Professor Guillaume's translation of the Sira of Ibn Ishaq is now reissued. The translator used Ibn Hisham's abridgement and also included many additions and variants found in the writings of early authors. The book thus presents in English practically all that is known of the life of the Prophet.In the introduction, the translator discusses the character of the Sira in the light of the opinion of early Arabian scholars, noting especially the difficulties of the poetry. As the earliest monument (...) of Arabian prose literature, the Sira remains a work of the first importance. (shrink)

Bu kitapta, Ebû İshâk es-Saffâr’ın (öl. 534/1139) kelâmî görüşleri, Telḫîṣü’l-edille li-ḳavâʿidi’t-tevḥîd adlı eserinde Allah’ın isimlerinin anlamlarını açıklarken yaptığı yorumlar çerçevesinde ele alınmaktadır. Ebû İshâk es-Saffâr, 6./12. yüzyıl Hanefî-Mâtürîdî âlimlerinden biridir. Kelâma dair Telḫîṣü’l-edille eserinde esmâ-i hüsnâ konusuna ayrıntılı olarak yer vermektedir. İki cilt hâlinde yayımlanan bu eserin yaklaşık üçte birlik bir kısmını esmâ-i hüsnâ konusu oluşturmaktadır. Bu kısım incelendiğinde, Saffâr’ın Allah’ın varlığı, birliği ve sıfatları ile ilgili konular başta olmak üzere pek çok konuyu 175 esmâ-i hüsnâya dayanarak izah ettiği görülmektedir. (...) O, esmâ-i hüsnâ bölümünde yer vermediği bazı isimlere ise müstakil başlıklar altında değinmektedir. Örneğin el-Mütekkelim ismi kelâm sıfatını bağlamında ve halku’l-Kur’ân ile icâz’ul-Kur’ân gibi konularla ilişkili bir şekilde ele almaktadır. Bu isimler de listeye dahil edildiğinde sayı 178’e ulaşmaktadır. Bu durumda eserin yarısını esmâ-i hüsnâ konusu teşkil etmektedir. -/- Saffâr, esmâ-i hüsnâ bölümünde alfabetik bir sıra içerisinde ele aldığı ilâhî isimleri öncelikle lugavî (semantik) yönden izah etmektedir. Sonrasında ise değerlendirdiği ilahî ismi, bir kelâm konusu ile bağlantı kurarak kelâmî perspektifle açıklamaktadır Esmâ-i hüsnâ temelinde ele alınan konuların hilâfet meselesi hariç diğer kelâm bahislerini kapsadığı görülmektedir. Saffâr öncesi Hanefî-Mâtürîdî kelâm literatürü içinde esmâ-i hüsnânın bu kadar kapsamlı ele alındığı başka bir eser bilinmemektedir. -/- Bu kitap; üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. “Metodolojik Çerçeve” başlıklı giriş bölümünde çalışmanın konusu, önemi, amacı, yöntemi ve kaynakları hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Birinci bölümde Saffâr’ın yaşadığı sosyokültürel çevre olan Mâverâünnehir bölgesi ile Buhara ve Merv şehirlerinin siyasî, sosyal ve dinî durumu ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci bölümde esmâ-i hüsna konusunun anlaşılmasına temel oluşturan isim, tesmiye, müsemmâ, sıfat ve vasf gibi kavramlar ile esmâ-i hüsnânın sayısı ve ihsâsı gibi kelâmî tartışmalara değinilmiştir. Sonrasında Saffâr öncesi dönemde kaleme alınan esmâ-i hüsnâ litaratürü hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Bölüm sonuna Saffâr’ın rivayet ettiği 178 ilahî isme dair ayrıntılı bir tablo eklenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde öncelikle, Saffâr’ın esmâ-i hüsnâyı izah ederken dikkate aldığı kelâmî ilkeler tespit edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Sonrasında ise Saffâr’ın Telḫîṣü’l-edille’de ilâhî isimleri açıklarken ortaya koyduğu kelâmî görüş ve değerlendirmeler belirlenerek sistematik bir şekilde kategorize edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda ele alınan her konunun sonuna ilgili ilâhî isimleri ve bağlantılı olduğu tartışmaları içeren tablolar eklenmiştir. Sonuç bölümünde ise Saffâr’ın esmâ-i hüsnâ anlayışına dayanan kelâm yöntemine dair ulaştığımız sonuçlara yer verilmiştir. Bu kitapta onun, esmâ-i hüsnânın %75’inde kelâmî yorumlarda bulunduğu ve bilgi-varlık bahsinden âhiret hayatına kadar bütün kelâm konularını esmâ-i hüsnâ ile bağlantılı yorumladığı tespit edilmiştir. Ulaşılan bu sonuçlar, Saffâr’ın kelâm anlayışının ilâhî isimlerin yorumuna dayandığını ortaya koymaktadır. [his book discusses the theological views of Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār d. 534/1139), within the framework of his comments on the meanings of Allah’s names, provided in his work titled Talkhīṣ al-adilla. Abū Isḥāq al-Ṣaffār is one of the Ḥanafite-Māturīdite scholars in the 6th/12th century. In his work titled Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd on kalām, he spared extensive space for al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Approximately one third of this work, published in two volumes, is devoted to al-asmāʾ al-husnā. An examination of the related section reveals that al-Ṣaffār explains many issues, particularly those related to the existence, unity and attributes of Allah, based on 175 al-asmāʾ al-husnā. He mentions some of the names that he does not include in the al-asmāʾ al-husnā section under separate headings. For example, the name al-Mutakallim is addressed within the context of the attribute of kalām and in relation to subjects, such as the khalq al-Qurʾān and i‘jaz al-Qurʾān. Upon the addition of these names to the list, the number names reaches 178. This means that half of the work deals with the subject of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. -/- al-Ṣaffār lists the divine names in alphabetical order and explains them semantically in the chapter of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Then he goes on to clarify each divine name through a theological lens with a specific reference to the subject of kalām. In the pre-Saffar Ḥanafite-Māturīdite theological literature, there is no other work that addresses al-asmāʾ al-husnā in such an extensive way. -/- This book consists of three main sections. The first section titled “Methodological Framework”, elaborates on the focus, significance, purpose and method of the study, along with the sources used. The first part describes the political, social and religious status of Transoxiana (Mā-warāʾ al-Nahr) region and the cities of Bukhara and Marw, the sociocultural environment in which Saffar lived. The second chapter addresses various concepts, which promote the understanding of al-asmāʾ al-husnā, such as name, tasmiya, musammā, attribute and qualification in addition to the theological debates such as the number and iḥṣāʾ of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. Then, it provides information about the al-asmāʾ al-husnā literature produced in the pre- Ṣaffār period. The end of each chapter comes with a detailed table with the 178 divine names mentioned by al-Ṣaffār. In the third chapter, the author initially discusses the theological principles that al-Ṣaffār considered while explaining the essence of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. This section also determines and systematically categorizes the theological views and evaluations put forward by al-Ṣaffār while explaining the divine names in Talkhīṣ al-adilla. The tables with the divine names and the related discussions can be seen at the end of the discussion for each subject. The last section presents the conclusions reached, regarding the kalām method based on al-Ṣaffār’s understanding of the essence of al-asmāʾ al-husnā. The present study revealed that he made theological interpretations in 75% of the al-asmāʾ al-husnā and interpreted all theological issues ranging from the subjects of knowledge and existence to the Afterlife in connection with the al-asmāʾ al-husnā. These results indicate that al-Ṣaffār's understanding of kalām is based on the interpretation of the divine names.]. (shrink)

