This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Mr. Berlin offers, with characteristic brilliance and insight, a compelling indictment of the modern tendency to deny the relevance of moral considerations to history: to minimize the influence of human individuals upon--and their responsibility for--historical events, as well as to eliminate evaluation and moral judgment from the writing of history. History, it is maintained, neither can be nor should try to be "objective," i.e., free from evaluations, in the way that physics is "objective." Mr. Berlin's points are not always (...) clearly organized, but they are sensible and telling; his running critique of the prevalent naive "scientism" of contemporary social scientists is especially effective.--V. C. C. (shrink)

History and chronicle, by B. Croce.--History as a system, by J. Ortega y Gasset.--The idea of history, by R. G. Collingwood.--The historian's purpose; history and metahistory, by A. Bullock.--What are historians trying to do? By H. Pirenne.--What are historical facts? By C. Becker.--The concept of scientific history, by I. Berlin.--Reason in history, by G. W. F. Hegel.--The hedgehog and the fox, by I. Berlin.--What is history? By E. H. Carr.--Faith and history, by R. Niebuhr.--The world and the west, by (...) A. Toynbee.--Debates with historians, by P. Geyl.--Has history any meaning? By K. R. Popper.--Historical inevitability, by I. Berlin.--On fortune and misfortune in history, by J. Burckhardt.--Selected readings (p. 179-181). (shrink)

Life's Solution builds a persuasive case for the predictability of evolutionary outcomes. The case rests on a remarkable compilation of examples of convergent evolution, in which two or more lineages have independently evolved similar structures and functions. The examples range from the aerodynamics of hovering moths and hummingbirds to the use of silk by spiders and some insects to capture prey. Going against the grain of Darwinian orthodoxy, this book is a must read for anyone grappling with the meaning of (...) evolution and our place in the Universe. Simon Conway Morris is the Ad Hominen Professor in the Earth Science Department at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of St. John's College and the Royal Society. His research focuses on the study of constraints on evolution, and the historical processes that lead to the emergence of complexity, especially with respect to the construction of the major animal body parts in the Cambrian explosion. Previous books include The Crucible of Creation (Getty Center for Education in the Arts, 1999) and co-author of Solnhofen (Cambridge, 1990). Hb ISBN (2003) 0-521-82704-3. (shrink)

I reject both (a) inevitabilism about the historical development of the sciences and (b) what Ian Hacking calls the "put up or shut up" argument against those who make contingentist claims. Each position is guilty of a lack of humility about our epistemic capacities.

In Anti-Oedipus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari maintain that nature is a process in which there is neither nature nor human being, except as a single reality produced in the processes of production, distribution and consumption, where distributions are immediately consumed and the consumptions immediately reproduced. In its historical realization, this is the process of capitalism, which must be an effect of such processes, processes of nature and human nature. This gives rise to this question: given the rules governing (...) nature, including human nature, how much contingency is there and how much determinism? And ultimately, is capitalism inevitable? (shrink)

This paper examines the question of whether scientific realism is committed to the inevitability of science or is consistent with claims of the contingency of science. In order to address this question, a general characterization of the position of scientific realism is presented. It is then argued that scientific realism has no evident implications with regard to the inevitability of science. A historical case study is presented in which contingency plays a significant role, and the appropriate realist (...) response to this case study is indicated. Finally, it is argued that, when conjoined with a reliabilist theory of method, realism does have implications for the inevitability of science. (shrink)

The three ways to start thinking of modern ideology of the integrity of the scientific thinking of the life of the world's thinking, the nature of human thought. Theory for its own requirements, think of the first two forms of the rejection of metaphysics in the door to understanding other than for the occasional appearance of metaphysics. Productive nature of human depth of metaphysical thinking, recognized its relative historical inevitability. Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger reveals more of their origin relationships: (...) man and his living strength, will, thought relations. Authors think is an absolute metaphysical necessity. Modern thinking themselves to be reading for the historical marker. Should be based on the contemporary metaphysics itself as an intermediary to the reality of our own. There shall be: first, to break the so-called "historical continuity", that metaphysics is the history of the formation of technical thinking; two, revealing the "nothingness of the cry," the hidden "presence of the final there," which is preserved in the history of metaphysics "sacred." Modern thought has developed into what it is today from three sides, a consideration of science, of the living world and of man's essence. The first two systems of thought demand that the theory of a body be considered outside a metaphysical realm. The essence of man can be considered from a relative necessity of history. Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger have proceeded form an even more basic stance, considering the relationship between man and his will to power, volition and thought. I consider in this paper the absolute necessity of a metaphysics. Modern thought must resolve this historical representation. It must go the way of metaphysics in realizing this task. Here we must: 1) Breakthrough the notion of the so-called 'linear history'. Metaphysics must complete a history of technological thought . 2) Reveal existence's ultimate being hidden in the 'cry of nothingness'. This is a metaphysical 'holiness' hidden in history. (shrink)

