My paper is a reply to Mr. Seungbae Park’s article, “Defence of Cultural Relativism” (Park, 2011), which holds that no culture is better than another. In response,my paper challenges the author’s method, fairly popular amongst some postmodern thinkers, that tends to equate cultural relativism and Einstein’s theory of relativity. Firstly, I question the general rationale of establishing an analogy between relativity and relativism. In my opinion, the analogy fails to take into accountthe very large generic distance between physics and ethics. (...) Secondly, I try to demonstrate that the analogy can be construed in two opposite ways, so that, on theone hand, it might support relativism, while on the other, it might reinforce cultural absolutism. Therefore, one would rather dispense with so equivocal an analogy. Finally, I suggest that besides cultural absolutism and cultural relativism there is also another way of assessing different cultures – I used to call it intrinsic comparison – which is based on the second options of groups and individuals rather than on their first options. The issue of how to successfully compare cultures by avoiding both absolutism and relativism was extensively dealt with by me elsewhere. (shrink)

Paradox of the Evil and "Family Ressemblances". The paper tackles the problem of Matter and evil in Plotinus. monistic metaphysics, especially in theperspective of the following aparent inconsistency: if there is no other principle but the Good, then the Good creates the Matter which is the absolute evil. Itfollows that the Good is bad, according to a certain axiom of Proclus, which states that the creator is to a higher degree all what the creature is. The authorshows that, despite what (...) Proclus and then many modern critics believed, Plotinus is consistent within his system. He relies on the axiom that the creature is not all what the creator is, i.e. that the creator also gives what he has not. Therefore, the One gives the Intellect multiplicity and thought which He is deprived of and also gives the Matter the evil which He is also deprived of. The paper also shows that Plotinus developed a logic of ontological procession which is not Aristotelian. This logic does not work by formind classes, but chains of partially intransitive ressemblances. So, the Intellect ressembles the One (the Good), the Soul ressembles the Intellect and the Matter ressembles the Soul; yet the Matter resembles the One no more. Yet, the unity of the world is assured, because of the continuity of the chain. The extreme terms are contrary, though not in the Aristotelian sense of sharing in the same genus. A certain similarty with Wittgenstein's logic of "family resemblances" is striking, which means that not only Wittgenstein, but Plotinus also went beyond the Platonic-Aristotelian Vulgata, even while he was sticking to its linguage. (shrink)

The present paper is rooted in an older concern, regarding Augustine’s contradictions[1]. In the history of ideas there is a common place that authors contradict themselves and that their ideas migrate from one pole to another. This paper aims to present the case study regarding Augustine’s contradictions. I propose to focus on an issue that interfered later with the Church’s politics, namely the subject of peace and war, as we find them in De Civitate Dei and Epistola 185. Even though (...) the issue of peace and war appears in several of his writings, those mentioned before seem more relevant for the topic, as they were also approached previously by other authors. I equally propose to highlight that Augustine echoes some ideas on war that can be read under Plato’s pen, although he was more of a Plotinus’s follower. But, as a personal touch, I would try to incorporate it within the entire dual thought of Augustine, that was echoed in the following centuries in the thought of the scholastics and the policy of The Catholic Church. [1] I’m aiming to speak about the ideological contradictions in the present article (the good peace/the bad peace, the good war/the bad war, connected to the good love/the bad love etc). (shrink)

Graham and Maitzen think my CORNEA principle is in trouble because it entails “intolerable violations of closure under known entailment.” I argue that the trouble arises from current befuddlement about closure itself, and that a distinction drawn by Rudolph Carnap, suitably extended, shows how closure, when properly understood, works in tandem with CORNEA. CORNEA does not obey Closure because it shouldn’t: it applies to “dynamic” epistemic operators, whereas closure principles hold only for “static” ones. What the authors (...) see as an intolerable vice of CORNEA is actually a virtue, helping us see what closure principles should—and shouldn’t—themselves be about. (shrink)

The Principle of Credulity: 'It is basic to human knowledge of the world that we believe things are as they seem to be in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary' [Swinburne 1996: 133]. This underlies the Evidential Problem of Evil, which goes roughly like this: ‘There appears to be a lot of suffering, both animal and human, that does not result in an equal or greater utility. So there's probably some pointless suffering. As God's existence precludes pointless suffering, (...) theism is implausible.’ CORNEA is the principle that observation O raises hypothesis H's probability only if O is more probable given H than it is given not-H. Theists sometimes maintain that apparently pointless suffering is just as likely given theism as atheism (I support this claim by appealing to a Lewisian account of the relevant counterfactuals). Given CORNEA, therefore, what we see of suffering does not make theism unlikely. I maintain that a consequence of so deploying CORNEA is that CORNEA and the Principle of Credulity are incompatible. We are left with a skeptical paradox. CORNEA is a consequence of Bayes’s Theorem, I argue; but it is incompatible with a presupposition of empirical science, namely, that appearances create epistemic warrant, ceteris paribus. External-world probability skepticism follows. I treat the paradox as real. First, I offer an account of how we strike a balance in practice between CORNEA, on the one hand, and the Principle of Credulity and the scientific enterprise on the other. Second, I try to resolve the paradox outright by rejecting the Principle of Credulity and maintaining that the scientific project remains well motivated even allowing probability skepticism. On either response to the paradox, the Evidential Problem of Evil continues to have serious, but defeasible, force against theism. (shrink)

