Ingram Bywater first published his edition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in 1890. His reconstruction of the Greek text is based on a careful weighing of the Greek manuscript evidence, Latin translations, the witness of early commentators and his own thorough knowledge of Aristotle's language and style. Bywater's choice of readings introduced many important alterations to the text given in previous editions; his preference for manuscripts Kb and Lb and for the commentary of Aspasius, represented by Heylbut's edition, explains many of (...) these changes. Select readings of the most important witnesses are given in a critical apparatus. Bywater's edition has been widely used by scholars and students of the Greek text of Nicomachean Ethics and a number of important translations have been based on it. The edition's carefully compiled index of key Greek words, arranged according to usage, has proved an indispensable tool to generations of Greek students. (shrink)

The present study aims at understanding how Ethica Nicomachea V.6 relates to its preceding chapters, V.1-5. On the one hand, the interpreter wonders for what purpose Aristotle introduces a topic named ‘the civic just’ (to politikon dikaion) in V.6, since V.1-5 treats extensively of matters of justice in the city. On the other hand, the same text posits that there is a certain ‘just without qualification’ (to haplōs dikaion), which may or may not be the civic just itself; (...) compared to the just without qualification, other forms of just are so by similitude (kath’homoiteta). In attempting to clear the confusion around those two points, the present study proposes the following: (1) the civic just is the just without qualification insofar as it is the primordial form of the just, in which only humans who are cumulatively free, equals and self-sufficient have a share; (2) the description of the civic just recapitulates several aspects of the discussions of justice in V.1-5 – the laws, the kinds of equality, rule, the legal suit - because the civic just encompasses all the forms of just (dikaion) related to the virtues of universal justice (V.1) and partial justice (V.2-5); (3) the expression to politikon dikaion is introduced in V.6 in order to contrast everything treated in V.1-5 with the domestic just, to oikonomikon dikaion, mentioned for the first time in V.6; (4) the forms of the domestic just are just only by similitude with the civic just because justice loses density outside the civic sphere, a situation which can be explained by the shortcomings Aristotle ascribes to women, children and slaves in EN V.6 (lack either of freedom or equality or yet self-sufficiency) as well as in Politica I (varying degrees of defective deliberation and virtue). (shrink)

In the middle of the sixteenth century, Bernardo Segni (Florence, 1504 – Florence, 1588) published some Italian translations with commentaries on some works of Aristotle. He was not a scholar nor did he have a university affiliation nor could he boast a deep knowledge of Greek language, but he worked in the cultural climate of Duke of the Florentine Republic Cosimo I (Florence, 1519 – Florence, 1574) and of the Florentine Academy, whose aim was to raise the cultural centrality of (...) Florence and its dialect. In this paper I analyze some passages of his translation and commentary on Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea (Florence 1550; reprint Venice 1551). Through this examination some characteristics of the author’s work emerge, such as his didactic purposes, which may be related to the type of his audience, his (poor) knowledge of classical authors and sources, and his tendency towards continuous dialogue with the present. (shrink)

This paper examines what Aristotle could have meant in Nicomachean Ethics 1106b 14-16, when he says that moral virtue is more exact than craft. Aristotle’s meaning cannot be that moral knowledge is more exact than technical knowledge. Neither the practical knowledge that an agent has about the precepts guiding his actions nor the philosophical knowledge framed in a moral theory could be described as “more exact than craft- knowledge”. My point is that Aristotle’s meaning is better understood if he is (...) taken to be talking about the requirements for doing virtuously a virtuous action. Being successful at doing a virtuous action is “more exact” than being successful at making a good craft-product in the sense that more criteria for successfulness are required. (shrink)