The idea of an inevitable conflict between science and religion was decisively challenged by John Hedley Brooke in his classic Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives. Almost two decades on, Science and Religion: New Historical Perspectives revisits this argument and asks how historians can now impose order on the complex and contingent histories of religious engagements with science. Bringing together leading scholars, this volume explores the history and changing meanings of the categories 'science' and 'religion'; the role of (...) publishing and education in forging and spreading ideas; the connection between knowledge, power and intellectual imperialism; and the reasons for the confrontation between evolution and creationism among American Christians and in the Islamic world. A major contribution to the historiography of science and religion, this book makes the most recent scholarship on this much misunderstood debate widely accessible. (shrink)

Historians tend to speak of the problem of the origin of species or the species question, as if it were a monolithic problem. In reality, the phrase refers to a, historically, surprisingly fluid and pluriform scientific issue. It has, in the course of the past five centuries, been used in no less than ten different ways or contexts. A clear taxonomy of these separate problems is useful or relevant in two ways. It certainly helps to disentangle confusions that have inevitably (...) emerged in the literature in its absence. It may, secondly, also help us to gain a more thorough understanding, or sharper view, of the history of evolutionary thought. A consequent problem-centric look at that history through the lens of various origin of species problems certainly yields intriguing results, including and particularly for our understanding of the genesis of the Wallace–Darwin theory of evolution through natural selection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:482 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY G. E. Michalson, Jr. TheHistoricalDimensions ofaRattonalFaith. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977. Pp. 222. $8.65. The primary intentionof this work is to argue that historical or ecclesiastical religion plays a vital role in Kant's religious thought, because it is necessary to provide a sensible content for the purely formal doctrine of Kant's "moral" religion. But Michalson resists that this strategy cannot succeed, because (...) of the technical requirements of Kant's eplstmology, and that we must ultimately encounter an "impasse" in Kant's thought on history and religion (pp. 77, 134, 169). This is an area of Kant's thought that has not until recently received the attention it deserves. A careful consideration of all the related issued helps one to recognize, from perhaps the most beneficial standpoint, how all the various parts of Kant's philosophical scheme fit together. Michalson quite rightly maintains that we must remain within the epistemological framework Kant has established for the Critical Philosophy. But unfortunately he recognizes only the negative aspects of this framework. What he chooses to call "Kant's principle of human limitations" (mentioned thirtynine times) is the essential element in his interpretation. Secondly, Michalson is unwilling to follow the lead of other commentators (e.g., Michel Despland and Ylrmiahu Yovel) in broadening the context still further in order to take into account the full scope of Kant's philosophical project. These two defects persist throughout Michalson's analysis, and ultimately they prevent any fruitful conclusions. The approach employed, in its most simple form, ~sto point out that historical religion belongs to the phenomenal order and that morality (as the basis for Kant's technical rehgious position) belongs to the noumenal order. Kant's recognition of the need to bridge this gap is dealt with in terms of the "schematism of analogy" (pp. 95, 112-13) mentioned in Religion withinthe Ltmits ofReasonAlone. Michalson provides an interpretation of the schematism m Chapter 3 and concludes that "Kant's Religion is not altogether consistent with certain basic teachings of the critical philosophy" (p. 132). His attempt to deal with this problem carries him into a discussion of teleology and the highest good (Chapter 4), and it is only in this concluding chapter that his various interpretive errors crystallze and produce their Inevitable consequences. Rather than emphasizing the negative aspects of Kant's conception of man, Despland offers Kant's positive perspective on man and his destiny----drawing, for example, on the Anthropologyfrom a PragmaticPoint of View. Employing equally good judgment, Yovel provides an interpretation of the highest good which shows it as the culmination (in the indefinite future) of the concrete process through which man's social, political, educational, and religious development takes place. These perspectives permit the historical dimension (both religious and secular) to be gradually transformed by the imposition of moral designs--as men ~lowly and painfully assume responsibility for directing the blind laws of nature into patterns that serve moral ends. Such commentators help us to see more clearly what Kant was attempting to achieve and how the elements of his total philosophical scheme are to be understood as interconnected. Michalson, on the other hand, has only his impasse to offer us. Because history is phenomenal and religion (as morality) is noumenal, he maintainsthat no bridge is possible between the two realms. But this is simply a failure to recognize Kant's strategy. For Kant is very careful to restrict knowledge (in the strict sense) to the phenomenal order. But he is equally clear in asserting that it is legitimate (indeed, necessary) to postulate those conditions which alone make it possible for us to act in conformity with the moral law. Therefore, we must postulate not only God and immortality but the possibility of a worldly order which conforms both to the laws of nature and to the moral law. And for Kant these postulates have the full strength of rational truths, m that--like the postulates of mathematics -reason cannot reject them. Interpreting Kant's phenomenon-noumenon distinction strictly (but misapplying it), Michalson insists that such a projected ideal state of the world is inconsistent with Kant's epistemological commitment. For such... (shrink)