Skeptical theists have been charged with being committed to global skepticism. I consider this objection as it applies to a common variety of skeptical theism based on an epistemological principle that Stephen Wykstra labeled “CORNEA.” I show how a recent reformulation of CORNEA (provided by Stephen Wykstra and Timothy Perrine) affords us with a formal apparatus that allows us to see just where this objection gets a grip on that view, as well as what is needed for an (...) adequate response. I conclude by arguing that, given some plausible, modest, and independently motivated anti-skeptical principles, this objection poses no threat to Wykstra’s brand of skeptical theism. (shrink)

Long before skeptical theism was called “skeptical theism,” Stephen Wykstra (1984) defended a version of it based on an epistemological principle he called CORNEA. In this paper, I use elementary confirmation theory to analyze CORNEA’s core. This enables me to show precisely what is right about Wykstra’s very influential defense of skeptical theism and, perhaps more importantly, precisely what is wrong with it. A key premise of that defense is that, on the assumption that God exists, we wouldn’t (...) expect to know what God’s reasons for allowing certain evils are. I show that, while that premise together with CORNEA’s core shows that our inability to adequately explain the existence of those evils in terms of theism is not strong evidence against theism, it fails to show that the evils themselves are not strong evidence against theism. (shrink)

The problem of evil is best understood as an instance of what I call “the problem of defeated expectations.” These problems arise for theism when the world we experience does not conform to what we would expect to find in a world created and sustained by a being who is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. In this chapter, I explore skeptical theism, which is an approach to the evidential problem of evil that argues that, at least with respect to certain kinds (...) of evils we find, we simply should not have any firm expectation about whether the world would contain them or whether we would know why God permits them if it does. I focus on a particular variety of skeptical theism that makes use of a general epistemic principle to rebut the evidential problem of evil and defend it against criticisms. (shrink)

Skeptical theism is a family of responses to arguments from evil. One important member of that family is Stephen Wykstra’s CORNEA-based criticism of William Rowe’s arguments from evil. A cornerstone of Wykstra’s approach is his CORNEA principle. However, a number of authors have criticized CORNEA on various grounds, including that it has odd results, it cannot do the work it was meant to, and it problematically conflicts with the so-called common sense epistemology. In this paper, I explicate (...) and defend a CORNEA principle. After sketching a brief argument for it, I show how it can be acquitted of these recent charges. (shrink)

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian (...) epistemology. (shrink)

The inductive argument from evil to the non-existence of God contains the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil. Some skeptical theists object: one's justification for the premise that, probably, there is gratuitous evil involves an inference from the proposition that we don't see a good reason for some evil to the proposition that it appears that there is no good reason for that evil, and they use a principle, "CORNEA," to block that inference. The common sense problem of (...) evil threatens the CORNEA move, because the common sense problem of evil does not involve any inference to justify the belief that there is gratuitous evil. In this paper, I argue that the common sense problem of evil doesn't avoid CORNEA. CORNEA, or a reformulated version of it, can still prevent one from having justification for the belief that there is gratuitous evil. (shrink)

Cornea (2012) argues that I (2011) was wrong to use the analogy between morality and motion to defend cultural relativism. I reply that the analogy can be used to clarify what cultural relativism asserts and how a cultural relativist can reply to the criticisms against it. Ockham’s Razor favours the relativist view that there are no moral truths, and hence no culture is better than another. Contrary to what Cornea claims, cultural relativism does not entail that we cannot (...) protect ourselves from those who attack us, and that the ruling of an international court lacks moral legitimacy. (shrink)

Chris Tweedt has offered a solution to the “common sense problem of evil,” on which that there is gratuitous evil is justified non-inferentially as a trivial inference from non-inferentially justified premises by invoking versions of CORNEA. Tweedt claims his solution applies not only to the versions of the common sense problem of evil offered by Paul Draper and Trent Dougherty, but also to that offered by me in this journal in 1992. Here I argue that Tweedt fails to defeat (...) this version of the problem. So even if Tweedt’s response to Draper and Dougherty is successful, a version of the common sense problem of evil survives. (shrink)

