Production of Presence is a comprehensive version of the thinking of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, one of the most consistently original literary scholars writing today. It offers a personalized account of some of the central theoretical movements in literary studies and in the humanities over the past thirty years, together with an equally personal view of a possible future. Based on this assessment of the past and the future of literary studies and the humanities, the book develops the provocative (...) thesis that, through their exclusive dedication to interpretation, i.e. to the reconstruction and attribution of meaning, the humanities have become incapable of addressing a dimension in all cultural phenomena that is as important as the dimension of meaning. Interpretation alone cannot do justice to the dimension of "presence," a dimension in which cultural phenomena and cultural events become tangible and have an impact on our senses and our bodies. Production of Presence is a passionate plea for a rethinking and a reshaping of the intellectual practice within the humanities. (shrink)

Considering a range of present-day phenomena, from the immediacy effects of literature to the impact of hypercommunication, globalization, and sports, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht notes an important shift in our relationship to history and the passage of time. Although we continue to use concepts inherited from a "historicist" viewpoint, a notion of time articulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the actual construction of time in which we live in today, which shapes our perceptions, experiences, and actions, is no (...) longer historicist. Without fully realizing it, we now inhabit a new, unnamed space in which the "closed future" and "ever-available past" (a past we have not managed to leave behind) converge to produce an "ever-broadening present of simultaneities." This profound change to a key dimension of our existence has complex consequences for the way in which we think about ourselves and our relation to the material world. At the same time, the ubiquity of digital media has eliminated our tactile sense of physical space, altering our perception of our world. Gumbrecht draws on his mastery of the philosophy of language to enrich his everyday observations, traveling to Disneyland, a small town in Louisiana, and the center of Vienna to produce striking sketches of our broad presence in the world. (shrink)

When it comes to understanding the ontology of individual existence-that is the everyday behaviors that we all perform and hardly ever think about-the voice has a particularly complicated status. Together with writing, voice is the medium expressing ideas that, broadly speaking, we have previously formed in our minds. At the same time, voices trigger vague images and associations that do not have determinate forms. They remain in our memory, and we may even "hear" them as if immediately present, but we (...) are unable to detach the propositional contents they articulate from the centrifugal effects that they have on our lives. Writing in both a personal and philosophical register, Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht explores the complexity of the voice as an understudied philosophical, social, and existential phenomenon. He starts out with a focus on its core intellectual problem as "the knot of the voice" - referring to the inseparable proximity between meanings, images, and the physical perceptions on which they depend. In conversation with Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard, Luhmann, and above all Roland Bartes, Gumbrecht addresses topics that range from the social functions of the voice to its status in different historical contexts, and to the ways in which the perception of voices animates imagination. Throughout, incisive analyses of moments such as Julius Caesar's purportedly high-pitched voice, the surprisingly fragile authority of God's voice in the Torah and in the Gospel, and Gumbrecht's own personal attachment to the voices of popular singers such as Edith Piaf, Elvis Presley, and Adele, create a portrait of the voice that is both philosophically challenging and entertaining to read. (shrink)

From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to consciousness according to which an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic.

Summary Ordinary language philosophers frequently draw on the fact that an appropriately selected sentential combination of the form p but not q can, or cannot, be uttered without absurdity; however, they do so without sufficient reflection on the methodology of such combination tests, which results in considerable shortcomings even in practical application. To improve things, I shall discuss two criteria for distinguishing ‘pragmatic’ from ‘non-pragmatic’ implications and for separating the latter into ‘linguistic’ (‘semantic’ and ‘syntactical’) and ‘non-linguistic’ ones (2–3); consider (...) the bearing of the principle of ‘sense-constancy‘ on the applicability of combination tests (4); and call attention to the important, though merely heuristic, function of investigating pragmatic, as opposed to semantic, implications (5.1–5.2). Finally, I shall hint at a striking analogy between the linguistic (yet non-empirical) method of combination tests, the phenomenological method of ‘fictional variation’, and the empirical method of ‘conjectures and refutations’ (5.3). (shrink)