The issue of wiping over socks is part of the more general issue of wiping over leather socks (khuffayn) for ablution (wuḍū’). Washing feet or wiping over them is a debate whose sides bases their claims on the verses of the Qur’an and supports these claims with narrations. When performing ablution, if shoes or socks are on the feet, whether one can wipe over them without taking these off and the qualities that these clothes should have is a debate based (...) on hadith narrations. Most Muslims except for the Ja’farite are of the opinion that either washing the feet or wiping over a khuff or similar clothing that was put on while a person already had ablution can be done during ablution, while the Ja’farite think that wiping over bare feet is enough but wiping over khuff is not. There is a consensus that shoes, boots, buskins and other leather footwear qualify as khuff. However, there is disagreement over whether clothing from materials like cotton, linen, wool, and felt -usually referred to as socks- qualify as khuff. For this reason, some Muslims of the world wipe over socks while others do not. There are contemporary fatwas (legal opinion) that are supportive of either of the positions. However, there are those who treat this issue beyond choosing a side in an ijtihad (process of juristic legal reasoning) and some who wipe on socks are censured strongly. In this research based on an examination of the fiqh heritage, the goal is to contribute to making this issue better understood and its fiqh ruling clearer.Summary: The sixth verse of Surah Ma’idah in the Qur’an clearly states that wuḍū’ requires washing the face, arms up until elbows, and wiping over the head. However, when it comes to the fourth element of wuḍū’, the feet, there has been disagreement about whether it should be wiped or washed. Arabic grammar rules and narrations have been interpreted in ways that support both views; in general Sunni sects, Zaydis, and Kharijites argue the feet should be washed while Shia Ja’farites are in favor of wiping over bare feet. There have also been efforts among faqihs (jurists) to reconcile washing and wiping; washing slightly; choosing the better one between the two; washing when not covered, wiping when covered; washing if there is dirt, wiping if it is clean; viewing at least wiping as fard (obligatory), washing as a Sunna (recommended) that includes the fard as a way to unify the two approaches have also been proposed.According to widely accepted narrations, the prophet and his companions washed their feet when performing wuḍū’ and once they put on their shoes having had wuḍū’, the next time they only wiped over the shoes without taking them off. In less commonly accepted narrations, which some hadith authorities regard as authentic, the Prophet is said to have wiped over his socks. In narration sources, it has been narrated that about fifteen faqih companions, among them ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ʿAbdallāh Ibn Masʿūd, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, saw wiping over socks as appropriate. However, there are no narrations about the companions disapproving of wiping over socks. Among those who approved of wiping over socks are tābiʿūn (successors) faqihs like Saʿīd b. D̲j̲ubayr, Saʿīd b. al-Musayyab, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, ʿAṭāʾ b. Abī Rabāḥ, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī ve al-Aʿmash, and Mujtahid Imams like Zufar, Sufyan al-Thawri, al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ, Ibn al-Mubārak, Abū Yūsuf, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh. Considering their most prominent positions, we can say that Ḥanafis and Shafis allow wiping over socks that are thick and opaque, Hanbalis allow it over socks that cover the foot even if thin, while Mālikīs do not allow wiping over socks at all.As far as it is understood from narrations from the Prophet’s time, due to both climate conditions and weaving possibilities, socks were used only rarely. Also, footwear like shoes or slippers made of leather were very hard to find and narrations suggest that prayers were performed at houses and the masjids over soil base on either bare foot or with shoes. For these reasons, the issue of wiping over socks did not arise at the time and at later periods different opinions on the issue led to disagreements. When carpets were placed on the ground at later periods, performing the prayer with shoes was abandoned and a second layer of shoes (khuff) was placed inside the shoes as khuff. Since removing the shoes would invalidate wuḍū’ performed over that shoe, those who wanted to avoid the difficulty of having to wash their feet each time they needed wuḍū’ have instead wiped over this second layer once they put them on after performing wuḍū’.Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs, who tend to approach the issue of wiping over socks with hesitation and make this conditional on some strict rules, emphasize that the socks to be wiped over should be similar to shoes in terms of thickness, based on the idea that it is certain that the Prophet has wiped over shoes made of leather but his wiping over socks is weaker and that the qualities of those socks are not clear. Among the thickness criteria expressed for the socks are being waterproof, the ability to walk for at least a league with it, and its ability to hold on to feet without being tied at the wrists. Due to these criteria, which have been developed to protect the wuḍū’ and whose boundaries are not well specified, especially among Ḥanafis the idea that wiping over socks is not allowed has gained popularity. As opposed to this, in circles dominated by Ḥanbalīs opinions allowing wiping over any type of socks have been expressed.At times when the Prophet had his shoes on and did not want to take off his shoes, he used to wipe over the shoes. The equivalent of this act today is to wipe over socks since prayer with shoes on is not common any more. While nowadays wiping over socks is an ease for everybody when performing wuḍū’, it is something that is especially needed under certain circumstances. Cold weather and the lack of drying possibilities for the feet leading catching cold and illness, socks that are put on when feet are wet leading to bad smell and fungus on feet, the hardship of elevating the feet high enough to the sink and of changing socks on one foot when there are no special wuḍū’ places, the fact that at societies distant from Islamic culture it is seen against the etiquette to wash feet in the sink are among the reasons why this need arises. Because most of the time we are not in a position to determine the circumstances of our work and travels at modern times, it can be said that today this need is more than it was in the past.Some scholars of today use a precautionary principle and argue that the Qur’an commands to wash the feet, and the only narration powerful enough to make an exception to this rule is about masts made of leather, and extending this to include socks would go against the precaution principle and some other principles of uṣūl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). However, some other scholars who use the ease in religion principle argue that the permission to wipe over masts also include wiping over socks and that they are of the same nature, that there are authentic narrations that show wiping over socks are allowed and that one can even talk of an ijmāʿ (consensus) among the companions on this issue, and that seeking additional qualities socks on which one is to wipe over, such as thickness, ability to walk with it, its ability to hold on to the feet, being waterproof, have no merit in the sharīʿa. Jamaleddīn Qāsimī, who wrote a special research book on the topic, and scholars like Abū l-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, Ibn al Uthaymeen think that one can wipe over daily socks that do not show the skin beneath it, while scholars predominantly of the Ḥanafi opinion hold that one cannot wipe over the thin daily socks. (shrink)

This article discusses Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām’s (d. 231/845) (one of the first Muʽtazilī thinkers); understanding of Allah-world relationship, his theory of nature (tab‘) and his view on miracles. In a proposal form, Muʽtazilī scholars accept that the miracle, which is the actual confirmation, must occur, since it is not possible for Allah to confirm His messenger (prophet) in a way that everyone can hear and in a direct word. Since the Prophet's message can be authenticated only by a miracle, Muʽtazilī (...) thinkers paid great attention to this issue, organized and formed natural theories about the universe in a way that miracles can occur. Naẓẓām explains a kind of miracle that occurs under the power of Allah, by his theory of nature called latency and occurrence (kumūn-ẓuhūr). His view of miracles is rooted in the Muʽtazilī classification of miracles. Naẓẓām argues that in the theory of nature, things are infinitely divided. He also argues that all qualities considered accident (aʽrāḍ) by other Muslim theologians are different objects as only motion and rest are the only accidents. According to him, the universe consists of objects and accidents of motion only. In each object in the universe, an unlimited number of opposing objects (sub-components) that have different effects on each other is located in the same space. Those objects in the same space are intervened (tadākhul) with each other. Kumūn refers to sub-components that are located inside the object in a state of passing into each other, and a state of balancing each other through the push-pull motion (i‘timād). Ẓuhūr is an outward movement of the sub-component from where it is located when an impact imposed outside the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in it. Naẓẓām says that too many opposing sub-components, such as heaviness-lightness, heat-coldness contained in the object, form an internal dynamic by providing balancing each other through inside the object with the push-pull motion. The state of balance inside the object is disrupted by an external factor affecting one of the sub-components. An external thing approaching the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in the object. Then, the affected sub-component moves out of the object and thus the state of balance inside the object is disrupted. According to the theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, change in objects occurs when the balance within the object is disturbed. The change in the balance also occurs not by the direct intervention of Allah and the creation of accidents, but by the disruption in the balance of natures within the object. Naẓẓām, who advocates the intrinsic natures in things, has been criticized for not leaving any room for Allah’s influence on objects at least through miracles. This criticism is not correct. Naẓẓām says that the nature of objects depends on God, and it is possible for God to intervene in them at any time. According to him, Allah can force opposing objects into a union that is not in their natures. In their natures, unification can separate those by applying pull and push. In this way, Naẓẓām sees the intervention of Allah as possible in the occurrence of a situation that is the opposite of what is present in the nature of objects. In Naẓẓām's theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, there are suppressed natures and sub-components that are in a weak state inside the actual object. Furthermore, they cannot go out in any way from the actual object. One of these suppressed natures found in the object is removed from the nature of the object by the intervention of Allah when a miracle occurs in the hands of theProphet. In this case, the miracle is not something new that Allah has created, but that Allah has disclosed a hidden sub-component that is hidden in that thing that has never appeared before. Naẓẓām’s view of miracle is something occurring under the power of the created, which Muʽtazilī scholars accept in the classification of miracles in relation to, the theory of sarfa. He suggests that the Qur'an, which he accepts under the power of the created, would not be a miracle, if the Arabs could dispute it. However, according to him, the Qur'an is a miracle because Allah prevents them from the dispute. In his understanding of sarfa, the miracles occur directly as an act of God’s divine intervention with human beings. This study investigates Naẓẓām’s view of miracles along with his theory of nature and his understanding of sarfa. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 418/1027) was one of the prominent figures of Khorasan Shafiʻīsm and a jurist among the Aṣḥāb al-Wujūh. He received education in Irāq from important scholars in the fields of theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), and hadīth. After returning to Nishabur, he taught at a madrasa built in his name. He trained students such as ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037-38), Abū al-Ṭayyib al-Ṭabarī (d. 450/1058), Abu al-Qāsim al-Isqāf al-Isfarāyīnī (d. 452/1060), Abu al-Rabīʿ Ilākī (...) (d. 465/1073), and Abu al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072), who later influenced the course of Shāfiʿīsm. He authored works as an important hadith scholar and Ashʿarī theologian. Although most of these works have not survived to the present day, we learn about his views through excerpts from them. He held views, reflected in the prin-ciples of jurisprudence, that led to criticism for being influenced by the Muʿtazila. Despite being a theologian, his adoption of the jurists' method in jurisprudence further emphasizes the importance of his views. The aim of this study is to reveal Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī's thoughts on the principles of jurisprudence, specifically in the areas of hadīth, consensus (ijmā), indepen-dent reasoning (ijtihād), and imitation (taqlīd), and to identify their reflecti-ons on the Shāfiʿī school of jurisprudence. Since there is no specific study on Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī’s thoughts on jurisprudence in our country, we beli-eve that this research will contribute to future studies on his legal scholarship. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the science (...) of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