Historical consciousness of the modern period, which shows a clear distinction from that of the previous periods, is well displayed in intellectual history, which is investigation into the development of ideas and transmission of knowledge. To understand the academic issues that are grappled with in intellectual history, it is necessary to understand how it interacts with other relevant academic disciplines. Firstly, it is connected to classics and philology, in which historicity is regarded as part and parcel of their research. (...) Critical investigation into them leads intellectual historians to take the stance that perception on historicity lies not in a factual stratum but in an interpretive stratum. Further, they usually focus on coherently organizing inconsistent, inessential, contradictory elements of interpretation within the frame of temporality on which all texts have a footing. Next, intellectual history is closely tied to philosophy and the history of philosophy because it is a historiography of ideas and thinkers. On the basic assumption that the historicity of philosophy should be involved for a proper understanding of philosophical texts, intellectual history focuses on diachronic influences and changes of ideas which are intertextually detected. Clearly, intellectual historians assume that texts may be considered as ahistorical or even trans-historical when historicity was not a concern between traditions nor is it in modern interpretive traditions of philosophy. As a result, a tension between intellectual history and philosophy is inevitable, and the former has conditioned and simultaneously fostered understanding of the latter. Taken together, it may look as if intellectual history, being based on classics and philology, attempts a risky pas de deux with philosophical traditions which may be understood as ahistorical where their foci are given to doctrinal sides. The hitherto mentioned issues of intellectual history raised by Western critical approaches to historicity are also inherent in Buddhist studies and Buddhist intellectual history which have developed on Western soil. For example, the historicity of person(s) as seen in such examples as the historicity of Maitreya(-nātha), and the transition of philosophical thought in the works attributed to Vasubandhu/ Vasubandhu-s—which have become controversial since the 20th century, can be understood within the bigger frame of modern historical consciousness and how its coupled intellectual history unfolded. Specifically regarding these issues, efforts have been consistently made to construct a proper intellectual history in spite of limited sources of inner- and outer-textual evidence. The seemingly diversified opinions and cacophony in the development of interpretations of the issues epitomizes intellectual history, including the theoretical process which explores ways of thinking about various possibilities and the presuppositions of those possibilities. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Looking in particular at the Scientific Revolution, this essay argues that, for all their differences, positivist commentators on science and contextualist historians of science ought to be committed to the view that counterfactual changes in the history of science would have made no significant difference to its historical development. Assumptions about the history of science as an inexorable march toward the truth commit the positivist to the view that, even if things had been different, scientific knowledge would still (...) have ended up where it is. Perhaps surprisingly, the move away from “great man” history and the increasing emphasis among contextualist historians on the broad cultural influences on scientific thought and practice also imply that changes of a restricted or specific nature ought to have no significant effect on general outcomes. Unlike the positivist, however, the contextualist is willing to concede that things might have been different if the entire cultural background had been different. But in such cases the effect of such sweeping changes would be impossible to conceive and so deprive counterfactual history of any useful insights it might be supposed to offer. (shrink)

Should people make demands for justice relating to events occurring in the past, even the distant past? What does and what should happen when they do? These questions frame the problems of historical justice that became especially palpable during the twentieth and early twenty‐first centuries and contributed to innovations in the design and use of tribunals, truth commissions and reparations initiatives. These responses to calls for historical justice deal with objections and difficulties in their own ways. Objections to (...) such innovations include charges that they depart too radically from established legal forms, that they reopen old wounds, that they inevitably rely on stale and partial evidence, that their costs are excessive or divert resources from more pressing needs, and that they do little to prevent future atrocities or to heal social rifts. (shrink)

In this essay, I ask what form of historical consciousness schools should nurture in students. The two criteria I set up in this regard are plausibility—is the account of history plausible—and practicality—does the form of historical consciousness help young people contribute to the betterment of society. The level of my analysis is that of modernity, a novel interpretation of which I gradually develop. I begin by drawing on Nietzsche to assess three forms of historical consciousness that are (...) on offer: the belief in the old age of humankind, a forward-looking rebellion, and a backwards-looking rebellion. All three are found wanting according to my criteria. I retain from Nietzsche the idea that a certain degree of ‘presentism’ is inevitable in historical consciousness. I then use Paul Ricoeur’s reflections on modernity as a springboard for outlining a different account, which mobilizes the metaphor of modernity as a period of transition akin to adolescence. The form of historical consciousness that is associated with this metaphor is more plausible and practical than the three competitors I assessed. I conclude by defending this account from potential objections. (shrink)

In this useful edition, Popkin selects, translates, and annotates thirty-nine articles from the Dictionnaire, with the aim of preserving in miniature the overall character of Bayle's magnum opus. Included are the historically important articles, "David," "Manicheans," "Paulicians," "Pyrrho," "Rorarius," "Spinoza," "Zeno of Elea," and Bayle's "Clarifications." Some inevitable omissions are regrettable, but Popkin has caught Bayle in a variety of his moods, sarcastic, skeptical, and scholarly.—R. B. C.