Kant setzt sich im Vorwort seiner Schrift "Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft" mit dem Vorwurf auseinander, die Deduktion der Verstandeskategorien in der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft" würde dem Gedanken einer prästabilierten Harmonie Vorschub leisten. Gleichsam ins kritische Mark getroffen weist er diesen Gedanken der dogmatischen Metaphysik zurück. Nicht zuletzt durch diesen Vorwurf angeregt überarbeitet er für die zweite Auflage seiner Kritik insbesondere die Deduktion, die sich nun in zwei Schritten vollzieht. Die Überlegungen sollen verdeutlichen, daß sich diese zwei Schritte zum einen (...) als ein analytisches und zum anderen als ein synthetisches Argument verstehen lassen. 1790 deutet Kant in seiner sogenannten "Streitschrift gegen Eberhard" allerdings in der Tat den Gedanken einer prästabilisierten Harmonie an. Wenngleich er damit eine Argumentationslücke in seinem transzendentalphilosophischen System offenbart, läßt sich doch zeigen, daß er auch hier nicht in dogmatische Metaphysik zurückfällt, sondern vielmehr aus empirischer Sicht die "Zusammenstimmung" der Erkenntnisvermögen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand erörtert. (shrink)

Verstehen ist nicht nur ein Grundbegriff menschlicher Lebensfuhrung und Lebenswelt, sondern besitzt auch in der Philosophie und den verschiedenen Wissenschaften eine zentrale Bedeutung. Die Frage nach der Moglichkeit von Verstehen ist dabei immer auch die Frage nach dem Subjekt und Objekt des Verstandnisses. Wer versteht wen oder was? Ist "Verstehen" also nur rationales Erfassen, Erkennen tieferer Einsichten und komplexerer Zusammenhange oder impliziert es mehr? Versteht man den Anderen, den Fremden, aber auch den Text wirklich so einfach? Und wenn ja, wie (...) strukturiert sich dieses Verstehen? Es soll in dem interdisziplinaren Band versucht werden, mit den genannten Fragen Anschlussfahigkeit zu evozieren, so dass die Vieldimensionalitat des Verstehens thematisiert und nach Funktion, Leistung und Grenzen des Verstehens vor allem in Philosophie, Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft gefragt werden kann. Mit Beitragen von Christina Brandt, Selin Gerlek, Julia Gruevska, Felix Huttemann, Bernhard Irrgang, Gudrun Kuhne-Bertram, Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Kevin Liggieri, Kate Meyer-Drawe, Sabine Ohlenbusch, Tobias Schlicht, Gunter Scholtz und Volker Steenblock. (shrink)

If identity is to be taken as a relation, not between any object and itself, nor between expressions , but between "intensions" or Fregean "Sinnen" of individual constants , then not only definite descriptions but also grammatically proper names ought to have intensions. This, however, has been repudiated by J. St. Mill and, more recently and more persuasively, by Saul Kripke. So an attempt will be made to interpret proper names as definite descriptions sui generis, namely, "rigid" descriptions referring to (...) the way the bearer of the name is called, in certain contexts, in the real world. To avoid circularity or a vicious regressus in infinitum, however, one has to do this on the basis of a distinction between "names" and "name-radicals". (shrink)

In his works on natural philosophy, Walter Burley designed a theory about one particular kind of opposition, namely contrariety. In this respect, one of his most peculiar tractates is the Tractatus primus. However, also in his Physics-commentary, in his Tractatus secundus and in the quaestio Utrum contraria adequata in virtute agant et patiantur ad invicem? one finds arguments revealing a dialectical approach to the problem of the specific identity and/or incompatibility of contrariously opposed qualities. Burley’s rea­­sonings compose an original attempt (...) to use philosophical dialectic not only as a meth­od of disputation, but moreover primarily as a theory of the mediation of opposites. These arguments refer to the scope of natural philosophy, logic, ethics and medicine. An analysis of these arguments and of the criticisms of Thomas Wylton and Konrad of Megenberg reveals Burley’s dialectical approach to be an eminent historical contribution to the solution of fundamental questions within the realm of Aristotelian metaphysics. (shrink)

