The Ethics of War is an indispensable collection of essays addressing issues both timely and age-old about the nature and ethics of war. Features essays by great thinkers from ancient times through to the present day, among them Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, Russell, and Walzer Examines timely questions such as: When is recourse to arms morally justifiable? What moral constraints should apply to military conduct? How can a lasting peace be achieved? Will appeal to a broad range of (...) readers interested in morality and ethics in war time Includes informative introductions and helpful marginal notes by editors. (shrink)

If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, (...) and in the process delineate a species of epistemic luck that has hitherto gone unnoticed—what we call propositional epistemic luck—but which we claim is crucial to accounting for the importance of proper basing. As we will see, in order to understand why this type of epistemic luck is malignant, we also need to reflect on the relationship between epistemic luck and epistemic risk. (shrink)

In his article ‘The substance view: A critique’, Rob Lovering argues that the substance view –according to which a human person comes into existence at the moment of conception – leads to such implausible implications that this view should be abandoned. I responded to his reductio arguments in ‘A critique of Rob Lovering's criticism of the substance view’ and concluded that his arguments did not justify a rejection of the substance view. Now Lowering and William Simkulet have both responded to (...) my criticism, claiming that my criticism of Lovering's article did not refute his original arguments. In this article I respond to their criticism and conclude that, while the substance view has some less plausible implications, none of them justify a complete refutation of this view. (shrink)

A collection of new essays on the influential medieval philosopher John Buridan, written by leading Buridan scholars. The volume places Buridan in his philosophical context and examines his writings on topics including logic, modal logic, paradoxes, metaphysics, epistemology, theory of knowledge, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy.

Inference to the best explanation—or, IBE—tells us to infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, best explain that evidence. As Peter Lipton puts it, the core idea driving IBE is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference. But what is the epistemic status of IBE, itself? One issue of contemporary interest is whether it is possible to provide a justification for IBE itself which is non- objectionably circular. We aim to carve out some new (...) space in this debate. In particular, we suggest that the matter of whether a given rule-circular argument is objectionably circular itself depends crucially on some subtle distinctions which have been made in the recent literature on perceptual warrant. By bringing these debates together, a principled reason emerges for why some kinds of rule-circular justifications for IBE are considerably less objectionable than others. (shrink)

In recent work, Mark Alfano and Jennifer Saul have put forward a similar kind of provocative sceptical challenge. Both appeal to recent literature in empirical psychology to show that our judgments across a wide range of cases are riddled with unreliable cognitive heuristics and biases. Likewise, they both conclude that we know a lot less than we have hitherto supposed, at least on standard conceptions of what knowledge involves. It is argued that even if one grants the empirical claims that (...) Saul and Alfano make, the sceptical conclusion that they canvass might not be as dramatic as it first appears. It is further argued, however, that one can reinstate a more dramatic sceptical conclusion by targeting their argument not at knowledge but rather at the distinct epistemic standing of understanding. (shrink)

In a recent article, William Simkulet has argued against the anti-abortion view by invoking the fact that many human fetuses die from spontaneous abortion. He argues that this fact poses a dilemma for proponents of the anti-abortion view: either they must abandon their anti-abortion view or they must engage in preventing spontaneous abortion significantly more than at present—either to the extent that they try to prevent induced abortion or at least significantly more than they do today. In this reply, I (...) acknowledge that, if the latter would follow, the anti-abortionist view would imply implausibly strong obligations. My aim with this reply is to demonstrate that anti-abortionists can hold on to their view without having implausibly strong obligations to prevent spontaneous abortion. My conclusion is that Simkulet clearly overstates his position by not sufficiently considering the differences between the act of killing versus death by natural causes and between positive and negative rights. (shrink)

In his article, The Substance View: a critique, Rob Lovering argues that the substance view – according to which the human embryo is a person entitled to human rights – leads to such implausible implications that this view should be abandoned. In this article I respond to his criticism by arguing that either his arguments fail because the proponents of the substance view are not obligated to hold positions which may be considered absurd, or because the positions which they are (...) assumed to be obligated to hold, are not absurd at all. (shrink)

Philosophical Explorations, Volume 15, Issue 2, Page 87-90, June 2012.