The rapid change in the world after the Enlightenment not only brought about revolutionary scientific and technological innovations, but also opened the door to important transformations in the context of thought. Especially with the wind created by the French Revolution, some concepts such as equality, fraternity, and justice, which were already in circulation before, came to the fore even more. One of the concepts that was magnified in this process was freedom. The concept manifested itself in philosophy as an understanding (...) of free will against the idea of determinism, and in politics as independence against oppressive governments. Since the day it was addressed as an independent topic, it has attracted attention with its different types and aspects, including freedom of the press, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of religion and conscience. We see that the intellectual adventure of the Western world in the last two centuries has been shaped around these concepts. The libertarian attitude, which at first manifested itself as a rebellion against religious and secular authorities, was later driven to extremes that saw itself as independent from all moral and social norms. These debates were inevitably reflected in the field of theology, and topics such as the position of the will of man against God’s will, fate and the problem of evil were reconsidered according to contemporary claims and objections. The atheistic tendencies that emerged in the Western world claimed that all religions deprive man of the possibility of being an active subject on earth and that a person who believes that all his/her actions are known and determined cannot be truly free. This point is actually one of several important issues that contemporary atheism raises against theism. These debates have also reached the Islamic world and the issue continued to be addressed with similar arguments. At its core, each of these claims rests on the assumption that Islam's conception of the human being leaves no room for individual freedom. Although the problem has different aspects such as fate and theodicy, one of the most striking aspects of the problem is the question of whether man has the right to reject Islam as well as the right to enter Islam by one’s own free will. It is important to answer this question. Because some practices from the early period of Islamic history and the assumptions that apostates should be killed according to certain conditions, which are accepted as an established jurisprudence in Islamic law, have provided important opportunities for anti-Islamic ideas and ideologies. This article shows how the issue has been dealt with in the classical literature, while at the same time suggesting solutions on how to approach the phenomenon of conversion today. In addition, the study will show that the issue is dealt with in the context of public security in the fiqh literature, and therefore, the current cases of conversion or apostasy do not fully correspond to the discussions in the classical period. (shrink)

Paternalism is a frequent source of anxiety and scholarly enquiry within public health. This article examines debate in the UK from the 1950s to the early 1980s about two quintessentially paternalistic laws: those making it compulsory to use a motorcycle helmet, and a car seatbelt. This kind of historical analysis, looking at change over time and the circumstances that prevent or enable such change, draws attention to two significant features: the contingent nature of that which is perceived as paternalistic (...) and therefore objectionable, and the wide range of arguments that can be marshalled for and against. It suggests that paternalism became a particularly disruptive accusation in the UK of the 1970s in relation to seatbelts, thanks to the population that would be affected and the wider socio-political context. It also suggests that arguments about the social cost of death and injury on the roads, along with overt acceptance that some element of paternalism could be acceptable, proved influential—as was the sense of inevitability that 10 years of regular debate helped to create. (shrink)

The debate over the relationship between political practice and theory is as old as political science itself. The study of ideology, this article contends, offers a unique opportunity to explore the nexus of social phenomena and political philosophy, provided the study is launched from a new perspective. Instead of undertaking another exercise in the endless effort to define the concept of ideology, this analysis emphasizes the objects of ideology. It thereby exposes, first of all, that historically analysts of ideology have (...) ineptly assumed they were studying the same concept -- ideology -- whereas in fact they used the same term to refer to significantly different political phenomena. Second, the genealogy of the objects of ideology discloses the changing terrain of political reality since the Enlightenment. Three moments in the history of 'ideology' are identified as heuristic devices: ideology as a function of class (eighteenth-nineteenth centuries), ideology as a function of (totalitarian) regimes (early twentieth century), and in the aftermath of the 'end of ideology' debate, ideology as a social discourse (1960s onward). Third, the role of the analyst is therewith also transformed: from a scientist, to a critical historian of ideas, to a political agent of social change. The inevitable embeddedness of political theory in changing political praxis urges a new dialogue between empirical and theoretical political scientists. (shrink)

Kant’s essay Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose differs in deep ways from standard Enlightenment views of human history. Although he agrees with many contemporaries that unsocial sociability can drive human progress, he argues that we know too little about the trends of history to offer either metaphysical defence or empirical vindication of the perfectibility of man or the inevitability of progress. However, as freely acting beings we can contribute to a better future, so have grounds (...) for committing ourselves to human progress even if we cannot guarantee or know that it will continue indefinitely. As Kant sees, it, human progress is better seen as a practical assumption—an Idea of Reason—than as a theoretical claim.Keywords: Cosmopolitanism; Historical trends; Ideas of Reason; Immanuel Kant; Philosophy of history; Optimism; Pessimism; Progress; Unsocial sociability. (shrink)

In an earlier paper by the author, Åqvist , I presented an approach to the logic of historical necessity, or inevitability, in the sense of a “two-dimensional” combination of tense and modal logic for worlds, or histories, with the same time order, known as T × W logic. Distinctive features of that approach were, apart from its two-dimensionality, its being based on discrete and finite time, and its use of so-called systematic frame constants in order to enable us (...) to indicate longitudes and latitudes of any points in the co-ordinate systems under consideration. This led us to study and axiomatize an infinite hierarchy HTWxy of two-dimensional modal tense logics with the characteristic operators for historical necessity and possibility added to the original basic vocabulary. The main purpose of the present paper is then twofold: to extend the logics HTWxy to the interesting branch of philosophical logic constituted by deontic logic as combined with tense logic; and to deal with a curious puzzle known as the so-called epistemic obligation paradox – a well known stumbling-block in this area of research in philosophical logic. We argue for a solution to both these problems, which appeals to a new infinite hierarchy DHTWxym of extensions of the HTWxy in the sense of logics combining dyadic deontic modalities with temporal ones such as those for historical necessity and other two-dimensional modalities. (shrink)