Abu Ishaq al-Saffar was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhanids' period who followed the Kalam thought of al-Maturidi (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhis al-adilla and Risala fi al-kalam, his method in kalam, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Saffar is a respected and authorative Maturidi theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalam. By adding a long introduction to Talkhis about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the (...) science of kalam, Saffar asserted that the kalam should be learned. When systematically vindication of the science of kalam is examined, it is understood that al-Saffar is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defending the kalam among Hanafi-Maturidis. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalam in al-Saffar divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Saffar's defending the science of kalam shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalam in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Ashab al-Hadith and Ikhwan al-Safa were the opposite fronts of kalam. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Hanafi jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. (shrink)

One of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study, is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provide new epistemological insights of legal reasoning in general but they also furnish a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning that can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and that does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied (...) in contemporary philosophy of science. More specifically the main claim is that a dialectical framework provides the right instrument to stress two of the most salient features of this form of inference: (1) it's heuristic nature and (2) the dynamics underlying the meaning-explanation of the terms involved. Both display what we take to be the main epistemological idea behind the qiyās, namely: the open texture of the meaning of normative statements. To put it more generally, the notion of co-relational inference suggests that every form of parallel reasoning based on meaning presupposes that the concept of meaning involved is open to contextual changes. Moreover the latter indicates that the whole process deployed is intrinsically dialectic. (shrink)

Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār is one of the important representatives of the Kalām thought of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī School. He was born in A.H. 450/ C.E. 1058 in Bukhara that is one of the city of Transoxiana/Mawara al-nahr where Maturidi School has emerged around this socio-cultural environment. He completed his education and served as a leader (rais/ ṣadr) of the Hanafite scholars there until he was exiled to the city of Marv. Upon his return from exile, he passed away in (...) Bukhara in A.H. 534/ C.E. 1139. The present study aims to determine his method in Kalām. The introduction outlines the subject, significance, purpose, method, and sources of the research. In this study, it was employed a method that focuses on a person in which he/she is examined with his/her views and thoughts by taking into account his/her socio-cultural factors. By doing this, the first chapter of this study deals with the political, socio-economic, and scientific situation in Transoxiana, and the activities of diverse religions, sects, and philosophical schools in this region in A.H. V-VI/C.E. XI-XII. In the second chapter, it studies al-Ṣaffār’s life, scientific personality, works as well as the sources that he made references to in his works in detail. In the third chapter, the kalām method of al-Ṣaffār has been tried to be determined. For this purpose, it analyzes his extant works, Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risālah fī al-kalām and elaborates first on his defense of the Kalām that gives great importance to reason (ʿaql) and to intellectual debates, if necessary, in theological issues. Then it explores his theory of knowledge with his ideas on the definition, possibility, sources, and types of knowledge, and the epistemological understandings he defensed or criticised. Furthermore, to determine his Kalām method, it evaluates his approach towards the value of ‘aql and naql (Qurʾān-Ḥadīth) as sources of knowledge. Since this issue is a distinctive tool for unveiling the kalām methods of different mutakallims and Muslim sects. Finally, it finds out the types of istidlāl, meaning inference of one thing from the other that he used when he argues and defends his views, and illustrates with examples. (shrink)

Unico testimone superstite della disputa sugli universali fra i filosofi ebrei Shemuel di Marsiglia e Gersonide è il Supercommentario al Commento medio di Averroè all'Isagoge e alle Categorie di Yehudah ben Yishaq Cohen, redatto probabilmente in Provenza verso la metà del '400, dopo che Yehudah ebbe ascoltato a Bologna una disputa pubblica sul tema degli universali. Dopo aver esaminato la struttura di questo testo e le sue fonti, tra le quali si segnalano Pietro Aureoli e Gentile da Foligno, l'A. si (...) sofferma sul rapporto di Gersonide con la scolastica contemporanea, soprattutto Scoto e Ockham, le cui tesi secondo l'A. furono probabilmente apprese da Gersonide durante il suo soggiorno ad Avignone. La parte terza dello studio è dedicata a Shemuel ben Yehudah, traduttore di Averroè e logico vissuto in Provenza nella prima metà del '300. La quarta parte del contributo entra nel merito della polemica sugli universali attraverso una lettura commentata del testo, di cui sono tradotti ampi passaggi. (shrink)

A notion that the theologians consider as a physical explanation model while discussing the movement in accordance with their theological views on the comprehension and interpretation of the universe is i‘timād. In conclusion, this notion, which has various meanings in different contexts, has been used to express “the tendency of object in motion, potential energy, pressure or resistance of an object to another object”. Within this framework, including weight-lightness, ascent-descent, impulse-pull etc., many phenomena related to the unidirectional and compulsory movement (...) of objects have been explained. On the other hand, theologians dealt with i‘timād in the context of their own conceptions of the universe, in relation to their understanding of causality while discussing the movements of bodies in the universe and their changes-transformations, and the causality relationship between them. As a result of their discussions, they asked questions about i‘timād and tried to find answers to these questions in the perspective of their own views of the universe. Furthermore, in relation to the theory of i‘timād, Mu‘tazilite scholar Abû Ishâq Ibrâhîm al-Nazzâm (d. 231/845) discussed the theory of tafra (leaping) and put forward contrary arguments. One of those who sought answers to the questions discussed in this direction and expressed an opinion on i‘timād is the Ash’arî theologian Abû al-Maâlî al-Juwaynî (d. 478/1085). He discussed i'timād in terms of the accidents of spatial generation and used i'timād as a universal explanatory theory for the phenomena of movement, space, weight and lightness, and directional phenomena such as up and down. From this point of view, he also tried to interpret i'timād with examples from natural phenomena and objects. In doing so, he synthesized i'timād within his own system and presented it as an explanatory element by considering the Ash'arite metaphysical principles through the examples he frequently gave. Thus, he put forward views on whether the movements of objects give rise to i'timād or not, and drew attention to the usage of i'timād in the Muʿtazilite and Ashʿarī schools. In this context, he tried to prove with examples whether the Muʿtazilite understanding of iʿtimād overlaps with the Ashʿarī understanding of iʿtimād. On the other hand, al-Juwaynī put forward his proofs in the context of his criticisms of the Muʿtazilites in general and al-Naẓẓām in particular. His criticisms were generally in response to the views of Muʿtazilite scholars on the phenomenon of motion in the context of iʿtimād. In fact, al-Juwaynī criticized the arguments of Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916) and Abū Ḥāshim (d. 321/933) in the context of the theory of tawlīd and al-Naẓẓām in the context of the theory of tafra through their arguments. In this direction, the paper concentrates on how Juwaynî stated the examples he put while proving the theory of i‘timād in terms of movement phenomenon and what he comprehended from it. In addition, the paper discusses his criticisms against Nazzâm’s theoretical and experimental arguments he brought in the context of tafra theory while elaborating Juwaynî’s explanation of movement phenomenon. (shrink)

