ whatever it is that, for example, the thermostat is doing with the thermometer. The thermostat is disposed to act as long as the thermometer is outside a given range of parameters.. Our account allows us to offer a new perspective on the ‘responsibility gap’, a problem raised by the actions of sophisticated machines: because nobody has enough control over the machine’s actions to be able to assume responsibility, conventional approaches to responsibility ascription are inappropriate. We argue that there is a distinction between finding responsible and holding responsible and, in order to resolve the responsibility gap, we must first clarify the conceptual terrain on which agent is in fact responsible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:REFLECTIONS ON GADAMER'S NOTION OF SPRACHLICHKEIT by Deborah Cook The works of Hans-Georg Gadamer recall the works of Martin Heidegger as those of Plato memorialize Socrates. The history of philosophy is constituted in such iterations. Indeed, die relationship between Gadamer and Heidegger offers us a paradigm for the understanding of die history of philosophy, manifesting as it does how this history is less marked by change than by (...) a ceaseless repetition of the same. Nevertheless, whUe Gadamer reappropriates the Heidegger of Being and Time, he does so with a different aim in mind; an aim very similar to that of Wilhelm Dilthey: to give to die human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) a solid epistemological foundation for their judgments of cultural artifacts. This foundation would also unsetde the truth value of scientificjudgments about natural objects by reinterpreting them. Heidegger's goal, on die odier hand, was to understand why diere is somediing radier dian nodiing. This led him to propose a fundamental ontology in Being and Time which he later based on die word (verbum). From the beginning, Gadamer could see in the word die power and importance Heidegger had neglected in Being and Time. Thus, on die basis of a philosophy or phenomenology of language, Gadamer pursues his end with the aid of Heidegger's original and ontologically significant formulation of die hermeneutic circle. For Gadamer, the hermeneutic circle of understanding (Verstehen), interpretation (Auslegung), and application (Anwendung) is a movement inscribed primarily in language. Using the literary text as the prototype for any object understood in the circle, he accounts for our appropriation of 84 Deborah Cook85 objects by attributing it to the power diat dwells in language. Gadamer terms this characteristic ofunderstanding its Sprachlichkeit or linguisticality. In our dealings with die world, we understand everytiring in it linguistically. As Heidegger suggested in his Letter on Humanism, language is the house of Being. It is language and language alone which accounts for die fact that we understand die world. Gadamer takes up this view diat language is die house of Being and claims diat understanding, interpretation, and application must be interpreted as linguistic phenomena because diey embody a unified whole — die understanding must not be divorced from interpretation — and because our traffic with objects takes a form analogous to mat of dialogue. It is my aim in mis discussion to consider this Sprachlichkeit as described in Truth and Method first in relation to the Heidegger ofBeing and Time and the later Heidegger and then with respect to our understanding of texts in reading. The Heidegger of Being and Time portrays the much celebrated hermeneutic circle in an original and ontologically significant way. The circle is, for Heidegger, an existentiale characterizing Dasein's very mode of being in the world and its meaning structures. It is no longer primarily a mediod. What is originally meaningful is not language but die structures of significance (the Zeichen ofequipment and the Bedeutsamkeit ofdie world) which are prior to language and from which language is derived. The circle is first and foremost a prelinguistic understanding of tiiose structures of significance toward which Dasein always transcends itself in its projects. The world and equipment are meaningful because Dasein invests diem with meaning. It is thus Dasein diat is responsible for die meaning of the world and equipment. Nonedieless, this meaning is not, for all that, arbitrary ; what underlies it, or makes it possible, is Being. Being (Sein) is die ontological foundation