This study investigates the role of advantageous comparisons and professional commitment in earning management rationalization. Our study adopted a laboratory between-subject experimental design with 139 accounting students. The results show that advantageous comparisons and professional commitment affect the rationalization of earning management actions. Moreover, compared to participants with high levels of professional commitment, those with low levels of professional commitment view earning management as a more appropriate action when they are engaged in earning management and viewing the egregious example of (...) that action. This finding is important because it explains how personal psychological factors affect the ethical cognitive processes of accountants. This study complements the lack of previous studies and argues that the propensity to compare acts of delinquency depends on an individual's commitment to their profession. We also emphasize the importance of investigating this issue outside of the US context. The results of this study may be helpful to managers, practitioners, academics, and accounting researchers with a better understanding of the potential impact of exposure to earning management practices and an individual’s professional commitment to earning management behaviour. Further, based on this study, all stakeholders may be better positioned to suggest possible remedies and mitigate these behaviours. (shrink)

"Honesty is clearly an important virtue. Parents want to develop it in their children. Close relationships typically depend upon it. Employers value it in their employees. Yet philosophers have said almost nothing about the virtue of honesty in the past fifty years. This book aims to draw attention to this surprisingly neglected virtue. Part One looks at the concept of honesty. It takes up questions such as what does honesty involve, what are the motives of an honest person, how does (...) practical wisdom relate to honesty, and is there anything that connects all the different sides of honesty, including not lying, not stealing, not breaking promises, not misleading others, and not cheating. A central idea is that the honest person reliably does not intentionally distort the facts as she takes them to be. Part Two looks at the empirical psychology of honesty. It takes up the question of whether most people are honest, dishonest, or somewhere in-between. Drawing extensively on recent studies of cheating and lying in particular, the emerging model ends up implying that most of us have a long way to go to reach an honest character"--. (shrink)

What about honesty? -- History of honesty in society -- Honesty and the Constitution -- Honesty in society today.

I am very grateful to Jason Baehr and Bella DePaulo for the careful attention they have paid to my chapter. As I noted, this is my initial foray into providing a conceptual account of the virtue of honesty, and for that matter it is about the only such attempt any philosopher has offered in the past forty years. If others start to go down this road too, I would be thrilled. -/- Following the structure of my paper, I will start (...) with conceptual matters before turning to the implications of the empirical studies and then ending with more on mixed traits. (shrink)

No one in philosophy has paid much attention to the virtue of honesty in recent years. Here is a trait for which it is easy to find consensus that it is a virtue, and furthermore, a very important virtue. It also has obvious relevance to what we see going on in contemporary politics, for instance, or in sports, the entertainment world, and education. Yet as far as I can tell, only one article in a philosophy journal has appeared in several (...) decades which discusses this virtue at any length. -/- In this chapter I have two central aims: (i) to sketch some of the conceptual parameters of the virtue of honesty in general, as well as its subordinate virtues, and then (ii) to draw on leading work in psychology to determine, at least in a preliminary way, whether we should think that most people instantiate this virtue or not. (shrink)

Integrity, honesty, and truth seeking are important virtues that most people care about and want to see promoted in society. Yet surprisingly, there has been relatively little work among scholars today aimed at helping us better understand this cluster of virtues related to truth. This volume incorporates the insights and perspectives of experts working in a variety of disciplines, including philosophy, law, communication and rhetorical studies, theology, psychology, history, and education. For each virtue, there is a conceptual chapter, an application (...) chapter, and a developmental chapter. The resulting volume significantly deepens our knowledge about and appreciation for these central virtues. (shrink)

