This book offers a new account of what it is to act for a normative reason. The first part of the book examines the problems of causal accounts of acting for reasons and suggests to solve them by a dispositional approach. The author argues for a dispositional account which unites epistemic, volitional, and executional dispositions in a complex normative competence. This ‘Normative Competence Account’ allows for more and less reflective ways of acting for normative reasons. The second part of the (...) book clarifies the relation between the normative reason that an agent acts for and his or her motivating reasons. It refutes the widely held ‘identity view’ that acting for a normative reason requires the normative reason to be identical with a motivating reason. The author describes how normative reasons are related to motivating reasons by a relation of correspondence, and proposes a new understanding of how normative reasons explain those actions that are performed for them. Determined by Reasons engages with current debates from a wide range of different philosophical areas, including action theory, metaethics, moral psychology, epistemology, and ontology, to develop a new account of acting for normative reasons. (shrink)

I argue for the view that there are important similarities between knowledge and acting for a normative reason. I interpret acting for a normative reason in terms of Sosa’s notion of an apt performance. Actions that are done for a normative reason are normatively apt actions. They are in accordance with a normative reason because of a competence to act in accordance with normative reasons. I argue that, if Sosa’s account of knowledge as apt belief is correct, this means that (...) acting for a normative reason is in many respects similar to knowledge. In order to strengthen Sosa’s account of knowledge, I propose to supplement it with an appeal to sub-competences. This clarifies how this account can deal with certain Gettier cases, and it helps to understand how exactly acting for a normative reason is similar to apt belief. (shrink)

Are epistemic reasons normative in the same sense as, for instance, moral reasons? In this paper I examine and defend the claim that epistemic reasons are normative only relative to an epistemic standard. Unlike moral reasons they are not substantially normative, because they fail to make an independent contribution to obligations or permissions simpliciter. After presenting what I take to be the main argument for this view, I illustrate that the argument has often been defended by examples which controversially presuppose (...) strong epistemic obligations or pragmatic reasons for belief. Opponents of the argument often deny the existence of obligations and reasons of these kinds. I therefore examine whether the argument can withstand that line of critique by employing new examples. (shrink)

This essay is concerned with the relation between motivating and normative reasons. According to a common and influential thesis, a normative reason is identical with a motivating reason when an agent acts for that normative reason. I will call this thesis the ‘Identity Thesis’. Many philosophers treat the Identity Thesis as a commonplace or a truism. Accordingly, the Identity Thesis has been used to rule out certain ontological views about reasons. I distinguish a deliberative and an explanatory version of the (...) Identity Thesis and argue that there are no convincing arguments to accept either version. Furthermore, I point out an alternative to the Identity Thesis. The relation between motivating and normative reasons can be thought of as one of representation, not identity. (shrink)

In this article I advocate a worldly account of normative reasons according to which there is an ontological gap between these and the premises of practical thought, i.e. motivating considerations. While motivating considerations are individuated fine-grainedly, normative reasons should be classified as coarse-grained entities, e.g. as states of affairs, in order to explain certain necessary truths about them and to make sense of how we count and weigh them. As I briefly sketch, acting for normative reasons is nonetheless possible if (...) the connection between normative reasons and motivating considerations is a competence-based correspondence. (shrink)

Agents sometimes act for normative reasons—for reasons that objectively favor their actions. Jill, for instance, calls a doctor for the normative reason that Kate is injured. In this article I explore a dispositional approach to acting for a normative reason. I argue for the need of epistemic, motivational, and executional dispositional elements of a theory of acting for a normative reason. Dispositions play a mediating role between, on the one hand, the normative reason and its normative force, and the action (...) on the other hand. Thereby, they help to deal with problem cases such as cases of deviant causal chains and improper instrumental motivation. (shrink)

Payment reforms that link health care providers’ reimbursements to their performance on various metrics incentivize providers to improve the quality and efficiency of care they provide to patients. Unfortunately, these reforms also create strong incentives for providers to reject patients who do not adhere to medical advice. This commentary argues that providers’ avoidance of non-adherent patients flouts the medical profession's commitment to patients’ best interests, undermines patients' trust in health professionals, and aggravates disparities in health. Moreover, the economic incentives under (...) payment reforms that encourage quality and efficiency gains are weakened when providers can escape the financial penalties for poor outcomes by simply firing their non-adherent patients. (shrink)

