This reader collects and introduces important work in linguistics, computer science, artificial intelligence, and computational linguistics on the use of linguistic devices in natural languages to situate events in time: whether they are past, present, or future; whether they are real or hypothetical; when an event might have occurred, and how long it could have lasted. In focussing on the treatment and retrieval of time-based information it seeks to lay the foundation for temporally-aware natural language computer processing systems, for example (...) those that process documents on the worldwide web to answer questions or produce summaries. The development of such systems requires the application of technical knowledge from many different disciplines. The book is the first to bring these disciplines together, by means of classic and contemporary papers in four areas: tense, aspect, and event structure; temporal reasoning; the temporal structure of natural language discourse; and temporal annotation. Clear, self-contained editorial introductions to each area provide the necessary technical background for the non-specialist, explaining the underlying connections across disciplines.A wide range of students and professionals in academia and industry will value this book as an introduction and guide to a new and vital technology. The former include researchers, students, and teachers of natural language processing, linguistics, artificial intelligence, computational linguistics, computer science, information retrieval, library sciences, human-computer interaction, and cognitive science. Those in industry include corporate managers and researchers, software product developers, and engineers in information-intensive companies, such as on-line database and web-service providers. (shrink)

Recent years have seen rapid progress in the development of ontologies as semantic models intended to capture and represent aspects of the real world. There is, however, great variation in the quality of ontologies. If ontologies are to become progressively better in the future, more rigorously developed, and more appropriately compared, then a systematic discipline of ontology evaluation must be created to ensure quality of content and methodology. Systematic methods for ontology evaluation will take into account representation of individual ontologies, (...) performance (in terms of accuracy, domain coverage and the efficiency and quality of automated reasoning using the ontologies) on tasks for which the ontology is designed and used, degree of alignment with other ontologies and their compatibility with automated reasoning. A sound and systematic approach to ontology evaluation is required to transform ontology engineering into a true scientific and engineering discipline. This chapter discusses issues and problems in ontology evaluation, describes some current strategies, and suggests some approaches that might be useful in the future. (shrink)

The Rockefeller Foundation played a key role inthe shift from `isolationism' to globalism inUS foreign policy between 1939 and 1945. TheFoundation utilised its considerable financialresources in a conscious and systematic attemptto assist official policymakers and academicsto build a new globalist consensus within thestate and public opinion. The article testsfour theoretical models that have been used todescribe Rockefeller initiatives. It concludesthat a Gramscian analysis provides the mosthelpful way of understanding the Foundation'srole in American foreign affairs.

The aim of this article is to set forth conjectures that are likely to explain the inclusion of Plato and Hermes as heralds of Mani in the testimony of Ephrem of Syria. This incorporation should be set against the background of the Syrian religious milieu, which was influenced by both Hellenistic philosophy and Eastern religious traditions. Therefore, it would be better to seek a religious and philosophical environment wherein Plato and Hermes were associated. Keywords: Manichaeism, apocalypticism, theurgy, hermetism, Merkabah (...) mysticism, late platonism. (shrink)

The execution of the prophet Mani by the Sasanian king Bahram I received sharply different treatments in the historiography of three of the confessional groups of the Sasanian empire. Variously a persecuted prophet, a blasphemous lunatic or a sinister heresiarch the representations of this moment sought to establish its meaning in the context of communal narratives predicated on the claims of sacred history. Despite this, it is notable that Manichean, Christian and Perso-Arabic accounts clearly share features. This indicates not (...) only that Mani’s death became a site of competition between the constituent groups of the Sasanian empire, but that the internal historiographies of these groups were in some sense entwined, or at least sensitive to the historical claims made by their opponents. This is particularly relevant in the case of the Perso-Arabic narrative. This version, which almost certainly descends from a priestly Zoroastrian source, presents a picture of a confident priesthood stiffening the spine of a wavering king. It is contended that the source of this story was composed as a counterstrike in a historical debate in which Christian and Manichean authors had successfully propagated an image of Bahram’s court as religiously tepid and his priests as slanderers or non-entities. That such an intervention was required signals a disjuncture between early and late forms of Sasanian ideology. Moreover, it presents more evidence in support of theories of a late and deliberate construction of Zoroastrian “orthodoxy”. (shrink)