This article offers a new theory about how using lotteries to distribute scarce benefits satisfies beneficiaries' claims. In the first section of the article I criticize John Broome's view and on the basis of these criticisms set out four desiderata for a philosophically adequate account of claim satisfaction by lottery. In section II I propose and defend a new view called the dual structure view, so called because it posits that claimants have two types of claims in the relevant scarce (...) benefit distribution cases under discussion. This view meets all the desiderata set out in section I. Section III draws out the practical implications of my view for a variety of temporally extended cases, including the distribution of corneas to patients who have suffered corneal degeneration. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Institute of Medicine’s Report on Non-Heart-Beating Organ TransplantationRoger Herdman (bio), Tom L. Beauchamp (bio), and John T. Potts Jr. (bio)In December 1997, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) released a report on medical and ethical issues in the procurement of non-heart-beating organ donors. This report had been requested in May 1997 by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). We will here describe the genesis of the IOM (...) report, the medical and moral concerns that led the DHHS to sponsor it, the process of producing it, and its conclusions. The analyses, findings, and recommendations of the report are also reviewed, in particular the central issues that led to suggestions for policy changes.Transplantation BackgroundAs a first step, some background in the relevant aspects of organ transplantation will prove useful. For the purposes of this analysis, “transplantation” involves the transfer of cells, tissues, or solid organs from one human to another to replace the structure or function of comparable body components that, through injury or disease, are defective or of inadequate function. The IOM report deals with solid organs, primarily kidneys and livers, whose blood supply is reconnected in the organ recipient, in contrast to cells, like bone marrow, and tissues, like corneas. A variety of donor types exists for organ transplantation, each with particular medical and scientific conditions.Living donors are healthy (and usually genetically related) individuals who volunteer to provide either a whole, paired organ such as a kidney or a section of an organ such as a liver. Cadaver donors are individuals who have died and from whom a full array of organs can be taken. “Heart-beating” cadaver donors are individuals who have suffered “brain death,” that is, irreversible cessation of function of the whole brain including the brain stem; and “non-heart-beating” donors (NHBDs) are individuals who are ill or injured, but not “brain dead,” and who have suffered cardiopulmonary death, that is, irreversible cessation of cardiac and respiratory function. NHBDs can be “controlled,” which means that [End Page 83] they can be sustained by artificial life support systems until a medical and family decision is made to terminate futile life support. This can be done at a scheduled time and in a controlled manner, and organs can then be recovered for transplantation. NHBDs can also be “uncontrolled,” which means that their hearts and breathing have stopped through disease or injury at an unexpected time or in an uncontrolled manner, and they cannot be resuscitated; the organs of some individuals of this description can be recovered for transplantation. The IOM report focused on both controlled and uncontrolled NHBDs and on problems specific to them.The questions that were asked and addressed in the IOM report became current and salient beginning in 1992 with the establishment of the University of Pittsburgh “Policy for the Management of Terminally Ill Patients Who May Become Organ Donors After Death.” This policy addressed controlled NHBDs and the ethical questions raised by their use; much of the discussion was reported in the June 1993 special issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. Public notice and anxiety about some of these concerns were sharpened and refocused by national and local media allegations of improper treatment of donors at the Cleveland Clinic in 1997, specifically premature—i.e., antemortem—recovery of organs and administration of drugs that allegedly might hasten donor death.The DHHS Request for StudyIt is not surprising that several federal actions would be taken in response to these events. Some, such as the results of a transplantation task force, remain largely internal to DHHS at this writing. Others are public, such as the IOM study of the NHBD situation. In May 1997, the DHHS initiated contacts with the IOM with the goal of exploring federal concerns about the medical and ethical treatment of NHBDs, in particular the allegations directed at the Cleveland Clinic.The DHHS response should be understood in at least three contexts. First, living donors and uncontrolled NHBDs were essentially the only donor types in the early days of transplantation in the United States. The technologies, ethics, and social acceptance of controlling and terminating life support for... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethan’s GiftMichelle BurgessEthan was your average boy next door. He loved everything most 8–year–old boys do including playing baseball, swimming, and watching his favorite baseball team, the Philadelphia Phillies.On December 3rd 2008, life for our family changed forever when Ethan was diagnosed with Diffuse Intrinsic Pontine Glioma, a rare inoperable brainstem tumor. DIPG is in essence a death sentence. There are no survivors and life expectancy after diagnosis is (...) only 9–12 months. Our family was devastated.For the next 14 months, we lived life to the fullest, never taking a single moment or day for granted. As Ethan’s condition worsened, and it became clear that he was close to passing, I spoke with Ethan’s doctor about my desire to be able to donate Ethan’s corneas and his brain tumor for research. He informed me that because of Ethan’s type of tumor that he may be a candidate for donation of other organs as well if that is something we wanted to do.Knowing that there was nothing we could do to save Ethan, it was something that we felt we could do to help others so we decided to explore the option of donating Ethan’s other organs. We were put in contact with the Gift of Life.Two representatives from Gift of Life came to our home and discussed at length with us what would have to happen to make organ donation possible at the time of Ethan’s passing. Specifically that Ethan would have to pass away at the hospital and in the operating room. This was very different than the hospice environment that we had planned. They also had told us that Ethan was only the second young person that they had ever dealt with that the families had planned ahead of time to donate organs. The other person was a teenager who planned his own organ donation.On January 26th 2010, Ethan’s pain had become unmanageable at home and his breathing had become very labored. I spoke with his oncologist and he advised me to bring Ethan to the hospital to try and get his pain under control.We loaded Ethan up in the car for the one–hour car ride to the hospital. On the way to the hospital Ethan fell asleep while being cuddled by me in the backseat. When we arrived at the hospital we noticed that his fingers and toes had turned purple. The nurses immediately checked his oxygen and it had fallen to only 10 %.The doctors advised that he had slipped into a coma in the car, one that he would never awake from. He was immediately placed on life support. A scan was done and it was evident that the progressing tumor was placing pressure on the areas of the brain that controlled basic life functions such as breathing. Ethan could not recover.The decision was made to begin to look for recipients for Ethan’s organs. Because Ethan had not reached the point of brain death, his donation would have to be a post cardiac death transplant, meaning, life support would be removed, when his heart stopped beating and he passed away, the organ procurement would begin. However, he [End Page E1] would not be able to donate his heart. This was very sad for us, knowing how strong his little heart was, but we did understand the process.On January 28th 2010, our family spent the day saying goodbye to Ethan. Even though he could not respond, we know that he could hear us. The nurse was wonderful, doing everything possible to accommodate our large family and despite all the tubes and machines, make it so that I could cuddle with my little boy one last time.Ethan was moved to the operating room and with his stepfather and I on one side and his father and stepmother on the other, life support was removed. Watching my son take his last breath, while I held his hand, kissed his cheeks, told him I loved him and that it was okay to let go and go to Heaven was the hardest moment of... (shrink)