In the scholarly debate, refugeehood is often understood to arise from a special need for basic protection, i.e., for protection of basic needs and rights. However, the main definitions of refugeehood shift to duties when aiming to develop this view. Either, refugees are defined as all those individuals who can receive basic protection from the international community, and thus arguably ought to be protected, or refugees are defined as all those to whom a special form of protection, namely protection by (...) admission is owed. The paper argues that either definition is incompatible with a commonsense desideratum on consistent and plausible criteria for refugeehood, since these definitions imply that refugeehood depends partly on the capacities of protecting states and on the needs of third parties. Instead, refugeehood is defined by the need for basic protection and by flight aiming to remedy this condition. (shrink)

The Normative Competence Account characterizes acting for a normative reason as action which manifests the agent’s complex normative competence. But which role does the correspondence between the n...

The rise of managed care initiated a steady decline in solo and small group physician practices and the emergence of new delivery models built around large health care organizations. Health care reform has only accelerated this trend as public and private payors shift to new payment methodologies that reward clinical and financial integration among providers. As a result, patients increasingly receive care from physicians and other health professionals organized into collaborative partnerships with one another and institutional providers, such as hospitals. (...) As described below, this new organizational dynamic profoundly influences the clinical judgment of physicians. No longer can society simply depend on the professionalism of individual physicians to ensure ethical integrity in the health care setting. Rather, ethical integrity in the health care setting also requires a strong foundation of organizational ethics. (shrink)

This book presents stipulated definitions, essays, ontological arguments and logic used to determine necessary basic assumptions of right and wrong, culminating in a practical procedure based upon the Universal Law that can permit everyone to eliminate misconceptions, avoid destructive interpretations, and develop an ethical conscience.

Der vorliegende Aufsatz prüft, unter welchen Bedingungen ein Psychologismus für motivierende Gründe der gegenwärtig wachsenden Kritik standhalten kann. Zwei zentrale antipsychologistische Argumente, das „Spezialfallargument“ und das „Idealfallargument“, werden rekonstruiert und zurückgewiesen. Sie werfen dem Psychologismus vor, unsere praktische Überlegung lediglich in Spezialfällen adäquat zu beschreiben und damit unvereinbar zu sein, dass Personen im Idealfall aus normativen Gründen handeln. Der Aufsatz zeigt auf, dass diese Argumente voraussetzen, dass der motivierende Grund identisch ist mit demjenigen, was aus der Sicht des Handelnden als (...) normativer Grund erscheint. Diese Voraussetzung wird zurückgewiesen, so dass ein Psychologismus zum Vorschein kommt, der von den antipsychologistischen Argumenten unberührt bleibt. Stattdessen wird eine Konzeption motivierender Gründe vertreten, welche die Handlungserklärung und die Rationalisierung von Handlungen als zentrale Funktion motivierender Gründe betrachtet. (shrink)

We argue that explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), specifically reason-giving XAI, often constitutes the most suitable way of ensuring that someone can properly be held responsible for decisions that are based on the outputs of artificial intelligent (AI) systems. We first show that, to close moral responsibility gaps (Matthias 2004), often a human in the loop is needed who is directly responsible for particular AI-supported decisions. Second, we appeal to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility to argue that, in order to (...) be responsible for her decision, the human in the loop has to have an explanation available of the system’s recommendation. Reason explanations are especially well-suited to this end and we examine whether – and how – it might be possible to make such explanations fit with AI systems. We support our claims by focusing on a case of disagreement between human in the loop and AI system. (shrink)

This conceptual paper analyses the arguments which have been made in favour of a transition towards humanistic management. In order to reconcile economic as well as moral arguments an integrative model of humanistic management is presented. This model outlines prospective lines of empirical research especially in the area where business conduct is profitable but not humanistic.