The paper deals with Kuhn’s and Lakatos’s ideas related to the so-called “historical turn” and its application to the philosophy of mathematics. In the first part the meaning of the term “postpositivism” is specified. If we lack such a specification we can hardly discuss the philosophy of science that comes “after postpositivism”. With this end in view, the metaphor of “generations” in the philosophy of science is used. It is proposed that we restrict the use of the term “post-positivism” (...) to two and only two philosophical “generations”: the one to which Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend belong, and the previous “generation” to which Wittgenstein, Polanyi, Popper and Quine (as well as the major part of logical positivists) belong. From this point of view, Bloor, Latour, Pickering, Daston and Galison belong to the “third generation” which represents the philosophy of science “after post-positivism”. The characteristic feature of post-positivism is the combination of decisive impact of logical positivism and its severe criticism. This combination inevitably makes post-positivism a transitional form in the philosophy of science. In the second part the contribution of the “big four” of post-positivist philosophers (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend) to the radical change in the philosophy of mathematics in the second half of the 20th century is analyzed. Primarily, they shifted philosophical interest from the logical analysis of formal systems to the historical dynamics of informal mathematics. They also reconsidered the sharp opposition between mathematics and the physical sciences. However, the transitional character of their philosophy manifests itself both in their treatment of mathematics and their way of understanding history. On the one hand, their “heritage” is ambiguous, on the other hand, it opens new perspectives. Neither Kuhn, nor Lakatos, have eliminated completely the methodological barrier positing the fundamental heterogeneity of mathematics and natural science. Neither Lakatos, nor Kuhn, adhered to the viewpoint of relentless historicism. Nevertheless, it is their work that has made these options open for today’s historians and philosophers of science, even for philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

In connection with the failures in the reorganization of the Soviet economy, increasingly frequent attempts have been made recently not only to rethink the path traversed by the Soviet economy and the difficulties it has experienced but also to clarify its place within the historical process as a whole. This is not accidental: even as it deals with the very concrete questions of Soviet history, our social thought has again and again encountered general problems whose lack of resolution simply (...) blocks further progress. "Anyone who tackles particular problems without first resolving the general ones," wrote V.I. Lenin at one time, "will inevitably ‘stumble’ upon these general questions at each step without being aware of it. But to stumble blindly upon them in each particular case means to condemn one's policies to the worst vacillation and lack of principle" . We shall try to keep this methodological principle in mind in analyzing the historical interaction between Soviet politics and economics. (shrink)

Heidegger often asserted that Germany, as “the land of poets and thinkers,” has a central world-historical role to play in any possible recovery from the technological nihilism of the modern epoch. And yet, on numerous occasions, Heidegger also demonstrated a serious interest in dialogue with the East Asian traditions of Daoism and Zen Buddhism. How are Heidegger’s entrenched ethnocentrism and his interest in East-West dialogue related? While neither can be wholly confined to one or another period in his thought, (...) this article shows how, in the late 1930s, Heidegger begins to recover from the most ethnocentric period of his thought, and how he starts thinking of his reflections on the Western history of being as a preparation for what he came to call “the inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world.”. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant was one of the most significant philosophers of the modern age, many aspects of Kant's thoughts are not easy to understand and a guide like this Historical Dictionary of Kant and Kantianism should be very welcome not only to students, but also teachers and the general public, since it contains hundreds of entries describing Kant's life and works and explaining his concepts as well as the contributions of his followers . Given the inevitable problems of language, the (...) glossary is particularly helpful. And the bibliography makes the massive literature more accessible. (shrink)

The last thirty years have brought about a fundamental revision of historical epistemology. So intense a concentration on the nature of history as a form of inquiry has diminished attention given to the thing that history inquires into: the nature of the past itself. Too readily, that entire domain has turned into a place for dreams, as Hayden White put it: a lost world only available now through the imagination of the author and subject to aesthetic whim. The next (...) thirty years will, I propose, be the period in which ontology returns to the center of historical theory. And nothing short of the reconceptualization of the past—indeed of time itself—must be its objective. It must achieve that objective, moreover, in establishing arguments that are congruent with what revisions of epistemology have taught us about the limits of historical knowledge and the inevitability of textual representation. This paper enters this field by discussing some of the issues involved in rethinking the place of time in historical constructions since Bergson. It demonstrates the confusions inherent in spatial reductions of temporality, which historians have done so much to entrench rather than eradicate, and argues that historians have yet to accommodate the fundamental conceptual shifts inaugurated by Heidegger. It then moves to propose a methodological doctrine to which I have given the name "chronism" and seeks to sketch the utility of such a doctrine for bringing one form of presence—that of authenticity—back into the domain of historical study. Doing so invites a number of conceptual and practical difficulties that the paper will address in its conclusions; these may disturb those who have closed their minds to anything beyond the present. Taking ontology seriously interferes both with structuralist assumptions about the nothingness of time and with some of the styles of historical representation that have become fashionable in the postmodern climate. There may be painful lessons to be learned if we are to rescue the past from its current status as a nonentity. (shrink)

