Interrogations and elections were two branches of Arabic judicial astrology made available in Latin translation to readers in western Europe from the twelfth century. Through an analysis of the theory and practice of interrogations and elections, including the writing of the Jewish astrologer Sahl b. Bishr, this essay considers the extent to which judicial astrology was practiced in the medieval west. Consideration is given to historical examples of interrogations and elections mostly from late medieval English manuscripts. These include the work (...) of John Dunstaple , the musician and astrologer who is known have served at the court of John, duke of Bedford. On the basis of the relatively small number of surviving historical horoscopes, it is argued that the practice of interrogations and elections lagged behind the theory. (shrink)

Creations of the Mind presents sixteen original essays by theorists from a wide variety of disciplines who have a shared interest in the nature of artifacts and their implications for the human mind. All the papers are written specially for this volume, and they cover a broad range of topics concerned with the metaphysics of artifacts, our concepts of artifacts and the categories that they represent, the emergence of an understanding of artifacts in infants' cognitive development, as well as the (...) evolution of artifacts and the use of tools by non-human animals. This volume will be a fascinating resource for philosophers, cognitive scientists, and psychologists, and the starting point for future research in the study of artifacts and their role in human understanding, development, and behaviour.Contributors: John R. Searle, Richard E. Grandy, Crawford L. Elder, Amie L. Thomasson, Jerrold Levinson, Barbara C. Malt, Steven A. Sloman, Dan Sperber, Hilary Kornblith, Paul Bloom, Bradford Z. Mahon, Alfonso Caramazza, Jean M. Mandler, Deborah Kelemen, Susan Carey, Frank C. Keil, Marissa L. Greif, Rebekkah S. Kerner, James L. Gould, Marc D. Hauser, Laurie R. Santos, Steven Mithen. (shrink)

explores the interaction between psychology and epistemology and addresses empirical questions about how we should arrive at our beliefs, and whether the processes by which we arrive at our beliefs are the ones by which we ought to arrive at our beliefs.

We often find that beliefs we hold are in conflict with the beliefs of epistemic peers, individuals who are just as intelligent, just as well-informed, and just as scrupulous in forming their beliefs as we are. Is it permissible to maintain our beliefs in the face of such disagreement? It is argued here that continued belief in these circumstances is not epistemically permissible, and that this has striking consequences for the practice of philosophy: we cannot reasonably hold on to our (...) philosophical views. (shrink)

This paper examines the relationship between methodological naturalism and the standard practice within philosophy of constructing theories on the basis of our intuitions about imaginary cases, especially in the work of Alvin Goldman. It is argued that current work in cognitive science presents serious problems for Goldman's approach.

It has been maintained by such philosophers as Quine and Goodman that purely ‘extensional’ language suffices for all the purposes of properly formalized scientific discourse. Those entities that were traditionally called ‘universals’ — properties, concepts, forms, etc. — are rejected by these extensionalist philosophers on the ground that ‘the principle of individuation is not clear’. It is conceded that science requires that we allow something tantamount to quantification over non-particulars (or, anyway, over things that are not material objects, not space-time (...) points, not physical fields, etc.), but, the extensionalists contend, quantification over sets serves the purposes nicely. The ‘ontology’ of modern science, at least as Quine formalizes it, comprises material objects (or, alternatively, space-time points), sets of material objects, sets of sets of material objects,... but no properties, concepts,or forms. Let us thus examine the question: Can the principle of individuation for properties ever be made clear? (shrink)

Prioritarianism is supposed to be a theory of the overall good that captures the common intuition of . But it is difficult to give precise content to the prioritarian claim. Over the past few decades, prioritarians have increasingly responded to this by formulating prioritarianism not in terms of an alleged primitive notion of quantity of well-being, but instead in terms of von NeumannPrimitivistTechnicalpriority to the worse offMorgenstern utility is a retrograde step.

The notion of a reason often plays a central role in epistemological theories. Justification is often explained in terms of the having of appropriate reasons, and a variety of epistemological distinctions are most naturally explained, it seems, by adverting to reasons. This paper examines the extent to which we may, instead, make do without appeal to such a notion. It is argued that the extent to which the notion of a reason should play an important role in epistemological theorizing will (...) depend on how our psychological theories of belief acquisition and belief change are best conceptualized. (shrink)

Kind representations, concepts like table, triangle, dog, and planet, underlie generic language. Here, we investigate the formal structure of kind representations—the structure that distinguishes kind representations from other types of representations. The present studies confirm that participants distinguish generic‐supporting properties of individuals (e.g., this watch is made of steel) and accidental properties (e.g., this watch is on the nightstand). Furthermore, work dating back to Aristotle establishes that only some generic‐supporting properties bear a principled connection to the kind, that is, are (...) true of an individual by virtue of its being a member of a specific kind (e.g., telling time for a watch). The present studies tested the hypothesis that principled connections are part of the formal structure of kind representations. Specifically, they tested whether they structure a newly learned kind representation. Experiment 1 found that introducing a property of a newly encountered novel kind in any one of four linguistic frames that provide evidence that a property has a principled connection to a kind (e.g., “It has fur because it is a blick”) led participants to infer a different conceptual consequence of principled connections (i.e., “There is something wrong with this blick, which does not have fur”) for which they had no direct evidence. Two introduction frames that provided no evidence for principled connections (e.g., “Almost all blicks have fur”) did not generate the same consequence. Experiment 2 found that all of the targeted properties were generic licensing, irrespective of the introduction frame. That the distinction between properties that bear principled connections to their kinds, and merely generic‐supporting properties structures novel kind representations, provides strong evidence that this distinction is part of the formal structure of kind representations. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 6, June 2020, Page 75-77.