Die Existenz einer zentralisierten, funktional differenzierten, professionalisierten und hierarchisch gegliederten Bürokratie gilt seit jeher als ein charakteristisches Merkmal spätrömischer Staatlichkeit. Tatsächlich stellte dieser Apparat in seinen Dimensionen und in seiner Komplexität alles in den Schatten, was das griechisch-römische Altertum vorher aufzuweisen hatte, auch wenn seine Ausbildung bereits in der frühen Kaiserzeit begann und sich im Laufe des 3. Jahrhunderts rapide beschleunigte, wie jüngst Peter EICH (Zur Metamorphose des politischen Systems in der römischen Kaiserzeit. Die Entstehung einer „personalen Bürokratie“ im langen (...) dritten Jahrhundert. Berlin 2005) mit guten Argumenten wahrscheinlich gemacht hat. Auch ist unbestreitbar, daß diese Bürokratie als Instrument der Zentralisierung staatlicher Funktionen diente und daher den Handlungsspielraum lokaler Autoritäten, der in der frühen Kaiserzeit nach modernen Kriterien sehr groß gewesen war, zunehmend einengte. Der in Cambridge lehrende Althistoriker Christopher KELLY geht der Frage nach, wie diese auf ein monarchisches Zentrum ausgerichtete Bürokratie funktionierte und welche Auswirkungen ihre Existenz für Regierende und Regierte hatte. (shrink)

Husserl’s transcendental reduction admits of two motivations: the general methodological ban on begging the question, and the principle that a typology of objects ought to be based on a typology of my ways of cognizing them. As Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ agrees with the ‘linguistic phenomenology’ of many analytic philosophers in being at bottom an effort to understand what precisely we mean to say by asserting that there ‘exists’ a ‘consciousness-independent’ or ‘transcendent’ world, the ‘residue’ of transcendental reduction is my subjective (...) consciousness. My cognitive approaches to the latter and to that of somebody else are not only entirely different but ‘complementary’ in the sense of Bohr’s. In the course of searching for an identity criterion for temporal entities lacking a spatial localisation in the world, we can show that the allegedly noetic phenomenon of, say, my now seeing a cat is a noema, to wit, the cat-as-now-beingseen-by-me-in-such-and-such-a-manner. There is no sound base for postulating, over and above the noematic nature of my consciousness, a second, noetic, aspect thereof. (shrink)

These conference proceedings consider visual and literary images of ancient Rome created by artists and scholars from Late Antiquity until the present day. The occasion for the conference was the colossal panorama Rome 312 by Yadegar Asisi that was displayed in Leipzig. The papers explore the ways and means by which the idea of Rome was developed by the individual artists and authors and transferred to the cultural context of the epoch and of the personalities involved.

Juli Zeh, who enjoys an international reputation, is one of the most gifted and productive writers of Germany today. Her dystopian tale Corpus Delicti: Ein Prozess represents a lively, intelligent, and innovative addition to the genre. It presents a picture of a benevolent dictatorship that demands good health as the highest duty of its citizens, in a sequence of dramatic scenes combining the virtues of a thriller with a dystopia focusing on the present-day preoccupation with health and the body. Most (...) segments are presented as scenes of a trial against a biologist who is accused of rebellion against “The Method,” the ruling order of the future state, whose dominant ideology is “Health as the Principle of State Legitimacy.” Thus metaphysical morality and Enlightenment values such as freedom, democracy, and justice have been replaced by a scientific, secular notion of life as the ultimate criterion and value. (shrink)

