Metinleri cümleler, cümleleri ise kelimeler oluşturmaktadır. Kelime-lerin türlerinden biri de Arap dili literatüründe “hurûf-u meâni” diye isimlendirilen edatlardır. Arapça metinlere bakıldığında hemen hemen her cümle ve her satırda bu edatlara rastlamak mümkündür. Bu da edatların manaya katkısının ne denli önemli olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Cümle içerisindeki konumuna bağlı olarak gerek i‘rab, gerekse mana itibariyle değişkenlik arz eden edatlar, Arap dilbilimcilerinin bakış açısına ve yoruma dayalı olarak tartışmaya konu olmuş ve bu bağlamda sorun hale gelmiştir. Bu makalenin amacı, söz konusu edatlardan biri (...) olan “en” edatının işleviyle ilgili olarak öne sürülen görüşleri ve görüş ayrılığından kaynaklanan problemleri irdelemektir. Bu hedef doğrultusunda önce “en” edatının harf mi isim mi? Şeklindeki sorunun çözümüne çalışılacak, daha sonra bu edatın cümledeki pozisyonuna göre ne tür manalara geldiği ya da cümleye ne gibi anlam kazandırdığı üzerinde durulacaktır. (shrink)

Dyuḳan inṭeleḳṭuʼali shel manhig ruḥani be-ʻidan mahapkhani. Yehuda leʼon Ashkenazi (Meniṭo) 1922-1996 hogeh, mekhanekh ṿe-ish maʻaśhe.

Mr. Agar in Homerica, Preface ix., has suggested that κακι γλνηι was the original reading, ‘Be off with the evil eye upon you.’ I have searched, but in vain, for any formula of imprecation corresponding to the formula of blessing, τύχγαθι, though I should like to see it in κακι τѵχι of the Treacherous Hound in Agamemnon 1230. Mr. T. C. Snow, objecting to Mr. Agar's alterations of the Homeric text, once suggested to me that we should rather retain the (...) vocative, and translate it, ‘Be off, evil eye.’ Others also may have thought of this, but it does not appear to have got into print. (shrink)

In Arabic, hurūf al-ma'ānī (meaning letters) are of the most remarkable factors making the words make sense. One of these letters is harf al-jarr ba. Actually, it is seen that similar studies were conducted for this letter. It has been analysed under the hurūf al-jarr chapters in naḥw/syntax books, in separate works addressing meaning letters and in original studies related to hurūf al-jarr. Additionally, it was specifically scrutinized from various aspects in an original way. While some gave place to the (...) forms it was used in certain surahs of Qur’an, others analysed it in terms of certain meanings it conveyed. However, there are few studies applying the meaning letters and presenting poetry examples from the j̲āhilīyyah poems, which are extremely important in Arabic language and a type of Classical Arabic texts. This study addresses the ba preposition, used with many meanings and functions, about which there were no original studies on the basis of j̲āhilīyyah poetry which has been exemplified in almost all of the works written in the period beginning from the earliest times of Arabic language and literature to this time. This study analyses the place and style of use for the letter ba in muʿallaqāt poems written in j̲āhilīyyah. The aim of this study is to find answers for questions such as: “Being used in poems, which meaning is conveyed more often with ba? In which muʿallaqāt poem was it used more? Are there any poems in which it is used with its literal and figurative meanings simultaneously? Do the poems include all of the meanings this letter adds to expressions like in the classical texts?”. Consisting of two chapters, this study presents brief information regarding the general characteristics of the muʿallaqāt poems and their poets in the first chapter. In the second chapter, the forms this letter is used in poetry are presented. Since it influences meaning, the grammatical aspect of the ba preposition is also analysed when necessary. While this preposition used in poetry is examined, by considering the elucidation of the couplets it was used, the holistic text in which the couplet appeared and the grammatical aspect of this letter, we tried to make a conclusion. In the preliminary analysis about the subject, it was considered that harf al-jarr ba taking place in all muʿallaqāt poems was used with various meanings. In the muʿallaqāt poems, the most common meaning which harf al-jarr ba conveys is as adverb of place. It is thought that, this stems from the names of places which are frequently seen in muʿallaḳāt poems and for the expression style of harf al-jarr ba. The real meaning with which this letter is used is addition. Being used with numerous figurative meanings, this preposition is seen to reflect its literal meaning as well as these ones. For this reason, it can be understood how a meaning letter can be used both in its literal meaning and the secondary/figurative meaning. It is understood that harf al-jarr ba was used for a total of two hundred and forty-three times in muʿallaḳāt poems with its various meanings. With its many meanings, this letter was used with thirteen different meanings in muʿallaqāt poems with meanings such as addition, causative, referencing, giving reason, conversation, adverb, valuing, reciprocation, responding, escalation, indefinite, oath and reduplication. The muʿallaqā in which harf al-jarr ba was used the most is that of Ṭarafa b. al-Abd’s. (shrink)