of pre-linguistic significance. It is that upon which meaning is grounded. While objects, dien, do not have meaning, meaning is bestowed on them by the Dasein diat seeks to render diem intelligible to itselfon die basis ofits immediate and pre-ontological understanding of Being. The hermeneutic circle characterizes die way in which diis prelinguistic and pre-ontological relationship to the world and to objects is deployed. In Heidegger's words, "To every understanding of die world, existence is understood with it and vice versa. All interpretation, moreover, operates in the forestructure which we have already characterized. Any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted." Heidegger then goes on to claim that even the "... derivative ways... (shrink)

The article defines a comprehensive concept of cognitive objectivity (CCCO) applied to embodied subjects in health care. The aims of this study were: (1) to specify some necessary conditions for the definition of a CCCO that will allow objective descriptions and assessments in health care, (2) to formulate criteria for application of such a CCCO, and (3) to investigate the usefulness of the criteria in work disability assessments in medical certificates from health care provided for social security purposes. The study (...) design was based on a philosophical conceptual analysis of objectivity and subjectivity, the phenomenological notions ‘embodied subject’, ‘life-world’, ‘phenomenological object’ and ‘empathy’, and an interpretation of certificates as texts. The study material consisted of 18 disability assessments from a total collection of 86 medical certificates provided for social security purposes, written in a Norwegian hospital-based mental health clinic. Four necessary conditions identified for defining a CCCO were: (A) acknowledging the patient’s social context and life-world, (B) perceiving patients as cognitive objects providing a variety of meaningful data (clinical, psychometric, and behavioural data – i.e. activities and actions, meaningful expressions and self-reflection), (C) interpreting data in context, and (D) using general epistemological principles. The criteria corresponding to these conditions were: (a) describing the patient’s social context and recognizing the patient’s perspective, (b) taking into consideration a variety of quantitative and qualitative data drawn from the clinician’s perceptions of the patient as embodied subject, (c) being aware of the need to interpret the data in context, and (d) applying epistemological principles (professional expertise, dialogical intersubjectivity, impartiality, accuracy and correctness). Genuine communication is presupposed. These criteria were tested in the work disability assessments of medical certificates. The criteria were useful for understanding both how objectivity fails during work disability assessments and how it can be improved in the writing of certificates. The article specifies four necessary conditions for the definition of a CCCO in health care and social security medicine and the corresponding criteria for its application. Analysis of the objectivity of work disability assessments in medical certificates for social security confirmed the usefulness of the criteria. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit besteht, von Beigaben wie Indizes und Bibliographie abgesehen, aus einer 124 Seiten umfassenden Einleitung und einer 328 Seiten umfassenden vollständigen Werkausgabe des bisher wenig bekannten Antipalamiten Theodoros Dexios. Seine Schriften, eine von POLEMIS (P.) als „Appellatio“ bezeichnete Beschwerde über die Voreingenommenheit des Ioannes Kantakuzenos auf dem Konzil von 1351, zwei Briefe und ein von P. so genannter „Tractatus brevis de Christo ipso splendente in Transfiguratione“ sind anonym überliefert, zudem auch ohne Überschriften. Zu Beginn der Einleitung wird G. (...) MERCATIs Annahme, daß die Schriften von Dexios verfaßt wurden, gegen J. MEYENDORFF, der sie dem Arsenios von Tyros zuwies, überzeugend verteidigt. Der Autor des 1. Briefes vertrat die merkwürdige Meinung, daß das Thaborlicht mit dem menschlichen Körper Christi identisch gewesen sei (XVI). Diese Ansicht kritisierte Isaak Argyros in seinem Brief an Gedeon unter Namensnennung des Dexios, wie Mercati bereits feststellte (XXIII f.). Daß die genannten Schriften, die teils in Vat. Gr. 1111, teils in Vat. Gr. 1823 überliefert sind (XIII), auf denselben Autor