Using an explicit task cuing paradigm, we tested whether masked cues can trigger task-set activation, which would suggest that unconsciously presented stimuli can impact cognitive control processes. Based on a critical assessment of previous findings on the priming of task-set activation, we present two experiments with a new method to approach this subject. Instead of using a prime, we varied the visibility of the cue. These cues either directly signaled particular tasks in Experiment 1, or certain task transitions in Experiment (...) 2. While both masked task and transition cues affected task choice, only task cues affected the speed of task performance. This observation suggests that task-specific stimulus–response rules can be activated only by masked cues that are uniquely associated with a particular task. Taken together, these results demonstrate that unconsciously presented stimuli have the power to activate corresponding task sets. (shrink)

What is the purpose of our economic system? What would a more life-serving economy look like? There are many books about business and society, yet very few of them question the primacy of GDP growth, profit maximization and individual utility maximization. Even developments with a humanistic touch like stakeholder participation, corporate social responsibility or corporate philanthropy serve the same goal: to foster long-term growth and profitability. Humanism in Business questions these assumptions and investigates the possibility of creating a human-centered, value-oriented (...) society based on humanistic principles. An international team of academics and practitioners present philosophical, spiritual, economic, psychological and organizational arguments that show how humanism can be used to understand, and possibly transform, business at three different levels: the systems level, the organizational level and the individual level. This groundbreaking book will be of interest to academics, practitioners and policymakers concerned with business ethics and the relationship between business and society. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant is, famously, not only the major philosopher of European enlightenment, but also one of the first philosophers to develop a philosophical theory of “human races”. How do these two sides of Kant relate to each other? What is the significance of race in Kant’s philosophy? In this article, we aim to discuss these questions by taking a close look into the conceptual and philosophical presuppositions underlying Kant’s understanding of race; relating them to the concept of teleology as developed (...) by Kant in the Critique of Judgement and to the idea of natural history that can be derived from there. In the last two chapters, we intertwine both perspectives in such a way that, on the one hand, we can determine the philosophical significance of race for Kant, and, on the other hand, show how a race-sensible perspective gives new and critical insight into Kant’s concept of reason. (shrink)

The article critically engages Menachem Fisch’s account of normative frameworks, in particular of (rational) transitions between them. I argue, first, that exposure to the normative criticism leveled at us by other human beings is indeed “capable of destabilizing normative commitment” to one’s own underlying framework beliefs and standards, as Fisch holds; however, closer scrutiny reveals that such exposure is neither sufficient nor necessary but rather accidental in this respect. Second, I will try to show that Søren Kierkegaard’s account of how (...) people fundamentally change their mind provides resources for both a substantial critique of Fisch and a more adequate understanding of the transitions in question. The article argues, third, that Fisch’s framework model – though meaningful, in fact heuristically indispensable in and as of itself – has robust transcendental implications which as such are being ignored, if not directly denied by Fisch and, precisely by being ignored or denied, unnecessarily weaken the overall plausibility of his account. Finally, and ex post, I will address an important objection raised by some commentators. (shrink)

In his applied moral philosophy, Kant formulates the parents’ duty to make their child happy. I argue that, for Kant, this duty is an ad hoc attempt at compensating for the parental guilt of having brought a person into the condition of existence – and hence also having created her need for happiness – on their own initiative. I argue that Kant’s considerations regarding parental duties and human reproduction in general imply arguments for an ethically justified anti-natalism, but that this (...) position is abolished in his teleology for meta-ethical reasons. (shrink)

Der dritte Abschnitt der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten gilt als der am schwierigsten zu interpretierende Text der praktischen Philosophie Kants. Argumentationsziel und Aufbau des Textes sind bis heute umstritten, seine Deutung hängt in hohem Maße von philologischen Fragestellungen ab. Der Kommentar interpretiert den dritten Abschnitt der Grundlegung Satz für Satz entlang dem Fortgang des Textes. Er widmet der gängigen These von der Deduktion des kategorischen Imperativs kritische Aufmerksamkeit und analysiert Überlegungen Kants zum sittlichen Bewusstsein, die bereits auf die Faktum-Lehre (...) der zweiten Kritik vorausweisen. (shrink)

While organizational learning literature has generated significant insight into the effective and efficient achievement of organizational goals as well as to the modus of learning, it is currently unable to describe moral learning processes in organizations consistently. Corporations need to learn morally if they want to deal effectively with stakeholders criticizing their conduct. Nongovernmental organizations do not ask corporations to be more effective or efficient in what they do, but to become more responsible or to learn morally. Current research on (...) the moral aspect of organizational learning has been primarily of a theoretical nature and is in need of empirical verification. Results of a longitudinal case study as Citigroup’s conflict with the Rainforest Action Network show that current organizational moral learning theories do not fit the moral learning path observed at Citigroup. More empirical research is needed to describe organizational moral learning. (shrink)

