In the domain of astronomy the object oriented paradigm of informatics needs to construct an ontology to be able to reason about concepts and to construct queries in a computerized knowledge system. The article presents approaches to ontology in philosophy, the natural sciences and informatics and shows their limits and reciprocity.

So-called antimatter in the form of elementary particles such as positive electrons (antielectrons alias positrons) and negative protons (antiprotons) has for long been investigated by physicists. However, atoms or molecules of this exotic kind are conspicuously absent from nature. Since antimatter is believed to be symmetric with ordinary matter, the flagrant asymmetry constitutes a problem that still worries physicists and cosmologists. As first suggested by Paul Dirac in 1933, in distant parts of the universe there might be entire stars and (...) galaxies made of antiparticles alone. Why not? This paper examines how the concepts of antiparticles and antimatter slowly migrated from particle physics to astronomy and cosmology. At around 1970 a few physicists speculated about an anti-universe separate from ours while others looked for the charge asymmetry in quantum processes in the early big-bang explosion of the universe. Others again proposed a ‘plasma cosmology’ that kept our world and the hypothetical world of antimatter apart. Soviet physicists and astronomers were no less interested in the problem than their colleagues in the West. The paper details the development up to the late 1970s, paying attention not only to mainstream scientific works but also to more speculative ideas, some of them very speculative. By that time the antimatter mystery remained mysterious – which is still the situation. (shrink)

This work inaugurates a critical inquiry into whether the ideas of Karl Popper, a philosopher of science, are used by astronomers and astrophysicists, a practicing community of scientists. It examines four basic components of Karl Popper's philosophy— falsification, prohibition, simplicity, and risk taking— and the extent that these themes become integrated into recent scientific literature on astronomy, astrophysics, cosmology, and stellar evolutionary theory. It concludes that the philosophy of science is highly relevant to the practice of astronomy, and (...) that Karl Popper plays a unique role in directing different communities of astronomers and cosmologists. (shrink)

Thomas Hornsby was a hard-working, scientifically ambitious and significant man of vision during the second half of the eighteenth century. He was a notable astronomical observer, founder of the Radcliffe Observatory at Oxford, a successful lecturer, a Commissioner of Longitude at a critical time, and editor of James Bradley's Astronomical Observations. This paper presents some long-neglected facts; in assembling scattered fragments into a coherent account, it raises new speculations.

The philosophy of historical sciences investigates their distinct objects of study, epistemic challenges, and methodological solutions. Rethinking astronomy in this light offers a contribution. First, the methodology of historical sciences adds to a more adequate description of how astronomers study and utilize token events. Second, astronomy faces a typical difficulty in identifying traces of some past events and has developed a delicate solution. This enriches the idea of trace and suggests a methodology that relies on iterations between data-driven (...) approaches and theory-driven approaches, together with the cross-validation between multiple relevant historical events or datasets. (shrink)

This article charts the development of the modern astronomical observational system. I am interested most acutely in the digitization of this system in general, and in the introduction of adaptive optics in particular. I argue that these features have been critical in establishing the modern observatory as a factory for scientific data, rather than as a center of calculation in its own right. Throughout, the theoretical focus is on the nature of technological evolution in the observational system, understood as inextricably (...) bound up with both the system-internal drive to surpass the limits imposed upon the distributed cognition of the researcher and the boundary at which empirical objects resolve themselves into technical objects. In short, this article explores the historically constituted character of expert astronomical perception, arguing that it is impossible to understand without constant reference to its material substrate. (shrink)

The 2006 decision by the International Astronomical Union to strip Pluto of its status as a planet generated considerable uproar not only in scientific circles, but among the lay public as well. After all, how can a vote by 424 scientists in a conference room in Prague undermine what every well-educated second grader knows is a scientific fact? The Pluto controversy provides a new and fertile ground in which to revisit the traditional philosophical problems of natural kinds and scientific change. (...) Before engaging these philosophical problems, however, there are two misguided reactions to the Pluto controversy worth dispelling from the start. The first misguided reaction is that this sort of classificatory .. (shrink)

We present the historical development of Nonlinear Dynamical Astronomy with emphasis on the “third integral” and its applications. The new era started with the use of computers, and of formal analytical developments in the spirit of Poincaré. Most dynamical systems were found to contain both ordered and chaotic orbits. The transition from order to chaos is discussed. Recent developments refer to the dynamical spectra, integrals of notion in self-consistent models, systems of 3 or more degrees of freedom, chaos in (...) relativity and cosmology, and chaos in quandum mechanics. (shrink)