The subject of this article is the istishhād method used by Abû Ishâq al-Zajjāj (d. 311/923) in his work calledMa‘ānī al-Qur’ān wa i‘rābuh. Zajjāj, who lived in the third and fourth centuries of the Islamic calendar, is one ofthe leading scholars of the Arabic language. Zajjāj, who wrote various works in the field of Arabic language,wrote his most important work in the field of tafsir named Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān wa i‘rābuh, in a long period ofabout sixteen years. In this work, Zajjāj (...) examined the verses in terms of language and rhetoric, and also includedexplanations about word structure and syntax rules. In his analyzes and evaluations, it is seen that Zajjāj madeistishhād from verses of the Qur'an, Qur’anic recitation, hadiths, poems and Arabic dialects. The verses of theQur'an are at the forefront of the istishhāds used by Zajjāj in his mentioned work. Zajjāj, who applied to poemsin the second place, made istishhād with nearly five hundred poems in his work. In the present study, Zajjāj’s lifestory, his tafsir named Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān and the characteristics of the work are briefly mentioned. Followingthis, the concept of istishhād, the place and importance of istishhād in Arabic language are examined. Finally, theistishhād method used by Zajjāj in his work named Ma‘ānī al-Qur’ān has been tried to be explained with someexamples. (shrink)

Medieval Islamic philosophers were occupied with questions of cosmology, predestination and salvation and human responsibility for actions. For Ismailis, the related notions of religious leadership, namely the imamate, and the eschatological role of the prophets and imams were equally central. These were also a matter of doctrinal controversy within the so-called Iranian school of Ismaili philosophical theology. Hamid al-Din al-Kirmani (d. after 411/1020) was one of the most important theologians in the Fatimid period, who rose to prominence during the reign (...) of the imam-caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (r. 386/996–411/1021). He is renowned for blending the Neoplatonic philosophical heritage with Ismaili religious tradition. This book provides an analysis of al-Kirmani’s thought and sheds new light on the many layers of allusion which characterise his writings. Through a translation and analytical commentary of the eighth chapter of al-Kirmani’s Kitab al-Riyad (Book of Meadows), which is devoted to the subject of divine preordination and human redemption, Maria De Cillis shows readers first-hand his theologically distinctive interpretation of qada’ and qadar (divine decree and destiny). Here, al-Kirmani attempts to harmonise the views of earlier renowned Ismaili missionaries, Abu Hatim Ahmad b. Hamdan al-Razi (d. 322/934), Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Nasafi (d. 331/942) and Abu Ya'qub Ishaq b. Ahmad al-Sijistani (d. c. 361/971). De Cillis skilfully guides the reader through al-Kirmani’s metaphysical and esoteric correspondences, offering new insights into Shi’i/Ismaili philosophical thought which will be of great interest to those in the field of Shi’i studies and, more broadly, to scholars of medieval philosophy. (shrink)

In legal methodology (usul al-fiqh), the problem of the defining istiḥsān and the legitimacy of its definition is among the critical discussion topics. To overcome the rigorism of law, istiḥsān was used by the founder scholars of Ḥanafī school of law and Malik b. Anas - however this use received various objections. Although the Mālikī scholars also used istiḥsān strong criticisms of istiḥsān have been directed on the Ḥanafīs. After the severe criticism of Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, the Ḥanafī scholars (...) carried out various intellectual activities to define istiḥsān and to prove that it is legitimate. This process -which started especially with Abū’l-Ḥasan al-Karkhī and Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ, revealed a rich accumulation with the contribution of the legal theorists in other school of laws. It is known that al-Karkhī's definition of istiḥsān has become widespread among the legal theorists, and the legitimacy of istiḥsān in the works of legal theory was based on his definition. Al-Karkhī's considerations on the legaliticamy of using istiḥsān can be traced in his student al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in the following centuries, Abū Zayd al-Dabūsī, Abū l-‘Usr al-Bazdawī and al-Sarakhsī’s works. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ' explanations on the legitimacy of istiḥsān begin with the criticism of Imam al-Shāfiʿī's against istiḥsān. He provides the proof of legitimacy for istiḥsān in divided two sub-headings. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, who deals with istiḥsān in two parts as word and meaning, argues that there is no disagreement about the use of istiḥsān and that all mujtahids accept istiḥsān, and even al-Shāfiʿī, who opposes to the use of istiḥsān, employs istiḥsān in this sense. The type of istiḥsān on which there is a deabte is the istiḥsān used in relation to its meaning. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ states that this use is a qiyas operation; he justifies his point of view by referring to the works of Muḥammad b. Hasan al-Shaybānī. Indeed, when we look at how al-Shaybānī explained the istiḥsān’s examples in his works, it is seen that there are two conflicting juristic analogy (qiyas) made in many examples. Moreover, al-Shaybānī openly considered some types of istiḥsān part of qiyas by stating that some examples “can be included in this type of istiḥsān” Ḥanafī scholars wanted to break the hostile atmosphere toward istiḥsān by defining and evaluating the istiḥsān in a way that their opponents could accept. The definition of Istiḥsān “to abandon the judgment given to similar ones due to stronger evidence.” has been generally accepted. In this definition, istiḥsān is defined by associating with qiyas, and referred to an istihsan that is presented as the more substantial evidence, and qiyas is the weaker evidence. Although it is appropriate to define istiḥsān in relation to qiyas, the claim that in the definition istiḥsān is put in stronger place than qiyas might casuse to some the contradictions- in particular when the example’s of al-Shaybānī are taken into consideration. Because in most cases, when qiyas conflicts with istiḥsān, istiḥsān is taken. But in an opposite case, qiyas might be taken. Apart from these, there are examples of the types of istiḥsān that al-Karkhī has classified in the works of al-Shaybānī, but sometimes there are also strange situations such as taking the qiyas by istiḥsān. This also means that the term is not sufficiently defined. The negative attitude towards istiḥsān in some Shāfiʿī circles and the criticisms against the legitimacy of istiḥsān continued in the works of the fiqh method. Istiḥsān is defined as making a judgment without evidence by Shāfiʿī circles. Therefore, they did not accept the abandonment of qiyas, which is a sharī proof, because of istiḥsān, which is a non-sharī notable proof. Based on the examples given by the users of istiḥsān, Ibn Ḥazm, one of the Ẓāhirītes, claims that istiḥsān opens the door to arbitrariness. According to him, a situation that is accepted as istiḥsān according to Ḥanafīs can be taken as istiḥsān according to Mālikīs. This creates an apparent contradiction. There are some valid points in the assessment of Ibn Ḥazm. Because while it is seen that the istiḥsān of Mālikīs is criticized in al-Shaybānī's book named al-Ḥujjah, it can be also found that the istiḥsān of Ḥanafīs is charged in the works of Abū’l-Walīd al-Bājī, one of the Mālikīs. The criticism toward istiḥsān was continued by Shāfiʿīs such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwaynī and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. While al-Juwaynī sees istiḥsān as a method based on the lust of the soul, not istinbat/legal deduction, al-Ghazālī understands istiḥsān as a personal comment. The main reason for the negative attitude towards istiḥsān is that the content based on the definitions, has been neglected most of the time. However, when we look at the works of al-Shaybānī, it can be seen that there is a proof of istiḥsān contrary to what is believed-and that this can be sometimes a work, sometimes a necessity, sometimes another comparison, or sometimes a custom. (shrink)