In this paper, Sarah Stitzlein considers the consequences of honesty on our democracy, especially for citizens' ability to engage in civic inquiry together as they face shared problems. Honesty is a key component of a well-functioning democracy; it develops trust and fosters the sorts of relationships among citizens that enable civic dialogue and reasoning. Post-truth attitudes and truth decay pose serious obstacles to good civic reasoning as citizens struggle to draw clear distinctions between fact and opinion, weigh personal beliefs and (...) emotions over facts, and increasingly distrust traditionally respected sources of information. Stitzlein employs a Deweyan pragmatist account of truth and a distinctly social account of democracy to build a case for foregrounding honesty in the development of citizens. She describes how schools can employ communities of inquiry to cultivate habits of honesty within citizenship education. She explains how a better democracy — one grounded in a wider understanding of social life and relationships — might head off the temptation to be dishonest for self-serving reasons, focusing on how dishonesty jeopardizes our relationships to each other as citizens and our ability to engage in civic reasoning together to fulfill shared goals. (shrink)

Honesty is widely accepted as a prime example of a moral virtue. And yet, honesty has been surprisingly neglected in the recent drive to account for specific virtuous traits. This paper provides a framework for an increased focus on honesty by proposing success criteria that will need to be met by any plausible account of honesty. It then proposes a motivational account on which honesty centrally involves a deep motivation to avoid deception. It argues that this account satisfies the required (...) success criteria and discusses why (and when) honesty can be accepted as a moral virtue. Finally, it highlights some implications of accepting a motivational account of honesty for future work on encouraging the development of honesty, and on the relationship between different types of virtue. (shrink)

There has been almost nothing written in philosophy on honesty in the past fifty years. This paper contributes one piece to a larger project of trying to change this unfortunate state of affairs. In section one, I outline an original account of the behavioural component of honesty as involving being disposed to not intentionally distort the facts as the person sees them. Section two turns to the vice of deficiency, namely dishonesty, which I suggest is the only vice corresponding to (...) honesty. It has at least five different dimensions, and a person’s character needs to be assessed along all of them before an overall judgment as to her dishonesty can justifiably be made. (shrink)

Colleges and universities need to first develop an empirically informed understanding of their students when it comes to their honesty and cheating, so as to be in a better position to develop policies which can try to help them not become more disposed to cheat during their college years. In section one of this paper, I review some of the leading research on cheating behavior, and in section two I do the same for cheating motivation. Section three then draws some (...) implications from this research, both about what faculty can typically expect the characters of their students to be like when it comes to cheating, and what colleges might try to do to help foster character improvement in this area of their students’ lives. (shrink)

The standard view of honesty is a subjectivist one, according to which honesty concerns the facts merely “as the agent sees them”. Against this view, the present paper argues for a non-subjectivist view of honesty. It argues, in particular, that ideal honesty requires not merely expressing what one believes to be true but, moreover, expressing what is true. In that case, though one can be honest to an extent while merely expressing what one believes to be true, one cannot be (...) ideally honest without expressing the truth. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to advance understanding of intellectually virtuous honesty, by examining the relationship between a recent account of intellectual honesty and a recent account of intellectual transparency. The account of intellectual honesty comes from Nathan King, who adapts the work of Christian Miller on moral honesty, while the account of intellectual transparency comes from T. Ryan Byerly. After introducing the respective accounts, I identify four potential differences between intellectual honesty and intellectual transparency as understood by these (...) accounts. I then turn to the question of how to think about the relationship between these traits in light of these potential differences. I make the case that intellectual transparency can either be regarded as an exceptionally strong or ideal variety of intellectual honesty, or it can be regarded as a distinct virtue from intellectual honesty which is a more cardinal virtue than the latter. Along the way, I also note some places where a case can be made that Miller's and King's accounts of honesty and intellectual honesty are in need of refinement or clarification. (shrink)

Until recently, almost nothing had been written about the moral virtue of honesty in the past 50 years of Western analytic philosophy. Slowly, this is beginning to change. But moral honesty is not the only kind of honesty there is. In this paper, I focus specifically on the intellectual cousin to moral honesty, and offer a preliminary account of its behavioral and motivational dimensions. The account will be centered on not intentionally distorting the facts as the person takes them to (...) be, for one of a variety of intellectually virtuous motivating reasons. (shrink)