Bu makalede, râ harfinin tefhîm/kalın ve terkîk/ince okunmasına dair hususlar son dönem Osmanlı kurrâlarından Bursalı Süleyman Vehbi’nin (öl. 1334/1916) Risâle-i Râiyye adlı eseri ekseninde ele alınmıştır. Kur’ân harflerinin seslendiriliş biçimini ifade eden fonetik farklılıklar kıraat ilminin amelî/pratik boyutunu oluşturan en önemli unsurdur. Bu minvalde Kur’ân alfabesindeki harfler genel olarak, birbirinin zıddı olan tefhîm-terkîk sıfatlarından biriyle seslendirilmektedir. Bununla birlikte lâm ve râ harfleri bazen kalın bazen de ince okunmaktadır. Lâm harfinde aslolanın terkîkle telaffuz edilmesi olup bazı durumlarda tağlîzle/tefhîmle okunduğu hususunda ittifak (...) edilmiştir. Fakat âlimler râ harfinin tefhîm veya terkîki konusunda ihtilaf etmişlerdir. Bazıları, aslı itibariyle râ harfinde tefhîm-terkîk özelliği bulunmayıp birtakım şartlar muvacehesinde bunlardan birisiyle okunduğunu söylerken; cumhur ise râ’da aslolan tefhîm olup bazı şartlar çerçevesinde terkîkle okunduğunu ileri sürmüştür. Husûsen Verş (öl. 197/812) rivâyeti ve Ezrak (öl. 240/854) tarikine göre râ harfinin tefhîm-terkîkle okunması gereken yerlerin tespiti kıraat tedrisatında zaptı en zor olan hususlardan addedilmiştir. Hâl böyle iken günümüze değin râ harfine dair kurrâ arasındaki ihtilafların tam anlamıyla açıklanıp vuzuha kavuşturulduğu -Süleyman Vehbi’nin risâlesi dışında- Türkçe bir eser kaleme alınmamıştır. Türkçe eserlerde râ’nın okunuşuna dair hususlar genelde Hafs (öl. 180/796) rivâyeti özelinde işlenmiş, Verş ve Ezrak’ın, râ harfini okuyuş keyfiyetlerine yönelik bilgilere yeterli ölçüde yer verilmemiştir. Bu bağlamda mezkûr boşluğun doldurulması, çalışmanın amaçlarından biridir. Makalenin Risâle-i Râiyye çerçevesinde ele alınmasının sebebi müellifin, Osmanlı’daki kıraat tedrisinde temel kaynak olarak kullanılan en-Neşr, İthâf, Zübdetü’l-irfân, Umdetü’l-hullân, el-Îtilâf, Bedâi‘u’l-burhân ve Mürşidü’t-talebe gibi eserlerin hemen hepsine müracaat edip konuyu sistematik bir şekilde ele alması ve yeri geldikçe mezkûr eserlerdeki hata ve eksikliklere değinmesidir. Makalede öncelikle müellifin hayatına yer verilmiş, ardından risâlede işlenen konular tavzih edilmiştir. Bu yapılırken müellifin verdiği bilgilerin aslî kaynaklardaki yeri ve râ’nın tefhîm-terkîk ile okunmasının illeti/sebebi tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca müellifin eser içerisinde hata ve eksikliklerine değindiği kaynakların ilgili yerleri tespit edilip hangi ibare ve ifadelerle tashih edilmesi gerektiğine işaret edilerek araştırmacılara kolaylık sağlanması amaçlanmıştır. Çalışma sonunda görülmüştür ki Ezrak, esreli râlar’ın terkîkinde ve kelime başlarındaki fethalı-zammeli râlar’ın tefhîminde diğer kurrâ ile müttefiktir. Ancak kelime ortasında-sonunda bulunan mansûb-meftûh râlar’ı “kelimenin aslından olan lâzımî kesreli harften sonra gelmesi”, “lâzımî kesreyle râ’nın arasında sakin bir hurûf-i isti‘lânın -hâ/خ hariç- bulunmaması” ve “râ’nın sakin yâ harfinden sonra gelmesi” durumunda sadece terkîkle; bu şartları taşımakla birlikte râ’nın tenvinli olması durumunda terkîk ve tefhîm olmak üzere iki vecihle; bu şartlardan birinin bulunmaması durumunda ise sadece tefhîmle okumuştur. Mazmûm ve merfû râlar’ı ise mansûb râlar için zikri geçen şartları taşımaları halinde Verş sadece terkîk, Ezrak ise terkîk ve tefhîm vechiyle okumuştur. Burada şunu ifade etmek gerekir ki kütüphanelerde özellikle Osmanlı dönemine ait pek çok kıraat eseri gün yüzüne çıkarılmayı beklemektedir. Söz konusu eserlerin ortaya çıkarılıp incelenmesi hem süreç içerisinde kıraat ilminin nasıl bir seyir izlediğinin tespiti hem de mezkûr eserlerin verilerinden istifade edilerek yeni çalışmaların ortaya konulması açısından önem arz etmektedir. (shrink)