Abstract Starting with Ben-Menahem's definition of historical contingency as sensitivity to variations in initial conditions, we suggest that historical events and processes can be thought of as forming a complex landscape of contingency and necessity. We suggest three different ways of extending and elaborating Ben-Menahem's concepts: (1) By supplementing them with a notion of historical disturbance; (2) by pointing out that contingency and necessity are subject to scaling effects; (3) by showing how degrees of contingency/necessity can change (...) over time. We also argue that further development of Sterelny's notion of conditional inevitability leads to our conclusion that the topography of historical contingency is something that can change over time. (shrink)

This article blends cultural history and theoretical psychology in a discussion of new treatment methods for psychiatric casualties that emerged early in World War II. It draws on philosophical hermeneutics and Hacking's historical ontology to clarify how our interpretation of this history inevitably reflects current struggles making sense of PTSD while efforts to understand this history can enrich present-day reflections about war neurosis and the social good. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Isaiah Berlin famously attacked a view he called historical inevitability. He believed that a causal view of history entails the adoption of an extreme deterministic position – a kind of determinism which would rule out the possibility of free will, turning moral responsibility a notion void of meaning. His thesis was also based on the assumption that historians are not just chroniclers of the past but need to engage in moral judgments; therefore should determinism hold true of our (...) world, our moral language – and consequently much of our historical language – would need to undergo serious revision. In this brief article we look in some detail at the arguments offered by Berlin in support of his thesis and offer criticism. (shrink)

Discussions about abstraction are so important and so profound that this topic can hardly be neglected. It has inevitably cropped up again in various periods of philosophical enquiry. Despite these ancient roots and after the great debate that characterised the empirical and rationalistic tradition, interest in the problem has unfortunately been absent in large measure from the mainstream of mathematical logic and analytic philosophy. It seems that there is a gap between the epistemological theorization, in which it is difficult to (...) find new insights on the problem of abstraction, and the historical studies concerning the development of philosophical thought. Such studies, however, present a more fertile ground for such insights. Here the reader will find presented for the first time a collection of papers about the topic, considered from an historical point of view together with an awareness of the need for building a bridge between historical research and theoretical speculation. Accordingly the volume consists of both general overviews which sketch the signifcance and the fortunes of abstraction in science, philosophy and logic (the first part) and historical case studies which focus on abstraction in particular thinkers (the second part). This volume is of interest for both general philosophers and historians of philosophy. (shrink)

Debates between historians show that they expect descriptions of past people and events, and interpretations of historical subjects, and genetic explanations of historical changes, to be fair and not misleading. Sometimes unfair accounts of the past are the result of historians' bias, of their preferring one account over others because it accords with their interests. It is useful to distinguish history which is misleading by accident from that which is the result of personal bias; and to distinguish personal (...) bias from cultural bias and general cultural relativity.This paper explains what fair descriptions, interpretations, and explanations are like in order to clarify the senses in which they can be biased. It then explains why bias is deplorable, and after noting those who regard it as more or less inevitable, considers how personal bias can be avoided. It argues that it is not detachment that is needed, but commitment to standards of rational inquiry.Some might think that rational standards of inquiry will not be enough to avoid bias if the evidence available to the historian is itself biased. In fact historians often allow for bias in evidence, and even explain it when reconstructing what happened in the past.The paper concludes by noting that although personal bias can be largely avoided, cultural bias is not so easy to detect or correct. (shrink)

Historia, as both a type of critical inquiry and a source of information about nature and the human world, is a key category in Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus. In this work, the Latin word cannot be simply and invariably translated as “history,” not even if we add the proviso that its meaning wavers inevitably between “history” and “story,” for its semantic range is too broad and complex. At the two ends of the semantic spectrum we have the impartial report, on the (...) one hand, and the creations of sheer fantasy, on the other. Historia may therefore denote the detached observation of nature and the philological analysis of a text, but it can also refer to the free exercise of the imagination in a variety of narrative contexts. While Spinoza denies that the inquiry resulting from historia and its products may have true cognitive value, he acknowledges that historia plays a fundamental role in society and politics. The reason is that historia and the imagination are bound up together by a special relationship. This is apparent at all levels of the historical engagement with reality, but is particularly true in the case of religion, moral norms and belief systems, for in this variegated domain the link between imagination and historia functions as the connective tissue that keeps societies united and functioning. This specific nexus of imagination and historia is Spinoza’s original contribution to the early modern notion of “moral certainty.” More importantly, it is only at this level that Spinoza grants a modicum of intelligibility to the ‘historical’ productions of the imagination, be they signa, revelationes, or even nugae. The fact remains, though, that to a certain extent humans keep having a distorted grasp of reality, indeed hallucinate, even when their ‘historical’ accounts of reality are socially and politically productive. Here the key element is the notion of fictional continuity based on a socially constructed trust in narrative accounts of reality: the imagination turns reality into stories, but in so doing it keeps the otherwise constitutively hallucinatory nature of humans at bay and under control. Perceptibilitas, that is, the ability to provide acceptable cognitive solutions between intelligible knowledge and moral certainty, is ultimately what defines the contribution of the imagination to the human work of knowledge. (shrink)