There is risk of intellectual dishonesty in the act of modernizing traditional doctrines. One reason theologians reform traditional doctrines is that the original formulations have become incredible to them. This is seldom honestly admitted. It is further dishonestly claimed that new formulations have a direct conceptual link to the old as if the new were the old retold. However, many times the connection between the new theology and the old is in name only, with radically new understanding for an old (...) term. Can we honestly say so? Theology should resuscitate questions of intellectual honesty that were present at the Liberal theology's origins in the interest of maximizing honest theological inquiry. Can theology construct an ethics of belief for itself? (shrink)

A growing literature in economics studies ethical behavior and honesty, as it is imperative for functioning societies in a world of incomplete information and contracts. A majority of studies found more pronounced dishonesty among teams compared to individuals. Scholars identified certain nudges as effective and cost-neutral measures to curb individuals' dishonesty, yet little is known about the effectiveness of such nudges for teams. We replicate a seminal nudge treatment effect, signing on the top of a reporting form vs. no signature, (...) with individuals and confirm the original nudge treatment effect. We further ran the same experiment with teams of two that have to make a joint reporting decision. Our results show the effectiveness of the nudge for teams, which provides further confidence in the applicability of the nudge. (shrink)

Philosophy & Public Affairs, Volume 50, Issue 1, Page 6-49, Winter 2022.

According to the Maxim of Quality, rational agents tend to speak honestly. Due to the influence of Grice, a connection between linguistic rationality and honesty is often taken for granted. However, the connection is not obvious: structural rationality in language use does not require honesty, any more than it requires dishonesty. In particular, Quality does not follow from the Cooperative Principle and structural rationality. But then what is honest rational speech? I propose to move the discussion in the context of (...) Stalnaker's theory of assertion. From this perspective, although there is no most rational way to behave, Quality follows from the structure of Stalnakerian conversations if interlocutors are sensitive to credibility. In this case, honesty is built on the expectation of reciprocity, and cooperativity is an outcome and not a precondition of rational communication. A benefit of my discussion is that the account of linguistic rationality falls under the more general view of interactive rationality familiar from theoretical economics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Much has been made of the apparent tensions in Nietzsche's ethical and metaethical views. In this essay I examine a kind of value standard available to Nietzsche that is present in his work. I offer an interpretation of honesty as both a Nietzschean virtue and a means of ethical assessment. Despite Nietzsche's well-known criticisms of truth, he upholds honesty as the only remaining virtue of his free spirits. Honesty has been treated in the literature primarily in the contexts of (...) truth or life affirmation, but I argue that we should instead recognize honesty as a virtue within the context of valuing. I defend honesty as a distinct kind of truthfulness and sincerity involving what I call confrontation. The seeds of Nietzsche's mature view are first evident in his work on tragedy, then developed further in Zarathustra, ultimately revealing a constraint on valuing that is essential to Nietzsche's broader normative projects. (shrink)

We introduce several new variants of the dice experiment by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi :525–547, 2013) to investigate measures to reduce lying. Hypotheses on the relative performance of these treatments are derived from a straightforward theoretical model. In line with previous research, we find that groups of two subjects lied at least to the same extent as individuals—even in a novel treatment where we assigned to one subject the role of being the other’s monitor. However, we find that our participants hardly (...) lied if they do not benefit and only others do, even if they were in a reciprocal relationship. Thus, we conclude that collaboration on lying mostly happens for personal gain. To mitigate selfish lying, an honesty oath which aims to increase moral awareness turned out to be effective. (shrink)

Bereby‐Meyer, Hayakawa, Shalvi, Corey, Costa and Keysar investigate lying for self‐serving reasons. Participants in their experiments had to report the outcome of rolling a die only known to them. They inflated their outcomes less, and thus lied less, when using a foreign language than when using their native language. The authors suggest that lying for self‐serving reasons is an automatic tendency that can be overcome by speaking in a foreign language. [71].

