J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and John Dunn try to introduce historicity into the study of political thought. Believing that meaning is relational, they attempt to build cognitive contexts in which to fit events. Yet, their structural focus is often either ill-defined or overly simplified. They claim that if any statement is fixed into its proper context, the context will help to explain it. But the historical context is not always clearly understood itself; this is acting under (...) the "illusion of historical solidity and substance." They see language as the limitation of action, while actually it is a tool for inventiveness of thought. (shrink)

Praised by President Richard Nixon as his favorite read for 1987, _The Search for Historical Meaning_ presents the postwar American conservative movement against a background of ideas with which it has only rarely been identified. This important book—updated with a new preface—examines the influence of Hegelian concepts on the historical attitudes and cultural judgments of prominent postwar conservatives who, because of their concern with personal freedom as a political and ontological value, denounced Hegel while ascribing their own Hegelian (...) ideas to less offensive sources. Gottfried argues that the lack of a true historical perspective was a serious defect in the postwar American conservative movement, and it grew worse in the years that followed. Essential reading for conservative thinkers, political philosophers, and American political historians, _The Search for Historical Meaning_ concludes with an incisive examination of the American conservative movement that has implications for today. (shrink)

The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation (Bil dung) and its Historical Meaning. This article aims at analysing the historical meaning of the German ideal of self-cultivation (Bildung), considering its different uses and interpretations over time. Based on the historical semantics of Reinhart Koselleck and the bibliography on the subject, it reconstructs the core transformations in its semantic structure from the beginnings in the late Middle Ages to its institutionalization in the German school system in the nineteenth (...) century. The development of the ideal of Bildung in Germany is characterised by the tension between its function as means of integration through education and its function as instrument of social distinction. The reflexion on this educational ideal is presented as a counterpoint to some of the contemporary educational practices, based on the imperatives of the market and the neoliberal management of human capital. (shrink)

This chapter discusses that Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey are united by a shared conviction that historical reality is the proper domain of philosophical inquiry. In their view, Kant's critical philosophy had effectively foreclosed the traditional enterprise of metaphysics. Rather than viewing this as a loss, however, both Schleiermacher and Dilthey took the Kantian revolution as a cue to make historical reality, as opposed to an ahistorical domain of transcendent entities, an independent field of investigation. The chapter articulates (...) their basic philosophical orientation and its enduring significance by examining two domains about which they thought deeply: philosophy of religion and ethics. In the case of Dilthey, whose work is less well known in Anglophone philosophy, the chapter also frames the discussion with an examination of his more general intellectual project, which he labeled the “Critique of Historical Reason”. (shrink)

The paper examines the very different insights of theorists into the interpretation of historical meaning of literary reception and Anglo-American theorists of the "new" history of political thought . Among the former, readers create meaning; among the latter, authorial intended meanings are fundamental. Both perspectives are valuable, but one-sided. The differences between them arise from different perspectives on the character of a text. But those perspectives are not as incompatible as has been supposed, especially by reception theorists. (...) By examining the incoherences of literary reception theory when viewed from the perspective of the intentionalists, and by examining the one-sidedness of intentionalist theory in the light of a modified version of the reception perspective, it is shown that an understanding of historical meaning requires both insights. The argument is illustrated by reference to the history of political thought, a history which might more usefully be conceived as the history of political literature. (shrink)

Benhabib recasts the Derridean idea of `iteration' in democratic terms. While adhering to the original idea that both the fundamental terms of political consociation and the identity of the people itself is `radically' open, Benhabib argues that deliberative norms do and should frame the process of reiteration. For the deliberative democrat, the democratic constitution is not a would-be barrier to iterability (which we are told cannot be contained anyway); it is rather a communicative or discursive space in which the hitherto (...) suppressed or not yet present voice of other people finds its way and expands the terms of meaning giving and hence reason giving. The democratic constitution enables iteration; it is one side of a dialectic that relies upon, balances and, in some sense, makes the most of people power. Immigrants, in the final analysis, are the latest group to proclaim their presence in the sphere of constitutional interpretation, and thereby recalibrate the interpretive frame. And when they make their presence known in this way they have truly become a part of the `people'. When, however, they make their presence known in ways that undermine constitutional self-understanding, instead of engaging it, they are `not us'. Benhabib is hesitant to add this last bit, as she is hesitant to admit how much the constitutional identity of a people `rift with otherness' is reliant upon the historical referent and the generative/steering power of the right sort of constitutional court. (shrink)