In a book that first appeared in 1965 entitled Analytical Philosophy of History, Arthur Danto argues that historical inquiry cannot be conceived as an attempt to reconstruct the past along the lines of an "ideal chronicler." The ideal chronicler "knows whatever happens the moment it happens, even in other minds. He is also to have the gift of instantaneous transcription: everything that happens across the whole forward rim of the Past is set down by him, as it happens the (...) way it happens." Historians cannot aspire to this ideal because they inevitably use what Danto calls "narrative sentences," that is, sentences that describe one event by referring to one or more later events. For example, "The Thirty Years War began in 1618" is a sentence typical of historical inquiry but unavailable to the chronicler because it goes beyond what could have been known at the time it occurred, that is, that the war was to last thirty years. Danto reasons that because of the indispensability of narrative sentences to historical understanding, we can never give a complete description of past events since this presupposes knowledge of all relevant later events. The consequence is that our descriptions of past events will inevitably change as history unfolds. This discovery is remarkable and incontrovertible: descriptions of past historical events will and must always be reconceived not just because of the unearthing of new documents or the changing interests of the historian but because of the peculiar narrative structure of historical understanding. (shrink)

A mass casualty (MASCAL) event is different to a major incident. The crux of this difference is that in a major incident, by the adoption of special measures, normal or near-normal standards of care can be maintained. In a MASCAL, irrespective of what special measures are instituted, standards of care inevitably drop. This is a, currently unmet, challenge for medical planning and planning policy. Twenty-First century weaponry is capable of producing thousands of causalities a day over a period of several (...) days in peer-on-peer conflict. In this chapter, we propose that medical planning for military events on this scale should include the following: explicit acceptance that ‘gold standard’ care cannot be given to patients who are triaged for treatment, a better understanding how to identify those patients who will not be triaged for treatment, a focus on ensuring patient flow (which includes diversion, self-care and remote monitoring), and implementation of the principle that care should be given by the lowest capable provider. We attempt to begin to develop some principles for planners to consider drawing on historical precedents and explore some of the ethical implications of our proposals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Xenophon, Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical CommentaryAlison BurfordSarah B. Pomeroy. Xenophon, Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. xii + 388 pp. 3 pls. 1 fig. Cloth, $75.00.Xenophon has often been dismissed as a light-weight essayist of considerable charm but limited analytical capacity. His dialogue, Oeconomicus, tends to be perceived primarily as a ragbag for social historians in pursuit of a reference. Both (...) deserve better, and this Sarah Pomeroy’s new commentary now provides. As its full title promises, it constitutes an invaluable supplement both to the study of Xenophon and to ancient social history. Discussion is well informed throughout, and many fundamental questions arise for consideration regarding modern perceptions of the ancient economy, Xenophon’s own economic viewpoint, and the true nature of the dialogue. The introduction, while inevitably addressing all the familiar topics, stands on the far less familiar premise that Xenophon pursues a coherent, consistent, and in some ways quite radical agenda, and that what has been widely regarded as episodic or anecdotal in nature is a unity in style and argument (5ff. and 14–20). Oeconomicus is for P. a combination of philosophical dialogue and agricultural treatise (263). The central theme, therefore, remains the obvious topic of household and estate management, with this difference that Xenophon intends an analysis of the domestic economy—its nature and what makes it tick, not a mere exposition of “how to run” a marriage, a house, and an estate—as his own dismissive remarks on manual-writers (xvi.1), and the sharp Socratic character of the dialogue might suggest. But the complex literary style and the telling dramatic character of the dialogue, of which her comments make us aware, are such as to suggest that Xenophon’s argument is even more authoritative than she allows.Amidst the commentary’s great wealth is the discussion of Ischomachus’ role. How historical a figure is he? P. gives a succinct account of the matter (259–64), and deals with Xenophon’s use of humor which has been variously interpreted. Some see the portrayal of Ischomachus’ marriage as a satirical joke against the historical figure, but P. while allowing for humor within the conversation between husband and wife considers that Xenophon’s overall intention is [End Page 492] serious, if not necessarily factual, and the ideal marriage is integral to the idealisation of the past which is part of the overall design. P. points out that the dramatic date of the dialogue is fixed very imprecisely within the later fifth century (18f.). At the same time Xenophon moves between past and present from the good old days to the less glorious now when, P. and others have argued, Athenian society had been irrevocably altered by the effects of the Peloponnesian War (47). She observes (31) that institutions may only elicit overt comment on the inception of their decline, so that Xenophon can be understood as recording the fading-away of traditional mores in marriage and the self-sufficiency of the household. Yet the existence of a written account need only signify a new interest within narrow literary circles in certain subjects—power-politics surely outlasted Thucydides’ time.Is it a problem that Xenophon appears both as a conservative traditionalist and as an analytical observer of Athenian society and domestic economy in its present state? We may simply regard the apparent contradiction as intentional on Xenophon’s part in this multifaceted and many-layered work, as P. does, or we can make additional assumptions. One might be that the war’s effects were less severe than P. supposes, and that Xenophon is both responding to a need to reenforce traditional values, rather than to recommend them to an age which has lost them, and commenting on the enduring good practices which have always produced beneficial results. Another might be that Xenophon certainly is playing many games here, the most complex of which is to refer to his real concerns by analogy, and that what seems to be the big picture (the domestic economy) is only the reflection. He does indeed idealise the past, as P. points out, particularly in his Persian section (iv, her commentary on... (shrink)