zurückgehen, ist daraus zu erschließen, daß der Schreiber von Vat. Gr. 1823 in Vat. Gr. 1111 Autorenkorrekturen vornahm (XV f.). Ein wichtiger Punkt der Widerlegung Meyendorffs besteht auch darin, daß dieser die Worte des Dexios, die sich auf den Schluß des vom „seligen Gregoras“ inspirierten Glaubensbekenntnisses der Antipalamiten im Jahr 1351 beziehen, nämlich „an letzter Stelle war in ihm (dem Bekenntnis) folgendes zu lesen: ‚Hinsichtlich des Kalabrers Barlaam und des Akindynos sagen wir, daß wir damit einverstanden sind, was die heilige Kirche Gottes entschieden und festgelegt hat‘ (220), indem wir auf unseren Patriarchen verwiesen“, auf Ignatios von Antiochien, den Vorgesetzten des Arsenios, bezog, dieser schmähliche, wenn auch wohl postume Verrat an Akindynos (so unsere Meinung) aber laut P. eine Anerkennung des Tomos von 1341 bedeutet, mit dem Patriarchen demnach Kalekas gemeint ist (XX f.). P. weist nach, daß der Brief des Dexios, auf den sich Argyros in seinem Brief an Gedeon bezieht, trotz gleicher Thematik nicht mit dem von ihm herausgegeben Brief I identisch ist, sondern etwas früher (XXVI versehentlich „later“) geschrieben wurde (XXVI–XXVIII). Die Datierung der „Appellatio“ auf die Zeit zwischen 1351 und 1354 (Sturz des Kantakuzenos) ist sicherlich richtig. Da Gregoras in seinen zweiten „Antirrhetikoi“ wie Dexios von der Nichtveröffentlichung des Tomos von 1351, der Unvollständigkeit der erworbenen Abschrift wie auch von der Gefahr spricht, durch den Herrscher ermordet zu werden (s. JÖB 36, 1986, 263 f. 276), ist laut meiner Datierung (s. JÖB 27, 1978, 146, Nr. 70) 1353 als wahrscheinliches Datum der Abfassung anzusehen. P. verfaßte eine bemerkenswerte Anmerkung zu Georgios von Pelagonia (XXXI f., A. 65). Die Identifizierung des Georgios Gabrielopulos mit Georgios, dem Philosophen, geht auf R.-J. LOENERTZ und F. TINNEFELD zurück, die mögliche Identifizierung des Georgios von Pelagonia mit Gabrielopulos auf mich (s. PLP II, Nr. 3433 und Talbot in ODB II 838 f., die PLP ausschreibt). Inzwischen bin ich zu dem Schluß gekommen, daß Georgios von Pelagonia, der an Akindynos Kritik übt, auf Grund seiner guten Informiertheit kein anderer sein kann als Akindynos, der wegen seiner Voreingenommenheit gegen Barlaam im Jahr 1341 Selbstkritik übt. Akindynos stammte aus der Region von Pelagonia. Möglicherweise ist er nach seiner Flucht aus Konstantinopel 1347 mit Hilfe Stefan Dušans sogar Bischof von Pelagonia geworden. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF FICTION by James D. Parsons When nelson Goodman writes, "All fiction is literal, literary falsehood," he seems to be disregarding at least one noteworthy tradition.1 The tradition I have in mind includes works by Jeremy Bendiam, Hans Vaihinger, Tobias Dantzig, Wallace Stevens, and a host ofother writers in many fields who have been laboring for more man two centuries to clear the ground (...) for a general theory of fiction. Such a general dieory would, if its exponents are right about its relevemce, be situated at the very heart of die law, literature, religion, science, mathematics — in fact, of humem life itself. Fiction dien would be no neirrow litereiry falsehood, but a kind of pressure, eis Wedlace Stevens said, which die imagination exerts "against die pressure of reality," and which "helps us to live our lives,"2 or, in Hans Vaihingens metaphor, "a scaffolding afterwards to be demolished" 3 — that is, elfter it heis served its constructive purpose. A fiction is a vitally useful creation of die mind corresponding to nothing in the real world. Most people eire aware of some of these fictions, from the perfect geometric figures of Euclid to the black box of contemporary axiomatics. There are many odiers. The notion diat all human beings are equal before die law is a fiction that can serve opposing purposes: it can work as an instrument for securing greater justice in the courts and in society, or it can function as ceimouflage, helping to perpetuate em unjust legal system and em oppressive social order — emd probably in any actual situation it serves both purposes at once. In die science of mechanics the idea of a pure vacuum, in which moving objects meet with no resistance, was for some centuries a useful fiction diat made possible the exact mathematiced analysis of motion in memy forms — another useful fiction. The notion of normality in psychology — mat diere is a universal standard of reference for human behavior — is