This paper defends an approach to epistemology which treats the study of knowledge as on a par with the study of natural kinds. Knowledge is seen as a natural phenomenon subject to empirical investigation. In particular, it is argued that work in cognitive ethology is relevant to understanding the nature of knowledge, and that this approach sheds light on traditional philosophical questions about knowledge, including questions about the source of epistemic normativity.

Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology . This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.

This paper describes and assesses a number of dispositions which are instrumental in allowing us to take on the opinions of others unselfconsciously. It is argued that these dispositions are in fact reliable in the environments in which they tend to come into play. In addition, it is argued that agents are, by their own lights, justified in the beliefs they arrive at as a result of these processes. Finally, these processes are argued to provide a basis for rejecting the (...) claim that fixation of belief is radically holistic. (shrink)

Studies of reasoning have often invoked a distinction between a natural or ordinary consideration of the premises, in which they are interpreted, and even distorted, in the light of empirical knowledge, and an analytic or logical consideration of the premises, in which they are analysed in a literal fashion for their logical implications. Two or three years of schooling have been seen as critical for the spontaneous use of analytic reasoning. In two experiments, however, 4-year-olds who were given brief instructions (...) that prompted use of an analytic approach continued to adopt this approach one week later. Thus, when given syllogistic problems in which the major premise was incongruent with their empirical knowledge (e.g. "All snow is black"), instructed children reasoned more accurately from that premise both immediately and a week later as compared to children given only a basic introduction. A third experiment showed that instructions also improved 4-year-olds' performance on hard-to-imagine, abstract material (e.g."All mib is white"). Similarities between the effects of brief instruction and of schooling are discussed. (shrink)

There is a worry about the intellectual legitimacy of philosophy. Although the sciences have a progressive history, with later theories largely building on earlier ones, and a tremendous amount of agreement within the scientific community about the approximate truth of current theory, philosophy is different. We do not see a progressive history of philosophical theorizing, and there is little agreement within the philosophical community about which theories are even roughly correct. This not only encourages a certain skepticism about the possibility (...) of philosophical knowledge, but a real question about whether the activity of philosophical theorizing is intellectually legitimate. It is argued here that there are features of a naturalistic methodology in philosophy which have the resources to respond to these concerns. (shrink)

Laurence BonJour has defended the view that we have an a priori intellectual capacity to understand the nature of proper reason. This view is critically examined in detail and a naturalistic alternative is proposed and defended according to which our understanding of proper reasoning requires a posteriori support.

Some philosophers believe that epistemological theories are a priori knowable. Others weaken this claim slightly, arguing that epistemological theorizing is properly conducted “from the armchair.” It is argued here that even this claim is far too strong. This paper defends the view that epistemological theorizing must take account of empirical work in psychology, and, without this, epistemology inevitably loses touch with the very phenomena it seeks to account for.

This essay explores how, for many minoritized peoples, cyborg ontology is experienced as dehumanizing rather than posthumanizing. Rereading Haraway’s Cyborg Manifesto through a decolonial, transfeminist lens, it explores the implications of Haraway’s assertion that cyborg subjectivity is the “illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism” by examining the modern/colonial development and deployment of microprosthetic hormonal technologies – so often heralded as one of the technologies ushering in a queer, posthuman, post-gender future – as mechanisms of gendered and racialized subjective control (...) operative at the level of the biomolecular. (shrink)

Effective documentation is considered a core competency for clinical ethics consultation. Ethics consultants within the Cleveland Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio, observed variation in the formatting of ethics chart notes across consultants and realized that this formatting was based on their own views of effectiveness. To minimize variation and optimize the readability and understandability of ethics chart notes for end users, a team undertook a quality improvement project to assess the formatting preferences of healthcare professionals who rely on ethics consultation notes. (...) The team developed three sample templates and conducted interviews with stakeholders to understand their preferences. A single standardized template was developed based on the preferences that emerged, which all consultants on the ethics consultation service then utilized. In the first five months of implementation, the percentage of end user respondents marking the highest Likert scale option on a post-consultation survey regarding whether the ethics consultation service provided helpful documentation increased from 60 percent to 72 percent compared to the same five-month period in the year prior. (shrink)

Decisions about continuing or terminating a pregnancy touch on profound, individualized questions about bodily integrity, reproductive autonomy, deeply held values regarding one's capacity for parenthood, and, in the case of a high-risk pregnancy, the risks one is willing to take to have a baby. So far as possible, reproductive decisions are made between a patient, in some cases her partner, and her medical provider. However, this standard framework cannot be applied if the patient lacks decision-making capacity. In this essay, we (...) discuss one such case that came before our clinical ethics team. We describe the challenges of respecting a patient's reproductive preferences when the patient cannot share what those preferences are, and we argue that decisions regarding reproductive health care should not be treated with exceptionalism. Rather, they should proceed under the normal processes of surrogate decision-making, including the application of substituted judgment. This approach enables us to take the patient's values into account when considering the questions implicated in reproductive health care, just as we do for other kinds of health care decisions in which a patient's deeply held values are salient. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 3, March 2020, Page 39-41.

Drawing on pedagogical tools utilized in clinical scenario simulation and emergency preparedness training, the authors describe an innovative method for teaching clinical ethics consultation skills, which they call a “tabletop” exercise. Implemented at the end of a clinical ethics intensive course, the tabletop enables learners to implement the knowledge and practice the skills they gained during the course. The authors highlight the pedagogical tools on which the tabletop exercise draws, describe the tabletop exercise itself, offer how to best operationalize such (...) an exercise, reflect on the method’s strengths and weaknesses, and provide insights for others who may want to implement their own tabletop for ethics consultation education. (shrink)