We propose an epistemic logic in which knowledge is fully introspective and implies truth, although truth need not imply epistemic possibility. The logic is presented in sequential format and is interpreted in a natural class of partial models, called balloon models. We examine the notions of honesty and circumscription in this logic: What is the state of an agent that only knows and which honest enable such circumscription? Redefining stable sets enables us to provide suitable syntactic and semantic criteria for (...) honesty. The rough syntactic definition of honesty is the existence of a minimal stable expansion, so the problem resides in the ordering relation underlying minimality. We discuss three different proposals for this ordering, together with their semantic counterparts, and show their effects on the induced notions of honesty. (shrink)

Anne Barnhill focuses her article in this issue on the American Medical Association's ethics policy governing clinical use of placebos, but the implications of her analysis are deeper, touching on how physicians should make judgments about which interventions to offer patients in the process of shared decision‐making. The bottom line is that, even if an undisclosed placebo might be marginally more effective for a particular patient in the short term, over the long haul the integrity of the patient‐physician relationship relies (...) on doctors being honest with their patients. Even when it comes to placebos, honesty remains the best policy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The discourse on honesty and dishonesty in academic work has seen considerable growth over the past two decades. This study empirically analyses the shifts in the literature over the past two decades in the research focus and most prolific authors, institutions, countries, and journals. A broad list of terms was employed from the Glossary of Academic Integrity to shortlist journal articles (n = 782) from Scopus. A bibliometric analysis was conducted for each decade and the results were compared. Research (...) outputs and number of clusters were over two-fold in the second compared to the first decade indicating an increase in volume and complexity. The study found a continued focus on plagiarism and academic misconduct research, though academic integrity and contract cheating emerged in the second decade. Shifts were evident in the output signifying a diversification of the research base and perspectives. Further research and action are needed to develop integrity as the broadest defense against dishonesty in all spheres of academia. (shrink)

In a competitive and morally imperfect world, business people are often faced with serious ethical challenges. Harboring suspicions about the ethics of others, many feel justified in engaging in less-than-ideal conduct to protect their own interests. The most sophisticated moral arguments are unlikely to counteract this behavior. We believe that this morally defensive behavior is responsible, in large part, for much undesirable deception in negotiation. Drawing on recent work in the literature of negotiations, we present some practical guidance on how (...) negotiators might build trust, establish common interests, and secure credibility for their statements, thereby promoting honesty. We also point out the types of social and institutional arrangements, many of which have become commonplace, that work to promote credibility, trust, and honesty in business dealings. Our approach is offered not only as a specific response to the problem of deception in negotiation, but as one model of how research in business ethics might offer constructive advice to practitioners. (shrink)

The practice of ascribing dispositions of communicative truthfulness to others is necessary if language-use is to be effective. In this article, through a phenomenological analysis of everyday judgments about the sincerity and honesty of others, the author shows that, in learning to employ these two distinct concepts correctly, users of language are learning that communicative truthfulness is morally significant insofar as it manifests fairness (in the case of honesty) and the goods of affective human connectedness (in the case of sincerity). (...) In so doing, the author identifies important evaluative differences between sincerity and honesty and provides a substantive explanation for how our lived presumption about the communicative truthfulness of others is possible. (shrink)

We briefly present three problems related to promiscuous trust in connection to germane notions of honesty and competence in systems design.

Dishonest research violates one of the cardinal virtues of the academic vocation. Some readers might already be familiar with the traditional list of the cardinal virtues: Justice, Courage, Prudence, and Temperance. Honesty, of course, is nowhere on this list. So what does it mean to say that honesty is a cardinal virtue of the academic life? Professors typically have two primary tasks: the generation and transmission of knowledge. For both of these tasks, an emphasis on truth takes center stage. And (...) this focus on truth means that honesty is of particular importance for the academic vocation. (shrink)

