Islamic ethics in the light of Koranic teachings.

A variant of the notion of symmetric constructive realizability is introduced where the information about the symmetric constructive truth or falsity of an arithmetical formula is expressed by a single natural number. The methods of transformations of such a realization to the realizations of known kinds and those of reverse transformations are given. The formal arithmetical system based on such a realizability is investigated.

"A tribute to Chedva Zilberfarb, a "h, "Chedva of Shemiras Ha-lashon.".

The complexity of this question derives from the fact that both the mechanism of action and the mechanism of utilization of social laws operate through the practical life and activity of human beings. Human beings are the vehicles of the objective-subjective relationships formed in the process of production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of material and cultural goods, and because of this fact are a part of the systems and mechanisms of action and the mechanism of utilization of social laws. This (...) creates the impression that the objective-subjective activity of people is indivisible and, accordingly, that there is but one mechanism of manifestation of these laws; this, of course, compounds the difficulty of knowing and taking into account objective conditions and subjective factors in the process of scientific leadership and administration of society as a whole. What, then, is the relationship between the mechanism of action and the mechanism of utilization of social laws at the object-subject level? (shrink)

al-mujallad al-awwal. al-Qayim al-īmānīyah wa-al-qiyam al-ijtimāʻīyah -- al-mujallad al-thānī. al-Qiyam al-akhlāqīyah -- al-mujallad al-thālith. -- al-Qiyam al-siyāsīyah wa-al-idārīyah wa-al-qiyam al-iqtiṣādīyah -- al-mujallad al-rābiʻ. al-Qiyam al-ʻilmīyah wa-al-qiyam al-ṣiḥḥīyah wa-al-bīʼah wa-al-qiyam al-wajdānīyah wa-al-jamālīyah.

Islamic philosophy; God (Islam); religious life, Islam, customs and practices; Islam and science.

Voters satisfy maximin or maximax in their choices between sets of alternatives and secure a Pareto improvement by all voting strategically under simple majority voting for particular sincere preferences. Thus the assumption that strategic voting is a bad thing is challenged and the idea that we should reject voting because of the possibility of misrepresentation dismissed.