SUVs are the safest vehicle because they're so large-right? Wrong! That's the advertising pitch, but in 2000, they had the highest rollover rate (36%) of any vehicle type involved in fatal accidents. Yet two years later their safety myth was still so strong that one of four vehicles sold in the U.S. was an SUV. The world of spin we live in is full of such potentially hazardous illusions. We need to know if particular foods can hurt us with Salmonella (...) or cholesterol, whether our government is truthful in its reasons for waging war, what problems a political candidate may cause or resolve if elected, and whether the items we purchase are durable or junk. But gaining those insights can be challenging when so many of the illusions surrounding us are deliberately created. As a civil-litigation attorney for over twenty-five years, Randy Kasten has heard thousands of lies. He has witnessed that those who dispense the information we need to make decisions-advertisers, salespeople, politicians, and the media-often have a vested interest in manipulating us. Truth's biggest enemies are the people whose job it is to sell us incomplete versions of the facts and our willingness to believe what we want to believe. Often, we believe what we believe because it is the only story available. To help us see through deceptions of all types, Kasten discusses eight kinds of lies and what we can do about them, as well as methods for discerning the truth gleaned from his practice of law. Other topics include advertising magic, thirty-six places where the truth hides, lessons from science, the media and misinformation, and how we fool ourselves. Altogether, he provides a unique tool for enabling us to make decisions that will lead to more prosperity, better health, greater intimacy, and a life based on lasting values. (shrink)

Ṿa-ani tefilati -- Emet me-erets titsmaḥ.

The text on this website is copyright in the same way as any other publication. It is of course legitimate to make small quotations from it. A link to this site should then be put in to acknowledge the origin of quoted text. For any more substantial use of the material on this site you should ask permission from me. You should also ask my permission to use any of the graphic icons or the images which are marked as being (...) my photographs. (shrink)

The topic of "Einladung zur Odyssee" is the knowledge of the human individual. As knowledge nowadays is always associated with scientific knowledge, and as scientific knowledge is always collective knowledge - and not individual knowledge - this book is not only not scientific, it also tackles a non-topic, a topic that, from the point of view of today's people, simply does not exist. The consequences of this point of view and of this concept that there is no knowledge other than (...) scientific knowledge can be seen in our current educational systems: The mind of a young person can either be adapted to science or it has to be broken. The author of this book is in no manner unscientific and does not have any tendency to the belief in esoteric truths; he just misses (and missed in his life) the understanding of teachers and university professors for the necessity of the individual student to find his own approach to a topic and to find answers to his own questions. This book was inspired by personal experiences during my studies at the University of Vienna like the following: When I tried, in a seminar, to express that I have now understood a certain concept which I did not understand before, and what that means for me, how it modifies other related concepts in my mind, I was regularly shut down by the professor who was offended by my practice of relating a concept to myself, to my own person. Instead of doing that I should relate it to that which is of general interest. (In this occasion I also learned that my professors confunded universality with that which is of general interest.) In short, university professors and persons of scientific character seem to lack the understanding that the head of a student has to wire itself in order to function. This process of wiring itself of students' brains is called learning. Nowadays people seem to have no respect of learning, they do not understand that learning is a sensitive and fragile process which can easily be harmed by professors shutting down students without kowing and even caring about what is currently happening in their brains. (shrink)