Al-Fārābī's lost commentary on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea is without doubt one of the most sorely missed lost works of the Islamic falāsifa. In part, this is because the commentary was in some respects a scandal, and scholars accordingly believe it may hold the key to resolving present-day disagreements on how to interpret al-Fārābī's views as expressed in his independent treatises. Perhaps al-Fārābī's most shocking or scandalous statement is that preserved by the Hispano-Muslim philosophers Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufayl, and (...) Ibn Rushd. According to them al-Fārābī says in his commentary on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea that happiness is to be achieved only in this life, not in the afterlife; that there is no happiness but political happiness; and that union with the active intellect – generally considered the highest goal of human existence by the philosophers – is impossible. This paper addresses the following questions: What exactly is the debate about? Why is the question of immortality or conjunction related to Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea? And why was it so controversial to say, in the context of the Ethica Nicomachea, that there is no happiness but political happiness? Although the bulk of al-Fārābī's commentary is still lost, I have discovered two quotations of it in Hebrew manuscripts. As I will argue in this paper, these newly-discovered quotations – which are included with an English translation in the appendix – can shed light on the mysteries concerning al-Fārābī's commentary. Résumé Le commentaire perdu d'al-Fārābī à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque d'Aristote est sans conteste, parmi les ouvrages perdus de philosophes islamiques, l'un de ceux dont on regrette le plus l'absence. Cela s'explique notamment par le caractère à certains égards scandaleux de ce commentaire, dont les spécialistes attendent dès lors qu'il recèle la clé pour résoudre les désaccords actuels quant à l'interprétation à donner aux idées formulées par cet auteur dans ses traités personnels. La thèse peut-être la plus choquante ou scandaleuse d'al-Fārābī est celle qui est préservée par les philosophes hispano-islamiques Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufayl et Ibn Rushd: selon eux, il affirme, dans son commentaire à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque, que le bonheur ne saurait se réaliser qu'en cette vie et non dans l'au-delà, qu'il n'y a pas de bonheur autre que le bonheur politique, et que l'union à l'intellect agent – généralement tenue par les philosophes pour être la fin suprême de l'existence humaine – est impossible. Cet article traite les questions suivantes: quel est exactement l'enjeu de ce débat? Pourquoi les questions de l'immortalité et de la conjonction sont-elles liées à l’ Ethique à Nicomaque? Et en quoi était-il si problématique d'affirmer, en référence à cette œuvre, qu'il n'y a pas de bonheur autre que le bonheur politique? Même si le corps du commentaire d'al-Fārābī est encore perdu, j'en ai découvert deux citations dans des manuscrits hébreux. Comme je le soutiens ici, ces citations récemment découvertes – données dans l'appendice avec leur traduction anglaise – font un peu de lumière sur les mystères du commentaire d'al-Fārābī. (shrink)

This article focuses on Nicomachean Ethics III, 13 and its quotations in the work of Thomas Aquinas. The aristotelian examples of predators pursuing their prey inserted in this extract aroused Thomas’ interest from the Sentences commentary until the IIa-IIae. They offered him an alternative model to the famous avicennian paradigm of the sheep fleeing the wolf, that enabled him to account for the motivation of animal movement, instinct and animal pleasure. Unlike modern commentators, Thomas takes seriously this small but significant (...) piece of zoology inserted in the chapter on temperance of the ethica vetus. (shrink)

The Oxford Classical Texts, or Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, are renowned for their reliability and presentation. The series consists of a text without commentary but with a brief apparatus criticus at the foot of each page.

English summary: The fifth book of Aristotles Metaphysics is presented here in a new French translation with analysis of the books structure and considerable commentary and overview of the significance and often difficult meaning of this essential text. French description: On s'est beaucoup interroge sur le cinquieme livre de la Metaphysique, qui se presente sous la forme de trente notices consacrees a l'etude des differentes significations ou usages de certains termes, dont les raisons du choix n'apparaissent pas d'emblee. Le present (...) travail met en evidence la maniere dont le livre s'integre a l'enquete proprement metaphysique d'Aristote, par l'analyse de ces termes de toute premiere importance philosophique, trop generaux pour etre etudies par une science particuliere, mais indispensables a la connaissance de n'importe quel domaine de l'etre. Une traduction inedite, qui degage la structure du texte, un commentaire approfondi et une synthese originale des significations distinguees permettent une approche nouvelle de ce document celebre. Les auteurs esperent ainsi a la fois faciliter la lecture et la comprehension du texte, et fournir en outre aux specialistes de nombreuses suggestions d'interpretation de passages controverses ou obscurs. (shrink)