The fortress of Kelefa on the western side of the Mani peninsula in southern Greece is one of a series of fortifications constructed or refurbished to defend the Ottomans' maritime frontier against Venice in the late seventeenth century. This chapter addresses whether the castle is indeed of Ottoman construction, or whether it is in fact an earlier, Frankish, structure that was merely restored by the Ottomans. It outlines what The Chronicle of the Morea says and how it can be (...) interpreted. It looks at what light later literary and other sources can throw on the problem, discussing Evliya Çelebi in the process. It identifies Grand Magne with a fortress which others have claimed is of Ottoman construction and dates from the seventeenth rather than the thirteenth century. The chapter also provides a sketch of the Mani as part of the Ottoman frontier zone in the Mediterranean region. (shrink)

Scarcity acts as a mental burden that disrupts how people process information and make decisions (Mullainathan and Shafir in Scarcity: Why having too little means so much. Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013; Mani et al. Science 342:976–980, 2013). In this study, we replicated Mani et al.’s (Science 342:976–980, 2013) experimental design to explore whether scarcity also taxes Colombian high school students’ mental bandwidth. In a lab-in-the-field experiment, we tested how 417 high school students from high and low socioeconomic status (SES) (...) in Bogotá, Colombia, responded to different scarcity situations. Students were first presented with hypothetical scenarios of harsh or soft scarcity. Next, participants had to solve a series of tasks that measured higher cognitive functions (i.e. Raven’s Progressive Matrices, Cognitive Reflection Task and questions to assess their Delay Discounting value) and had to explain how they would solve the scarcity situation. As opposed to Mani et al. (Science 342:976–980, 2013), we did not find that scarcity taxed individuals’ mental bandwidth, neither their cognitive nor executive functions. We found that low-SES individuals, under the harsh scarcity condition, displayed more empathic attributes than high-SES individuals. Taken together, the results of this study show the importance of replication in different cultures and environments. (shrink)

Research papers on the fundamentals of Indic philosophy and culture.

Study and philosophy of human facing the internal conflicts and challenges of good and evil and the Survival struggles throughout the history.