The authors believe that the questions raised at the beginning of Frege’s On Sense and Reference – ‘Is [identity] a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects?’ – set the course for a long-lasting but not at all satisfying discussion. For the disputants tend to advocate, either a ‘name-view’ of identity in a straightforward but rudimentary and logically untenable form, or else a version of an ‘object-view’ that makes all too light of the analysandum–analysans distinction (...) and hence is damned to analytical barrenness. In contrast, by unfolding the underlying idea of the original ‘name-view’, the authors offer three alternative and mutually compatible interpretations of identity that may best be characterized as the ‘name-based’, the ‘hybrid’ and the ‘sense-based’ variant of a ‘concept-view of identity’. At the same time, however, these interpretations may well be considered variants of a non-barren ‘object-view’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why Maturana?Hans Ulrich GumbrechtWhy would a German scholar specializing in pedagogical thought travel thousands of miles to Santiago de Chile for an interview with a aging scientist who, it seems, has created for himself a solid reputation in the field of "biology of vision" without being hailed by his peers as a path-breaking innovator? In the German intellectual context, the answer to this question could be as (...) laconic as it would be superfluous: it consists in a deictic reference to the name and, implicitly, to the work of Niklas Luhmann. American readers, in contrast, may need some introductory explanation in order to understand the epistemological triangle between contemporary pedagogical thought, Maturana's biology, and Luhmann's philosophy—and, above all, in order to assess and even to appreciate its intellectual potential.Niklas Luhmann is certainly difficult to read, at least for starters, and to those who met him during his lifetime he invariably appeared to be a dead-serious person. But today, more than five years after Luhmann's death, we begin to discover traces of a sometimes uncanny irony—one may want to call it a "practical irony"—in his writing. One of the discursive gestures that characterized Luhmann's texts were references to academic authors who nobody had ever heard of (let alone read), presented with the same seriousness and with the same attitude of intellectual reverence that we normally reserve for the classics: for example, to the logician Gotthart Guenter, the philosopher Fritz Heider, the biologist Humberto Maturana, or the mathematician George Spencer Brown. There is no doubt that, in each case, a specific concept or a specific thought developed by one of these authors had turned out to be truly important within Luhmann's own work, and yet the "effects of authority" that his very serious quotes produced were nothing short of hilarious. For Luhmann's readers, with that self-flagellating attitude in which we academics so like to indulge, quite regularly attributed the experience that they had never heard of those seeming "authorities" to their own lack of intellectual cosmopolitanism. This is why, until the present day, some departments of sociology or philosophy in Germany have Spencer Brown or Guenter specialists on their payrolls, and this also explains why some of those authors have had moments of intense reception [End Page 22] in the world of the humanities and social sciences at German universities. Among them, Humberto Maturana, together with his co-author the late Francisco Varela, seem to be the exception confirming the rule that none of those Luhmann references had the intellectual power to survive Luhmann himself.Now why should one trust Luhmann's trust in Maturana? The debate about the importance of Luhmann's thought (he labeled it a "theory of social systems") in the larger context of contemporary Western philosophy has barely begun to become serious, and we are certainly many years away from a definitive consensual evaluation. But there are two—very different—features about Luhmann's work that make him fascinating at first glance. One lies in the simple fact that, probably, no other thinker since Hegel has managed to develop a restrained set of basic concepts and premises into a systematically coherent philosophical edifice of similar proportions. In this sense, entering the dimension of Luhmann's thought offers the patient reader a possibility to view many familiar positions and questions from sometimes radically different innovative angles. Less obvious, however, and more intriguing is Luhmann's intellectual bet to develop his systemic thought under strict avoidance of notions such as "subject," "subjecthood," or "agency." It was this very bet (about whose existential and political motivations he only left some rather vague remarks) that explains Luhmann's fascination for much theoretical thinking emerging from biological research, above all for Humberto Maturana's work. For from a biological perspective, subjecthood and agency are highly marginal attributes in the realm of living organisms. I believe that this (almost hidden) component in Luhmann's thinking can explain the particularly strong affinity of contemporary pedagogical thought in Germany with his work. Of course, such an affinity will not necessarily lead to a pedagogical theory that, in orthodox reliance on Luhmann, will... (shrink)