Biophilia is a concept that has been much utilized as a foundation for an environmental or “land” ethic. E.O. Wilson characterizes it as a genetic disposition that links human survival to valuing living systems. J. Baird Callicott argues that human sentiments are naturally directed to all living systems and beings and this sentiment has evolutionary value. This author contends that if biophilia is to be a viable foundation for such an ethic, it must be conceived more abstractly and broadly as (...) an interconnecting feature of biotic systems. The foundation for such a conception can be found in Aristotle’s ethics, wherein his discussion of friendship, philia, can provide a theory of interspecies obligation. Although Aristotle’s focus in the Nicomachean Ethics is human relations, he makes it clear that this sentiment can be felt towards other living beings. This paper develops a broader conception of philia that includes interspecies relationships and then reconceives the modern concept of biophilia as a form of interspecies philia. It goes on to argue, using Aristotle’s theory of obligation as reciprocity within friendship, that such a re-conception of biophilia might provide another approach to founding an environmental ethic on a theory of sentiment. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of the application of democraticand anti-racist educational principles in a college setting.The paper explores both the implications of pedagogical theoryfor anti-racism and the implications of anti-racism forpedagogy. After giving a brief description of the conditionsencountered in an economically and intellectually impoverishedregion of the country, the paper outlines an application ofJohn Dewey's educational theory to college instruction.Then, after an account of what racism is, the paper reappliesDewey's model to the teaching of anti-racism, and with thehelp of (...) Paulo Freire's theory of educational praxis,readapts Deweyan principles to the task of reconstructingour classrooms as models of anti-racist communities. (shrink)

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O presente trabalho tem por finalidade analisar, a partir do livro V da obra Ethica Nicomachea, se a justiça poderia ser tomada como um meio que irá auxiliar os cidadãos a desenvolver plenamente as suas virtudes. Buscar-se-á fundamentar que é através da justiça que os bons cidadãos seriam formados, bem como o bom caráter seria cultivado. Analisar-se-á, também, ainda que minimamente, o que Aristóteles entende de fato por justiça, de que o justo seria dar a cada um o (...) que lhe é devido, o que merece, haja vista que essa afirmação traz consigo um peso muito grande, pois nos faz indagar sobre o que seria o devido de cada indivíduo, bem como quais seriam as bases relevantes do mérito. Isto é, se o justo é dar a cada um o que lhe é devido, cabe a nós nos perguntarmos de que forma e critério seria usado na distribuição. De certa forma, ao raciocinarmos sobre justiça e direitos, consequentemente temos de raciocinar sobre a finalidade, o objetivo, o telos das atividades que circundam a vida social na Pólis. Buscar-se-á discutir sobre os temas apresentados, porém não se tem por finalidade propor medidas para pôr um fim na discussão. (shrink)

Neste texto defende-se a hipótese de que, segundo Aristóteles, a vida contemplativa consiste no ato do intelecto e no ato da percepção sensorial. Segundo nossa interpretação, a felicidade aristotélicaNeste texto defende-se a hipótese de que, segundo Aristóteles, a vida contemplativa consiste no ato do intelecto e no ato da percepção sensorial. Segundo nossa interpretação, a felicidade aristotélica, no sentido de felicidade contemplativa, consiste, portanto, numa atividade que somente é possível durante a vigília, quando não nos encontramos tomados por qualquer dos (...) apetites e paixões que obstaculizam nosso contato com nossa realidade interna ou externa. Alcançar a contemplação neste sentido é algo como perceber que vemos quando vemos, perceber que escutamos quando escutamos, perceber que pensamos quando pensamos, e perceber que existimos quando percebemos que percebemos e que pensamos. E tanto mais felizes seremos, de acordo com nossa interpretação, quanto mais capazes sejamos, ao longo da nossa vida, de pôr em ato esta faculdade sensorial em relação a nossos próprios sentidos e intelecto. no sentido de felicidade contemplativa, consiste, portanto, numa atividade que somente é possível durante a vigília, quando não nos encontramos tomados por qualquer dos apetites e paixões que obstaculizam nosso contato com nossa realidade interna ou externa. Alcançar a contemplação neste sentido é algo como perceber que vemos quando vemos, perceber que escutamos quando escutamos, perceber que pensamos quando pensamos, e perceber que existimos quando percebemos que percebemos e que pensamos. E tanto mais felizes seremos, de acordo com nossa interpretação, quanto mais capazes sejamos, ao longo da nossa vida, de pôr em ato esta faculdade sensorial em relação a nossos próprios sentidos e intelecto. (shrink)

