He finds the key in the concept of responsibility, which implies not only the freedom and flexibility of responsiveness to others but also a guiding ideal of ...

He is currently a research fellow at the University of Frankfurt. Theory and Politics is included in the series, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy.

Let A be a formula without implications, and Γ consist of formulas containing disjunction and falsity only negatively and implication only positively. Orevkov and Nadathur proved that classical derivability of A from Γ implies intuitionistic derivability, by a transformation of derivations in sequent calculi. We give a new proof of this result , where the input data are natural deduction proofs in long normal form involving stability axioms for relations; the proof gives a quadratic algorithm to remove the stability axioms. (...) This can be of interest for computational uses of classical proofs. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...) a global alternative. Hummell and Opp's research programme for the reduction of sociology to psychology is used as a starting?point and taken as the primary object of criticism. Following the introductory Section I, Section II analyses the three crucial notions of Hummell and Opp's research programme ? their explications of the notions of ?sociology?, ?psychology? and the concept of reduction itself ? and criticizes the authors? deficient ?logic of reduction?. Although the ?local? shortcomings of our authors? ?logic of reduction? do not affect reductionism as such, i.e. logically sound versions of reductionism as devised by Kemeny, Nagel, Oppenheim, Putnam, Woodger et al., it is argued that the logical soundness of sophisticated reductionism cannot compensate for its additional epistemological and methodological deficiencies. Section III analyses the ?dynamic? interpretation of reductionism as a particular developmental pattern of scientific growth. It is argued that even reductionism at its best can produce only cumulative progress, thus ?a priori? excluding scientific revolutions which are inevitably counter?inductive as well as counter?reductive. Section IV discusses the philosophical background of modern reductionism, and examines the effects both of reductionism and of anti?reductionistic pluralism on the autonomy of scientific fields. It is argued that pluralistic anti?reductionism undermines spurious claims for autonomy much more effectively than reductionism. As a ?local? improvement of the reductionistic research programme, the replacement of the predominant one?way reductionism by a less restrictive many?way reductionism is proposed. It is argued that the appropriate treatment for an allegedly backward science (say sociology) is not its reduction to an allegedly more advanced science (say psychology) but its non?reductive replacement by new theories (of the same or of another field) that do not incorporate the older ones. As a ?global? alternative to the reduction of sociology to psychology, the frontier?crossing direct application of psychological theories to sociological phenomena is proposed. A plea is made for a pluralistic science without reduction, based on intra? and interscientific criticism as the proper method for the advancement of knowledge. (shrink)

Reasoning about change is a central issue in research on human and robot planning. We study an approach to reasoning about action and change in a dynamic logic setting and provide a solution to problems which are related to the Frame problem. Unlike most work on the frame problem the logic described in this paper is monotonic. It (implicitly) allows for the occurrence of actions of multiple agents by introducing non-stationary notions of waiting and test. The need to state a (...) large number of frame axioms is alleviated by introducing a concept of chronological preservation to dynamic logic. As a side effect, this concept permits the encoding of temporal properties in a natural way. We compare the relative merits of our approach and non-monotonic approaches as regards different aspects of the frame problem. Technically, we show that the resulting extended systems of propositional dynamic logic preserve (weak) completeness, finite model property and decidability. (shrink)

That reality, and in particular the (dynamic) objects of signs, are independent of our thoughts or other representations is a crucial thesis of Peirce’s realism. On the other hand, his semiotics implies the claim that all reality and all real objects are real for us only because of the signs we use. Do these two claims contradict, even exclude, each other? I will argue that both Peirce’s metaphysics and his semiotics provide a natural via media: a structural account of the (...) openness of processes, featuring transitive relations, connects process ontology implicit in his evolutionary metaphysics and the relational, quasi-inferential features embodied in interpretational sequences of signs. It is shown that Peirce’s notion of a sign, its normative role and his account of the directional force of objects implies a sort of logical causality that supports the unity of objects. In this way sign sequences are able to relate flexibly sign use with contextually specified independent objects. That is to say, relational properties of object-oriented chains of interpretations provide sign users with a flexible, fallibilistic instrument able to capture by contingent identity relations (teridentity) of the identity of objects in changing situations. (shrink)

Professor Thielicke's lectures on nihilism deal with the experience of nothingness in Europe after World War II, and trace the development of the ism which attempts to interpret that experience.

The way physics and other parts of science work can be explained in the framework of radical constructivism. However, this constructivist view itself shows that a uniquily accepted epistemology, constructivism or any other, would not be an advantage for the developmentof science. Unlike physics some parts of science successfully use constructivist concepts inside their theories. Because this is the case particularly in learning theory, constructivist ideas can help to improve physics teaching.