Mit dieser Edition wird erstmals ein Vorlesungszyklus aus Helmuth Plessners wissenschaftlichem Nachlaß der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht. Das klar und übersichtlich gegliederte Kolleg "Elemente der Metaphysik" präsentiert in leicht verständlicher Sprache und gut nachvollziehbarer Gedankenentfaltung die Grundzüge von Plessners Anthropologie, die dieser in seinem nur schwer rezipierbaren Hauptwerk, den "Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch" von 1928, entwickelt hatte, und stellt sie in einen umfassenden philosophischen Kontext. Die Vorlesung umfaßt drei Hauptteile: Im 1. Teil, der "Metaphysik des Bewußtseins", zeigt Plessner, daß (...) der klassische bewußtseinsphilosophische Ansatz zur Beantwortung zentraler metaphysischer Probleme nicht in der Lage ist. Die entscheidende Frage nach dem Sein des Bewußtseins ist – wie Plessner nachweist – im Rahmen der Bewußtseinsproblematik, wie sie von der neuzeitlichen Philosophie seit Descartes entfaltet wurde, nicht zu beantworten. Die Bewußtseinsphilosophie muß daher – so Plessners Grundthese – durch einen lebensphilosophischen Ansatz überwunden werden. Dieser Übergang zur Problematik des Lebens und die breite Ausführung des neuen philosophischen Zugriffs steht im Mittelpunkt des 2. Teils. Plessner unternimmt hier vor allem den Versuch, das Wesen des Lebens durch das Verhältnis des Körpers zu seiner Grenze zu bestimmen und hält fest, daß solche Körper, die ihre Grenzen realisiert haben, "Positionaliät" besitzen. Dieser Begriff der Positionalität wird zum Zentralbegriff von Plessners Biophilosophie, die im Fortgang dieses Teils der Vorlesung ausführlich dargestellt wird. Im Zentrum der Darlegung, die Plessner im engen, kritischen Kontakt mit der biologischen Forschung hält, steht u.a. die Beziehung von Organismus und Umwelt, die Organisationsformen des Lebens, die Struktur der tierischen Umwelt, die Bestimmung des Bewußtseins, das Verhältnis von Bewußtsein und körperlichem Sein und das Problem des Gedächtnisses. Im abschließenden 3. Teil skizziert Plessner die Grundzüge seiner philosophischen Anthropologie, wobei er den Menschen als dasjenige Lebewesen bestimmt, das – in Abhebung vom Tier, dem eine zentrische Organisationsform zukommt – eine "exzentrische Positionalität" besitzt, und das in einem dreifachen Bezug zur Außenwelt, zur Innenwelt und zur Mitwelt steht. Die besondere Bedeutung dieser Vorlesung liegt einerseits in ihrem Charakter als leicht nachvollziehbare Hinführung zu Plessners Philosophie des Lebendigen. Andererseits enthält sie neue Inhalte – insbesondere im 1. und 2. Teil – und trägt dadurch zur Erweiterung unserer Kenntnis von Plessners Philosophie bei. (shrink)

In 1514 at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Leipzig, a quodlibetical disputation took place. About 60 persons participated in the disputation. A handwritten record of this event has been preserved. A thorough analysis of these texts gives us a wealth of information with regard to the themes, positions, and tendencies of thinking during that period of time. The scholars at Leipzig University made an attempt at reconciling their philosophical interests with the claim to spiritual hegemony on the (...) part of theology and the church. This aspect is remarkable if one thinks of the famous papal bull Apostolici Regiminis, promulgated in the year 1513. The attached appendix lists the topics and the names of the participants of the disputation according to the record. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 30.4 (2000) 83-101 [Access article in PDF] Martin Heidegger and his Japanese InterlocutorsAbout A Limit of Western Metaphysics Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht 1 Quite obviously, the central position that Western philosophical discourses have assigned, over the past two centuries, to the concept of "sense" hinges upon the epistemological dominance of the Subject/Object paradigm. In whichever specific ways this concept has been defined (and we all know how (...) confusing the range of those proposals has become), 1 it always ends up referring to the modalities in which an "Observer-Subject" can refer to what (s)he is observing as the "World of Objects." "Making sense," then, may be described as the selection, performed by an observer, of a specific object of reference among all the objects of which the world is believed to consist; or as the drawing of a line by which (s)he makes a distinction, at every given moment, between those parts of the world that (s)he is observing and those that (s)he is not observing; or as the positioning of a chosen topic within a preexisting context of possible associations. All these different descriptions can be turned into definitions of "sense making" as long as they point to the awareness that whatever has been chosen, divided, or contextualized could have been chosen, divided, or contextualized differently. Another way of evoking the same type of relation between what remains "potential" and what becomes "actual" would be to say that the concept of "sense" always refers to cases of entropy transformed into structure—under the condition that alternative patterns of transforming entropy into structure remain available. What we call the Subject's consciousness (Bewusstsein) is the place where these selections take place and where their alternatives are held available.If we consider the Subject/Object paradigm as the core element of that style of philosophizing which has been called (sometimes from a purely descriptive and sometimes from a critical angle) "Western metaphysics," then it is a both true and trivial conclusion to say that, within Western metaphysics, sense making is inevitable (that is, that Subjects cannot help producing sense and, also, that there can be no effects of sense without pointing to a Subject). An interesting case that proves the point of this implicational relationship is Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. Despite Luhmann's sustained effort to be epistemologically eccentric, despite all his great conceptual ambition to bypass the instance of the Subject, 2 his books (and, above all, their reception) make it [End Page 83] very clear how a philosophical discourse that gives as central a position to the concept of "sense" as Luhmann's cannot help producing Subject-effects. The frequently used everyday expression, on the other hand, that "something makes no sense" is not in conflict with our point about the inevitability of sense making within the metaphysical—and also within our Western everyday—framework of discursive presuppositions.For if we say that "something makes no sense," we are not using the word "sense" in accordance with the conventional philosophical meaning of "sense making," and we are thus not referring to individual phenomena that would "resist" individual acts of sense attribution. 3 Rather, when we say that "something makes no sense," we react to situations where a (shorter or longer) sequence of those elementary and inevitable acts of sense attribution does not produce an impression of "coherence" or "consistency"; we refer to situations where we lack a larger perspective from which we could subsume the results of different individual acts of sense making [see Hahn]. Astonishingly enough (or not astonishingly at all), all those loud intellectual slogans from a decade or two ago about the "death of the Subject" never reached this—altogether unsurprising—point: that any attempt at (or the mere historical process of) overcoming a Subject-centered epistemological tradition (or, with the more Heideggerian concept, of overcoming "metaphysics") would have to ask how one could—begin to—avoid sense making. On the contrary, that "weak subject" and that so-called "weak thinking" as which the Subject/Object paradigm seems to... (shrink)