Philosophical study of the sufic aspect of Islamic teachings.

Ten of the twelve essays in this fine collection treat subjects that are relevant to any reasonably comprehensive understanding of the nature of the history of science. The first four essays are either completely or largely historiographical. Each explores the extent to which the natural sciences have been, or should be, seen as central to the Scottish Enlightenment. As all four provide extended descriptive historiographies, there is extensive repetition here, but as the four also offer radically different answers, they are (...) worth reading.In the first essay Paul Wood argues that Dugald Stewart created an imaginary picture of the Scottish Enlightenment that has influenced almost all subsequent interpretations of the movement. These interpretations have promoted the idea that there was a coherent “Scottish school” of philosophy of which David Hume and Francis Hutcheson were the cofounders; that the Scottish school emphasized moral philosophy and social theory; and that it included figures from Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Aberdeen. Wood claims that Stewart downplayed the relationship between natural knowledge and social theory, except for some minor methodological commonalities, for several reasons. In part, he desperately wanted to maintain the mind‐body dualism that characterized the Scottish school. In addition, his main statement on the Scottish Enlightenment appeared as an essay on the history of the progress of metaphysics and morals that was paired with John Leslie's essay on the progress of the natural sciences in the supplement to the fourth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and he was simply responding to the limits of his assignment. Regardless of his motives, one major consequence of Stewart's approach has been the exclusion of the natural sciences from a central role in most subsequent interpretations of the Scottish Enlightenment not written by historians of science—an exclusion Wood laments.The second essay, by John Robertson, seems, on one level, almost designed to prove Wood's main point, for it explicitly denies natural science a significant role. For Robertson, moral philosophy, history, and, above all, political economy are at the core of Scottish concerns. He departs from Stewart, however, by insisting on a fundamental opposition between Hume and Hutcheson and by arguing that the Scottish Enlightenment would be better understood as part of a broader European Enlightenment, with less patriotic fervor about Scots exceptionalism.Richard Sher's essay on what book history can tell us about science and medicine in the Scottish Enlightenment is remarkably insightful and illuminating; it left me waiting with great anticipation for his book‐length study on the subject. Although Sher rejects Roger Emerson's claims that the natural sciences were the driving force for the Enlightenment in Scotland, he insists that science and medicine were important. He then goes on to suggest a series of fascinating ways in which characteristics of the book trade both shaped and can illuminate the place of science.Among the other essays likely to interest historians of science are those by Anita Guerrini, John Wright, and Fiona MacDonald. These authors explore aspects of medical theory and medical care in very different but very illuminating ways. One other related set of essays consists of pieces by James Moore, Christopher Berry, and Alexander Broadie, all of which focus on aspects of the theorized relationship between science and religion. Here, the major theme is the difference in emphases between those who followed the ancient materialists in seeing fear as the primary motive in the origins of religion and those who emphasized some version of the design argument.This volume provides a good introduction to the current state of interpretations of the Scottish Enlightenment, and its special emphasis on the place of science among eighteenth‐century Scottish intellectuals should make it attractive to many readers of Isis. (shrink)