A familiar point in the literature on the epistemology of disagreement is that in the face of disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer the epistemically virtuous agent should adopt a stance of intellectual humility. That is, the virtuous agent should take a conciliatory stance and reduce her commitment to the proposition under dispute. In this paper, we ask the question of how such intellectual humility would manifest itself in a corresponding peer disagreement regarding knowledge-how. We argue that while it is (...) relatively straightforward to recast this debate in terms of a reductive intellectualist account of knowledge-how, whereby knowledge-how just is a matter of having a particular propositional attitude, the issue becomes more complex once we turn to anti-intellectualist positions. On these views, after all, such a disagreement won’t be just a matter of disagreeing about the truth of a proposition. Accordingly, to the extent that some kind of conciliation is plausibly required of the virtuous agent in the face of a recognised peer disagreement, this conciliation will not consist simply in belief revision. We propose a novel way to address this problem. We claim that what is required of the epistemically virtuous agent when confronted with peer disagreement regarding knowing how to φ is that thereafter she should be disposed to employ her way of φ-ing across a narrower range of practical circumstances than beforehand. Moreover, just as an agent needs to call on her intellectual virtues in order to determine the extent of conciliation required in an ordinary case of epistemic peer disagreement, so the intellectual virtues will play an important role in determining this shift in dispositions to φ that occurs as regards epistemic peer disagreement about knowledge-how. (shrink)

This scholarly article delves into the intricate realm of metaphysics, specifically focusing on the nature of self and personal identity. Drawing from various philosophical traditions and contemporary perspectives, the article aims to explore the fundamental questions surrounding what constitutes the self and how personal identity is established. The examination encompasses both historical and modern philosophical inquiries, providing a comprehensive overview of the metaphysical underpinnings of identity.

How can we assess the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making? Sceptics doubt such assessments are possible, as they must rely on controversial substantive standards of truth and rightness. Challenging that scepticism, this paper suggests a procedure-independent standard for assessing the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making by evaluating whether it is adequately supported by reasons. Adequate support for conclusion is a necessary aspect of epistemic quality for any epistemic justification of democracy, though particularly relevant to theories that emphasize public deliberation. Finding (...) existing methods for measuring the quality of public discourse to fall short, we draw on an epistemological theory of argumentation to provide a more sophisticated approach to evaluating the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making, illustrate how the approach can be used, and demonstrate its relevance for the epistemic turn in democratic theory. (shrink)

While most theorists agree with the claim that human beings have high and equal moral standing, there are strong disagreements about how to justify this claim. These disagreements arise because there are different ways of managing the difficulty of finding a basis for this claim, which is sufficiently substantial to do this justifying work, but not vary in degree in order to not give rise to inequality of moral considerability. The aim of this paper is to review previous attempts to (...) address this difficulty and to demonstrate why they fail and then to defend another way of dealing with this challenge by applying two views: the substance view on the human person and the natural-law account of morality. My claim is that this approach has comparative advantages because it provides a binary and a normatively significant basis of justification for equality without being implausibly inclusive. (shrink)

Epistemic anti-individualism is the view that positive epistemic statuses fail to supervene on internal, physical or mental, properties of individuals. Intellectual humility is a central intellectual virtue in the pursuit of such statuses. After some introductory remarks, this paper provides an argument for epistemic anti-individualism with respect to a virtue-theoretic account of testimonial knowledge. An outline of a dual-aspect account of intellectual humility is then offered. The paper proceeds to argue that insofar as testimonial knowledge is concerned, this stripe of (...) epistemic anti-individualism leads to a particular account of intellectual humility. (shrink)

Epistemological contextualism has become one of the most important and widely discussed new proposals in the theory of knowledge. This special issue contributes to the debate by bringing together some of the main participants to provide a state-of-the-art discussion of the proposal. Here we offer a brief overview of the contextualist position, describe some of the main lines of criticism that have been levelled against the view, and present a summary of each of the contributions to this collection.

The aim of this paper is to encourage liberals to reconsider whether liberalism needs to be compatible with naturalism—as is demanded by public reason liberalism—by showing the comparative cost of that and the advantages of grounding liberalism in theism, which is the main alternative to naturalism. The reason why theism provides better grounds for defending liberalism than naturalism does, is that justifying human freedom and equality—which are core values of liberalism—in a robust way, requires metaphysical assumptions that cohere better within (...) a theistic rather than naturalistic framework. More specifically, I argue that liberals should adopt agent-causal libertarianism (ACL) and favor what I will call an endowment account of equality (EAE). Both ACL and EAE are best supported by postulating theistic and theistic-friendly assumptions about the human nature. (shrink)

It is often assumed that people of faith should not endorse a law for religious reasons, since such an endorsement is considered to be disrespectful. Such a position is increasingly opposed by scholars who argue that such demands unjustifiably force people of faith to compromise their religious ideals. In order to defend their opposition to such demands, some scholars have invoked thought experiments as reductio arguments against the claim that endorsing laws dependent on religious reasons is necessarily disrespectful. I argue (...) that these attempts have failed, and present an alternative thought experiment that demonstrates that such a law is not necessarily disrespectful. Because I conclude that previously proposed principles cannot defend this conclusion, I defend an alternative way of accommodating this intuition; a post-secular deliberative approach based on the principle of double effect. (shrink)