Hadiths that have been discussed in this paper consist of narrations regarding divine attributes and having some problematic meanings between supporters of Bişr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī. These narrations were mostly accepted denounced (munkar) by Bişr al-Marīsī and his sopporters due to having an anthropormophist and corporealist content about God. They rejected divine attributes according to their understanding of God based on incomparability (tanzīh) which provided by Mutazilite approach towards divine attributes even though they conveyed some features of Ahl al-Ra’y. (...) They found contradicted of attributing human features to God based on their tanzīh understanding, therefore, they interpreted such this kind of narra-tions in terms of their approach or rejected at all. At the other hand, a hard Hadith scholar Uth-man al-Darimi believed that one should accept divine attributes as they are in the Qur’an and Sunna. According to his belief, he considered the explicit meanings of the narrations without interpretation of divine attributes, and based on his perpective he denied Bişr al-Marīsī and his supporters’ interpretations claiming they would cause divesting God of all attributes (ta‘tīl). He argues that these narrations should be taken into considerations based on their explicit mea-nings. The discussions on these hadiths are important due to showing different approaches of scholars from the schools of Ahl al-Ra’y and the ones from Ahl al-Hadith towards the hadith du-ring the period when the main Hadith works were collected. Discussions on the narrations stu-died in this paper reveal two schools’ understandings of divine issues, their approaches to divi-ne attributes, as well inform us their perspectives of hadith in general.Summary: The present paper examines the debates between ʿUthmān al-Dārimī (d. 280/894) and the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī (d. 218/833) on the divine attributes mentioned in some hadiths in the period when the main hadith books were composed (i.e., III/IXth century). These debates that took place between the scholars of Ahl al-Hadith and Ahl al-Ra’y concern the un-derstanding and interpretation of the hadiths in a certain way.It could be stated that the debates focus on how the hadiths should be understood, or whether it is the explicit meaning of the words or the possible methaphorical meanings beyond them that should be considered.It is worth briefly introducing the parties who discussed the hadiths studied here. The aforementioned discussions about some hadith narrations are between the supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī and ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, one of the important figures of the Ahl al-Hadith who wrote a separate work on these hadiths. This work was written as a rejection of the views of Bishr al-Marīsī and his two students on the attributes of God and some issues regarding hadith.Bishr al-Marīsī was regarded as an important scholar of Kalam who received fiqh education from Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798). He is a scholar of Ahl al-Ra’y who made scientific dis-cussions with many scholars including Imam al-Shafiʿī (d. 204/820). He was on the council of the Caliph Al-Mamūn (d. 218/833) and had a significant role in the adoption of the idea of the createdness of the Qurʾān (khalq al-Qurʾān).Uthmān al-Dārimī,on the other hand, was a scholar of Ahl al-Hadith who learned ha-dith from the authorities of his era such as Yaḥyā b. Maʿīn (d. 233/847), ʿAlī b. al-Madīnī (d. 234/848), Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh (d. 237/851), and Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (d. 241/855). Having visited all the important cities for the training of hadith, he learned the hadiths and conveyed them.With the understanding of proving the divine attributes and the opposition of the misin-terpretation of the narratives related to them, the groups advocating the appropriation of these lines in accordance with the understanding of incomparability (tanzīh) have complied the works since the first period. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the rejection of the divine attributes by Mu'tazila was influential in the emergence of the criticism literature of the Ahl al-Hadith and many authors wrote works in this direction.Regarding a narration by Abū Hurayra, an opponent reports that this narration gives the impression that God has the eyes and ears as we know. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī reports that this hadith proves sight and hearing not the eyes and ear organs. He indicates that God has no like by no means. Therefore, it is slanderous to refer the claim that Allah is made of organs to the Ahl al-Hadith. Abū Dāwūd states that with this hadith the attributes of sight and hearing for God are proved and Jahmiyya’s denial of the divine attributes are rejected.The opponent also considered Abū Hurayra's narration referring to the Prophet: "Faith is from Yemen, wisdom is from Yemen! I feel the breath of your Lord from Yemen!" as denounced (munkar). Because, according to Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions, breath can only come from those with an abdominal cavity, and Allah is free from it. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the opponent misunderstood. What is meant here is the wind that blows from Yemen and comforts people. In the context of this narration, we see that supporters of Bishr al-Marīsī evaluate the narrative literally, while ʿUthmān al-Dārimī interpret the narrative.Regarding the narration, "You can not approach Allah with something more virtuous than what comes out of it (the Qur'ān)" Ibn al-Saljī reports that Mushabbiha understands this as one with an abdominal cavity and from whom speech comes out. This understanding is in-valid since God is "samad" in the sense that He has no void. With this hadith, it is meant that the Qur'ān comes out of Allah’s presence rather than Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, the real aim of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny God's attribute of speech. There is no doubt that the Qur'ān comes from Him, and those who do not accept it merely deny His attribute of speech.Attributed to Ibn Abbas; The meaning of "yamīn Allah" (the right hand of Allah) in narration "Black Stone (al-ḥajar al-aswad) is the right hand of Allah on earth, handshakes with the people" is not the right hand that we know according to Ibn al-Saljī, it is blessing and grace of Allah. According to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who acknowledges that Black Stone is not meant to be a hand, the purpose of Ibn al-Saljī is to deny the two hands mentioned in the verses and ha-diths about Allah with invalid interpretations.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who criticized that Ibn al-Saljī quoted from another narration which Ibn Abbās heard from the Prophet, says that such poor narrations should not be spread. In addition, he points out that Ibn al-Saljī's interpretation is ugly and he criticizes it. Because Allah who is mentioned in the narrative is depicted as a young man with curly hair in a green suit. Such a narration is also an untrustworthy narration as it contradicts the authentic narrations of the Prophet. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, who made this assessment of the narration, rejects the com-ments that the opponent made about the narration. According to the opponent, the phrase "I have come to Allah" means "to come into the presence of Allah in the Garden of Eden." Accor-ding to ʿUthmān al-Dārimī’s understanding, such complicated hadiths should not be only narra-ted.About the narration that are based on the Prophet and he does not know the answer to what he has come to know of himself, then he feels the coolness of his fingers as he puts his hand on his back and learns everything, the opponent evaluates the following: He was not Allah who came to the Prophet, but a well-behaved angel who was being directed by Allah and he was the angel who put his hand. ʿUthmān al-Dārimī rejects this interpretation of that oppo-nent. This comment is also contrary to other authentic hadiths. After he refused to the com-ment of the opponent about relevant narration, ʿUthmān al-Dārimī stated that he could not trust this comment on the basis of the authentic narrations he mentioned.Salaf scholars have preferred to be silent in this regard, as it is seen among the most difficult subjects to talk about divine attributes. However, subsequent generations have held dif-ferent paths in this regard. The basic approaches to understanding the divine attributes can be summarized in three main titles: tafwīd, tashbīh, and ta’wīl. Tafwīd is the path adopted by the early salaf scholars and means to leaving the knowledge about Allah’s entity and attributes to His knowledge. Tashbīh means to compare Allah to the created or the created to Allah. Ta'wīl is to interpret the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths that give the impression that Allah is like the crea-tures with semantics and rational deduction. The ones who deny the adjectives are called as Muʿattila and those who prove their attributes are called as Sifatiyya. According to Ahl al-Ra’y, it is necessary to appropriately make interpretation (ta'wīl) of the attributes giving the impression of anthropomorphism in terms of the dictionary. In the divine attributes, Muʿtazila advoca-ted the incomparability (tanzīh), whereas Ashʿariyya and Māturīdiyya adopted interpretation in accordance with incomparability. Mushabbiha and the Wahhābī-Salafī understanding has also taken the expressions regarding divine attributes with their explicit meanings.The debate between the scholars who lived in the ages II/VIII and III/IX, when the most important works are composed in the science of hadith, is important in that it is the first turn. In addition to this, the debate also contains important information on the approach to the Qur'ānic verses and hadiths, in that it shows two basic approaches, one of which represents the school of Ahl al-Ra’y, and the other represents the school of Ahl al-Hadith.ʿUthmān al-Dārimī generally advocates adhering to the explicit meaning of the narra-tion, while Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions criticize the narration labeling it as denied (mun-kar) or making an interpretation. On rare occasions, the places where ʿUthmān al-Dārimī re-jects the narration and makes interpretation, or where Bishr al-Marīsī and his companions de-fend the narrative can be seen.Interpretations made by Bishr al-Marīsī on the problematic narratives have influenced on the next scholars. Alongside Muʿtazilite scholars such as al-Jubbāʾī (d. 303/916), Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1024) and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), his interpretations have been quoted by Sunni scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210).The fact that the truth can be put forward in the science of hadith, which is based on the narration, does not favor one of the "narration" and "ra’y", it should be kept in mind that both of these depend on the proper and balanced use of both. To reveal the truth, the narration is in need of the opinion and the opinion (ra’y) is in need of the narration. Narration and opinion sho-uld be seen as complementary elements, not each other's opponents. (shrink)

