The work on set theory made by A. Tarski in the years 1924-1950 is very interesting, but little know.We develope partial questions in set theory in the moment that A. Tarski intervenes and his contributionsand also influences.The principals aims in this development are:1. The axiom of choice [A.C.] and his equivalents;2. the general continuum hypothesis [G.C.H.] and the A.C.;3. the dual trichotomy principle;4. the inaccessible cardinals and his relation with the A.C. and the G.C.H.;5. the notion of finite set and (...) his relation with the A.C and the G.C.H.;6. the almost disjoint set and their relation with the G.C.H.;and finally,7. the results in Berkeley. (shrink)

FIRST PARAGRAPH I have argued that dispositionalism is incompatible with the Principle of Least Action (PLA) (Katzav 2004). In ‘Katzav on the Limitations of Dispositionalism,’ Brian Ellis responds, arguing that while naïve dispositionalism is incompatible with the PLA, sophisticated dispositionalism is not. Naive dispositionalism, according to Ellis, is the view that the world is ultimately something like a conglomerate of objects and their dispositions, and that, therefore, dispositions are the ultimate ontological units that explain events. Sophisticated dispositionalism, according to Ellis, (...) supposes that, how things are disposed to behave depends also on what kinds of things they are, what kinds of property they have, and how these kinds of things and properties are placed in the natural kinds hierarchies to which they belong (Ellis 2005). Further, it supposes that at the top of each hierarchy of natural kinds there is a global kind. For example, ‘[t]he global natural kind in the category of substance is that of the physical system’ (Ellis 2005). Ellis continues, claiming that the PLA is of the essence of the global kind in the category of objects or substances. If this is so, then, of course, every continuing object must be Lagrangian, i.e. disposed to evolve in accordance with the principle of least action (Ellis 2005). Ellis concludes that, therefore, a sophisticated dispositionalist can accommodate the PLA and its metaphysical necessity. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the grammatical nature of Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA). On my interpretation, the definition of private language implies that the private speaker has no natural expressions for his sensations. This in turn implies that he has no criterion of correctness for using his sensation‐words. This then implies, together with the grammatical rule that a word is senseless without a criterion of correctness for its use, that private sensation‐words are senseless, and hence also that private language (...) is senseless. So in my analysis, Wittgenstein succeeds in dissolving the problem of private language through a grammatical investigation, and therefore, his treatment of private language is consistent with his metaphilosophy. I further explain that Wittgenstein provides a diagnosis of the error of the philosopher who thinks that private language is possible and that he also offers a therapy consisting of analogies or objects of comparison. I also make a comparison with previous studies on the PLA and discuss a number of novelties in my interpretation. (shrink)

My aim is to argue for the incompatibility of one of the central principles of physics, namely the principle of least action (PLA), with the increasingly popular view that the world is, ultimately, merely something like a con- glomerate of objects and irreducible dispositions. First, I argue that the essentialist implications many suppose this view has are not compatible with the PLA. Second, I argue that, irrespective of whether this view has any essentialist implications, it is not compatible with the (...) kind of explanation that the PLA affords. (shrink)

Siguiendo la definición de Osvaldo Pessoa Jr., un “escenario contrafáctico” sería “una situación posible que no se realizó, como una posibilidad futura en algún instante del pasado”. Este concepto no es nuevo. De hecho, tiene una presencia significativa en campos como la filosofía analítica, la economía, las ciencias experimentales o la psicología. La pretensión de este texto es presentar, mediante el rigor teórico, conceptual, y el método inductivo, una reflexión no derivada de investigación. Esta reflexión es la importancia de la (...) relación entre los escenarios contrafácticos y el mundo del arte desde una perspectiva institucional. La observación inicial en la que se sustenta este texto es que, en una época en la que cualquier cosa puede ser arte y, sin embargo, no todo lo es, las razones por las que algo pudo ser arte, pero no lo fue, cobran una gran importancia para comprender la base de su valor económico y cultural y ahondar en nuestras categorías lingüísticas del presente; en este caso, la de arte. (shrink)

This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI §580) there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument (henceforth PLA) overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are transparent in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “What is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, (...) I aim to show that Wittgenstein’s PLA teaches us that the prevailing picture of the nature of phenomenal concepts (henceforth PCs) is upside down: we can only introspectively know what is going on inside our heads after we learn of what is going on outside (PI §580). In this regard, I aim to defend two associate claims against the prevailing view of PCs on the basis of PLA. First, by means of transparency, I aim to show that there is no de re awareness of our private sensation that could determine the meaning of sensation words; for example, I am never aware of the phenomenal blueness of my experience of something blue. The second associated claim is that introspective self-knowledge of our private sensations is always de dicto. We can only know introspectively that phenomenal blueness is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that (de dicto knowledge) blue is the color that usually causes us that kind of experience. Likewise, we can only introspectively know that pain is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that pain is what usually causes some typical pain behavior. (shrink)

Without doubt, the principle of least action is a fundamental principle in classical mechanics. Contemporary physicists, however, consider the PLA as a purely mathematical principle – even an axiom which they cannot completely justify. Such an account stands in sharp contrast with the historical meaning of the PLA. When the principle was introduced in the 1740s, by Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, its meaning was much more versatile. For Maupertuis the principle of least action signified that nature is thrifty or economical (...) in all its actions, i.e., that nature avoids to do anything unnecessary. Maupertuis understood the principle in teleological terms and even considered the principle as an expression of God’s wisdom. It has been correctly pointed out by historians that Maupertuis in his later years moved towards a more speculative and metaphysical approach, whereas his contemporary Euler and later Lagrange, wanted to avoid such theological and metaphysical implications and frame the PLA in purely mathematical terms. Such readings, however, have had the unintended side-effect that they lose out of sight the question how the mathematical and metaphysical aspect of the principle of least action fit together within Maupertuis’ own work. Investigating if and how the mathematical and metaphysical aspects of the PLA are compatible within Maupertuis’ thought will be the main goal of this paper. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with Stanley Cavell’s reading of the notion of privacy as it appears in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s private language argument (PLA). Defined as a fantasy or fear either of inexpressiveness or excessive expressiveness (cf. Cavell 1979: 254), I argue that such an account is partial, in that it does not represent those individuals that are exposed to epistemic injustice. Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s seminal work Epistemic Injustice (2007) and on Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks (1952), I trace (...) some similarities between the conditions of marginalized subjectivities and the private language speaker. This comparison suggests a correction of Cavell’s words and discloses an understanding of the clarificatory import that Wittgenstein’s PLA conveys, rendering it a way to resist marginalization and alienation due to the logical impossibility of a private language. In the second part of the paper (section 3), I consider two other Cavellian notions, namely the “claim to community” and ‘the turn to the ordinary’. Following the line of criticism developed in section 2, which revolves around the need of considering the situatedness of marginalized subjectivities and the oppressive character of the dimension of the ordinary, I try to implement Cavell’s concepts. I do so by taking into account (i) the Wittgenstein-inspired wider conception of rationality Alice Crary (2015) purports and (ii) the practices of some feminist consciousness-raising groups that were active in Milan (Italy) during the Seventies and some ideas developed by feminist and art critic Carla Lonzi. These contributions show that it is possible to maintain the general asset purported by Cavell, but they also call for criteria for better defining on which principles a community can form and which role the collectivity plays in revising the structure of the ordinary. (shrink)