The article explores meditation-based examination of experience as a means for developing a contemplative, nonnaturalized, and existentially meaningful empirical research of consciousness in which the experiencing person is regarded as the primary investigator. As the first phase of a broader project, a group of seven researchers carried out a series of five meditation retreats. We sampled the ongoing experience of the researchers at the same random moments during meditation practice. The acquired data, consisting of more than 500 journal entries, interview (...) transcripts, and participatory analysis records, set the ground for three lines of enquiry: (1) What, if any, kind of meditative practice is suitable for researching experience? How can it be cultivated? (2) Can a group of researchers skilled in meditation systematically investigate selected experiential phenomena? (3) What is the actual lived experience of a group of researchers engaged in a continuous meditation-based examination of experience? In this report, we primarily focus on the third question, offering a concrete ethnographic overview of our research enterprise. We conclude by relating our findings to the discussion of the phenomenological practice of the epoché as an empirical tool for the study of consciousness. (shrink)

Let me first explain what I am not attacking in this paper. I am not attacking, for instance, the right of free speech or any of the other specific rights listed in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights or the United Nations' Charter. I am, rather, attacking any specific right's being called a ‘human right’. I mean to show that any such designation is not only fraudulent but, in case anyone might want to say that there can be noble lies, (...) grossly wicked, amounting indeed to genocide. (shrink)

Il y a chez Thomas d'Aquin une autre morale que celle que nous connaissons. Si elle n'a pas été développée, c'est que les options et les sensibilités du temps ne la réclamaient pas. Cette autre morale, dont les assises ne font aucun doute, se trouve, elle, en rapport avec le meilleur des options et des sensibilités de notre temps. La morale de Thomas d'Aquin est celle du chemin qui conduit à Dieu. Les humains sont ici-bas des voyageurs, en quête de (...) leur fin bienheureuse. Si riche soit-elle, cette morale ne promeut pas pour elles-mêmes les valeurs proprement terrestres et humaines. L'autre morale se définit comme une manifestation de ce qui nous habite : Dieu est en nous et pas seulement dans un au-delà, et notre vie éternelle est déjà commencée. En manifestant ce qui en nous est vie et valeur, nous les faisons nôtres et nous les développons; en les engageant dans des tâches terrestres et humaines, nous prenons au sérieux la création de Dieu remise entre nos mains. Et nous travaillons au vœu que celle-ci porte : la promotion des peuples et l'instauration d'une société juste et fraternelle dès ici-bas. Le livre articule, en finale, ces deux morales dans un nouvel ensemble."--From the publisher. (shrink)

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless (...) of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney, or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts, this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations. (shrink)

In recommending a book like this, one is tempted to fall back on cliches such as 'brilliant insights', 'original perspectives', etc. The origina lity of this book is on a different plane. The problem of subject and object has been central to Western philo sophic thinking at least since the time of Descartes. So much so that many students of philosophy see it as the philosophical problem. In his Mundus Cognobilis and Mundus Causalis Mr. Mes offers an ontological-epistemological view, the (...) originality of which consists precisely in the fact that it is not an innovation. Rather, it seeks to put 'in order' the elements already at hand in such a way as to show the subject-object paradox to be non-existent where it seems to be significant and trivial where it really does occur. He has a new and interesting perspective both on what 'materialism' might mean and on how a 'scientific' view of the world has to be constructed. 'Energy-patterns' emerge as explanatory ulti mates, although there is no effort to arrive at any sort of ultimate meta physics. (shrink)

I cordially thank the members of the Central Committee for the high honor they have bestowed on me-my election as General Secretary of the Central Committee. I am fully aware of the tremendous responsibility that has been placed upon me. I understand how important and how extremely complicated the work before me is. I assure the Central Committee, and the party, that I will apply all my efforts, my knowledge, and my experience to justifying this confidence and, together with you, (...) continue that fundamental line of our party that Iurii Vladimirovich Andropov consistently and persistently put into practice. (shrink)