This essay proposes that our understanding of medical instruments might benefit from adding a more forthright concern with their immediate presence to the current historical focus on simply decoding their meanings and context. This approach is applied to the intriguingly tricky question of what actually is meant by a “medical instrument.” It is suggested that a pragmatic part of the answer might lie simply in reconsidering the holdings of medical museums, where the significance of the physical actuality of instruments (...) comes readily to hand. (shrink)

The thesis of this study is that Hegelian historicism plays a foundational role in the thought of several postwar American conservative intellectuals, in particular Will Herberg, Karl Wittfogel, Eric Voegelin, Frank Meyer, and James Burnham. It is a peculiarly anti-Hegelian Hegelianism that Gottfried has in mind. He describes it as “residual,” “unacknowledged,” “subterranean,” and “disguised.” For his heroes hardly ever identify themselves as either Hegelians or historicists. More frequently, their public comments on Hegel are negative. “But the evidence of their (...) debt to Hegelian and other forms of historicism is both abundant and clear”. (shrink)

The rapid rise of varieties of historicism in Germany, during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and subsequently in England and America, resulted in a radical transformation of the principles of coherence and methods of analysis within biblical studies.1This paper will argue that the foundational ‘subject/object’ metaphysics of historicism has been subverted over the past century. For this reason, historical positivism should no longer be accorded the status of ‘normative paradigm’ and ‘gatekeeper’ over and against other interpretive approaches. This paper (...) next lays out five principles for a renewed practice of historical inquiry. It argues, first, that historical inquiry continues to serve a vital function within biblical studies in its ability to call attention to historical difference, and, thereby, to contribute to a strategy of resistance to ideology and to totalizing theories; second, that the traditional appeal to historical ‘context’ and ‘author’ in the interpretation of texts continues to be a useful practice – despite the provisional and constructed nature of both – as a way of taking into account extra-lingual reference and of avoiding presentism; third, that the substitution of new ‘grand narratives’ of Christian origins in place of the (quasi-theological) ‘historical’ narrative of traditional Christianity – under the claim of historical objectivity – should be abandoned because the very concept of ‘origins’ is the result of a literalizing of a metaphor. Such totalizing narratives always reduce history's inherent polycentricism. Fourth, I will argue that the continued use of historicism in the antiquarian attempt to reconstruct the past, disconnected from both a quest for social justice and a desire for personal self-creation, represents a form of thought that alienates scholars from themselves and from their real material contexts. Finally, and following on the previous point, this paper submits that the practice of historical analysis has an ethical dimension by virtue of the fact that the personhood of the biblical historian is indissolubly linked to other dimensions of life including the social and ethical aspects of life. These added dimensions complicate the making of choices, which is implicit within all practices of interpretation. These five principles are here suggested as points of departure for the reconceptualization of the scope and function of historical inquiry within the discipline of New Testament studies. (shrink)

Se presenta en este trabajo la encrucijada actual de la interpretación de la novela más célebre de Gabriel García Márquez dando cuenta, por un lado, de una tradición interpretativa que desde una cierta idea de “lo nacional” relaciona el sentido de la obra con un agotamiento de la historia y, por otro lado, postulando las condiciones de posibilidad de otra interpretación, vale decir, otra tradición interpretativa desde donde leer la novela para hallar en ella otro sentido con relación a la (...) historia. La argumentación se apoya en postulados de la hermenéutica de Hans-Georg Gadamer y de Paul Ricoeur. (shrink)

