Assuming that there is moral progress, and assuming that the abolition of slavery is an example of it, how does moral progress occur? Is it mainly driven by specific individuals who have gained new moral insights, or by changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions in which agents morally judge the norms and practices of their society, and act upon these judgements? In this paper, I argue that moral progress is a complex process in which changes at the level of (...) belief and changes at the level of institutions and social practices are deeply intertwined, and that changes in the socio‐economic and epistemic conditions of moral agency constitute the main motor of moral progress. I develop my view of moral progress by way of grappling with Michelle Moody‐Adams’ prominent philosophical account of it. My view is less intellectualistic and individualistic than hers, does not presuppose meta‐ethical moral realism, and blurs her distinction between moral progress in beliefs and moral progress in social practices. I point out the limits of humans to progress morally, which are partly grounded in our evolutionary history, and argue that moral progress is always of a ‘local’ nature. (shrink)

Science-fiction (SF) has become a reference point in the discourse on the ethics and risks surrounding artificial intelligence (AI). Thus, AI in SF—science-fictional AI—is considered part of a larger corpus of ‘AI narratives’ that are analysed as shaping the fears and hopes of the technology. SF, however, is not a foresight or technology assessment, but tells dramas for a human audience. To make the drama work, AI is often portrayed as human-like or autonomous, regardless of the actual technological limitations. Taking (...) science-fictional AI too literally, and even applying it to science communication, paints a distorted image of the technology's current potential and distracts from the real-world implications and risks of AI. These risks are not about humanoid robots or conscious machines, but about the scoring, nudging, discrimination, exploitation, and surveillance of humans by AI technologies through governments and corporations. AI in SF, on the other hand, is a trope as part of a genre-specific mega-text that is better understood as a dramatic means and metaphor to reflect on the human condition and socio-political issues beyond technology. (shrink)

Impressions, energy radiated by phenomena in the momentary environmental scene, enter sensory neurons, creating in afferent nerves a data stream. Following Kant, by our inner sense the mind perceives its own thoughts as it ties together sense data into an internalized scene. The mind, residing in the brain, logically a Language Machine, processes and stores items as coded grammatical entities. Kantian synthetic unity in the linguistic brain is able to deliver our experience of the scene as we appear to see (...) it. Uniquely, the brain records its own history, synthesizing a Movie-in-the-Brain, called the Noumenal Cosmos. Attempting thereby to represent the actual Universe, this makes for a sovereign brain that governs itself. The brain is domicile of an Ego, with its selfhood at stake at all times. Yet, it can know itself only by its actions, in which it appears as an actor in its own movie. Phenomena enter garbled, as confused apparitions, and must be put in good form using top–down feedback control by Ego, so that each movie frame makes rational sense within the overall context of the Noumenal Cosmos. A stack of frames is processed typically in 40 Hz rhythm with 300 ms process time each, for about 12 in the stack at any time. Successive neural centers are processing the stack in the brain assembly line, based on data from increasingly global receptive fields. Ego stitches together the movie frames, but only the top frame is in consciousness for 25 ms. The top frame contains the whole scene where the Ego makes an appearance as the actor that imposes Kantian synthetic unity on the scene, merely an assembly of grammatical texts, in a system-internal coded process language, fitting the scene into the Noumenal Cosmos. But Ego observes Ego only to the extent permitted by the objectivity rule, only what it does and thinks, not its true face. From the Noumenal Cosmos, the Ego receives grammatical messages in the internal sense code. They are integrated into a whole in the reaction of the Ego to the momentary scene. The voluntary nature of Ego’s decisions is explained, based on its ability to code in advance its own actions sequentially in time, as it sees fit with a view to an orderly Noumenal Cosmos, records of code being arranged spatially in neural structures. (shrink)

Vorwort Fruhe Abhandlungen zum Verstandnis der Phanomenologie des Geistes. I. Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Hegelschen Geisteswelt - II. Hegels Aesthetik-Vorlesungen in ihrem Verhaltnis zur Phanomenologie des Geistes - III. Hebbel und Hegel. Ein Versuch zur Erfassung ihres gemeinsamen Ideen-Bereichs Der Begriff in Hegels Philosophie. Versuch einer logischen Einleitung in das metalogische Grundproblem des Hegelianismus. Vorbemerkungen - Erster Abschnitt: Wandlungen des Begriffs Begriff von Aristoteles bis Hegel (im Abriss dargestellt) - I. Logik und Erkenntnistheorie: der Weg vom Begriff zum Urteil - II. (...) Erkenntnistheorie und Philosophie: der Weg vom Urteil zum Gegenstand - III. Philosophie und Welt: der Weg vom theoretischen Gegenstand zur theoretisch-atheoretischen Welterfahrung Zweiter Abschnitt: Wandlungen des Begriffs Begriff innerhalb der Hegelschen Philosophie. I. Der Begriff in seiner ursprunglich-logischen Bedeutung - II. Die Idee, eine uberlogische Gestalt des Begriffes - III. Der Geist, die metaphysische Wurzel der Idee und damit des Begriffes in seiner uberlogischen Gestalt. - Hegels Metalogik Schlussbetrachtungen. I. Der mittlere Standpunkt. Das Bewusstsein. Der Widerspruch und seine Aufhebung - II. Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis oder das Ein-und-Andere, das Ganze und das Eine - III. Hegels Wirksamkeit und die Unausgeglichenheit seines Systematisierens - IV. Die Versohnung mit der Wirklichkeit. Zustand und Gegenstand Welt Die ethisch-politische Personlichkeit des Philosophen. Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung zur Umgestaltung der Hegelschen Geisteswelt. I. Programmatische Darlegung der hauptsachlichsten Probleme. Die doppelte Heterothetik des Ich - II. Der mittlere Standpunkt. Das Ich als Gegenstand. Die Panarchie des Logischen. Der Weg vom Ein-und-Anderen zum Ganzen, All-Einen und Einzigen. Para-physik. Erkenntnis mit Selbstkorrektur. Das gegenstandliche Zusammen. Die Personlichkeit - III. Die Verpflichtung, die durch die Welt geht. D". (shrink)

The anthology focuses on the major classical pragmatist theories of religion. It is unique in pointing out pragmatist concepts of religious individualization as alternatives to the common secularization discourse and by stressing the compatibility of religious individualism with a positive concept of community.

Journal Name: Philologus Issue: Ahead of print.