U ovom će radu biti objašnjena važna sintagma Anthony Giddensa koja se nadovezuje na refleksivnu projekciju osobnosti, a to je transformacija intimnosti. Uz taj pojam povezane su i teorija i praksa čiste veze, dakle način na koji se ljudi ponašaju u bliskim odnosima, što traže u njima, te kako se ti odnosi mijenjaju. Prije, tumači Giddens, odnosi su se ostvarivali preko određenog skupa pravila, slijedeći određene norme i vrijednosti u društvu, tj. u lokalnoj zajednici. Danas, intimnost postaje projekt na kojemu (...) treba raditi. Ona zahtijeva otvaranje individuuma prema drugima, pri čemu se stvara međusobni proces otkrivanja i povjerenja, budući da je upravo i prvi čovjekov odnos, tj. odnos prema sebi, postao proces promatranja i otkrivanja sebe. Zadanih formi više nema. Vidjet ćemo kako transformacija intimnosti u sebi obuhvaća i pojam refleksivne projekcije osobnosti, prema tome je pojam refleksivne projekcije osobnosti konstitutivni dio transformacije intimnosti i bitno na nju utječe, budući da ju izgrađuje.In this paper we shall look at an important syntagm of Anthony Giddens – transformation of intimacy – which is linked with reflexive project of the self. It also closely observes the theory and practice of a pure relationship, that is how people behave in close relationships, what they want from them and how they change. Before, explains Giddens, relationships followed an established set of rules, norms and values in the society, i.e. a particular local community. Today, intimacy is a project one has to work on. Intimacy demands opening up of an individual to the others with mutual revelation and trust because the very first relationship, with oneself, has become reflexive in a new way and self-discovering. Nothing is taken for granted any more. We shall see that transformation of intimacy is largely constituted and greatly influenced by the term reflexive project of the self. (shrink)

Excerpt from Le Philosophe Themistios Devant l'Opinion de Ses Contemporains Il ne veut pas seulement amener les philosophes a sortir de leurs ecoles pour entrer en contact avec la foule, il reve d'une association definitive et feconde entre la philosophie et'le pouvoir. Lui-meme donne l'exemple de cette double activite, en faisant en public des conferences et en accep tant des charges publiques. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This (...) book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

For any putative excuse, why not recast it as a justification rendering one’s wrongful conduct ultimately permissible? This paper confronts the worry that many, perhaps all, excuses might collapse into justifications – either in morality or criminal law. It is an especially pressing problem for normative expectations views, on which excuses speak to a lower standard than justifications. I argue that the prospects for decisively blocking collapse within morality look bleak – at least if we adhere to an important constraint (...) of the present project. I want to see if we can block collapse without appealing to a substantive theory of moral wrongness or taking on robust theoretical commitments about interpersonal morality. This is especially important for criminal law purposes, though I concede that blocking collapse in morality likely requires substantive commitments. Accordingly, I develop a more ecumenical way to block collapse within the criminal law, although not morality. The key is to attend to differences in how the legislature can legitimately assign weight to reasons in determining which actions it deems to be wrong vs. how individuals can fairly be expected to assign weight to reasons, which is key to assessing culpability. Institutional considerations impact the former but not the latter. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the (...) claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes. Most important among these are the objective fuzziness of all relative positions and momenta and the consequent incomplete spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world. The latter makes it possible to draw a clear distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic. This in turn makes it possible to understand the special status of measurements in all standard formulations of the theory. Whereas Bayesians have written contemptuously about the “folly” of conjoining “objective” to “probability,” there are various reasons why quantum-mechanical probabilities can be considered objective, not least the fact that they are needed to quantify an objective fuzziness. But this cannot be appreciated without giving thought to the makeup of the world, which Bayesians refuse to do. Doing this on the basis of how quantum mechanics assigns probabilities, one finds that what constitutes the macroworld is a single Ultimate Reality, about which we know nothing, except that it manifests the macroworld or manifests itself as the macroworld. The so-called microworld is neither a world nor a part of any world but instead is instrumental in the manifestation of the macroworld. Quantum mechanics affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world, at stages in the process of manifestation, but it does not allow us to describe what lies “behind” the manifested world except in terms of the finished product—the manifested world, for without the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could describe its manifestation. (shrink)