In joining a discussion of the subject, object, method, and other specifications of culturology, one should first define one's view of the correlation between culture and history, culturological and historical knowledge, the purposiveness of history as a social movement, and its certainty as a science. From the point of view of positivist philosophy and the social science based on it, history a priori lacks any teleology, goal-orientation, or inner meaning and is simply the sum of the collective life (...) of people. I would even risk defining the historical process as a dynamics of people's realization of the collective forms of their life activity and an accumulation of justified models of the corresponding social experience. In that case, historical knowledge can be defined as a special way of describing and systematizing the most socially significant processes and results of people's realization of their sociality, that is, technologies of collective existence. I draw attention to the fact that what we are talking about, first of all, is the way we-the interested people-have chosen to describe past events we had systematized in some way or another on some suitable basis. In itself, history is not a living entity and cannot have any independent goals, meanings, intentions, or other manifestations of free will, which are characteristic of a freely acting human individual. (shrink)

One way to recast the problem of cultural explanation in historical inquiry is to distinguish two conceptualizations involving culture: cultural meanings as contents of signification that inform meaningful courses of action in historically unfolding circumstances; and cultural structures as institutionalized patterns of social life that may be elaborated in more than one concrete construction of meaning. This distinction helps to suggest how explanation can operate in accounting for cultural processes of meaning-formation, as well as in other ways (...) that transcend specific meanings, yet are nonetheless cultural. Examples of historical explanation involving each construct are offered, and their potential examined. (shrink)

Historicism -- Time -- Interpretation -- Representation -- Reference -- Truth -- Meaning -- Presence -- Experience (I) -- Experience (II) -- Subjectivity -- Politics.

The English word ‘pain’ is commonly used by lay people in a ‘messy’ life-world of imprecise meanings. It has a complex etymology, including legal and political uses as ‘punishment’. Understandings of pain in the political theory of Hobbes and Bentham are summarized. This wider historical and philosophical account of the uses of ‘pain’ means the IASP definition can be seen in relation to medical history and to present-day clinical challenges. We can consider the misunderstandings that may occur between clinicians (...) and pain sufferers, and the ways in which ‘pain’, although ‘subjective’, is inescapably a political concern. Using Wittgenstein’s approach to meaning, however, we can envisage a context-sensitive and flexible approach to communication about pain. (shrink)

In recent years, it was notorious the presence of a persistent interpretation of the political field in terms that find in the notion of crisis its main narrative. In order to assess this historical sensitivity ―which is an effect of the rupture of the grand narrative of progress― the analysis of Janet Roitman has been particularly relevant. Her critical perspective on this historical matrix is based on her assumption that such sensitivity leads to a strong paralysis in terms (...) of political agency, mainly through its claim of being the same incarnation of moments of truth. The central aim of this paper is to challenge this interpretation of the narrative of crisis as a case of post-historical meaning through the analysis of the transhumanist philosophy as deployed by Nick Bostrom. It is thanks to the scrutiny of the affective dimension involved in this sort of historical meaning focused in the role played by anxiety, that is possible to explore the kind of agency that may result from this framework. (shrink)