This chapter re-examines the status and role, in Bayle’s reflection, of the dualistic objections to the goodness of a monotheistic God. Bayle’s conclusion that these objections are insoluble by reason alone has been taken as an indication that his aim was to undermine an essential tenet of biblical revelation, with the result that his turn to faith to solve the problem of the existence of evil rings hollow. A closer examination of the historical context and logic of these objections, however, (...) reveals that the charge of dualism (especially Manichaeism) was commonly leveled against the Calvinist doctrine of predestination by Catholics and other Protestant denomina tions throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. On a purely philosophical level, Bayle could have drawn the dualistic objections he needed from Plutarch, whom he knew well and quotes in the same discussions. If he invokes the ghosts of Mani and Zoroaster in his turn, it is to prove that the accusation of Manichaeism directed against Calvinist orthodoxy can be reversed against the attackers. The opponents’ own answer to the problem of evil, which in all its variants rests on the responsibility of the human will, does not solve the problem and exposes them no less than the Calvinists to the charge of making God the author of sin. This strategy is the reason why Bayle places so much emphasis on the question of free will in these discussions. His intention, however, is not to draw out this kind of mutual finger-pointing, but, on the contrary, to prove that these controversies are sterile and endless, and to suppress them as they do more harm than good to Christianity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Vaidya, Guhe, and Williams on the Bloomsbury Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi of GaṅgeśaStephen Phillips (bio)More or less happy with the reviews, I would like mainly, in response, to identify advances made in the study of Gaṅgeśa. Anand Vaidya articulates a clearer overview of Gaṅgeśa's theory of knowledge; Eberhard Guhe shows a better way to render the notion of vyāpti, "pervasion," which is central in the theory of (...) inference as a knowledge source; and Michael Williams, too, shows need for improvement on that score as well as for elaboration of matters taken up by classical commentators that are given short shrift in my running comments. For example, whereas long discussions are provoked by Gaṅgeśa's definition of "knowledge," pramā, major points in the purvapakṣa in the section on proving the existence of an īśvara, a "Lord," seem, as Williams says, "threadbare."Vaidya, following Burge (2003), introduces a distinction between entitlement and justification: entitlement is the kind of unreflective epistemic warrant delivered by Gaṅgeśa's pramāṇa, "knowledge sources," working automatically in our everyday lives, whereas justification requires self-conscious certification, prāmāṇya-jñapti. Thereby splitting the horns of a dilemma posed by internalist accounts of knowledge in opposition to externalist ones, Burge and Vaidya are able to incorporate the most [End Page 519] attractive features of each approach. The entitlement/justification distinction cashes out, I may add, to Vaidya's elucidation, Nyāya's deeply held doctrine of parataḥ-prāmāṇya, "certification by another," against the view of "intrinsic certification," svataḥ-prāmāṇya, of Prabhākara and others. As Williams notes, Prābhākara positions, for which Gaṅgeśa sometimes shows sympathy, may have led him to presume that an anubhava—"awareness" or "presentational experience" in my translation, "fresh news" in Matilal's snappy rendering—is an episode of knowledge, pramā, "unless one knows otherwise," bādhakam vinā.On reflection, one sees that such a presentation (it could be perceptual, inferential, analogical, or testimonial) has been produced by a pramāṇa, or, in abnormal cases, not, and so by a "pramāṇa-pretender," a pramāṇaābhāsa, as in seeing a mirage. Again, an anubhava is not just any old cognition or "thought" (pace Das 2021, p. 162); it is defined as nonrecollective. Unlike a deliverance of a genuine pramāṇa, some instances may, on examination, prove to be a-pramā, "non-knowledge," but are, nevertheless, at the animal level, sufficient to provoke and guide action that would not be unhesitating were there doubt in any way. A thirsty Maya, in Vaidya's example, would naturally move in the direction of the water she "sees." But she would hesitate were she to learn from her friend about the unreliability of water-perception in the current circumstances. At the reflective level, where she is unsure whether the anubhava she apperceives is pramā or apramā, her action, including speech (implying assertability), is altered.So far so good in Vaidya's reconstruction. But Gaṅgeśa does not himself pronounce on the question of whether, after learning about the defeater, Maya would still be entitled to her perceptual belief that there is water in the distance. In the volumes under review, I assumed that she would not be "justified" and indeed that she would no longer have the belief (if we may speak about "beliefs"). The defeater grasped at the reflective level would mean not only that she could not certify the perceptual deliverance but also that there would be no knowledge. Clearly, she can't certify it, and thus, as Vaidya reasons, loses the right to assert. But maybe he's correct that, according to Gaṅgeśa's sensibilities, she does not lose the perceptual knowledge. She would remain entitled to her belief.Personally, I think this is wrong, but Vaidya's understanding does have the merit of explaining why some later Naiyāyikas apparently took absurd positions on epistemic luck (Bhattacharya 1996, p. ix). I think that Maya would lose her entitlement, too, but what if, after being informed of the unreliability of water-perception... (shrink)

This article explores the role of the five “abodes” (or “intellectual powers” or “mental properties”) of the Light Realm in the narrative of Mani’s Living Gospel according to the Coptic Synaxeis codex. Far from being spared in the war effort (as it appears from Theodore bar Koni’s report on Mani’s doctrine), these five powers can be seen in Mani’s narrative to be active contributors not only to the generation of each divine persona newly called into being but (...) also in the actual fight against the forces of Darkness, securing their final defeat. (shrink)

Following their violent suppression of the Indian Revolution of1857, the British founded and consolidated their secular empire in the IndianSubcontinent, which marginalized and bypassed religion as far as possible,particularly Islam, which had been the official religion of the Mughal ancienrégime. Contemporaneous Ottoman efforts to counter European imperialism ledto Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s policy of pan-Islamism, particularlythe call for Islamic unity against the Russian aggression against Turkey in1877. It was at this critical juncture that some Indian Muslim scholars gallantlyvolunteered to counter (...) this threat, and to preserve the Islamic faith and heritageworldwide, despite the severe problems faced by the Muslims in India itself.This study highlights the role of an eminent scholar in this movement, namelyAllama Shibli Nu’mani, who in 1914 conceived the idea offounding the world-famous Islamic research institute Darul Musannefin ShibliAcademy in his home town of Azamgarh, Uttar Pradesh, India. Shibli was veryactive and instrumental in collecting donations from the wealthy landowners among the Muslim elite in his hometown of Azamgarh for theOttoman cause, raising 3,000 rupees, which was handed to Husain HasibAfendi, the Ottoman Consul in Bombay in 1877. Furthermore, his eloquentpoetry rallied Muslims across India to support the valour and heroism displayedin the jihad by Ghazi Usman Pasha against the Russians. Shibli travelled toIstanbul in 1892 and met with the Pasha, on whose efforts Tamgha-i Majidi was granted to Shibli on 13th Muharram, 1310/7th August, 1892.This article is based on Shibli’s major works in Urdu, particularly his arousingeulogies, Turkish archival reports, newspapers and magazines, andsecondary sources in Urdu and English. (shrink)