Hexa-Sabbath. Foreign Matter and Vital Substances, Experts and the Critical Consumer in the FRG during the 1950s and 1960sIn the late Fifties and early Sixties the regulation of food additives represented a remarkable turning point in German consumer politics, establishing a debate about decision making and policy advice, altering the discourse of purity and contamination, and inaugurating a new political actor, the organized critical consumer. The amendment of the Food Law in December 1958 functioned as a negotiation process between representatives (...) of science, industry and the state, which was institutionalized in the Senate Commissions of the German Research Foundation. While these Commissions for preservatives, foreign matter and colorants worked behind closed doors, a public discourse about the “toxic condition” of modern life and the negative role of the pharmaceutical and chemical industry gained strength.The debate about the admission of hexamethylenetetramine (hexa) took part at a crucial moment. Hexa was used as a preservative in the fish industry. But its anti microbial effectiveness was caused by the decomposition of hexa to formaldehyde. Despite the commission’s verdict against hexa, the lobbying activities of the industry granted it a reprieve. In the media, the case of hexa was seen as a touchstone for the capacity of negotiated decision making and the ability of rational scientists to resist the demands of industry. Finally, in 1963 it was the new political actor of the organized critical consumer, heir and successor to the housewife federations as well as to “purists” advocating life reform, who, supported by the media, enforced the prohibition of hexa as a preservative. (shrink)

The present study evaluates the cognitive representation of a kicking movement performed by a human and a humanoid robot, and how they are represented in experts and novices of soccer and robotics, respectively. To learn about the expertise-dependent development of memory structures, we compared the representation structures of soccer experts and robot experts concerning a human and humanoid robot kicking movement. We found different cognitive representation structures for both expertise groups under two different motor performance conditions . In general, the (...) expertise relies on the perceptual-motor knowledge of the human motor system. Thus, the soccer experts’ cognitive representation of the humanoid robot movement is dominated by their representation of the corresponding human movement. Additionally, our results suggest that robot experts, in contrast to soccer experts, access functional features of the technical system of the humanoid robot in addition to their perceptual-motor knowledge about the human motor system. Thus, their perceptual-motor and neuro-functional machine representation are integrated into a cognitive representation of the humanoid robot movement. (shrink)

This paper has two goals. The first is to develop a cross-linguistically valid model of modality and mood that captures the most important dimensions along which modal expressions vary. I posit a model with two such dimensions, one of volitivity, and one of event-orientation vs. speaker-orientation, mood being placed at the speaker-oriented end relative to modality proper. The second goal is to provide a new perspective on semantic change of modal expressions on the basis of the proposed model. I argue (...) that unidirectional change along the event-oriented / speaker-oriented dimension is the one overarching tendency of semantic change in modals. This stands in contrast to the widespread perception that change from deontic to epistemic is the dominant tendency. The directionality suggested in this new model is also more comprehensive than previously proposed tendencies of change, such as ‘‘from agent-oriented to epistemic’’, ‘‘from agent-oriented to speaker-oriented’’, and ‘‘from participant-internal to participant-external’’, as it better accounts for various kinds of change that have been previously neglected, including change from epistemic to deontic. (shrink)

Menschen schreiben sich ein Selbst zu. Die Wissenschaften haben Mühe zu sagen, was das ist und wie es zustande kommt. Sie sind sich aber sicher, dass wir es haben und brauchen. Für Forscher ist es jedoch kaum greifbar und deshalb ein verflixtes Problem. Daran wird die Entwicklung einer starken KI scheitern, Menschen bleiben etwas anderes. Der Inhalt Die Stunde Null; Vorteile der Sterblichkeit Die Erfindung des Selbst; ohne Selbsttäuschung geht es nicht Nagelprobe Moral; warum der Liberalismus einen Neustart braucht Über (...) den Autor Dr. Heiko Reisch ist Philosoph und arbeitet als Kommunikationsberater und Journalist. Er ist Autor der,,Kleinen Geschichte der Philosophie" bei Springer VS. (shrink)

chapter Introduction Poststructuralist perspectives on language, gender and sexual identity Since the inception of the field of language and gender in the, ...