This comment proposes that Bullot & Reber's (B&R's) emphasis on historical and intentional knowledge expands the range of emotions that can be properly viewed as aesthetic states. Many feelings, such as anger, contempt, shame, confusion, and pride, come about through complex aesthetic meanings, which integrate conceptual knowledge, beliefs about the work and the artist's intentions, and the perceiver's goals and values.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Historical Narratives and the Meaning of NationalismLloyd KramerThe vast, expanding literature on nationalism may well defy every generalization except a familiar, general theme of intellectual history: texts about nationalism have always drawn their perspectives and passions from the evolving political and cultural contexts in which their authors have lived. Modern accounts of nationalism show the unmistakable traces of political, military, and cultural conflicts in every decade of (...) the twentieth century—from the era of nationalist rivalries before World War I to the redefinitions of gender, literature, and history that have emerged in contemporary postmodernism, postcolonialism, and multiculturalism.This connection between the texts of nationalist scholarship and the modern contexts of politics and culture suggests why historical narratives of nationalism have become part of the history of nationalism itself. Nationalism’s scholarly interpreters cannot easily separate themselves from the objects of their analysis, and their interpretations are often as diverse and fragmented as the nations they describe. This essay enters the debate on nationalism, describes recurring themes in the historical literature, and replicates a key characteristic of the historiography by stressing that the complexity of nationalism and its interpreters resists every simplifying, comprehensive definition. Histories of nationalism provide a striking example of how the history of ideas never reaches a point of uncontested closure and never finally escapes the political and cultural contexts in which all historical narratives are produced.Like most analysts of nationalism, I assume that it is one of the decisive forces in modern history and that its significance demands careful, critical analysis. It also calls for always incomplete definitions, one of which can be drawn from the German historian Peter Alter. Nationalism is “both an ideology and a political movement which holds the nation and sovereign nation-state to be crucial indwelling values, and which manages to mobilize the political will of [End Page 525] a people or a large section of the population.”1 Nationalist ideas are thus a distinctive form of modern thought that shapes the political actions and cultural identities of individuals as well as groups. The meanings of nationalism and national identity typically depend on various dichotomies that define the nation in terms of its differences from other places or people—the dynamic process of identity formation that has received wide attention in contemporary cultural studies. My own view of the “oppositional” structures in nationalist thinking coincides with the concise description by Peter Sahlins: “National Identity is a socially constructed and continuous process of defining ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’.... National identities... do not depend on the existence of any objective linguistic or cultural differentiation but on the subjective experience of difference.”2 Sahlins thus assumes that something called national identity is “there,” but he also insists that national consciousness is a “constructed” identity. Nationalism, in short, does not express or reflect a natural, primordial reality.The assumption that nationalisms are historical rather than natural phenomena shapes most of the scholarly literature, so that the study of nationalism leads to historical analysis rather than to biology or physical geography. Although there have been countless historical studies of nationalism in different periods, cultures, and conflicts,3 my discussion will refer to a small number of narratives that have made especially significant theoretical claims about the nature of nationalism. There is of course no way to analyze such theories without exclusions and generalizations, which I shall provide by focusing mostly on works about Europe and dividing the patterns of historical analysis into the following broad categories: (1) the description of nationalism as a central component of modernization, reflecting and also shaping intellectual, cultural, economic, social, and political transitions from premodern to modern history; (2) the claim that nationalisms are modern religious movements, related to but also displacing earlier religions; (3) the argument that nationalism is a linguistic, literary construction that depends on new forms of communication, intellectuals, and narratives; (4) the description of nationalism as a discourse of gender and ethnicity that shapes individual identities and also expresses anxieties about sexuality, culture, and respectability; and (5) the argument that nationalisms can be divided into categories (good/bad, Western/Eastern, [End Page 526] political/cultural) and phases that represent sharp differences in the development of modern... (shrink)

How does history relate to the past? According to leading historical theorists, the relation to the past in history is reducible to evidential, psychological, practical and retrospective concerns. In contrast, this volume claims that historical relations to the past are irreducible products of the logical commitments of history as method. Ahlskog argues that the method of history shapes and enables relations to past in historical research by invoking past perspectives of meaning for rendering reality intelligible. The (...) book provides a much-needed philosophical clarification of key concepts in one of the most fundamental debates within the humanities today. (shrink)