The principle of least action (PLA) has often been cited as a counterexample to the dominant mode of causal explanation in physics. In particular, PLA seems to involve an appeal to final causes or some other teleological ideology. However, Ben-Menahem (Causation in science, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2018) argues that such implications no longer apply given that PLA can be recovered as limiting case from quantum theory. In this paper, I argue that the metaphysical implications of PLA-based explanations are not (...) undermined by its status as derivative. However, I contend that PLA functions as a diachronic constraint that licenses explanations by constraint (Lange, Because without cause: non-casual explanations in science and mathematics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016). PLA-based explanations, on this account, are non-causal but also differ from familiar cases of teleological explanations in several respects. (shrink)

This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are _transparent_ in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “What is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, I aim to show (...) that Wittgenstein’s PLA teaches us that the prevailing picture of the nature of phenomenal concepts is upside down: we can only introspectively know what is going on inside our heads, after we learn of what is going on outside. In this regard, I aim to defend two associate claims against the prevailing view of PCs on the basis of PLA. First, by means of transparency, I aim to show that there is no _de re_ awareness of our private sensation that could determine the meaning of sensation-words; for example, I am never aware _of _the phenomenal blueness of my experience of something blue. The second associated claim is that introspective self-knowledge of our private sensation is always _de dicto_. We can only know introspectively that phenomenal blueness is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned _that _ blue is the color that usually causes in us that kind of experience. Likewise, we can only introspectively know that pain is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that pain is what usually causes some typical pain behavior. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELL AND WHITEHEAD ON THE PROCESS OF GROWTH IN EDUCATION1 HOWARD WOODHOUSE Educational Foundations / University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon, Sask., Canada S7N owo 1. RUSSELL, WHITEHEAD, AND PROCESS PHILOSOPHY W ere there no similarities between the philosophies of education of Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, one would want to know why. Russell, after all, was Whitehead 's student as an undergraduate at Cambridge, his colleague and collaborator for (...) a dozen years working on the manuscript of Pri1!cipia Mathematica published in three volumes from 1910 to 1913, as well as his friend. Moreover, it was the sight of Whitehead's wife, Evelyn, in paroxysms of pain that prompted Russell's mystical experience in 1901, during which he tells us that he became a humanist, pacifist, and advocate of free schooling.2 In this paper, I consider the question of whether or not Russell's account of the process of growth in education is compatible with that of Whitehead. The question is important because it enables one to 1 Presented ar the annual meeting of rhe Association of Process Philosophy of Education, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, 25-7 April 1991. Brian Hendley was the respondent. I would like to thank the audience for its penetrating questions, as well as Don Cochrane, Brian Hendley, John McMurtry and Viola Safr for their comments on an earlier draft. 2 Auto., I: 149. For a psychoanalytic interpretation of Russell's "mystical illumination ", see Bennett and Nancy Simon, "The Pacifist Turn: an Episode of Mystic Illumination in Russell's Life", Russell, no. 13 (Spring 1974): Il-12, 17-24. Jo Vellacott believes that the term "pragmatic pacifist" more accurately desctibes Russell's ". Russell and Whitehead on the Process ofGrowth. 139 Whitehead the precise investigation of the natural world. Both the logical method and the precision of ideas that are learned in mathematics form the foundations of science and philosophy. Indeed, the structures of the physical world mirror those of mathematics, since they, too, are based upon relations among entities.1O The kind of understanding afforded by mathematics, therefore, is also the basis of philosophy, since it puts students in contact with long-lasting ideas having fundamental value, and enables them to gain a kind of liberation from the concerns of the everyday world. (2) Both Russell and Whitehead uphold the idea· that science is based on those kinds of sense-experience to which human beings have ready access (colours, sounds, smells, and observable objects, etc.).II The problem facing science at this point is to show how its generalizations are based upon these experiences. For Russell, induction fails because we can never prove the principle on the basis of experience without thereby begging the question.I:'- This is because the prin~iple of induction appeals to the future or to those unexperienced parts of the past or present with which we are not acquainted. As a result, Russell prefers to adopt a hypothetico-deductive method by which it is possible· to move from the sense-experience of everyday life to a systematic understanding of the structures of the universe. In this way, science is able to progress by means of "an application of mathematical probability to premisses arrived at independently of induction."I3 Whitehead also argues for the need for "careful scrutiny" in the manner in which we infer the existence of "the physical world [which] is, in some general sense of the term, a deduced concept."I4 In other words, like Russell, he prefers a more deductive kind of approach, suggesting that the theory of induction is the despair of philosophy.I5 10 Whitehead, The Aims ofEducation, pp. 82, 84, 89, 134, 155-7. Russell, PoM, pp. 448-9,471; PLA in LK, p. 207. II Russell, "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics" in Mysticism and Logic, pp. 145-79. Whitehead, of course, also includes feelings as integrating features of sense experience that allow us to relate the diverse elements of such experience into a unitary whole; see Process and Reality (New York: Free P., 1969), p. 244 and Part III. 12 Russell, PP, Chap. 6. His argument is mirrored by Whitehead, op. cit., pp. 235-6. lJ Russell, HK, p... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anonymous Versus Open Donation and Queerness as Political:Comments on Groll's Conceiving PeopleAmanda Roth (bio)1. IntroductionIn this commentary on Daniel Groll's 2021 book Conceiving People: Genetic Knowledge and the Ethics of Sperm and Egg Donation, I examine a number of the book's major themes, especially around the idea that donor-conceived children have a significant interest in genetic knowledge and therefore, donor-conceiving parents are morally required to use an open donor.1 (...) I point to some concerns about Groll's case for this view and, in doing so, highlight the way in which taking up an LGBTQ+ perspective complicates and undermines the case against anonymous donation. The major theme of my comments is that the open versus anonymous decision is not merely an ethical decision, but a political one.My comments are organized around a few of the book's major themes, so I'll begin with laying out the most relevant themes in some detail. I then take up four points to consider in more depth. In so doing, I'll be drawing on my own scholarly perspective on issues of nontraditional reproduction, which is informed by my own social positionality in relation to family matters; this means that I (not so subtly) bring a queer perspective to the discussion of Groll's book. The through-line of my comments is this: While I agree with and appreciate much of Groll's approach, I want to stress the sense in which gamete donation is not just an ethical issue, but a political one, given its implication in bionormativity (and heteronormativity). I wonder if a deeper acknowledgment of the political nature of the issues might lead to moral conclusions that are different from those that Groll comes to, even assuming similar ethical values as starting points.2. Groll's major claims(1) Claim 1: Disclosure to donor-conceived offspring—in the usual case at least—is morally required given the intimacy argument: [End Page 166]The intimacy argument suggests that keeping "the secret" about donor conception involves intentional deception and undermines the proper intimacy of parent-child relationships (Groll 2021, 36–49).(2) Claim 2: Anonymous donor conception is (generally) morally impermissible because of the significant interest view.Donor-conceiving parents can reasonably foresee that their children will likely develop a significant interest in genetic knowledge. Significant interests "matte[r] quite a lot to the person who has [them]," "tak[e] up a space … in a person's mental economy" and/or "pla[y] a structuring role in a person's life and self-conception" (Groll 2021, 62–3). But not all donor-conceived people take such an interest in genetic information, and this information is not necessary for identity construction or psychological wellbeing (Groll 2021, 58, 61).2 Rather, multiple routes to self-identity exist, the genetic route being one among the options. Moreover, one needn't experience any loss in not taking this route; however, for those who take it up, genetic knowledge is objectively valuable and nonfungible (Groll 2021, 81–9). This is because genetic knowledge is uniquely relevant to the identity-related question "Who am I?" (Groll 2021, 112–3).3Groll argues that donor-conceiving parents should assume that their child will form such an interest because this is empirically a "good bet." Further, significant interests—at least when they are worthwhile (that is, not trivial and not morally objectionable)—are connected to one's wellbeing by the wellbeing principle: In satisfying a non-instrumental significant worthwhile interest, one's life goes better (Groll 2021, 62). It follows, then, that parents ought to choose open donors since (to simplify) parents are obligated to promote their children's wellbeing (ibid).4Counter to what one might expect, Groll does not take his ethical case against anonymous donor conception to justify prohibition of the practice. This is because wronging children in this way is within the realm of (unethical) choices we allow parents to make without societal interference.5 Moreover, to aim regulation at anonymous donor conception could reinforce bionormativity and target already marginalized families for special negative attention (Groll 2021, chapter 8).(3) "Claim" 3: Groll's own personal... (shrink)