Der vorliegende Band bietet eine Sammlung teils andernorts publizierter, teils bislang unveröffentlichter Arbeiten zur Philosophie und Theologie Søren Kierkegaards. Das Spektrum der Texte und Themen reicht von systematischen Einführungsartikeln über wissenschafts- und erkenntnistheoretische Grundlegungsfragen bis hin zu begriffsanalytischen, ontologischen und theologischen Spezialuntersuchungen. Die Beiträge sind durchweg von einem doppelten, genetisch-rekonstruktiven und geltungstheoretisch-konstruktiven Interesse geleitet. Zum einen wollen sie zur Lösung hermeneutischer Probleme beitragen, die Kierkegaards Texte en détail und/oder als Ganzes aufwerfen. Auf der Basis einer kritischen Plausibilitätstaxierung der behandelten Aussagezusammenhänge (...) wird zweitens der Versuch unternommen, deren religionsphilosophisch und/oder theologisch prinzipielles Potential abzuschätzen, aufzunehmen und weiter zu entwickeln. Die Dialektik von Aneignung und Reflexion erweist sich in der Umsetzung beider Teilziele als bestimmend: Kein restlos Reflektiertes kann angeeignet, kein Angeeignetes restlos reflektiert sein. (shrink)

In jüngerer Zeit findet wieder eine vermehrte Auseinandersetzung mit den Kategorien der Freiheit in der Kritik der praktischen Vernunft statt. Die vorliegende Arbeit bereichert diese neu erwachte Diskussion, indem sie anhand einer entwicklungsgeschichtlich orientierten Betrachtung die vernunftarchitektonische Stellung praktischer Kategorien bei Kant umfassend analysiert: Die Untersuchung nimmt ihren Ausgang bei einer frühen Reflexion, in der Kant die "Categorien der Moralität" als Funktionen der Freiheit bestimmt, und verfolgt das Thema einer praktischen Kategorienlehre über dessen eigentliche Entfaltung in der zweiten Kritik hinaus (...) bis in die Metaphysik der Sitten, in der sich in Kant bei der Entfaltung von Rechts- und Tugendlehre eines kategorialen Leitfadens bedient. (shrink)

The present paper argues that, despite appearance to the contrary, Kierkegaard’s writings offer promising argumentational resources for addressing the problem of evil. According to Kierkegaard, however, in order to make use of these resources at all, one must necessarily be willing to shift the battleground, so to speak: from a third- to a genuine first-person perspective, namely the perspective of what Climacus dubs Religiousness A. All (yet also only) those who seek deliberate self-annihilation before God—a God in relation to whom (...) they perceive themselves always in the wrong—shall discover the ideal that an unwavering and in fact unconditional thankfulness (namely, for being forgiven) is to be considered the only appropriate attitude towards God and as such both necessary and sufficient for coming to terms with evil and suffering, at least in the life of someone making that discovery. I will argue that Kierkegaard’s (non-)pseudonymous writings provide reasons, at times unwittingly, for adopting the perspective of Religiousness A; however, I will also and ultimately argue that the principle of infinite thankfulness as a corollary of that perspective flounders when it comes to making sense of (the eschatological implications of) the suffering of others. (shrink)

Einer weit verbreiteten Lesart zu folge hat Kant mit seiner Kritik der praktischen Vernunft den Ansatz der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sittenverworfen. Während er in der Grundlegung noch an einer Deduktion der Freiheit und Sittengesetzes arbeite, habe er diesen Gedanken in der zweiten Kritik mit seiner Theorie vom Faktum der Vernunft aufgegeben. Dementsprechend wird auch angenommen, dass das Gefühl der Achtung, welches in Kants Faktum-Lehre eine zentrale Rolle spielt, in der Grundlegung keine zentrale Funktion zukomme. Der vorliegende Aufsatz untersucht die (...) Funktion der Achtung in dieser Schrift und kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass der Achtung schon dieselbe moralepistemische Funktion zukommt, wie in der zweiten Kritik. Kant behandelt im Kontext der Zirkelproblematik der Grundlegung ausgiebig das moralische Interesse. Dieser Ausdruck ist lediglich ein anderer Begriff für die Achtung. Dieser kommt damit für die Auflösung des Zirkelverdachts in GMS III eine bedeutende Funktion zu und ihre Bedeutung für die Grundlegung als ganze muss revidiert werden. (shrink)