Dans la Politique, Aristote s’attache à distinguer, pour les articuler et les hiérarchiser, la sphère économique et la sphère politique. Tout en reconnaissant l’autonomie propre des activités économiques, il s’attache à exposer les motifs qui légitiment la limitation de celles-ci par le pouvoir politique. En consacrant l’éminence de la politique par rapport à la sphère marchande, Aristote manifeste l’impérieuse nécessité de subordonner la recherche et l’acquisition des biens et des richesses matérielles – légitimes dans leur ordre – aux activités les (...) plus hautes de l’homme qui, seules, sont susceptibles de lui procurer le bonheur véritable. Recherchées pour elles-mêmes, celles-ci sont l’expression d’une sortie par l’homme d’une logique de l’utilité et témoignent d’une forme authentique de liberté dans laquelle se déploient sa vertu et son excellence. C’est in fine uniquement une éducation à la vie de loisir qui fait advenir, dans la communauté, des individus susceptibles d’assumer la destination morale et politique à laquelle la cité est appelée. Classification JEL : B11. (shrink)

Daniel Mansuy | : L’article que nous présentons est une analyse de la lecture que fait Leo Strauss du passage où Aristote distingue entre la justice naturelle et la justice positive. Tout en voulant s’écarter des interprétations thomiste et marsilienne, Strauss suggère une position paradoxale qui, tout en admettant qu’il y a un droit naturel, rejette l’existence des principes de justice immuables. Notre thèse est que l’interprétation de Strauss n’est pas complètement fidèle au texte d’Aristote, et présente en fait sa (...) propre position comme étant aristotélicienne. | : The article we are submitting intends to analyze the interpretation proposed by Leo Strauss of the passage in which Aristotle makes the distinction between Natural Justice and Positive Justice. While attempting to distance himself from Thomist and Marsilius-based interpretations, Strauss suggests a paradoxical position which, while admitting natural right, rejects the existence of principles of immutable justice. Our thesis is that Strauss’s interpretation is not faithful to Aristotle’s text and that he actually presents his own position as if it were Aristotelian. (shrink)

Plusieurs aspects de la métaphysique, de la physique, de l'éthique et de la psychologie d’Aristote peuvent s'interpréter comme des affleurements d'un concept non-thématisé, celui d'être-dans-le-monde (l'in-der-welt-sein de heidegger). L’ensemble de la pensée grecque classique, même si elle était fascinée par l'ordre du cosmos, ne s'est guère demande ce que signifiait "être-dans-le-monde". L’expérience de la facticité, qui est un des traits fondamentaux de celle-ci, est ce qui permet à Aristote dans le protreptique, de justifier la vie philosophique ; mais il conçoit (...) celle-ci comme culminant dans la contemplation, c'est-à-dire l'accès a ce qui est au plus haut point (ch. 2). Aristote est toujours resté pris dans cette ambiguïté, qui provient de ladite transposition : son éthique révèle ses hésitations entre deux sujets de l'agir moral : le "je" à qui il incombe d'agir de par ce qu'il a d'unique, le cédé a l'homme, tel qu'il est défini par sa place parmi les autres parties de l'univers (ch. 3 & 4). Par suite, il lui faut définir l'homme comme le plus mondain des êtres sublunaires : l'homme imite l'univers grâce à son universalité, et parce qu'il est capable de saisir les réalités les plus élevées (ch. 5). Cependant, Aristote ne peut définir le topos - ce dans quoi sont les choses- sans renvoyer à notre façon particulière d'être-là, même s'il réintroduit ensuite l'idée d'univers grâce à sa théorie des dimensions du corps humain comme fondées dans la structure objective du cosmos (ch. 6). Les difficultés de la définition aristotélicienne de l'âme ainsi que celles de la doctrine de l'intellect agent proviennent de la tentative d'Aristote pour transposer ce qu'il pense implicitement comme l'ouverture même du monde à travers notre présence dans le registre de la réalité mondaine-ce qui l'oblige à réduire l'âme à la conscience de ce qui se produit parmi les choses du monde (ch. 7). Il conçoit celui-ci d'une manière telle qu'elle l'amène à exclure le mouvement spécifiquement humain au profit de la continuité absolue des corps célestes. Cependant, la contemplation de soi du premier moteur reflète l'ambiguïté non résolue de l'energeia humaine : le pur acte d'être-là et l'activité de contempler le plus haut de tous les êtres s'y fondent (ch. 8). Malgré tout, l'energeia comme concept ontologique fondamental ne peut pas se définir en dehors de l'expérience humaine de l'être-là (ch. 9). (shrink)