Beylikler devri Türk-İslam ciltleri hem tezyînatları hem de üzerlerindeki dini içerikli ibareler, dua ve mücellid mühürleri vasıtasıyla cilt sanatı araştırmacılarının yayınlarına konu olmuştur. Ancak ciltlerdeki dua ifadelerini müstakil olarak konu edinen yayın sayısı oldukça azdır. Türk-İslam ciltlerinin gerek kapak yüzeyinde gerekse kapak içlerinde dua içerikli ibarelere rastlamak mümkündür. Makalenin konusu, Beylikler devrinde üretilen Türk-İslam ciltlerinin deri kaplı kapak içlerinde yer alan el-İzzü’d-Dâim ve’l-İkbâl (العزّ الدّائم والإقبال) yazısı, bu yazının yer aldığı desen kompozisyonu ve yazının analizidir. Makaledeki amaç, şimdiye kadar cilt (...) literatüründe müstakil olarak ele alınmamış el-İzzü’d-Dâim ve’l-İkbâl yazılı cilt kapak içi tezyînatı hakkında tespit edilebilen örneklerin detaylı desen ve yazı analizleriyle bilimsel birikim oluşturabilmek ve aynı ya da benzer ibarenin yer aldığı diğer İslam sanat eserlerini tespit ederek bu dua ibaresinin ciltlerdeki kullanım amacını ve kullanıldığı dönemleri belirlemeye çalışmaktır. Cilt sanatı literatürü ve yazma eser kütüphanelerinde yaptığımız araştırmalar neticesinde, Beylikler dönemine ait ciltlerin altı tanesinin kapak içinde el-İzzü’d-Dâim ve’l-İkbâl ibaresi tespit edilmiştir. Bu tespitlerin sayısı, yapılacak yeni araştırmalarla artabilecektir. Tespit edilen yazma eserler; Amasya YEK: 217, İnebey YEK Hüseyin Çelebi: 481 ve Ulu Cami: 318, Kastamonu YEK: 2856 ve 3435 ve Süleymaniye YEK Fatih: 5004’tür. Ciltlerin kapak, sertâb ve mikleb yüzeylerindeki tezyînatları, Beylikler dönemi cilt sanatı üslûbunu yansıtan süslemelerdir. Ciltlerin teknik ve tezyînatları, -mevcut olanların- istinsâh kayıtları incelendiğinde üç örneğin (Amasya YEK: 217, Kastamonu YEK: 2856 ve 3435) 14. yüzyıl tarihli olduğu ya da tarihlendirildiği, üç örneğin (İnebey YEK Hüseyin Çelebi: 481 ve Ulu Cami: 318, Süleymaniye YEK Fatih: 5004) ise 15. yüzyıl tarihli olduğu ya da tarihlendirildiği görülmektedir. Ciltlerin kapak içi deseni, bitkisel ve rûmî motiflerle bezeli tam zemin geometrik bir tasarıma sahiptir. Geometrik desenin içerisindeki altıgen paftalarda el-İzzü’d-Dâim ve’l-İkbâl (العزّ الدّائم والإقبال) yazısı yer almaktadır. İbarenin, cilt kapak içlerine tek satırda (İnebey YEK Ulu Cami: 318, Kastamonu YEK: 3435) ve çift satırda -½ oranında ters simetrik- (Amasya YEK: 217, İnebey YEK Hüseyin Çelebi: 481, Kastamonu YEK: 2856, Süleymaniye YEK Fatih: 5004) olmak üzere iki türde yazıldığı tespit edilmiştir. Her iki tasarımda da sülüs yazı çeşidi tercih edilmiştir. İnebey YEK Hüseyin Çelebi: 481 envanter numaralı 15. yüzyıla ait cildin kapak içinde ise diğer örneklerden farklı olarak yazı paftalarının bazılarında mücellit kitabesi bulunmaktadır. Kitabede, “Amel-i Mücellid Haydar b. Turbegî” yazılıdır. Kapak içi tezyînatının aynı olması nedeniyle, Kastamonu YEK: 2856 ve Süleymaniye YEK Fatih: 5004 envanter numaralı ciltlerin de Haydar b. Turbegî adlı mücellidin eseri olma ihtimali vardır. Ciltlerin kapak içlerinin tümü, çeşitli tonlarda kahverengi sahtiyanla kaplıdır. Derilerin gözenek türü bunu ispat eder niteliktedir. Süsleme tekniği, tüm kapak içlerinde soğuk baskı tekniğidir. Bu teknik adını, uygulanması esnasında altının kullanılmamasından almaktadır. Soğuk baskı tekniğinde, desenin deriye genellikle sıcak pres uygulaması yapılarak aktarıldığı bilinmektedir. Uygulamada yüzeyinde motif veya desenin yer aldığı kalıp, çivi ve diğer ciltçilik aletleri kullanılmaktadır. Çalışma kapsamındaki ciltlerde kapak içi deseninin kalıpla uygulandığı, deri üzerindeki desenin kesintili çizgilerden anlaşılmaktadır. Kapak içi tezyînâtını oluşturan desenin simetrik bir parçası, kalıba işlenmiş ve kalıp deri üzerine simetrik bir şekilde, boşluk bırakılmadan basılmıştır. Yapılan incelemelerden anlaşıldığı kadarıyla kalıbın basıldığı deri, kapak içine yapıştırıldıktan sonra kapak kenarlarından cilt ebadına uygun şekilde kesilmiş olmalıdır. Kalıbın bazı örneklerde hatalı basıldığı da görülmektedir. Bu da desenin devamlılığını kısmen bozmuştur. Soğuk baskı tekniğinde, desenin deriye genellikle sıcak pres uygulaması yapılarak aktarıldığı bilinmektedir. Desenin deri renginden daha açık olması, uygulamanın ısıyla yapılmış olduğunu doğrulamaktadır. Ciltlerin kapak yüzeylerinin kullanıma bağlı olarak yıprandığı ve bu nedenle desenlerin deforme olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ancak kapak içleri böyle bir yıpranmaya maruz kalmadıkları için korunarak günümüze ulaşmıştır. el-İzzü’d-Dâim ve’l-İkbâl (العزّ الدّائم والإقبال) ibaresi Arapça bir terkip olup “sonsuz güç ve yüksek mevki” anlamına gelmektedir. Terkip; güç, kudret ve ihtişam anlamına gelen العزّ ve ferah, parlak ve yüksek mevki anlamındaki الإقبال kelimelerinden oluşmaktadır. İbare dua, temenni vb. maksatlarla kullanılmış olmalıdır. Çalışma kapsamındaki ciltler ve diğer İslam sanatı örneklerinden anlaşıldığı kadarıyla İslam sanat eserleri üzerinde el-İzzü’d-Dâim ve’l-İkbâl ibaresine 12. yüzyıldan 15. yüzyıla kadar geniş bir dönemde yer verilmiştir. (shrink)