Summary This article analyses the Danish 1909 celebrations of the centenary of Charles Darwin's birth on 12 February 1809. I argue that the 1909 meetings, lectures and publications devoted to Darwin and his theory of evolution by natural selection can be characterised by ambivalence: on the one hand, tribute to a great man of science who established a new view of nature and, on the other hand, scepticism towards the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection and the wider religious and political (...) implications drawn from his theory. The article examines both professional and popular commemorative activities, focusing primarily on celebratory articles carried in widely circulated magazines and newspapers. I identify three types of interpretations of Darwin's ideas which I characterise as ‘radical’, ‘evangelical’ and ‘safe’ science. These different positions were closely linked to the political and cultural divisions of the periodical press. Moreover, my analysis of the popular press offers a solid basis for asserting that to most people Darwinism was associated with human evolution, primarily the relationship between man and apes, while more sophisticated discussions about the crisis of Darwinism prominent among naturalists played only a secondary role in the public arena. This article demonstrates the value of using newspapers as historical sources when looking for public images of Darwin, popular receptions of Darwinism and representations of science in general. (shrink)

Om den teknologiske tids verdensbillede.

This article describes a project which involved an attempt to integrate an expert system with a hypertext database of primary and secondary text materials. Our chosen legal domain was that of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (The Brussels Convention 1968). In this article, we address three dimensions of system design. With regard to the legal dimension, we consider the choice of domain and the representation of both knowledge and data in the (...) system. On the technological dimension, we discuss the selection of software development tools and problems associated with keeping knowledge bases and databases up-to-date. Finally, we pay particular attention to the Cinderella dimension of legal expert system development — the user interface. (shrink)

Abortion critics have argued that one should err on the side of life and prohibit abortion since the status of the fetus is uncertain. David Boonin has criticized this precautionary argument, but his criticism has been ignored. The aim is to elaborate on the precautionary argument by responding to Boonin’s criticism. Boonin considers three versions of the precautionary argument—the disaster avoidance argument, the maximin argument, and the expected utility argument; yet all three are judged unsuccessful for the same reasons: they (...) lead to unacceptable implications, they lead to conclusions that are too weak, and they undermine the integrity of moral reasoning. I respond to this criticism by arguing that one can avoid unacceptable implications by considering a criterion of realism, that the weaker conclusions are rather an advantage, and that the application of the precautionary principle makes room for considerations which maintain the integrity of moral reasoning. I also consider some criticism beyond Boonin’s objections. (shrink)

We aim to move the externalism and self-knowledge debate forward by exploring two novel sceptical challenges to the prospects of self-knowledge of a paradigmatic sort, both of which result from ways in which our thought content, cognitive processes and cognitive successes depend crucially on our external environments. In particular, it is shown how arguments from extended cognition ; Clark A. Supersizing the mind: Embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press ) and situationism, Alfano M. Expanding the situationist challenge (...) to reliabilism about inference. In Fairweather A Virtue epistemology naturalized, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 103–122 ; Doris JM. Noûs 32:504–530, Doris JM. Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ; Harman G. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 99:315–331, Harman G. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:223–226 ) pose hitherto unexplored challenges to the prospects of self-knowledge as it is traditionally conceived. It is shown, however, that, suitably understood, these apparent challenges in fact only demonstrate two ways in which our cognitive lives can be dependent on our environment. As such, rather than undermining our prospects for attaining self-knowledge, they instead illustrate how self-knowledge can be extended and expanded. (shrink)

This paper introduces the articles in this volume, and offers an overview of each piece.

The social sciences lack concepts and theories for an understanding of what new information technology is doing to our society. The article sketches the outlines of a broad historical and comparative approach to this issue: ‘an anthropology of information technology’. At the base is the idea ofexternalisation of knowledge as a historical process. Three main epochs are characterised by externalisation of knowledge through a) spoken language and a social organisation of specialists, b) writing and c) computer programming. The impact of (...) expert systems on learning is also discussed. (shrink)

Systems theory is proposed as a major resource for reconceptualizing a Christian theology of creation. Section I outlines the principles of the theory of autopoietic systems and discusses in particular Manfred Eigen's and Stuart Kauffman's differing views of the emergence of life. Section II shows how biblical texts conceive of God's “blessing” as a divine installment and reshaping of spatio‐temporal fields for creaturely self‐productivity. On this double basis, Section III undertakes a constructive attempt to formulate a theology of self‐productivity within (...) a Trinitarian framework. The unity of divine self‐consistency and capacity for self‐relativization is seen as the clue for understanding how God not only sustains the world in general but also influences particular processes by changing the overall probability pattern of evolving systems. (shrink)

"A critical investigation of modern naturalism is vitally needed for a deeper understanding of pragmatism's ability to offer enriching perspectives on contemporary philosophy of science. The kind of non-reductive naturalism so often associated with pragmatism needs to be assessed for its plausibility, as does whether a pragmatist perspective on different human ways of conceiving of the world can mediate between different points of view, especially those of natural science and common sense"-- Publisher summary.