English summary: This volume offers a reading of Book III of De Anima, followed by thirteen chapters by leading specialists in Aristotelian philosophy. In this difficult book, which has not ceased to nourish the interpretations of commentators since antiquity, Aristotelian psychology, starting with the faculties that the human soul shares with the rest of the animals, rises to the cognitive functions by which man is distinguished from them. The thirteen studies in the form of a commentary on Book III of (...) De Anima invite us to enter into this Aristotelian exploration of the human soul. French description: Le volume Aristote et l'yme humaine. Lectures de De Anima III offertes a Michel Crubellier, propose une lecture suivie, par de grands specialistes de philosophie aristotelicienne, des treize chapitres qui composent le livre III du De Anima. Dans ce livre difficile, qui n'a cesse de nourrir les interpretations des commentateurs depuis l'Antiquite, la psychologie aristotelicienne, partant des facultes que l'yme humaine partage avec le reste des animaux, s'eleve jusqu'aux fonctions cognitives par lesquelles l'homme, cette fois, s'en distingue. Les treize etudes de ce volume, en forme de commentaire du livre III du De Anima, nous invitent a entrer dans cette exploration aristotelicienne de l'yme humaine. (shrink)

What is the criterion for distinguishing between the excellence of the excellent constitution κατ’ εὐχήν in Politics VII and the excellence of the other excellent constitutions? Every constitution includes in its composition necessity and good. Yet, unlike what happens in the other excellent constitutions, in the best constitution of Politics VII there is a convergence, not an opposition, between necessity and goodness. This point is confirmed by a change in the meaning of the word ἀναγκαῖον. In the constitution delineated in (...) Book VII, ultimately matter and form are identical. Both the convergence between necessity and good and the fact that every citizen should be a good man or a ‘maker of virtue’ lead to equate the excellent constitution with the completed form of political capacity. Hence, the relationship between πολιτεία and ἀρίστη πολιτεία is similar to the relationship between ἔργον κιθαριστοῦ and ἔργον σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ. (shrink)

Aristotle’s observation that “Plato not wrongly ordered sophistry around non-being” (Metaph. E 2, 1026b14; also in K 8, 1064b29) refers generally to Plato’s Sophist. The admission of non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) could be considered as a certain consequence of the Eleatic monism, which gave rise to the Sophistic movement as has been recognized by Plato and Aristotle. In this paper, we try to identify more precisely the context of this setting of non-being of polemical and very particular importance.

The tripartite division of peoples described in chapter 7 of book VII of Aristotle’s Politics identifies natural-born Greeks as the only people capable of free and well-ordered living in the polis. Ought we to infer from this passage that the underlying asymmetry between Greeks and non-Greeks somehow corresponds to the distinction, found in book I, between those who are masters by nature and those who are slaves by nature? The aim of this paper is to show that this claim is (...) not only not self-evident, but that it runs counter to Aristotle’s non-providential finalism, which is incompatible with the notion that nature could favor one people to the detriment of all others. In other words, the Greek people is not the rightful heir of the order of the world to the extent that their natural superiority in the political realm is quite accidental. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Die parallele Untersuchung der historischen Quellen zum oligarchischen Teilstaat von Eleusis nach dem Sturz der Dreißig legt nahe, dass der Vertrag unter anderem die Ordnung in Eigentumsfragen wiederherstellen sollte, nachdem die Häuser der zuvor ermordeten Eleusinier von Athenern willkürlich in Besitz genommen worden waren. Während bisherige Interpretationen der entsprechenden Klausel von der Annahme ausgehen, dass viele Eleusiner gezwungen waren, ihre Häuser zu verlassen, wird argumentiert, dass sie das Recht behielten, weiter in Eleusis zu wohnen. Das eingeführte Vermittlungsverfahren wird als (...) ein Indiz interpretiert, dass auch diese Maßnahme als Verhandlung mit dem Ziel der Versöhnung eingeführt wurde. (shrink)