stdl utilized by clinical and laboratory workers in the field, in spite of the metssive sociological emd ethnographic criticisms that have been leveled against it. In science generally, the idea that 92 James D. Parsons93 diere is a community of experts who by dieir combined influence decide what the trudi is in every field is a fiction diat seems to have come to the end of its usefulness, diough some philosophers have written about it as if it were a reality and not a fiction at edl. The fictions I have cited so far are none of them literary, nor être diey fedse in the ordinetry meaning of the word. They are simply not true; they describe nothing mat exists, except in die mind, emd cem be considered false only if one forgets what they eire emd tries, illegitimately, to apply tests of trudi to them in a direct way. Among the fictions mat might be called literary are the fictions derived from mydis. Now, a myth is a story told in answer to a question or a series of questions that has never been asked, eidier about the real world or (most likely) about the perennial performance of a ritual. The mydi is designed to forestall the questioning, because the questions that might be raised would be too embarrassing or because questions about some aspects of reality ceuinot be formulated without distorting our relation to them. These are the aspects of reedity that can be viewed only out of die corner of the eye, that disappear when we focus our gaze upon diem, and mat can be identified only indirectly.4 The more explicitly fictional devices, too, of poetry, drama, and the novel develop out of the attempt to achieve some sort of cognizeuice of the seune aspects of reality that are related in mydis. I do not meetn to imply that literature, of which mydi is a part, is concerned only with such disconcerting or evanescent aspects of reality. Literature, like all the great realms of culture, is concerned with the whole of reality. It has to be, omerwise its more passionate, its more ediereed concerns would have no lodging place, no environment in which to maintain... (shrink)

This contribution deals with an interpretation of practical theology which reckons amongst its tasks both an empirical situational analysis and a normative guide to action. We address the question to what extent it is possible for practical theology to fullfil both these tasks when, in the tradition of Weber's concept of scientific method, it wants to be descriptive above all, while applying at the same time methods that claim to be objective and value-free, i.e. that do not jump to conclusions (...) about what should be on the basis of what is. In order to relate all this to practice, both the foundations of our theory and its initial formulation and evaluation need to be worked out and submitted to rational verification. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate Accardi's claim that the "quantum paradoxes" have their roots in probability theory and that, in particular, they can be evaded by giving up Bayes' rule, concerning the relation between composite and conditional probabilities. We reach the conclusion that, although it may be possible to give up Bayes' rule and define conditional probabilities differently, this contributes nothing to solving the philosophical problems which surround quantum mechanics.

Die Zeiten, da die Philosophen ganze Epochen in den Blick nahmen, um ihre Tendenzen zu charakterisieren und zu kritisieren, scheinen längst vorbei. Die hypertrophen Ansprüche der Hegelianer und Marxisten bzw. Neomarxisten sind einer kleinteiligen logischen Analyse gewichen, die an Schärfe gewinnt, was sie an umfassendem Überblick verliert.In einer solchen Situation ist es bemerkenswert, wenn der Dortmunder Philosoph Friedrich Rapp den Mut hat, an ältere Formen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftskritik anzuknüpfen, um schonungslos die Pathologien der Moderne aufzudecken. Diese Pathologien rühren seiner (...) Meinung nach daher, daß dem Freiheitsdrang des modernen Menschen keine entsprechenden konstruktiven Leistungen gegenüberstünden, die eine ordnungsstiftende Kraft hätten. Es gilt sogar: „Die Konsequenzen der maßlosen Freiheit sind ein Tabuthema." An dieses Tabu will Rapp rühren, weil die destruktiven Konsequenzen unseres Freiheitsdranges inzwischen Ausmaße erreicht haben, die zur Selbstzerstörung führen könnten. Die „Lebenslüge der Moderne" bestehe darin, dies nicht sehen zu wollen. (shrink)