This article explores the different uses of forms of direct verbal quotes in follow-up utterances delivered during the parliamentary debates after the inaugural speech of a new chancellor in the Austrian parliament and investigates their positioning effects for members of parliament who have the first opportunity of publicly ‘doing being a government or opposition MP’ in the new legislative term. Representing the first public confrontation between government and opposition MPs, the debates foreshadow topical and interpersonal aspects of the political frontstage (...) communication in the beginning legislative term. The main purpose of this article is to investigate the relations between formal properties of direct verbal quotes, recontextualization practices, their pragmatic function, and the specific aspect of the public personae speakers foreground by their use in the inaugural debates. Although direct quotations in follow-up utterances of MPs do not occur very often, the analyses demonstrate that this specific form of discourse representation deserves attention not only because it is mainly opposition MPs who use direct quotations in uptaking discourse units, but also because of the different semiotic aspects of direct quotes which are foregrounded in the investigated recontextualization practices. These practices result in MPs’ different public self-positionings toward their role of ‘being an opposition MP’, namely, either as policy-oriented arguers or as ironic evaluators. (shrink)

Globalisation seems to be especially the Westernisation of the World. One of the crucial elements of (Western) European cultural identity is the reference to its scientific and philosophical inheritance. European culture is held to be rooted in ancient Greece, where a unique, historically inevitable and irreversible transition from myth to reason is thought to have taken place. I shall try to re-examine this still predominant view to clarify the elements of Western thought by comparing it with its historical predecessors in (...) ancient Greek mythology in order to discuss its Euro-centric elements. For this purpose, two questions have to be asked: What is so special about ancient Greek philosophy? And how and why did it come into being? The arguments given to solve the first question are hardly convincing. If we might not be able to give a satisfying answer, the search for the reasons to come up with something like Western philosophy are becoming more important. (shrink)

Marxist philosophers are increasingly beginning to elaborate a philosophical axiology of their own, to articulate the meaning of socialism in axiological terms. Traditionally, Marxist doctrine has been very eager to present socialism and its motivation as a matter of scientific prediction rather than in terms of value judgments, wishes, or the proclamation of ideals. A more accurate analysis, however, shows that the Marxist undertanding of human social practice presupposes some active striving in relation to which all objects and circumstances of (...) human life receive a positive or negative meaning. It is just this practical relation of human subjects to their world (and of their world to them) that is conceptually grasped by the notion of value.From the theoretical point of view, Marxist axiology is not oriented towards some “realm of values” all values and value relations are understood strictly in anthropological terms as components of human and social practice, as some particular aspects which objects and circumstances assume in relation to actively striving beings and their qualitatively determined self-affirmation on a definite historical level. Marxist axiology presents itself both as a theoretical analysis of these value qualities and relations, and at the same time as a doctrine of practical involvement whose aim is to clarify and strengthen the socialist value consciousness.The basis of all these value relations lies in the system of human needs. According to Marxism, this system proves to be multi-dimensional, encompassing as its fundament the complex of “material needs” which are to be satisfied through work. But equally important and urgent for human beings are those needs and requirements in relation to which all social relations are characterized as being “worthy” or “unworthy” of man (such judgments being in accordance with some historical standard of claims). Finally, there are also those peculiar needs basic to the “aesthetic” qualities of objects as well as to the free (not imposed by natural or social necessities) and “purposeless” activities of human play and self-realization. The desideratum of socialism is to bring about a harmoniously proportioned synthesis in the satisfaction of the totality of human needs for the totality of human beings. Socialism is not only necessary and predictable in a scientific sense but also valuable and desirable for people.Several Marxist (and especially Soviet) authors have worked out the outlines of a Marxist philosophical axiology (V. P. Tugarinov, O. M. Bakuradze, V. A. Vasilenko and others). The opponents of such an enterprise (O. G. Drobnickij and others) have more or less radically contested the value and legitimacy of such a theory of value, for they consider value consciousness as a part of a pre-scientific way of thought. On the theoretical level the abstract specification of such value relationships constitute an artificial separation of the theoretical-practical unity and totality of human relations to the world.The author finds these objections not convincing because the danger of hypostatizing and isolating the “values”, of presenting them as some kind of substantial eternal entities, can fully be overcome by anthropological integration and sociological concretization of the “value aspect”. In a Marxist “philosophy of practice” something is not valuable in itself but is either positively or negatively significant for human beings. Certainly this development of axiology in Marxism is an attempt to set up a counterweight to the traditional scientific objectivism of the Marxist doctrine by confirming the right of people to judge and act “subjectively” on certain issues. (shrink)