Cosmological arguments attempt to prove the existence of God by appeal to the necessity of a first cause. Schematically, a cosmological argument will thus appear as: (1) All contingent beings have a cause of existence. (2) There can be no infinite causal chains. (3) Therefore, there must be some non-contingent First Cause. Cosmological arguments come in two species, depending on their justification of the second premiss. Non-temporal cosmological arguments, such as those of Aristotle and Aquinas, view causation as requiring explanatory (...) or conceptual priority, and thus insist that there can be no infinite regresses in such priority. Temporal cosmological arguments, also called kalam cosmological arguments due to their historical roots in Islamic kalam philosophers such as Abu Yusuf Ya'qub b. Ishaq al-Kindi and Abu Ali al-Hussain ibn Sina, view causation as requiring temporal priority, and thus insist that there can be no infinite temporal regresses.1 The kalam cosmological argument thus requires some supporting argument showing the incoherence of an infinite temporal regress of causally related events. William Lane Craig, in "The Finitude of the Past and the Existence of God"2, attempts to provide such an argument: (4) An actual infinite cannot exist. (5) An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite. (6) Therefore an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist. (9) I will not be concerned here with the general status of cosmological arguments, kalam or otherwise, or with contesting Craig's assumption that an infinite past would (unlike an infinite future) constitute a problematic actual infinity. I am rather concerned with Craig's general working principle, embodied in (4) above, that actual infinities are impossible. Craig, of course, is not alone in denying the possibility of the actually infinite. Resistance to such infinities is at least as old as Aristotle (Physics 3.5.204b1 – 206a8), and, as Craig rightly points out, persists through much of modern (i.e., post-scholastic, pre-twentieth-century) philosophy.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam by Larry Benjamin MillerKhaled El-RouayhebLarry Benjamin Miller. Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam. Logic, Argumentation and Reasoning 21. Cham: Springer 2020. Pp. xviii + 143. Hardback, €77.99.Very few unpublished PhD dissertations have had a formative influence on a field. One of the precious few is Larry Miller's Princeton dissertation from (...) 1984 on Islamic disputation theory. It proposed an original and compelling account of the development of the discipline, from the earliest extant Arabic works in the tenth century to the composition of classic madrasa handbooks in the late thirteenth century. It has been cited regularly in the past decades and has served as the starting point for all later studies of Arabic/Islamic dialectics in European languages. The fact that it has finally been published is a fitting tribute to a study that is even more admirable for having been written when many of the primary sources were still only available as manuscripts.Part of the explanation for why the dissertation was not published sooner may be that its author did not pursue an academic career. And as he states in a short preface, he has not kept abreast of all relevant studies and editions that have appeared since his dissertation. A thorough revision and update has therefore not been possible. Though some minor corrections and revisions have been made, the book is still by and large the influential 1984 dissertation, now made available with a short introduction by Walter Young, one of the leading younger scholars in the field, along with helpful indices of proper names and subjects.Miller's narrative begins with Arabic works on disputation (jadal) by a number of theologians from the late ninth and tenth centuries, such as Ibn al-Rāwandī (d. 911), [End Page 518] al-Ash'arī (d. 935), and the Karaite Jewish scholar al-Qirqisānī (d. ca. 960). The basic assumption was that a questioner (sā'il) would ask a claimant (mu'allil) (i) what his view is; (ii) what the ground or reason ('illa) for that view is; (iii) the appropriateness of the ground/reason for the view; and (iv) to verify the ground/reason by showing it to be commensurate with the view. The ground/reason for the theological dialecticians was standardly an entity or property, not a premise. The reasoning tended to be informal and analogical, as opposed to explicitly making syllogistic deductions from quantified premises.Parallel to this theological tradition of jadal, there was an Arabic Aristotelian tradition that took its point of departure from Aristotle's Topics, translated into Arabic more than once in the period from the late eighth to the early tenth centuries. Though also often referred to as jadal, this tradition, represented by the writings of al-Farabi (d. 950), Avicenna (d. 1037), and Averroes (d. 1198), retained distinct features. It tended to deny any epistemic value to dialectics, instead seeing it as useful only insofar as it provided logical training. For the Aristotelian/Neoplatonic philosophers, the pursuit of truth was the preserve of demonstrative syllogism (burhān). Whereas the theological dialecticians envisaged a claimant (mu'allil) and a questioner (sā'il), with the burden of proof on the former, the philosophical tradition had a questioner (sā'il) seek, in the manner of Socratic elenchus, to elicit from a respondent (mujῑb) a series of answers that would allow the construction of a syllogism whose conclusion contradicted the respondent's initial position.From the time of al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Islamic theologians tended to take over the syllogistic ideal of reasoning from the philosophers, perhaps explaining why theological writings on jadal trail off after the eleventh century. The informal, analogical jadal tradition continued, however, in the writings of Islamic jurists. From the eleventh century, scholars such as Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083) and al-Juwaynī (d. 1085) wrote works on jadal in which the examples are disputes about questions of Islamic law and the disputants are partisans of the various legal schools. This tradition of what Miller calls "juristic dialectics" (74, 95) later adopted some... (shrink)

The Greek original of Galen's is lost, nor has a copy of the complete translation into Arabic, made by Hunayn b. Ishāq in the first half of the ninth century, come down to us, though some passages of it are quoted by various Arab authors. A summary of the translation, however, was discovered by P. Kraus in a miscellaneous manuscript in Cairo and published by him in the Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Egypt, vol. v/i.