William Rowe has offered one of the most simple and convincing evidential arguments from evil by arguing that the existence of gratuitous evil in our world serves as strong evidence against the claim that God exists. Stephen J. Wykstra attempts to defeat this evidential argument from evil by denying the plausibility of Rowe’s claim that there are gratuitous evils in the world. Wykstra sets up an epistemological test that he refers to as CORNEA, and he proceeds to demonstrate that (...) Rowe’s inference to his existential claim is unjustified in light of our particular epistemic situation. Specifically, this inference is unjustified because compensating goods that would be “connected to” any given evil lack what Wykstra calls ‘seeability.’ Without seeability, it is illicit to infer the nonexistence of an object simply from the fact that we cannot detect it, and thus Rowe is denied justification for his first premise. Wysktra’s principle defense of the non-seeability of compensating goods rests on an analogy comparing children and parents to humans and God. I will show that Wykstra’s conclusion regarding the seeability of compensating goods is unjustified given this analogy. Without justification for the claim that some compensating goods lack seeability, Wykstra’s defeater crumbles. (shrink)

In this article I will address the issue of the embodiment of computing systems from the point of view distinctive of the so-called Unconventional Computation, focusing on the paradigm known as Morphological Computation. As a first step, I will contextualize Morphological Computation within the disciplinary field of Embodied Artificial Intelligence: broadly conceived, Embodied Artificial Intelligence may be characterized as embracing both conventional and unconventional approaches to the artificial emulation of natural intelligence. Morphological Computation stands out from other paradigms of unconventional (...) Embodied Artificial Intelligence in that it discloses a new, closer kind of connection between embodiment and computation. I will further my investigation by briefly reviewing the state-of-the-art in Morphological Computation: attention will be given to a very recent trend, whose core concept is that of “organic reconfigurability”. In this direction, as a final step, two advanced cases of study of organic or living morphological computers will be presented and discussed. The prospect is to shed some light on our title question: what progress has been made in understanding the embodiment of computing systems? (shrink)

v. 1. Sŏngnihak pʻyŏn -- v. 2. Kyŏngse sasang pʻyŏn.

t. 1. Igry rynka -- t. 2. Torgovet︠s︡ v Khrame.

-- v. 2. Pami︠a︡ti Vitalii︠a︡ Ivanovicha Svint︠s︡ova.