The problem of the Rota Aristotelis deals with the unrolling of two tightly connected concentric circles with different radii. It is to be found in Chapter 24 of the text Mechanica of the Aristotelian corpus (today generally no longer attributed to Aristotle) and has bothered many authors until the modern age. All these scholars agree that the solution given there is not satisfactory. We conclude that Chapter 24 is close to Aristotle, at least, both from a philological and philosophical (...) point of view. The solution of the problem given in the ancient text can very well be transferred into a modern physical phenomenological explanation. (shrink)

Comparaison entre la philosophie pratique aristotélisante d'aujourd'hui, représentée en Allemagne surtout par H.G. Gadamer, J. Ritter et leurs élèves, et les théories d'Aristote sur la phronesis et l'ethos, visant à montrer que ces dernières, dans la pensée du Stagirite, ne remplissent pas, contrairement à ce que croient ces interprètes, le rôle de la philosophie pratique toute entière. Contrast between the aristotelizing practical philosophy of today, represented in Germany especially by H.G. Gadamer, J. Ritter and their followers, and Aristotle's theories on (...) phronesis and ethos, in order to show that these theories, in the Stagirite's thought, don't play, against the opinion of those interpreters, the rôle of the whole practical philosophy. (shrink)

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections (...) in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book. (shrink)

Aristotle says at the start of the De interpretatione that words symbolise thoughts, which are in turn likenesses of things. The present paper argues that he is speaking here primarily of the signification of whole sentences, and at most secondarily of the semantics of individual words. This proposal is defended by drawing attention to a shift in the meaning of ‘sign’ and cognate terms that occurs in the course of the first chapter, one which enables us to separate the way (...) in which words ‘signify’ thoughts (declarative, interrogative, etc.), by expres­sing them, from the more narrowly semantic way in which, subsequently, they are said to signify things. Aristotle’s famous opening state­ment finds its main application, not in the rudimentary grammar of nouns and verbs that follows in chapters 2-3, but later in the treatise, and above all in chapter 14, where it is invoked to establish for dialectical purposes that the relation between a sentence and its negation is the strongest of all contrarieties. Aristotle’s insis­tence, in this same treatise, on the conventional character of language is also explained: for in chapters 8 and 11 it is because of the conventionality of language, and its consequent failure to map systemati­cally onto the divisions between things, that what is in surface grammar a single sentence may turn out to be in reality two or more sentences, in other words, to signify (i.e. express) two or more different thoughts. Aristotle’s primary focus on the meanings of entire sentences is thus explained by the role of the De interpretatione as a work ancillary to dia­lectic, a discipline for which the relation between contradictory pairs of assertions is fundamen­tal. In addition, such a focus is argued (with a comparison to the Stoic lekton) to reflect Aris­totle’s teleological frame of thought. (shrink)

This paper aims at investigating Aristotle’s criticism of Plato on the practical good. It confronts the practical functions attributed to the Idea of the good in Plato’s Republic to Aristotle’s objections against this Idea in the Ethics, objections that point out its practical inefficiency. Then I turn to Aristotle’s own elaboration of the practical good, showing how indebted it is to the treatment of the human good in the Philebus. This leads to assess how and how far Aristotle distances himself (...) from Plato’s views on the practical good. (shrink)

Este artículo recoge y aúna, por vez primera en un solo trabajo, los distintos aspectos acerca de la tradición manuscrita, las dataciones y las autorías de las tres principales traducciones de Ethica Nicomachea en circulación durante el s. XIII. El trabajo de Aristóteles, de significativa e ininterrumpida influencia en el ámbito de la filosofía práctica, sorteó para ese entonces no sólo los escollos de las prohibiciones que recayeron sobre otros importantes tratados del Estagirita, sino que además fue honrado (...) por la pluma de tres traductores de reconocida pulcritud y erudición: Burgundio de Pisa, Roberto Grosseteste y Guillermo de Moerbeke. Gracias al trabajo concatenado de diversos filólogos, paleógrafos y otros especialistas en estudios medievales, el itinerario de las traducciones latinas de Ethica Nicomachea representa hoy un modelo de cooperación científica, cuyos numerosos e incluso inesperados resultados se hallan a menudo desperdigados en una abultada bibliografía. Aquí se ofrece un mapa completo y exhaustivo de estos estudios, junto con algunas conclusiones sugeridas por una visión más panorámica de los distintos eventos. (shrink)