This paper considers two deflationary responses to the Fitch argument on behalf of the semantic anti-realistthat is, two responses which aim to evade the conclusion of that argument by, on a principled basis, weakening one of the principles essentially employed. The first deflationary approach that is consideredwhich proceeds by weakening the factivity principle for knowledgeis shown to be ultimately unpromising, but a second approachwhich proceeds by weakening the knowability principle that is at the heart of semantic anti-realismis shown to have (...) considerable prima facie appeal. It is then argued that some key objections that one might raise for this approach are on closer inspection ineffective. (shrink)

The two tragedies argument (2TA) has been raised as a response to the argument against abortion from spontaneous abortion (or miscarriages). According to this argument against the antiabortion position (AAP), miscarriages should be of great concern for proponents of this position since they result in a greater amount of deaths of human beings than induced abortions do. According to critics of AAP, this fact undermines its plausibility, since proponents of the AAP either must try to prevent miscarriages to the same (...) extent as they try to prevent abortions or abandon their opposition to at least some abortions—which are not acceptable options for proponents of APP. The claim of 2TA is that one can differentiate between induced abortion and miscarriages due to the fact that the former involves the act of killing of another human being. This fact adds a tragedy to the tragedy that both abortions and miscarriages result in – the death of a human being – and contributes to justifying the choice of proponents of AAP to prioritise the prevention of abortions rather than miscarriages. In this response, I defend 2TA against criticism that claims that this argument is: (1) inconsistent with the AAP and (2) trivialises the death of the fetus. My claim is that the first line of criticism rests on a misunderstanding of the premises of 2TA while the second line of criticism rests on a disanalogous thought experiment. I therefore conclude that these objections fail. (shrink)

Liberalism and naturalism are the reigning orthodoxies of most faculties today, while dualism is overwhelmingly rejected. The overarching claim defended in this paper is that liberals should consider dualism more seriously than what currently seems to be the case. This claim will be defended in two stages. First, I will argue that dualism provides better resources with which to defend foundational liberal commitments to human equality and human agency than those naturalism offers. Secondly, I will argue that dualism is plausible (...) enough to be seriously considered by liberals granted that this view is friendlier to liberal commitments than naturalism is. (shrink)

Wright (In Gendler and Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and possibility, 2002) rejects some dominant responses to Kripke’s modal argument against the mind-body identity theory, and instead he proposes a new response that draws on a certain understanding of counterpossibles. This paper offers some defensive remarks on behalf of Lewis’ objection to that argument, and it argues that Wright’s proposal fails to fully accommodate the conceivability intuitions, and that it is dialectically ineffective.

The background for this special issue is the multidisciplinary workshop "Minds, Models and Mechanisms: Current Trends in Philosophy of Psychiatry" which was held at Saarland University in April 2021. Though we had to switch to an online format due to the pandemic, the discussions at the event have been extremely inspiring. It brought together experts from diverse disciplines, like clinical psychiatry, neuroscience, computational modelling, philosophy of mind and cognition, and philosophy of science. Joining forces, researchers from these disciplines presented their (...) ideas on the subject. In the aftermath of the workshop, the organizers issued an open call for contributions. After a rigorous review process five papers made it into the final issue, each making an original contribution to the field. (shrink)

Chronic widespread pain is one of the most difficult pain conditions to treat due to an unknown etiology and a lack of innovative treatment design and effectiveness. Based upon preliminary findings within the fields of motivational psychology, integrative neuroscience, diaphragmatic breathing, and vagal nerve stimulation, we propose a new treatment intervention, motivational nondirective resonance breathing, as a means of reducing pain and suffering in patients with chronic widespread pain. Motivational nondirective resonance breathing provides patients with a noninvasive means of potentially (...) modulating five psychophysiological mechanisms imperative for endogenously treating pain and increasing overall quality of life. (shrink)

As in other European countries, in Denmark philosophy was an important factor in the cultural life of the nineteenth century. Kierkegaard lived and wrote in Copenhagen, where Hegelianism both flourished and met with serious criticism, and both of these elements can be found in his authorship. This chapter explores possible sources of inspiration for Kierkegaard's rejection of Danish Hegelianism and its follower, speculative theology, and discusses his influence on the fashionable Danish philosopher of the day, Rasmus Nielsen. By way of (...) conclusion, it is emphasized that Kierkegaard's understanding of Christianity and his struggle over it were decisive for a shift in Danish intellectual life around 1870. (shrink)

This is a collective study of philosophical questions to do with experts and expertise, such as: What is an expert? Who decides who the experts are? Should we always defer to experts? How should expertise inform public policy? What happens when the experts disagree? Must experts be unbiased? Does it matter what the source of the expertise is?