There is a close relationship between Ashʿarism and Ḥanbalism since the emergence of Ashʿarism. However, they often conflicted with each other as they approached to religious matters from different perspectives. These conflicts were not only limited to theological discussions but also turned into social conflicts, which occasionally resulted with deaths. First massive events occurred in 429/1038 in Baghdād between Ashʿarites and Ḥanbalities. When Niẓām al-Mulk was appointed as vizier, the conflicts reached a peak. The apparent reason of the conflicts was (...) the theological controversy between these two sects. However, the rise of Ashʿarism, which was usually against Ḥanbalism, was the main reason of the social conflicts. Supports of the Ashʿarite thought by the leading statesmen of the era such as Niẓām al-Mulk and Ayyūbid sultans, and accusations of some Ashʿarite preachers about Ḥanbalities relying on this political support were also among the factors that led to these conflicts. Nevertheless, even if any accusation was not made, it occurred that the members of both sects resorted to violence in case of criticisms about their beliefs. This shows that the most important reason of the conflicts was sectarian fanaticism.Summary: Ashʿarism is the name of the sect that was formed around the ideas of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī. It is a continuation of Kullābism in terms of general thought system. Ashʿarism replaced Kullābism by the end of the 5th century of the Hijrah, and started to be called as an independent sect. It spread mostly among the Shāfiʿites and Mālikites in Iraq, Khurāsān, Damascus, Maghreb, and Yemen. When it was arrived to the last quarter of the 5th century, it became the common theological sect of most of Shāfiʿites and Mālikites. Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013), Ibn Fūrāk (d. 406/1015), and Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāyīnī’s (d. 418/1027) efforts played an important role in rising of Ashʿarism in this period. In the following periods, contribution of the Seljuk vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092) to Ashʿarism was massive by establishing the Niẓāmiyah Colleges to strengthen the Ashʿarites against the Hanafites in Khurāsān and against the Ḥanbalites in Baghdād. The Niẓāmiyah Colleges were donated by Niẓām al-Mulk to Shāfiʿite scholars for the mission of primarily limiting the influence Shīʿī thought. The condition of belonging to Shāfiʿites in waqfiyyah (endowment certificate) of the colleges provided some important advantages for Shāfiʿites and Ashʿarites. On the other hand, the Ayyūbids provided important contributions to Ashʿarites in the regions of Egypt, Damascus and Yemen. They worked for strengthening Ashʿarism during their ruling for two centuries. It was a state policy for the Ayyūbids to support Ashʿarism starting from the founder of the state, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (d. 589/1193).This rapid rise of Ashʿarism led to a tense relationship between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites who became the most important representative of Aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth (people of the traditions of the Prophet) after the period of Miḥnah (period of religious persecution). Undoubtedly, the first respondents of these tense relations were Kullābite scholars. At the beginning of the 4th century of the Hijrah, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī became the natural inheritor of the Ḥanbalite reaction to the Kullābites. He conflicted with the Ḥanbalites because of his different approach on the debate regarding creation of the Qur’ān. Ḥanbalite reactions to Imam al-Ashʿarī continued after his death. When he died in Baghdād in 324/935, officials buried him secretly as they worried about Ḥanbalite attacks against his funeral. Hence, after his burial some Ḥanbalites tried to destroy his tomb several times. After Ashʿarī died, the first social events between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites took place in Iṣfahān, one of the most important cities of West Khurāsān, in the end of the 4th century of the Hijrah. The debate started around the question of whether the letters of the Qur’ān were created or uncreated between the Ḥanbalite scholar Ibn Mandah (d. 395/1005) and Ashʿarite scholar Abū Nuʿaym al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430/1038). This debate led to prolonged events between the supporters of these scholars. Abū Nuʿaym, saved his life from various attacks and finally he had to leave Iṣfahān.The tense relationships between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites reached the peak in the 5th century of the Hijrah. Many events occurred in Baghdād during this century. The discussion on interpretation of the revealed attributes of Allah turned into conflict between the two sides from time to time. The Ashʿarite scholars accused the Ḥanbalites with tashbih (affirming Allah’s similarity to humanity) and tajseem (anthropomorphism) by pointing at Abū Yaʿlā al-Farrā’s work titled Ibṭāl al-taʾwīl al-ṣifāt. The ʿAbbāsid caliphs generally supported the Ḥanbalites in this debate. For example, when al-Qāim bi-Amr Allāh re-published the famous declaration known as the Qādirī Creed in 433/1042, he proclaimed that rejection of the Ḥanbalite approach on the issue of the revealed attributes of Allah would be regarded as a cause of blasphemy. The paper was read in a meeting where several scholars from various sects were present. It was signed firstly by Ashʿarite scholar Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAli ibn ʿUmar al-Qazwīnī (d. 442/1051). However, he was one who had criticized Ibṭāl al-taʾwīl al-ṣifāt in 429/1038, which caused conflicts in society at that time. This shift in his position is remarkable as it shows that the declaration was primarily response to him.In the middle of the 5th century of the Hijrah, Ashʿarite scholar al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463/1071) became a victim of the tension between the Ashʿarites and Ḥanbalites. Khatīb had protection of vizier Ibn al-Muslima and under his protection he lectured on Hadith in the Mansur Mosque. However, after the death of the vizier, he was subjected to harassment of the Ḥanbalites because of some expressions in his work titled Tarīkh Baghdād. So much so that he began to worry about his life, thus he had to leave Baghdād and went to Damascus in 451/1059.The tense relations between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites reached the summit in the period of Niẓām al-Mulk who was the vizier of Seljuk Empire. In fact, some events resulted with deaths. For example, in the events of 469/1076, which lasted years, the Ḥanbalites attacked Ashʿarite scholar Abū Naṣr ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d. 514/1120) who accused them with tashbeeh and tajseem. As a result, around twenty people died during these events. The gradual rise of the Ashʿarite thought with the support of Niẓām al-Mulk and abusive discourses of some Ashʿarite scholars who relied on this support can be mentioned among the basic reasons of the events at that time.After the death of Niẓām al-Mulk in 485/1092, for a long time there was no serious event between the Ashʿarites and the Ḥanbalites. In the middle of the 6th/12th century, the relations started to become tense again in the regions of Egypt, Damascus, and Yemen under the Ayyūbid dynasty. In addition to these places, various events occurred in Khurāsān region, in cities such as Marw. Nevertheless, unlike some previous events, the current tensions were not against a whole sect but only targeted some individual scholars. Moreover, unlike the previous periods, oppressed and victimized people were mostly Ḥanbalite scholars this time. No serious events took place between two sects after this period. Therefore, it can be said that their struggle to dominate society led to the above-mentioned events. (shrink)

L'A. confronta due commenti su quello che nel mondo arabo viene considerato il primo libro della Metaphysica di Aristotele: alpha Elatton. Dopo averne delineato i contenuti e la penetrazione nel mondo arabo grazie alle traduzioni di Ustat e Ishaq ibn Hunayn, l'A. esamina due importanti commenti a quest'opera: Yahyá Ibn 'Adi, un commentatore cristiano della scuola di Baghdad e Averroè . I due autori leggono il testo in modo molto diverso: questo suggerisce una grande differenza tra Averroè e la (...) scuola di Baghdad, sebbene il filosofo andaluso abbia ammirato e seguito il lavoro di al-Farabi. In particolare è naturale il rifiuto da parte di Averroè di introdurre un'inchiesta puramente teologica nella trattazione, punto accettato invece da Ibn 'Adi, secondo il proposito di Averroè di rimarcare il fondamento fisico della metafisica, come è possibile comprendere soprattutto grazie alla lettura del Trattato. (shrink)