Let k be the number of all pure sets, und let K be the number of all pure classes. The Platonist, assuming that the class \V of all pure sets cannot be enlarged by any formal means, will come to the conclusion that cardinalities between k und K are conceptually impossible. So the Continuum Hypothesis is true on class level. And if this feature of \V is reflected by all infinite sets \Va, the General Continuum Hypothesis is true on set (...) level. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem is well known in Mathematics/Logic/Philosophy circles. Gödel was able to find a way for any given P (UTM), (read as, “P of UTM” for “Program of Universal Truth Machine”), actually to write down a complicated polynomial that has a solution iff (=if and only if), G is true, where G stands for a Gödel-sentence. So, if G’s truth is a necessary condition for the truth of a given polynomial, then P (UTM) has to answer first that (...) G is true in order to secure the truth of the said polynomial. But, interestingly, P (UTM) could never answer that G was true. This necessarily implies that there is at least one truth a P (UTM), however large it may be, cannot speak out. Daya Krishna and Karl Potter’s controversy regarding the construal of India’s Philosophies dates back to the time of Potter’s publication of “Presuppositions of India’s Philosophies” (1963, Englewood Cliffs Prentice-Hall Inc.) In attacking many of India’s philosophies, Daya Krishna appears to have unwittingly touched a crucial point: how can there be the knowledge of a ‘non-cognitive’ mokṣa? [‘mokṣa’ is the final state of existence of an individual away from Social Contract]—See this author’s Indian Social Contract and its Dissolution (2008) mokṣa does not permit the knowledge of one’s own self in the ordinary way with threefold distinction, i.e., subject–knowledge-object or knower–knowledge–known. But what is important is to demonstrate whether such ‘knowledge’ of non-cognitive mokṣa state can be logically shown, in a language, to be possible to attain, and that there is no contradiction involved in such demonstration, because, no one can possibly express the ‘experience-itself’ in language. Hence, if such ‘knowledge’ can be shown to be logically not impossible in language, then, not only Daya Krishna’s arguments against ‘non-cognitive mokṣa’ get refuted but also it would show the possibility of achieving ‘completeness’ in its truest sense, as opposed to Gödel’s ‘Incompleteness’. In such circumstances, man would himself become a Universal Truth Machine. This is because the final state of mokṣa is construed as the state of complete knowledge in Advaita. This possibility of ‘completeness’ is set in this paper in the backdrop of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya’s Advaitic (Non-dualistic) claim involved in the mahāvākyas (extra-ordinary propositions). (Mahāvākyas that Śaṅkara refers to are basically taken from different Upaniṣads. For example, “Aham Brahmāsmi” is from Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanisad, and “Tattvamasi” is from Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Śrī Śaṅkarācārya has written extensively. His main works include his Commentary on Brahma-Sūtras, on major Upaniṣads, and on ŚrīmadBhagavadGītā, called Bhāṣyas of them, respectively. Almost all these works are available in English translation published by Advaita Ashrama, 5 Dehi Entally Road, Calcutta, 700014.) On the other hand, the ‘Incompleteness’ of Gödel is due to the intervening G-sentence, which has an adverse self-referential element. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in its mathematical form with an elaborate introduction by R.W. Braithwaite can be found in Meltzer (Kurt Gödel: on formally undecidable propositions of principia mathematica and related systems. Oliver & Boyd, Edinburgh, 1962). The present author believes first that semantic content cannot be substituted by any amount of arithmoquining, (Arithmoquining or arithmatization means, as Braithwaite says,—“Gödel’s novel metamathematical method is that of attaching numbers to the signs, to the series of signs (formulae) and to the series of series of signs (“proof-schemata”) which occur in his formal system…Gödel invented what might be called co-ordinate metamathematics…”) Meltzer (1962 p. 7). In Antone (2006) it is said “The problem is that he (Gödel) tries to replace an abstract version of the number (which can exist) with the concept of a real number version of that abstract notion. We can state the abstraction of what the number needs to be, [the arithmoquining of a number cannot be a proof-pair and an arithmoquine] but that is a concept that cannot be turned into a specific number, because by definition no such number can exist.”.), especially so where first-hand personal experience is called for. Therefore, what ultimately rules is the semanticity as in a first-hand experience. Similar points are voiced, albeit implicitly, in Antone (Who understands Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, 2006). (“…it is so important to understand that Gödel’s theorem only is true with respect to formal systems—which is the exact opposite of the analogous UTM (Antone (2006) webpage 2. And galatomic says in the same discussion chain that “saying” that it ((is)) only true for formal systems is more significant… We only know the world through “formal” categories of understanding… If the world as it is in itself has no incompleteness problem, which I am sure is true, it does not mean much, because that is not the world of time and space that we experience. So it is more significant that formal systems are incomplete than the inexperiencable ‘World in Itself’ has no such problem.—galatomic”) Antone (2006) webpage 2. Nevertheless galatomic certainly, but unwittingly succeeds in highlighting the possibility of experiencing the ‘completeness’ Second, even if any formal system including the system of Advaita of Śaṅkara is to be subsumed or interpreted under Gödel’s theorem, or Tarski’s semantic unprovability theses, the ultimate appeal would lie to the point of human involvement in realizing completeness since any formal system is ‘Incomplete’ always by its very nature as ‘objectual’, and fails to comprehend the ‘subject’ within its fold. (shrink)