Observational astronomy is plagued with selection effects that must be taken into account when interpreting data from astronomical surveys. Because of the physical limitations of observing time and instrument sensitivity, datasets are rarely complete. However, determining specifically what is missing from any sample is not always straightforward. For example, there are always more faint objects (such as galaxies) than bright ones in any brightness-limited sample, but faint objects may not be of the same kind as bright ones. Assuming they (...) are can lead to mischaracterizing the population of objects near the boundary of what can be detected. Similarly, starting with nearby objects that can be well observed and assuming that objects much farther away (and sampled from a younger universe) are of the same kind can lead us astray. Demographic models of galaxy populations can be used as inputs to observing system simulations to create “mock” catalogues that can be used to characterize and account for multiple, interacting selection effects. The use of simulations for this purpose is common practice in astronomy, and blurs the line between observations and simulations; the observational data cannot be interpreted independent of the simulations. We will describe this methodology and argue that astrophysicists have developed effective ways to establish the reliability of simulation-dependent observational programs. The reliability depends on how well the physical and demographic properties of the simulated population can be constrained through independent observations. We also identify a new challenge raised by the use of simulations, which we call the “problem of uncomputed alternatives.” Sometimes the simulations themselves create unintended selection effects when the limits of what can be simulated lead astronomers to only consider a limited space of alternative proposals. (shrink)

In his comprehensive survey of the work of William Herschel, published in the Annuaire du Bureau des Longitudes for 1842, Dominique Arago argued that the life of the great astronomer ‘had the rare privilege of forming an epoch in an extended branch of astronomy’. Arago also noted, however, that Herschel's ideas were often taken as ‘the conceptions of a madman’, even if they were subsequently accepted. This fact, commented Arago, ‘seems to me one that deserves to appear in the (...) history of science’. From the time Herschel published his first paper in the Philosophical transactions in 1781, he was subjected to the suggestion of lunacy. His patron and friend William Watson, told him that after his claims for the extraordinary power of his telescopes, ‘your prognosis that some would think you fit for Bedlam has been verified’. On learning of Herschel's supremely accurate new micrometer, the astronomer Alexander Aubert exclaimed to Herschel that ‘we would go to Bedlam together’: Aubert wrote to Herschel in January 1782 that he should ‘mind not a few jealous barking puppies: a little time will clear up the matter, and if it lays in my power you would not be sent to Bedlam alone, for I incline much to be of the party’. (shrink)

The significance of the plurality of the Copernican Revolution is the main thrust of this undergraduate text In this study of the Copernican Revolution, the ...

Using astronomy software, this article provides a systematic re-examination of the astronomical references in Ovid's Fasti and reviews the previous authority on the question, Ideler (1825). The review finds that most (three out of four) of the more than fifty astronomical references in the poem are accurate and reflects on the negative reception of Ovid's handling of astronomy in light of these findings.

In Hellenistic Astronomy: The Science in Its Contexts, renowned scholars address questions about what the ancient science of the heavens was and the numerous contexts in which it was pursued.

Plato's comments on astronomy and the education of the guardians at Republic 528e ff have been hotly disputed, and have provoked much criticism from those who have interpreted them as a rejection or denigration of observational astronomy. Here I argue that the key to interpreting these comments lies in the relationship between the conception of enquiry that is implicit in the epistemological allegories, and the programme for the education of the guardians that Plato subsequently proposes. We have, I (...) suggest, been too eager to stress the similarities here, when recognition of the differences may supply us with the tools required for a better understanding of 528e ff, one that to a large extent disarms the anti-empirical critique. My discussion proceeds in three stages. Firstly, Plato takes great care to place his comments on astronomy in the context of the preceding epistemological allegories. Is there any evidence here, where Plato might be thought to discuss enquiry in general, that he rejected or denigrated observation? I argue that even if Plato advocated a 'Two Worlds' (TW) ontology, he still envisaged a dynamic process of enquiry, interrelating sensibles and intelligibles, the investigation of each being necessary but not sufficient to achieve the overall aim. Secondly, Plato appears to be deriving how we ought to go about educating the guardians from how we ought to conduct our enquiries. While the two are intimately related there are important differences, recognition of which turns the supposed rejection of observation into an affirmation of the need for an initial empirical approach. I contend that this makes good sense of the internal structure of 528e ff, and of its relations to other parts of the Republic. Thirdly, I discuss the Republic in relation to the evidence offered by later works on the question of astronomy and observation, and raise the question of whether Plato's views on the imperfection of the sensible world necessarily lead to the denigration of careful and prolonged empirical work. (shrink)

This volume represents the first which interfaces with astronomy as the fulcrum of the sciences. It gives full expression to the human passion for the skies. Advancing human civilization has unfolded and matured this passion into the comprehensive science of astronomy. Advancing science’s quest for the first principles of existence meets the ontopoietic generative logos of life, the focal point of the New Enlightenment. It presents numerous perspectives illustrating how the interplay between human beings and the celestial realm (...) has informed civilizational trends. Scholars and philosophers debate in physics and biology, the findings of which are opening a more inclusive, wider picture of the universe. The different models of the universal order and of life here presented, all aiming at the first principles of existence—accord with the phenomenology/ontopoiesis of life within the logos-prompted primogenital stream of becoming and action, which points to a future of progressing culture. (shrink)

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving (...) special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)