Berger and Mylopoulos (2019) critique recent scepticism about unconscious perception, focusing on experimental work from Peters and Lau, and theoretical work of my own. Central to their wide-ranging discussion is the claim that unconscious perception occupies a default status within both experimental and folk psychology. Here, I argue to the contrary that a conscious-perception-only model should be our default. Along the way, I offer my own analysis of Peters and Lau's study, assess the folk psychological status of unconscious perception, discuss (...) vision-for-action, and confront an important dilemma which Berger and Mylopoulos raise for the sceptic concerning the existence of unconscious mentality in general. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:716 BOOK REVIEWS phies for each section (20 in all); (2) the summaries of major conclusions at the end of many chapters; (2) the explanations of how one body of texts (or its traditions) has been re-read (i.e., re-worked) by later texts; and (4) how one body of texts (e.g., the Psalms), provides for understanding a certain perspective other parts of the Old Testament (e.g., the Pentateuch). Some shortcomings (...) are evident. He relies heavily on the prophets for guiding insights, while law, priesthood, temple, and blessing play minor roles. Is this really faithful to the canonical shape of the Old Testament in its pre-Christian witness~ I find particularly inadequate the treatment of purity laws (p. 86) and priestly roles (pp. 150-53), and suspect the author needs to apply a hermeneutics of suspicion to his own Protestant presuppositions! In a similar way, the decalogue gets extended attention because Childs sees its theology as relevant to modern questions of violence, war, etc.; but he never seriously wrestles with those counter-passages whose theology encourages a divine warrior or a conquest motif. A similar problem arises when he ends the book with the theme of "Life under Promise." This is a judicious choice for the summarizing theme of the Old Testament and includes treatment of judgment versus salvation,.eschatology, messianic hope, the promise of the land, and eternal life. But it lacks any reference to liturgy and temple as symbols of hope, the book of the law, or the commandments of Torah, and no mention at all of the " blessing " theology of P that informs the whole Old Testament from Genesis 1 onwards. Clearly Childs has begun an important project, but much more clarity and balance is still needed in his continuing work during the years ahead. Washington Theological Union Silver Spring, Maryland LAWRENCE BOADT, C.S.P. Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives. Edited by TAMAR RUDAVSKY. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1985. Pp. ix + 299. $54 (cloth). Since this book originated from revised papers and commentaries presented at a conference (held at the Ohio State University on March 3 and 4, 1982.), it is not surprising to find that the completed edition displays wide variety both in its subject matter and in the quality of the chapters. The chapters reflect the quality of papers very often presented at conferences -some are excellent, others are not. In addition, some chapters deal BOOK REVIEWS 717 with problems and solutions which help significantly to advance medieval scholarship, while the problems and solutions raised in other chapters do. not add much to medieval research; indeed, some chapters seem to present arguments lacking both in plausibility and in an understanding of the dominant spirit of medieval thought. The book is divided into three specific parts which deal with Islamic, Jewish, and Christian authors respectively, and the chapters in each part are arranged in historical order. There is also an introduction and an extensive bibliography. In chapter 1, Calvin Normore gives a helpful, but tediously written, introduction and overview of the logical and epistemological problems which were involved in medieval discussions of divine omniscience and omnipotence. Chapter 2 focuses upon Boethius's account of the nature of contingency, and adopts a view which i;e:fl.ects a misunderstanding both of Boethius and of the theological spirit of medieval thought in general. Ignoring sage comments from Richard Sorabji (see p. 49, footnote 68), Norman Kretzmann argues that for Boethius free human choice is the source of all contingency. How the Christian, Boethius, could so badly confuse human choice with divine choice, Kretzmann fails to explain. Chapters 3-6 constitute Part Two of the text and contain some of the most scholarly research in the book. In chapters 3 and 4, Josef Van Ess, rightly noting the juridical foundations of Mu'tazilite thought, examines wrongdoing and divine omnipotence in the fragmentary work of Abu Ishaq An-Nazzam. His discussion is particularly helpful in its treatment of the Islamic understanding of God as not physei agathos, but good merely by doing what is good. This understanding is a necessary element for any sound grasp... (shrink)

Collected articles on spiritual life based on Bābubhāī Raṇapurā, 1940, Hindu saint; previously published in Kacchamitra, a Gujarati daily.

Salafism is one of the most important issues of the last few centuries. There are intense discussions on the issues related to Salafism, its emergence, how it was first used by whom and in what sense. Discussions about Salafism are sometimes experienced in relation to whether this concept corresponds to a mentality or to a sect, and sometimes this phenomenon is brought up in relation to a number of important names that have taken place in the history of Islamic thought. (...) Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) emerges as the most frequently mentioned name in this context. Therefore, in this article, we have examined how Salafism/Salafiyya concept is used in the works of Ibn Taymiyya who is accepted as the theorist and the most powerful representative of Salafism. We have discussed the issue in a comprehensive manner by including the concept of Salaf, which is one of the most used concepts of Ibn Taymiyya. When we consider Ibn Taymiyya's use of the concepts of Salaf and Salafiyya, the concept of Salaf is seen to be used much more than the concept of Salafiyya. Thus, the concept of Salaf in the thought of Ibn Taymiyya refers to the Islamic society that lived in the early centuries and the conception of religion revealed by this society. The concept of Salafiyya, however, appears to have been used in a way that reflects a mentality and a way of thinking rather than a particular school or sect.Summary: Sects are human made structures that emerged with the institutionalization of differentiations in the conception of religion. The production of systematic theology and fiqh, the formation of its own literature, its dissemination and dissociation from other systems of thought are the most important turning points for the emergence of sects. One of the most important variables that determine the formation process of sects is the mentality of sect. It is known that the sects come into the realm of existence when the mindsets with the implicit reference system become visible. Therefore, there is a mentality on which every sect is based, but not every mentality has come to the point of being a sect. While some mentalities have influenced different sects in different shades, some of them have been confronted with only one sect.In fact, Salafism is one of the ways of thinking which is a mindset and it is a subject of important debates about whether it is a sect. Although the use of salafiyya is seen in the literature in the past, the fact that Salafism felt its existence as a kind of religion or mentality was realized in the 18th and 19th centuries. It is also known that the discussions about the definition of Salafism have started since these periods. From the second half of the 20th century, Salafism began to take a place in the agenda of both the Islamic world and the West. This has naturally led to efforts to define Salafism. Thus, Salafism is subjected to attempts to identify and associate with structures, such as denomination, ideology, religious understanding and mentality. In this direction, it is seen that Salafism is tried to be defined by establishing close link with the structures, such as Ahl al-Sunnah, Ahl-i Hadith, Hanbalism and Wahhabism or by reducing them directly to one of these structures. Thus, Salafism is sometimes backed up to the early stages of Islamic thought and sometimes associated with multilayered structures, such as the Ahl al-Sunnah, which embodies many political-mythic and fiqh structures.In line with the efforts of defining Salafism, it is also seen that many names that have had a say in classical Islamic thought or have been mentioned in modern times have been brought to the agenda. In addition to the names, such as Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the names of Emir al-Saneyani, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad al-Shawkani, Shaykh Abdulaziz ibn Baz and Muhammad Nasir al-din al-Albani are frequently mentioned in this process. It should be noted that there is a special place of Ibn Taymiyya among these names. Ibn Taymiyya took the place of both in history of Islamic thought and Ahl al-Hadith-Hanbalite tradition and made a name for himself in the context of many subjects. It is claimed that Ibn Taymiyya, who was the theorist of the Hanbalite conception of religion, and the missionary of the New Hanbalism, was also the founding figure and the most important representative of Salafism. In modern times, most of those who declare ideas about Salafism place Ibn Taymiyya at the center of Salafism and present him as the founding name of this mentality. However, the question of what kind of relationship between the mentality called Salafism and Ibn Taymiyya's world of thought and religion is not the subject of academic studies. However, the works of Ibn Taymiyya, who is an author of a very velocity, should be analyzed from this point of view and all kinds of words about Ibn Taymiyya-Salafism relationship should be left behind this effort. Our study, which aims to fulfill this gap, was designed to explain topics, such as whether the concept of salafiyya was used in the works of Ibn Taymiyya, whether and how the past was used, and the extent to which the meaning attributed to the salafiyya coincided with the current Salafism. Understanding of the concept of the salafiyya in the works of Ibn Taymiyya depends on the explanation of how the term salaf was derived and used by Ibn Taymiyya. When the works of Ibn Taymiyya are scanned, it is seen that he used the word salaf much more than the word salafiyya. In fact, the word of salafiyya, which Ibn Taymiyya has rarely included, has been placed in some places in a way that refers to the meaning field of the word salaf. When we consider the use of the word salaf in the works of Ibn Taymiyya, we first see the generations who lived in the early historical periods of Islamic thought and the conception of religion which these generations have revealed. Other names that have taken place in the history of Islamic thought have similar opinions about the generation of the predecessors and the religious understanding of this generation. In other words, according to the general opinion of the predecessor, especially the first three centuries came to mind. However, it is seen that Ibn Taymiyya made some attempts to periodize both the generation of the predecessors and to define the understanding of religion of this generation. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyya could not provide a clear picture on this issue, and he occasionally contradicted his findings regarding his involvement in the predecessor generation. Nevertheless, he generally adopted generalizations and an attitude to limit the meaning of the predecessor to the first generations. The word salafiyya, which Ibn Taymiyya placed on the meaning of the word salaf, is used less compared to the word salaf and is given in more complete terms. This indicates that the main factor that influenced Ibn Taymiyya's salafi thought was salaf, not salafiyya as a systematic structure. These findings make it necessary to reconsider the claims of Salafism being a sect and it is being represented at the time of Ibn Taymiyya. (shrink)

L'utilitarisme té com a criteri bàsic aconseguir el màxim bé per al màxim nombre possible de persones. L'utilitarisme dóna molta importància a la recerca de la felicitat personal. Aquest llibre en descriu les tesis bàsiques i respon a les principals acusacions que ha rebut.

Cultural education for the soldiers of People army of Vietnam.

-- 3. Escrits d'economia i finances, 1925 / pròleg de Francesc Roca.