Engaging a listener’s trust imposes moral demands upon a presenter in respect of truthtelling and completeness. An agent lies by an utterance that satisfies what are herein defined as signal and mendacity conditions; an agent deceives when, in satisfaction of those conditions, the agent’s utterances contribute to a false belief or thwart a true one. I advert to how we may fool ourselves in observation and in the perception of our originality. Communication with others depends upon a convention or practice (...) of presumed nonuniversal truthfulness. In support of an asserted duty of nondeceptiveness, I offer a reconciliation of pertinent Kantian passages, a sketch of arguments within utilitarianism, contractarianism, and other views, and an account arguing for application of that duty to assertions, implicatures, omissions, equivocation, prevarication, and sophistry insofar as they affect listeners’ doxastic states. For scholarship, this duty is exceptionless. I describe the kernel of intellectual honesty as a virtuous disposition such that when presented with an incentive to deceive, the agent will not deceive. Intellectual honesty delivers candor when it counts. I contrast this with complementary virtues and the surpassing virtue of ingenuousness. An account is given of the connection between intellectual honesty and an influential physical model of integrity. (shrink)

For successful project outcomes to organizations and clients alike, project managers (PMs) need to make ethical decisions and yet balance the interests of all stakeholders involved. Hence, honest communication among project stakeholders is essential as a countermeasure to this paradox. Honesty is one of the core ethical values propagated by the Project Management Institute (PMI), USA. Our study aimed to gain an endogenous perspective on honesty vis-à-vis its reification by PMI in its effect on software project performance. Empirical data were (...) collected through in-depth interviews from 83 Indian PMs in one of the prominent Indian software consulting organizations. Grounded theory was utilized to analyze the data obtained. Our results validate the importance of honesty on software project performance, the need for trust among stakeholders in maintaining honesty, importance of Indian culture in understanding honesty and ensuing ethical challenges faced by PMs. Our results bear implications to extant research on honesty in projects with specific reference to the Indian software context. They are important for PMI professionals as they provide a culture-specific perspective to honesty and the scope for ideation on how to inculcate and sustain honesty in project management in India. (shrink)

Shares strategies for maintaining business competitiveness in an increasingly transparent world, revealing the importance of professional honesty, solution-driven practices and integrity-based customer support. By the authors of The One-to-One Future. 20,000 first printing.

We propose an epistemic logic in which knowledge is fully introspective and implies truth, although truth need not imply epistemic possibility. The logic is presented in sequential format and is interpreted in a natural class of partial models, called balloon models. We examine the notions of honesty and circumscription in this logic: What is the state of an agent that 'only knows φ' and which honest φ enable such circumscription? Redefining stable sets enables us to provide suitable syntactic and semantic (...) criteria for honesty. The rough syntactic definition of honesty is the existence of a minimal stable expansion, so the problem resides in the ordering relation underlying minimality. We discuss three different proposals for this ordering, together with their semantic counterparts, and show their effects on the induced notions of honesty. (shrink)

Does honesty result from the absence of temptation or the active resistance of temptation? The “will’’ hypothesis suggests that honesty results from the active resistance of temptation, while the ”grace” hypothesis argues that honesty results from the absence of temptation. We examined reaction time and measured the cheating behavior of individuals who had a chance to lie for money. In study 1, we tested the “grace” hypothesis that honesty results from the absence of temptation and found a priming effect of (...) moral constructs on increasing honest behavior. In study 2, we investigated the individual’s moral identity in the same context, articulating different mechanisms that lead people to behave ethically. The result confirms that the “grace” hypothesis was valid for people who had a high moral identity, while the “will” hypothesis was accurate for individuals who had a low moral identity. (shrink)

One persistent element of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work is his insistence on self-honesty as a condition for doing logical or sense-oriented philosophy.This gives his work a spiritual weight that is not often appreciated. Yet the connection between self-honesty and logical insights is unclear, and this paper attemptsto clarify it. The paper includes brief introductions to Wittgenstein’s earlier and later thought, along with some religiously relevant examples.