In recent years, the use of historical cases in philosophy of science has become a proper topic of reflection. In this article I will contribute to this research by means of a discussion of one very famous example of case-based philosophy of science, namely the debate on the London & London model of superconductivity between Cartwright, Suárez and Shomar on the one hand, and French, Ladyman, Bueno and Da Costa on the other. This debate has been going on for (...) years, without any satisfactory resolution. I will argue here that this is because both sides impose on the historical case a particular philosophical conception of scientific representation that does not do justice to the historical facts. Both sides assume, more specifically, that the case concerns the discovery of a representational connection between a given experimental insight – the Meissner effect – and the diamagnetic meaning of London and London’s new equations of superconductivity. I will show, however, that at the time of the Londons’ publication, neither the experimental insight nor the meaning of the new equations was established: both were open for discussion and they were stabilized only later. On the basis of this historical discussion, I will then propose an alternative approach to the case study: the case should not be seen as a site of confrontation between pre-existing philosophical accounts, but rather as a way to historically elaborate and develop philosophical concepts. I will then show how approaching the historical episode in this way suggests an alternative approach to the philosophical study of representation, according to which it involves the establishment, over time, of a stable connection between constellations of different elements that, through discussion and engagement with alternative views and approaches, come to constitute phenomenon and meaning. (shrink)

From James Legge’s first attempt to translate the Yijing in the English speaking world in 1854, to the latest translation, The Original Meaning of the Yijing, by Joseph A. Adler in 2019, the process of translating the Yijing into English has been continuing for nearly 170 years, and there are countless translations by numerous translators. Historically, these English translations of the Yijing reveal five trends: first, the translations rely on the authoritative, traditional commentaries on the Yijing; secondly, some translations (...) rely on the personal help and interpretations of Yijing scholars in China; thirdly, some translations depend on recently unearthed documents of the Yijing; fourthly, Yili and Xiangshu are more or less involved in these translations, although the focus of each translation is not always the same; fifthly, most translations strive for the “original” meaning of the Yijing, especially with the unearthed documents of the Yijing since the 1970s. It could be safely concluded that the ultimate goal of the English translators of the Yijing is to provide English readers with the Yijing that is closest to the original/authentic meaning so that people in theWest can truly understand the essence of Chinese philosophy represented by the Yijing. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es reconsiderar el punto de vista defendido por los pensadores que se pueden adscribir al famoso ‘Círculo de Viena’ sobre el significado y, especialmente, sobre los enunciados asignificativos. Para ello, procedemos usando la típica forma científica, heredera de la tradición del Círculo, de medir empíricamente los conceptos adquiridos. Además, proporcionamos algunas notas históricas, así como algunas reflexiones sobre el pensamiento de Karl Menger sobre la carencia de una geometría adecuada para el micromundo.

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Many contemporary historians and philosophers are dissatisfied both with the accounts traditional analytic philosophers have given of the epistemological dimensions of historical studies and also with the ways many continental philosophers more recently have brushed aside the need for any such accounts. Yet no one has yet proposed a unified research program that could serve as the central focus for a better epistemologically-oriented approach. Such a research program would not only address epistemological problems from a perspective that would be (...) of methodological interest to historians but would also be directly responsive to fundamental motivations people have for caring about historical studies in the first place. The main purpose of this review essay is to sketch and then illustrate the main outlines of such a research program.Basic to this research program is the recognition that the overwhelmingly central epistemological complication that arises in the attempt to say what happened in the past and what it means that it happened is that there are always competing ways to interpret evidence. The problem is to discover which among these competing interpretations is best, which involves, among other things, discovering which among them is most likely to be true. Strategies are suggested for solving this problem, which, at the limit, would result in the articulation of generally applicable criteria for assessing competing historical interpretations. (shrink)

Historical Narrative: A Dispute Between Constructionism and Scientific Realism An intense discussion about the issue of historical narrative arose during the time when the naïve realism of classical historiography was being critiqued and led to a dispute, in the last century, between constructionism and critical or scientific realism. We can distinguish between constructionism and noetic constructivism. According to ontological constructionism all facts are human constructions; according to noetic constructivism, our notions and theories are constructs with objective meaning (...) (sense and reference); they refer to objective reality. Scientific realism recognizes the existence of noetic construction but does not regard facts as our constructions, as pure fictions. The point of contention is the question over whether historical narrative is merely a discursive construction or whether it is also a scientific reconstruction of the past. Resolving the dispute over whether historical narrative can be objectively true, or whether it is subject to empirical control or not, is dependent on finding the answer to this question. (shrink)