Conversation about expected translation into Ukrainian of Gumbrecht's book Production of Presence. What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford UP: Stanford, 2004).

The first philosophical faculty in Saxony up to the beginning of the Reformation in its local, regional, and supraregional context. The University of Leipzig was founded in the year 1409. In the faculty of arts – the heart and the basis of the old university as a whole – there were numerous controversies during the first century of its existence. From the very beginning it competed with the older University of Prague, its historic mother, for an independent manner of philosophical (...) thinking. The so-called »Wegestreit« between the via moderna and the via antiqua, and the »Poetenstreit« between traditional and new humanistic patterns of science and philosophy were constituents of late medieval philosophy in Germany. Especially the various forms of academic disputation, that is ordinary, extraordinary and quodlibetal disputations, played an important part within the first hundred years of existence of this university, specifically its faculty of arts. The famous disputation between Johann Eck and Martin Luther at Leipzig in the year 1519 was one of the culminating points of this practice. Considerable work remains to be done on the exploration of late medieval philosophy. The analysis of the collection of medieval philosophical manuscripts originating from the old University of Leipzig could provide some new material for our historical knowledge of this period. (shrink)

Das Universalienproblem - die Frage nach der Erkenntnis der Natur des Allgemeinen -, das seit der griechischen Antike zu den zentralen Problemen philosophischen Denkens zählt, besitzt für die Gegenwart nicht nur philosophischen Wert, sondern liegt zugleich vielfach wichtigen Streitpunkten in verschiedenen Wissenschaften zugrunde. Wöhler legt eine Auswahl der wichtigsten Primärquellen, ausgehend von der berühmten "Isagoge" des Porphyrios und deren Kommentierung durch Boethius bis zu Anselm von Canterbury und Johannes von Salisbury vor, wobei er die arabische Tradition (Avicenna, Averroes) mit einbezieht. (...) Erstmals werden in dieser Breite dem deutschen Leser Texte mit dem Ziel zur Verfügung gestellt, die wesentlichen Entwicklungslinien des Streits um die Universalien mitvollziehen zu können. In seinem umfangreichen Nachwort gibt Wöhler über die Texterläuterungen hinaus einen Überblick über die Geschichte des Universalienstreits und seinen Verlauf bis zur Frühscholastik. Ergänzt wird der Band durch ein deutsch-lateinisches Glossar. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 285-292.