The boundaries of honesty are the focal point of this exploration of the individualistic origins of modernist ethics and the consequent need for a more pragmatic approach to business ethics. The tendency of modernist ethics to see honesty as an individual responsibility is described as a contextually naive approach, one that fails to account for the interactive effects between individual choices and corporate norms. By reviewing the empirical accounts of managerial struggles with ethical dilemmas, the article arrives at the contextual (...) preconditions for encouraging the development of reflective moral agents in modern corporations. (shrink)

Using self-report as a measure of conscious experience has been a point of contention in mind wandering research. Whereas prior work has focused on the introspective component of self-report validity, the current research introduces an honesty prime task to the current paradigm in order to assess the role of goal states and social factors on self-report accuracy. Findings provide evidence for an inflated report of mind wandering frequency arising from demand characteristics, intensified by the divergent properties of the subjective and (...) behavioural measures and the general deficit in meta-awareness of off task episodes. (shrink)

Current profess ional and la y lore ove rlook the ro le of hone sty in develop ing and s ustaining intimate relationships. We w ish to ass ert its importa nce. W e begin b y analyz ing the no tion of intimac y. An intim ate encounter or exchange, we argue, is one in which one verbally or non-verbally privately reveals something about oneself, and does so in a sensitive, trusting way. An intimate relationship is one marked by (...) regular intimate encounters or excha nges. Then, we co nsider two sorts of cases wh ere it is widely thought permissible, if not lauda tory, to lie to one 's intimates. In discrediting these presumably central cases of justified dishonesty, we put forward general considerations requiring hones ty. We e nd by s ugges ting how 'meta honesty'--hone sty about one's own efforts at communication, including one's efforts to be honest--is particularly important in intimate relationships. (shrink)

A large body of research has indicated international students in the United States and abroad experience difficulties understanding what academic integrity is and how to avoid academic misconduct, 159–172 2011; Brown & Howell, 2001; Gullifer and Tyson Studies in Higher Education, 39, 1202-1218 2014). While most studies focus on academic misconduct and academic corruption in research ethics, 339-358 2014), this study analyzes the length, English-language readability, and translation of academic integrity policies of 453 four-year U.S. institutions of higher education. Findings (...) indicate average academic integrity policies are over 2000 words long, are written above the 16th-grade reading level, and are very rarely translated into a language other than English. In addition, no institutions published their academic integrity policies in full on their institutional international student website, possibly rendering the policy difficult to locate on the institution’s website for international students. Implications for research, policy, and practice are addressed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTW.K. Clifford is widely known for his emphatic motto that it is wrong, always everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. In fact, that dictum and Clifford’s...

What qualities do we need in order to be good philosophers? Wittgenstein insists that virtues of character – such as honesty, humility, courage, and strength – are more important for our philosophizing than the relevant intellectual talents and skills. These virtues are essential because doing good philosophy demands both knowing and overcoming the deep-seated desires and inclinations which lead us astray in our thinking, and achieving such self-knowledge and self-overcoming demands all of these virtues working in concert. In this paper (...) I draw together many of Wittgenstein’s seemingly offhanded remarks on these issues in order to reconstruct his understanding of philosophy’s ‘difficulties of the will’ and the virtues needed to overcome them. (shrink)

Political liberals assume an accessibility requirement, which means that, for ensuring civic respect and non-manipulation, public officials should offer accessible reasons during political advocacy. Recently, critics have offered two arguments to show that the accessibility requirement is unnecessary. The first is the pluralism argument: Given the pluralism in evaluative standards, when officials offer non-accessible reasons, they are not disrespectful because they may merely try to reveal their strongest reason. The second is the honesty argument: As long as officials honestly confess (...) their beliefs after offering non-accessible reasons, disrespect and non-manipulation do not occur. This paper defends the accessibility requirement and asserts that these two arguments overlook a unique feature of the political domain. While all citizens collectively own political power as a corporate body, an official does not privately own her political power. Instead, she is a trustee who has a duty to act on behalf of the corporate body, that is, she has to make decisions on grounds that are accessible to others. This duty explains why, despite pluralism, the accessibility requirement is necessary. Moreover, given that political decisions are profoundly influential to each person, requiring people to be honest is ineffective in discouraging disrespectful and manipulative acts. (shrink)