This paper outlines briefly some of the research which has been carried out on attitudes to terminal illness and its care. The writer feels that not enough effort is being put into the teaching of this subject in our medical schools and Universities, and that doctors themselves are the ones who often wish to 'duck' the issue of dealing with disability and the dying. However, with the increasing awareness, through both the research and the growing allied literature, the writer feels (...) that there is no longer any excuse for omitting this subject from the curricula for doctors and nurses in training. (shrink)

The knowledge of an object under observation will have no concrete meaning unless we can work out a logical model the similarities of which are known in relation to the analysed structures. The logical model, when dealing with complex structures, is drawn out by similarity starting from an analogical model worked out in relating local dimensions in the object to physical dimensions of a different nature which restrict the number of variables and can be arranged and modified as required.Any operating (...) similarity and behaviour comparisons come actually down to an apparent functional analogy. The difference between the thin structure of the natural and artificial systems makes it illusive to hope that a strict isomorphism between these two fields may thus be sorted out. However, the fact of achieving analogical models widens our knowledge and shows new possibilities to the human creative mind. (shrink)

This study investigates the problem of the natural universal in the works of Mullā Ṣadrā. The problem of universals made its way into Arabic/Islamic philosophy via its Greek sources, and was transformed into the problem of natural universals by Avicenna. Weighing in on this problem, Ṣadrā reinterprets the nature of natural universals against the backdrop of his doctrine of “the primacy of being.” As he argues, a natural universal or quiddity qua quiddity is an “accidental being” that requireswujūdfor its existentiation. (...) Thus, Ṣadrā re-envisions the status of natural universals by stripping them of their disputed status as independently existing entities.RésuméDans cette étude je me propose de réfléchir sur le problème de l'universel naturel dans l’œuvre de Mullā Ṣadrā. Le problème des universaux s'est introduit dans la philosophie arabe et musulmaneviales sources grecques et s'est trouvé transformé en celui des “universaux naturels” aux mains d'Avicenne. En contribuant à son tour à l’évolution de ce problème, Ṣadrā réinterpréta le statut des universaux naturels à partir de sa propre doctrine de la “primauté de l’être”. Selon lui, un universel naturel ou “quiddité en tant que quiddité” est un “être par accident” qui requiertwujūdpour son existentiation. Ainsi, Ṣadrā re-envisage le statut des universaux naturels en les privant de leur statut contesté en tant qu'entités “indépendantes existantes”. (shrink)

The mind cannot be an object. An object can be conceived only as that which may possibly become an object to something else. Now what can the mind become an object to? Not to me for I am it and not to something else. Not to something else without again being denuded of consciousness.And how could we descend into the depths of our nervous system to ascertain what is the nature of the psychical correlative of the physiological bottom? If we (...) could, we could only describe that correlative psychical in terms of object-consciousness, which would be a pseudo description of it.John Hughlings-Jackson.If Charles Scott Sherrington (1857-1952) was the most philosophically aware neurophysiologist of the late 19th to early 20th .. (shrink)

The scholarly turn toward visual culture has left in place the sensory hierarchy that subtends Western philosophy. Yet given the commodification of sense experience, an inversion of the sensory hierarchy with the proximal senses of touch, taste, and smell at the top is not necessarily any more conducive to knowledge or justice. I argue that proximal sense experience may be a vehicle of knowledge, beauty and even ethics. Operating at a membrane between the sensible and the thinkable, the proximal senses (...) have an affective dimension that permits an immanent epistemology. My examples and olfactory ‘illustrations’ emphasize the sense of smell, which, I posit, given its intimacy with emotion and memory, gives rise to an ‘olfactory unconscious’. (shrink)