In the private language argument (PLA), Wittgenstein raises a paradox, namely that a sensation is not a something, but not a nothing either. McDowell argues that Wittgenstein unnecessarily eliminates inner sensations. By contrast, McDowell insists that sensations are perfectly good somethings, namely concept-involving objects. Hao Tang praises McDowell’s idea that Wittgenstein’s target is the myth of the inner given, namely the private object, but he criticises McDowell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein as eliminating inner sensations. On his interpretation, Wittgenstein does not eliminate (...) the sensation as a concept-involving object. In this article, I advance two main arguments: (1) Wittgenstein objects to inner sensations being concept-involving objects because he rejects the model of “object-designation”; and (2) despite (1), Wittgenstein does not eliminate sensations nor does he deny that we can conceive of them; rather, he thinks that people conceptualise sensations in ways other than as concept-involving objects. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to PorphyryR. M. DancyGeorge E. Karamanolis. Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006. Pp. x + 419. Cloth, $125.00.Coleridge wrote: “Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that anyone born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure that (...) no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian. They are two classes of man, beside which it is next to impossible to conceive a third.”Ancient Platonists could not be counted on to accept this kind of dichotomy, and that is what Karamanolis’s book is about. (It may be usefully compared with Lloyd P. Gerson’s 2005 book, Aristotle and Other Platonists.) It covers Antiochus (second century BC), Plutarch [End Page 634] of Chaeronea, Numenius, Atticus, Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, and Porphyry (third century AD). And it does so with incredible thoroughness, making it a tough read. The book began as a dissertation; it still has something of the air of one.The longest chapter is devoted to Porphyry, whom Karamanolis claims to be the first Platonist to write commentaries on books of Aristotle, and the first to adopt the view that Aristotle simply was in agreement with Plato—the founder of a tradition in scholarship to the effect that “Plato is named as the authority in metaphysics, and Aristotle in logic” (330). His concluding paragraph is this:It is this understanding of philosophizing which lies behind the formation of the Pla-tonist syllabus I described in the beginning of this book. This remains the situation until the Renaissance. When Renaissance humanists revive ancient philosophy, especially Platonism, as happened in Renaissance Florence, they re-establish this very model. Few other shifts in the history of Western philosophy are of such significance as the one which we, quite rightly, attribute to Porphyry.(330)The “Platonist syllabus” to which Karamanolis here adverts is perhaps summed up when he says that “from the third to the sixth century AD... Aristotle was appropriated by Platonists because they found his philosophy, if properly studied, a prerequisite for, and conducive to, an understanding of Plato’s thought” (4). More precisely, Karamanolis’s book is about Porphyry’s view and the background of its formation.Answering Karamanolis’s title question is not what is at stake; rather, he is concerned with how the Platonists listed above answered it. So we are not getting a history of the reading of Plato and Aristotle as agreeing or disagreeing from the very beginning. The early Academy and the skeptical Academy before Antiochus, for example, do not figure, except incidentally, in Karamanolis’s story (although there is a useful appendix on the early peripatetics). There is enough here to keep us busy without this.Dealing with any of Karamanolis’s Platonists is made more difficult by the nature of the material that remains: except for Plutarch and Plotinus, it is almost entirely fragmentary. So it is a question of interpreting not just the target authors, whose works we do not possess, but the sources we have for them, who have their own hobby-horses to ride, and hence are not always reliable. Karamanolis pays suitable attention to such details. But the back-and-forth discussion required can make it difficult to keep the larger picture in view.Karamanolis’s Platonists do not uniformly go for the agreement of Plato and Aristotle. As Karamanolis has it, Porphyry is the only one to swallow it whole: “... nowhere does Porphyry criticize Aristotle,” he concludes (322). This requires him to explain away what he regards as misunderstandings of the evidence (243–45 records some disagreements, and the Porphyry chapter throughout is dedicated to rebuttal). Karamanolis is at least prima facie convincing. At the opposite end of the spectrum are Atticus and Numenius, whose antipathy toward Aristotle is universal.For the rest, whether we are to say that Plato and Aristotle were in agreement obviously depends on what the agreement is to be about. There is, among Karamanolis’s Platonists, a good deal of interesting variation over that. Most of those who... (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s ideas are a common ground for developers of Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems and linguists working on Language Acquisition and Mastery (LAM) models (Mills 1993; Lowney, Levy, Meroney and Gayler 2020; Skelac and Jandrić 2020). In recent years, we have witnessed a fast development of NLP systems capable of performing tasks as never before. NLP and LAM have been implemented based on deep learning neural networks, which learn concepts representation from rough data, but are nonetheless very effective in tasks (...) such as question answering, textual entailment, and translation (Devlin et al. 2019; Kitaev, Cao and Klein 2019; Wang et al. 2019). In this paper, I will debate some Wittgensteinian concepts that impact the architectures of many NLP deep-learning systems. I will focus, in particular, on the attempt to build a specific kind of architecture to model a private language. The discussion, I think, helps extract philosophical assumptions leading the research and development of AI systems capable of language modelling. In this paper, I will address some of the main features of NLP systems2 used for word embedding and one proposal to manipulate through a neural network a form of private language (Lawney et al. 2020). In §2, I will reconstruct the complex path of the private language argument (PLA). In §3, I will discuss connectivist language models and introduce notions about NPL systems' architecture. An overview of this kind of model is helpful to introduce the work of Lowney, Levy, Meroney and Gayler (2020). They submit that their model can respond to the issues raised by Wittgenstein in the notorious Private Language Argument (PLA). This argument unexpectedly turned out to be relevant not only for the philosophy of language but also for NLP and LAM modellers. I will describe the language game concept in NLP, how it is embedded, and its role in inductive systems development. This central concept in Wittgenstein’s work is relevant to describe the role of context in understanding the meanings of words. In §4, I present the Wittgensteinian main concepts in play in the connectivist paradigm. I argue that the connectionist theoretical framework can better catch the dependency of word meaning on context. There seems to be a correlation between Wittgenstein's invitation to look, an invitation to dismiss the aim of theorizing about languages, and the absence of theory-ladenness in deep learning technologies involved in NLP. In §5, I criticize Lowney and colleagues’ claim, whose model does not successfully capture Wittgenstein’s Beetle in the Box case. Moreover, I argue that even if we can distinguish a strong and a weak definition of a private language, Wittgenstein’s argument also holds for deep-learning models, and his worries are still a good guide for NLP developers. (shrink)