As part of an ongoing study of causal models in the history of science, a counterfactual scenario in the history of modern astronomy is explored with the aid of computer simulations. After the definition of “linking advance”, a possible world involving technological antecedence is described, branching out in 1510, in which the telescope is invented 70 years before its actual construction, at the time in which Fracastoro actually built the first prototelescope. By using the principle of the closest possible (...) world, we estimate that in this scenario the discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars would by anticipated by only 28 years. The second part of the paper involves an estimate of the probability of the previous scenario, guided by the principle that the actual world is the mean and using computer simulations to create possible worlds in which the time spans between advances is varied according to a gamma distribution function. Taking into account the importance of the use of the diaphragm for the invention of the telescope, the probability that the telescope were built by 1538 for a branching time at 1510 is found to be smaller than 1%. The work shows that one of the important features of computational simulations in philosophy of science is to serve as a consistency check for the intuitions and speculations of the philosopher. (shrink)

The article presents an in-depth analysis of epistemic cultures in conflict by exemplifying the epistemic conflict between high energy physics and astronomy which emerged after the discovery of “dark energy” and the accelerating expansion of the universe. It suggests a theoretical framework combining Knorr-Cetina’s concept of epistemic cultures with Whitley’s theory of dependencies in the sciences system, which explains that epistemic conflicts occur, if the strategic and functional dependency of two incommensurable epistemic cultures is suddenly growing. The pre-history of (...) the conflict is discussed on a micro-level for the two research groups involved in the breakthrough. The analysis of the consequent epistemic conflict on a macro-level reveals that it embraces the preferred epistemic strategy, the collaboration style, the instrumental concepts and the question how social legitimacy can be generated. (shrink)

Neuroscience made major progress in unravelling the neural basis of mental features like self, consciousness, affect, etc. However, we nevertheless lack what recently has been described as “missing ingredient” or “common currency” in the relationship between neuronal and mental activity. Rather than putting forward yet another theory of the neural basis of mental features, I here suggest a change in our methodological strategy how to approach the brain, that is, our view or vantage point of the brain. Learning from (...) class='Hi'>astronomy (Copernicus) and biology (Darwin), I suggest that we may want to change our currently pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. Such post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain allows us taking into view that what happens beyond the brain itself, e.g., the world, and how that shapes the brain and its neural activity, e.g., world-brain relation. We then lend empirical support to the world-brain relation by converging it with Karl Friston’s free energy principle that, as we see it, provides a neuro-ecological and therefore post-Copernican view of the brain. That, in turn, allows us taking into view that mental features are shaped by both world and brain and are therefore truly neuro-ecological rather than merely neuronal. This raises the question for the link, e.g., the “missing ingredient” or “common currency” of world brain relation and mental features. Recent empirical evidence suggests that temporo-spatial dynamics may provide such link as it characterizes both the world-brain relation’s free energy and mental features, e.g., their spatiotemporality as described in philosophy. Taken together, I here advocate a change in our methodological strategy on how to approach the brain, that is, a shift from a pre-Copernican vantage point from within brain to a post-Copernican vantage point from beyond brain. The latter allows us taking into view that what happens beyond the brain in the world and how that shapes the brain in such a way that it can yield mental features. This amounts to nothing less than a Copernican turn or revolution in neuroscience akin to the ones in astronomy (Copernicus) and biology (Darwin). (shrink)

While scholars and policy practitioners often advocate for science and technology transfer as a motor for economic growth, many in Latin America have long warned of the pitfalls of such top-down, North-South transfers. To many in Latin America, scientific aid or cooperation from the North has often reproduced hierarchies that perpetuate dependency. Large astronomy observatories located in Chile – with a high price tag, cutting-edge technology, and seen to answer seemingly arcane research questions – seem ripe for reproducing precisely (...) these kinds of hierarchical relationships. Using data from documents, interviews, and a site visit to Gemini South, one of several large telescopes in Chile, this paper takes a historical perspective to examine how resilient these hierarchical relationships are. Over forty years, astronomy in Chile grew thanks to new policies that fostered cooperation among universities and gave locals privileged access to the telescopes. But the community also grew in ways that reproduced dependency: foreign science benefits significantly, the Chilean state operates in top-down ways, and its support for science leaves it blind to the benefits high-tech telescopes deliver to Chile, which are not linked to export-led growth. The state appears as both an obstacle and an enabler to the growth of a national scientific community. (shrink)

: We question the claim, common since Duhem, that sixteenth century astronomy, and especially the Wittenberg interpretation of Copernicus, was instrumentalistic rather than realistic. We identify a previously unrecognized Wittenberg astronomer, Edo Hildericus (Hilderich von Varel), who presents a detailed exposition of Copernicus's cosmology that is incompatible with instrumentalism. Quotations from other sixteenth century astronomers show that knowledge of the real configuration of the heavens was unattainable practically, rather than in principle. Astronomy was limited to quia demonstrations, although (...) demonstration propter quid remained the ideal. We suggest that Osiander's notorious preface to Copernicus expresses these sixteenth century commonplaces rather than twentieth century instrumentalism, and that neither `realism', nor `instrumentalism', in their modern meanings, apply to sixteenth century astronomy. (shrink)