THE LENGTHENING SHELF of books on the special problems of historical knowledge reminds us that few obiter dicta have worn quite as badly as Santayana's remark that those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it. Though it epitomizes a recurrent mood of impatience with those who refuse to acknowledge our own favorite analogies between present problems and past disasters, yet it leaves one feeling uneasily committed to a set of underlying presuppositions which one would not care (...) to make explicit. Is the historical process of itself really repetitive? How many great historical changes have been brought about—as in the Renaissance—by those who did know history and wished to repeat its classic forms? Or is it possible, as Santayana suggests, that knowledge of history brings release from otherwise ineluctable forces and their consequences? What in Santayana's time seemed a radical denial of the commonplace notion of inevitable progress now appears as the most conservative of nineteenth-century attitudes: the belief that historical reality is there, weaving and reweaving its tangled web, subject like the laws of nature to discovery and perhaps exploitation, but remaining a field of real entities and forces whether discovered or not. Santayana's dictum is of a piece with all those claims which begin, "History shows that...." But few historians or philosophers now have much sympathy even with the possibility of such claims. Were there significantly repetitive patterns of major events, historical knowledge would indeed make the present an elaborate form of déjà vu. Yet historians above all are reluctant to claim that their subject is a manual of politics or of anything else. Call any current event "another Munich," and any historian worth his salt will list seventeen important respects in which that event does not, and even could not resemble Chamberlain's ill-starred agreement. (shrink)

Since the end of the Cold War, two parallel developments took place in global governance: fragmentation in social/environmental legislations across countries, and an increasing uniformity (or 'globalisation') of economic/financial legislations. In the liberal democratic context of global governance, both of these developments are embodied in partnerships for sustainable development. Studying these partnerships in the context of private environmental governance and tracing the origin of the concept in business and law, can reveal the implications of 'privatisation of governance' on sovereignty, authority, (...) and global governance. Focusing on partnerships in the United Nations context, this paper examines the private environmental governance institutions in their historical economic context. (shrink)

R.G. Collingwood greatly admired Dilthey’s philosophy of history. In this article, I show that despite the obvious affinities between both authors, their views on the historical role of philosophy are clearly divergent. I focus on one topic in particular in their writings, namely, the status of metaphysics and its relation to history. Whereas Dilthey argues that the awareness of the historicity of metaphysics and its psychological-hermeneutical foundation inevitably leads to the euthanasia of metaphysics, Collingwood defends the possibility of a (...) reform of metaphysics into a historical discipline, based on a logic of question and answer. The analysis of the difference between these two thinkers with respect to the role of metaphysics consists of three steps. First, I situate Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics into the whole of his oeuvre, followed by a presentation of his ”solution’ to the metaphysical antinomy. Second, I focus on the role of Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and on his ”solution’ to the metaphysical antinomy. To that end, I make use of Collingwood’s recently released unpublished manuscripts so as to shed greater light on his rejection of Dilthey’s understanding of the historical role and definition of metaphysics. Finally, I reformulate the differing statuses of metaphysics between these two thinkers by relating their divergent views to their respective understandings of human finitude. (shrink)

In the contemporary spiritual and moral situation, a question reverberates—sometimes obscurely, sometimes more distinctly—which may be phrased as follows: Will each of the nations of the world perform its singular part in the symphony of human history, or will unison, pale uniformity, the impotence of mankind's cultural forces prevail? This question, put bluntly, leaves no room for dubious speculations, since uniqueness is an inseparable component of the values that are currently being affirmed as universal human values in the contemporary consciousness. (...) But the concrete realities of the world situation are such that they inevitably make the task of preserving this uniqueness extremely complicated. Hence, a self-awareness of one's own specific nature remains relevant. That awareness cannot, of course, establish itself without turning to history, without an in-depth development of the conception of the cultural-historical process that would answer the questions of the place and the tasks of a particular community within the universal whole. (shrink)

Social constructionists believe that experimental evidence plays a minimal role in the production of scientific knowledge, while rationalists such as myself believe that experimental evidence is crucial in it. As one historical example in support of the rationalist position, I trace in some detail the theoretical and experimental research that led to our understanding of beta decay, from Enrico Fermi’s pioneering theory of 1934 to George Sudarshan and Robert Marshak’s and Richard Feynman and Murray Gell-Mann’s suggestion in 1957 and (...) 1958, respectively, of the V–A theory of weak interactions. This is not a history of an unbroken string of successes, but one that includes incorrect experimental results, incorrect experiment-theory comparisons, and faulty theoretical analyses. Nevertheless, we shall see that the constraints that Nature imposed made the V–A theory an almost inevitable outcome of this theoretical and experimental research. (shrink)