Maupertuis and Euler had an ambivalent and tense relationship to their Leibniz, especially concerning his grounding of physics in metaphysics. Consequently, this paper has two intersecting goals: first, it attempts to flesh out some aspects of the reception of Leibnizian thought in the context of Enlightenment physics, more precisely, in the deduction of the Principle of least action (henceforth PLA). Second, it also highlights a specific approach towards the intersection of physics and metaphysics that was championed by the Berlin Academy, (...) which would not have been well received in Paris or London. To that end, I will briefly examine some aspects of the strategies of argumentation, metaphysical presumptions and self-ascribed methodologies (often quite different from their actual methodology) employed by Maupertuis and Euler in their respective deductions of the PLA. (shrink)

No tenim temps per a res. La família, els amics, l’esport o altres dèries sempre queden en un segon pla. També el cultiu del pensament, que suposadament és una de les coses que identifica més i millor la nostra espècie, resta a l’espera. La pressa ens aclapara. En aquest context precipitat necessitem temps per descobrir el temps. Un oasi de pensament que comencem a explorar gràcies a parar atenció aquí i allà: ressenyem les observacions resultants, plantegem sengles qüestions estimulants i (...) esmolem el senderi amb l’exercici compartit d’enraonar, altrament conegut com a diàleg. No en va Ramon Llull augurava taxatiu que: “Pensar per un mateix és l’únic projecte a la vida”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Plutarchan Hypomnema on Self–LoveLuc Van der StocktHypomnemata and QuellenforschungPlutarch's "hypomnemata statement" in the introduction to De Tranquillitate Animi has elicited much industrious activity from the scholarly world, and rightly so. The sentence (464F) invites one naturally to apply the method of classical hermeneutics (as understood by Babilas 1961, 30, 51–52), consisting in the confrontation of an author's oeuvre (its inventio, dispositio, and elocutio) with all the elements of (...) its generating "context" (historical circumstances, literary antecedents, biography and psychology of the author, immediate reasons for the composition, etc.) that might shed some light on the work in question and help to understand it. In the case of De Tranquillitate Animi Plutarch himself mentions his hypomnemata as one of the elements that contributed to this work, thus provoking his reader to investigate the relationship between these hypomnemata and the text in hand.Under the positivist paradigm generated and promoted by the physical sciences, the interpretation of texts suffered from reduction: its aim became explanation by reducing the thematic, structural, and stylistic data of a text to its antecedents, that is, by simply equating text and context; moreover, this context was frequently reduced to literary antecedents. In the present case, it was the conviction of several scholars that De Tranquillitate Animi could be explained by reducing it to an amalgamation of literary sources (Quellen) and by assuming that the hypomnemata represented these sources without further ado.The consequences of this approach were considerable: in general, Quellenforschung created the image of "Plutarch the eclectic," copying and pasting together literary sources, and De Tranquillitate Animi in particular became a textbook case of his modus operandi—it was but a patchwork of the opinions of Panaetius, or Ariston, or Epicureanism,1 [End Page 575] and one even finds a meritorious scholar who is indignant because Plutarch "mutilates" his source by disturbing its composition!2 From the conflicting scholarly opinions, from their highly hypothetical nature, and from such awkward appreciations as that just mentioned, it is easy to see that the positivist approach failed really to understand Plutarch: his personality and writing activity were so utterly neglected that one wonders why ultimately even the sentence μνημάτων was not regarded as "aliunde petita"!3Nowadays the assumptions of Quellenforschung are rejected: Plutarch's personal contribution in the invention, composition, and style of his works in general is widely recognized. In regard to his writing technique, and especially the role of the hypomnemata in it, it has been observed that the very mention of the hypomnemata in De Tranquillitate Animi does not mean that Plutarch was simply copying, let alone copying only one source;4 moreover, we are not entitled to view hypomnemata as sources5 without any qualification. As to the general tendency of the work, Stoic influences in the presentation of its theme have been seriously questioned.6While fully agreeing with the critique of Quellenforschung and sympathizing with the more positive results of our recent understanding of Plutarch, I cannot but consider the question of Plutarch's hypomnemata a continuing challenge: their importance for his "Compositionsweise"7 cannot be doubted, even if we are somewhat at a loss concerning their size, content, and nature. With the aim of advancing our [End Page 576] knowledge in this matter,8 I here identify a hypomnema, make some observations on Plutarch's treatment of it, and consequently show its relevance for the interpretation of the meaning intended by Plutarch. But before doing so, an analysis of the "hypomnemata statement" and its immediate context seems appropriate: the sentence may trigger our search and condition our expectations.An Analysis of the "Hypomnemata Statement" and its ContextThe composition of De Tranquillitate Animi took place in urgent circumstances:9 Paccius, we are told, has asked for some exegesis of Pla-to's Timaeus and (apparently in dire need)10 for some advice on tranquility of mind. The obvious messenger, Eros, has been called away urgently to Rome by Fundanus, another representative of the genus irascibile.11 Plutarch adopts emergency measures: First, he does not want to disappoint his friend Paccius completely. Thus in this "letter– essay" (Betz 1978, 199) he will deal with the theme... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MACINTYRE'S REPUBLIC J. K. SWINDLER Westminster College Fulton, Missouri CONTRARY TO HIS own evident intentions and perceptions, in After Virtue A'lasdair Macinty!l.