This book explores a vital but neglected element in the philosophy of social science - the complex nature of the social world. By a systematic philosophical engagement, it conceives the social world in terms of three basic concerns: epistemic, methodological and ethical. It examines how we cognize, study and ethically interact with the social world. As such, it demonstrates that a discussion of ethics is epistemically indispensable to the making of the social world. The book presents a new interpretation of (...) philosophy of social science and addresses a series of related topics, including the role of the human subject in the context of scientific knowledge, objectivity, historicity, meaning and nature of social reality, social and literary theory, scientific methodology and fact/value dichotomy, human and collective agency and the limits to relativism. Examining each in turn, it argues that the social world is constructed through human actions and becomes significant because we ascribe meaning to it. This is organized around discussions on the meaning, agency and the making of a social world. The book will be useful to scholars and researchers of philosophy of social science, political philosophy and sociology. ficant because we ascribe meaning to it. This is organized around discussions on the meaning, agency and the making of a social world. The book will be useful to scholars and researchers of philosophy of social science, political philosophy and sociology. (shrink)

This paper advances a fresh theorization of historicity. The word and concept of historicity has become so widespread and popular that they have ceased to have definite meaning and are used to stand for unsupported notions of the values inherent in human experience. This paper attempts to repair the concept by re-defining it as the temporal aspect of the interdependence of life; having history is to have a life intertwined with the lives of all others and with the universe. (...) After separating out the looser uses, surveying some of the literature, and defining what needs to be done, the paper examines shortcomings in the very different and widely influential conceptions of historicity of Koselleck and Heidegger. It then advances a new conception and fits it into the theoretical and moral capabilities of the philosophy of history as a core of philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

Technoscientific research, a kind of scientific research conducted within the decontextualized approach (DA), uses advanced technology to produce instruments, experimental objects, and new objects and structures, that enable us to gain knowledge of states of affairs of novel domains, especially knowledge about new possibilities of what we can do and make, with the horizons of practical, industrial, medical or military innovation, and economic growth and competition, never far removed from view. The legitimacy of technoscientific innovations can be appraised only in (...) the course of considering fully what sorts of objects technoscientific objects are: objects that embody scientific knowledge confirmed within DA; physical/chemical/biological objects, realizations of possibilities discovered in research conducted within DA, brought to realization by means of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions; and components of social/ecological systems, objects that embody the values of technological progress and (most of them) values of capital and the market. What technoscientific objects are - their powers, tendencies, sources of their being, effects on human beings and social/economic systems, how they differ from non technoscientific objects - cannot be grasped from technoscientific inquiry alone; scientific inquiry that is not reducible to that conducted within DA is also needed. The knowledge that underlies and explains the efficacy of technoscientific objects is never sufficient to grasp what sorts of object they are and could become. Science cannot be reduced to technoscience. (shrink)

The book of world-known German philosopher Jurgen Habermas is devoted to the Marxist social theory and in general to potential of the evolutionary concept of society. A wide range of topics is comprised: from the role of philosophy in Marxism and rational and ethical foundations of social identity to comparative theories and problem of legitimacy. J.Habermas does not only critically rethink Marxist concept, but builds a coherent theoretical alternative to it. The power of the book is that the key problems (...) of social theory are considered not only in the abstract plane but in the context of contemporary, keen, topical socio-political challenges. Namely the nature of current social crises, conflicts of legitimation of the contemporary state, the morality of power, the effect of innovations etc. The book has become not only one of the classical samples of Marxism analysis, but it was recognized significant contribution to contemporary social theory. (shrink)

Seeing David in historical perspective means to see Israel's greatest king as a military commander superior to all others of his region, yet strangely flawed in personal and governmental affairs.