·e is much more of a Ptlatonist 1than the A1 ristotelian he aims to be. I hase this judgment both on the positive evidence that Macintyre and Plato (in the Republic) m1gue for and against the same crucial theses and on the negative evidence that Plato has read (...) answers to the very issues which Macintyre finds 1 intractable from an AristoteHan point of viiew. My thesis can be made out in terms of a half dozen issues which Maclntyire takes as crucial to his case: (1) Can there he a science of government? (2) Is there an answer to the sophist's chaillenge to morality? (3) How oan the fragmentation of the modern self he theoretically overcome? (4) What are the hi1stocical and social determinants of morality? (5) Is there a unity of virtue in addition to individual virtues? (6) Can we reconcile ourselves to teleofogy, the absence of the polis, and the tragedy of human 1:ife? I will consider each of these in turn. I. Wisdom Plato defines wisdom as knowledge of how to rule, and Aristotle (in the Nichomachean Ethics) distinguishes between theoretical and practical wisdom, 1suggesting thereby an interesting ambiguity in Plato's view, an ambiguity of which Macintyre makes a great deal. One may rule eithecr hy law or by judgment. In his attack on the Enlightenment, MacIntyre showis quite clearly tha;t the idea of a social science that would p11ovide laws of human behavior, which could in 343 344 J. K. SWINDLER turn be used by il"ulers and managers to predict and therefore manipulate!human action, was an invention of the eighteenth century. He offers an extensive 1oritique o.f this conception of socirul science, grounded primarily in the claim that human.behavior is essentially unlawful, at least if we judge it by the standards of the physical sciences. There is in human affairs a farge 1and uneliminwble element of fortiuna which makes it impossrible rto.formulate laws of human nature or behavior that would he exceptionless and therefore underwrite predictions of behavior. For there is nothing to be done about the unpredictability of innovations or, from one's own point of view, of one's own future actions; nor can the uncertainties of gametheoretie decisions and 1 the general contingency of the outcomes of ruction,be remedied. There is therefore no possibility of a social science in the sense in which Hume tried to imitate Newton. So much for Marx and Weber and the horde of modern.social scientists. This is not to say that life is completely uncertain; on the contrary, there are genuine and general regularities in society, some natural, some social, ·some statistical, some causal, wihich make life bearable. But these provide a,ground for the Aristotelian idea, endorsed by MacIntyre, that the principles of conduct, such as they might be, hold only for the most part and not universa1ly. There is therefore in Maclntyre's view no justification for 1a mora;l oode in the modern sense, nor ev;en of moral principles of the kind we are used to from Kant ·and Mill, Rawls and Nozick, which purport to istand as a sufficient criterion of right in all cases. But, importantly, we do not find any such rules or codes in Pla.to either. For Plato, too, insists on the mixed reign of chaos and logos in the materia;l world and in our Jives and concludes that judgment is essential to· determining right conduct. He tellrs us that wise rule comes only &om good oharructer and good institutions, that legislating in such detaii1 as to eliminate judgment is "cut:ting off the heads of a hy:dra." One cannot help hut think that tMs (essentially Hemclitean) point is something Aristotle ~earned at his MACINTYRE'S REPUBLIC 345 master's knee. And both aspects of Plato's :point ~e ipresent in Aristotle, viz., that s~nce the:ve is chance in nature, there is luck (good 'and had) in life, and since no rule can capture the particularity of conorete situations right... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Plutarchan Hypomnema on Self–LoveLuc Van der StocktHypomnemata and QuellenforschungPlutarch's "hypomnemata statement" in the introduction to De Tranquillitate Animi has elicited much industrious activity from the scholarly world, and rightly so. The sentence (464F) invites one naturally to apply the method of classical hermeneutics (as understood by Babilas 1961, 30, 51–52), consisting in the confrontation of an author's oeuvre (its inventio, dispositio, and elocutio) with all the elements of (...) its generating "context" (historical circumstances, literary antecedents, biography and psychology of the author, immediate reasons for the composition, etc.) that might shed some light on the work in question and help to understand it. In the case of De Tranquillitate Animi Plutarch himself mentions his hypomnemata as one of the elements that contributed to this work, thus provoking his reader to investigate the relationship between these hypomnemata and the text in hand.Under the positivist paradigm generated and promoted by the physical sciences, the interpretation of texts suffered from reduction: its aim became explanation by reducing the thematic, structural, and stylistic data of a text to its antecedents, that is, by simply equating text and context; moreover, this context was frequently reduced to literary antecedents. In the present case, it was the conviction of several scholars that De Tranquillitate Animi could be explained by reducing it to an amalgamation of literary sources (Quellen) and by assuming that the hypomnemata represented these sources without further ado.The consequences of this approach were considerable: in general, Quellenforschung created the image of "Plutarch the eclectic," copying and pasting together literary sources, and De Tranquillitate Animi in particular became a textbook case of his modus operandi—it was but a patchwork of the opinions of Panaetius, or Ariston, or Epicureanism,1 [End Page 575] and one even finds a meritorious scholar who is indignant because Plutarch "mutilates" his source by disturbing its composition!2 From the conflicting scholarly opinions, from their highly hypothetical nature, and from such awkward appreciations as that just mentioned, it is easy to see that the positivist approach failed really to understand Plutarch: his personality and writing activity were so utterly neglected that one wonders why ultimately even the sentence μνημάτων was not regarded as "aliunde petita"!3Nowadays the assumptions of Quellenforschung are rejected: Plutarch's personal contribution in the invention, composition, and style of his works in general is widely recognized. In regard to his writing technique, and especially the role of the hypomnemata in it, it has been observed that the very mention of the hypomnemata in De Tranquillitate Animi does not mean that Plutarch was simply copying, let alone copying only one source;4 moreover, we are not entitled to view hypomnemata as sources5 without any qualification. As to the general tendency of the work, Stoic influences in the presentation of its theme have been seriously questioned.6While fully agreeing with the critique of Quellenforschung and sympathizing with the more positive results of our recent understanding of Plutarch, I cannot but consider the question of Plutarch's hypomnemata a continuing challenge: their importance for his "Compositionsweise"7 cannot be doubted, even if we are somewhat at a loss concerning their size, content, and nature. With the aim of advancing our [End Page 576] knowledge in this matter,8 I here identify a hypomnema, make some observations on Plutarch's treatment of it, and consequently show its relevance for the interpretation of the meaning intended by Plutarch. But before doing so, an analysis of the "hypomnemata statement" and its immediate context seems appropriate: the sentence may trigger our search and condition our expectations.An Analysis of the "Hypomnemata Statement" and its ContextThe composition of De Tranquillitate Animi took place in urgent circumstances:9 Paccius, we are told, has asked for some exegesis of Pla-to's Timaeus and (apparently in dire need)10 for some advice on tranquility of mind. The obvious messenger, Eros, has been called away urgently to Rome by Fundanus, another representative of the genus irascibile.11 Plutarch adopts emergency measures: First, he does not want to disappoint his friend Paccius completely. Thus in this "letter– essay" (Betz 1978, 199) he will deal with the theme... (shrink)

During the last third of the 19th century, the ‘new’ French psychology developed within ‘the hypnotic context’ opened up by Charcot. In spite of their claims to the scientific nature of their hypnotic experiments, Charcot and his followers were unable to avoid the miracles that had accompanied mesmerism, the forerunner of hypnosis. The hysterics hypnotized in the Salpêtrière Hospital were expected to have supernormal faculties and these experiments opened the door to psychical research. In 1885 the first French psychology society (...) was founded. The research carried out by this society may seem surprising: its members – Charles Richet in particular – were interested in strange phenomena, like magnetic lucidity, ‘mental suggestion’, thought-reading, etc. Very quickly, psychologists applied themselves to finding rational explanations for these supposedly miraculous gifts. Generally, they ascribed them to unconscious or subconscious perceptual mechanisms. Finally, after a few years, studies of psychical phenomena were excluded from the field of psychology. However, during the 4th International Congress of Psychology, which took place in Paris in 1900, the foundation of an institute devoted to the study of psychical phenomena was announced, but Pierre Janet and Georges Dumas founded within it the Société Française de Psychologie, from which psychical research was excluded. As for Charles Richet, disappointed by the psychologists, he devoted himself to the development of a new ‘science’ which he called ‘Métapsychique’. Several hypotheses have been put forward to account for this early research undertaken by the French psychologists, pertaining as much to parapsychology as to scientific psychology. (shrink)

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v32-33-menke.

Cuando observamos el apabullante momento histórico en que estamos viviendo, con el alto desarrollo tecnológico disponible, y nos informamos de los éxitos de la física teórica y física aplicada, los avances en la cosmología, la biología, la filosofía de la ciencia, los vuelcos que le damos a los conocimientos para ajustarlos a la circunstancias de la ciencia actual, observamos la conquista del hombre sobre el planeta y sus recursos, los cambios en la sociología mundial, los avances y prospección de avaneces (...) en medicina y "n" circunstancias conexas, nos parece que todo está "hecho ya", no alcanzamos a informamos de tanto. La simbología nos arropa... y también, a medida que analizamos términos como luz, oscuridad, espacio, tiempo, distancia, macro, micro, positivo, negativo, atractivo, repulsivo, pareciera que nos confundimos más, lo simple nos confunde. Aparentemente términos como infinito, comienzo y fin de las cosas, crean un caos en el cual se nos hace inaprehensible lo pequeño y lo muy grande.¿Qué es el tiempo esencial?, quizás sea la evocación del espacio esencial, y por ello, estamos interconectados, enmarañados en un solo ser, un solo ser universal, que contiene toda la energía universal, y que soporta toda la energía universal. ¿Y entonces? ¿Cómo es el asunto de la entropía... que comienza, crece y vuelve a comenzar?Debe haber una razón que explique la dinámica universal más allá del análisis de movimiento, que explique la síntesis y el análisis. En la búsqueda de querer objetivar la función abstracta tratamos de encontrar el esqueleto de las sombras en forma de energía y espacio exóticos. Buscamos algo que es de lo que no es. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la potencialidad teórica de los análisis de movilidad social desde una perspectiva de la clase social. La temática de la movilidad social ha sido una de las más relevantes dentro del mundo de la sociología, para dar cuenta del patrón de fluidez social. El tema ha sido dejado de lado acusando a los estudios de movilidad social de referir a una visión política según la cual los individuos tienen oportunidades de moverse hacia diferentes estratos sociales, y lo (...) harán de manera meritocrática según el esfuerzo que pongan en hacerlo. Creemos necesario retomar la preocupación del análisis de los procesos de movilidad social a la luz de los análisis de estructuración social, centrándose en el concepto de clase. El presente trabajo aborda esa cuestión, relacionando los conceptos desde las perspectivas marxista, funcionalista y weberiana. (shrink)

Puede argumentarse que el hecho de que las democracias liberales occidentales no hayan sido ni sean en general lo suficientemente inclusivas es lo que permite desvelar en ellas una cierto componente de violencia. Sus más recientes justificaciones filosóficas, entre las que destaca la de Richard Rorty, contribuyen a fomentar esta argumentación en la medida que se declaran, con todas las cautelas ciertamente, etnocéntricas. Nos parece que el hecho de que sea factible cuestionar esta justificación ¿a la que denominamos, en la (...) línea de otros autores, ética postliberal- abre la posibilidad de una perspectiva crítica de la propia democracia liberal actual, no sólo sobre la base de razonamientos filosóficos, sino también con el concurso de consideraciones históricas. Iniciamos esta exposición con la propuesta de que ética postliberal y barbarie no tienen por qué ser consideradas antitéticas, sino que, por el contrario, pueden resultar coincidentes en algún sentido específico (sección segunda). A continuación, y con el objetivo de mostrar de qué sentido se trata, se abordan algunos textos de Rorty con la consecuencia final de que, al exhibir una vinculación más clara con el corpus del liberalismo clásico de lo que ellos mismos pretenden sugerir, pueden ser criticados por el tratamiento que hacen del pluralismo en un sentido análogo al de las críticas ya recibidas por el liberalismo clásico (sección tercera). Esta conclusión queda corroborada cuando se cotejan las tesis de Rorty con las críticas de Bikhu Parekh al monismo moral del liberalismo (sección cuarta). El abrazo del etnocentrismo, característico de la ética liberal y de la postliberal, constituye una determinación ideológica de las políticas de no inclusión llevadas a cabo por las democracias liberales occidentales en contradicción directa con los valores que declaran defender, y ello resulta particularmente visible en el caso de las relaciones de éstas con el Islam (sección quinta). Por último, en nuestras conclusiones, ponemos de manifiesto que el encaje contextualista al que la ética postliberal quiere someter a la democracia liberal no resulta suficiente para una defensa adecuada de la misma sobre todo si, además, tenemos en cuenta la praxis histórica real de Occidente en ámbitos no occidentales (sección sexta). (shrink)

El artículo plantea dos ideas-eje: una, el poder y la posibilidad de repartirlo y la segunda, educar en la participación como una manera de ejercer la ciudadanía responsable. El significado más habitual del sustantivo poder es la capacidad para ordenar o ejecutar una tarea. También se utiliza como dominio que ejercen unos sujetos sobre otros o como relación entre sujetos, donde unos proponen y otros secundan las propuestas. Se habla también de poder, al control que un individuo ejerce para conseguir (...) objetivos, extender su influencia sobre personas o para imponer su voluntad utilizando el miedo, el castigo, la fuerza, la recompensa, la persuasión�. (shrink)

Anesthesiology training programs are tasked with equipping trainees with the skills to become medically and ethically competent in the practice of anesthesia and to be prepared to obtain board certification, yet there is currently no standardized ethics curriculum within anesthesia training programs in the United States. To bridge this gap, and to provide a validated ethics curriculum to meet the aforementioned needs, in July 2021, a survey was sent to anesthesia scholars in the field of biomedical ethics to identify key (...) areas that should be included in such an ethics curriculum. The responses were rated on a Likert scale and ranked. This paper identifies the top ten topics identified as high priority for inclusion in an anesthesiology training program and consequently deemed most relevant to meet the educational needs of graduates of an anesthesiology residency: (1) capacity to consent; (2) capacity to refuse elective versus lifesaving treatment; (3) application of surrogate decisionmaking; (4) approach to do not resuscitate (DNR) status in the operating room; (5) patient autonomy and advance directives; (6) navigating patient beliefs that may impair care; (7) “futility” in end-of-life care: when to withdraw life support; (8) disclosure of medical errors; (9) clinical criteria for “brain death” and consequences of this definition; and (10) the impaired anesthesiologist. (shrink)

Analizaremos en este artículo cómo Charles de Saint-Évremond (1613-1703), sin renunciar a la religiosidad, propone una ética que no reniega del mundo terrenal, como preconizaba la Iglesia en la Francia de finales del siglo XVII. El filósofo no sólo rehabilita los placeres mundanos, sino que restablece como rasgo antropológico del hombre el carácter de zoon politikón que ya subrayó Aristóteles e influenciaría a Epicuro. Del Estagirita toma también su fórmula del término medio en una ética cotidiana: no caer en el (...) ascetismo, pero tampoco entregarse en exceso a los placeres mundanos, no moverse demasiado pero tampoco permanecer quieto. El ser humano puede que sea egoísta, pero el concurso con los demás, de un modo razonado y bien calculado, además de motor económico y social, nos sitúa en el mundo y nos reencuentra con Dios. Entendemos que es un filósofo fundamental, como otros «menores» de finales del siglo XVII para explicar el despegue del Siglo de las Luces. (shrink)