Three Worlds According to King Ruang - a Thai Buddhist Cosmology. Translation with Introduction and Notes by Frank E. Reynolds and Mani B. Reynolds. Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley 1982. 383 pp. $30.00.

Three Words according to King Ruang. A Thai Buddhist Cosmology. Translation with introduction and notes by Frank E. Reynolds and Mani B. Reynolds. Berkeley Buddhist Studies, University of California 1982. 383pp. + 15 colour plates $30.00.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some Ideas Concerning Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology:A Complete and Annotated Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇiEberhard Guhe (bio)Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology (see Phillips 2020) is surely a landmark achievement in the realm of research on Navya-Nyāya. It is a work of reference not only for specialists but also for a broader audience of philosophically interested readers. Phillips has demonstrated (...) his expertise on Nyāya in general in many previous publications. At present, there is probably hardly anybody else who would have been better qualified to accomplish the mammoth task of translating and elucidating such a complex and voluminous Sanskrit work as the Tattvacintāmaṇi. It should however be noted that there is another edition and annotated translation of the Tattvacintāmaṇi (excluding the Upamānakhaṇḍa) by V.P. Bhatta (see Bhatta 2005, 2012, 2021), which is rather addressed to specialists, who are proficient in Sanskrit. The two volumes on the Anumānakhaṇḍa were published in 2021 (one year after the publication of Phillips' three volumes). Considering the enormous size of such a book project, the result cannot be expected to be completely flawless. The present review focuses on the introduction in volume 1 and on volume 2. I will address some minor issues, primarily methodological ones, but I will also address a few more serious (albeit surely accidental) translation errors (especially in the Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-section of the Vyāptivāda), which can lead to a misunderstanding of Gaṅgeśa's stance on a pivotal topic of the Navya-Naiyāyikas, namely the correct definition of the concept of pervasion (vyāpti).IThe introduction is very insightful. However, logicians will probably stumble over Phillips' methods of formalization. Some examples are given below. [End Page 498](1) The language of Phillips' formalizations looks a bit like a first-order language. Thus, for example, he uses "Ha" as a formal equivalent of the sentence "The mountain is smoky" (see vol. 1, p. 18). An obvious deviation from first-order conventions consists in the fact that Phillips uses at least two types of negation. Propositional negation is expressed by means of the symbol "~" (see vol. 2, p. 668; unfortunately, this symbol is not mentioned in vol. 1, pp. 18–19, where Phillips introduces his formalization techniques). Moreover, Phillips uses the negation symbol "¬," which he applies to capital Roman letters, in order to express a kind of term negation. Thus, for example, "¬H" may serve as a term referring to "the absence of the probans" (vol. 2, p. 623). To be precise, the type of absence which "¬H" refers to is a so-called "relational absence" (saṃsargâbhāva). Phillips formalizes the so-called "mutual absences" (anyonyâbhāva) differently (see below).Although "¬Hc" (see vol. 1, p. 18) looks like an ordinary first-order wff, it should more accurately be read as "The absence of H is located at c." Properly speaking, we should then also read atomic wffs like "Hc" as "H is located at c," where "H" should not be regarded as an expression of a predicate like "… is smoky," but rather as a general term, that is, as a formal counterpart of expressions like, for example, "smoke."Unfortunately, Phillips renders the meaning of wffs of the form "¬ϕx" not as "the absence of H is located at x," but in a somewhat simplified manner, which obscures the fact that he treats the negation symbol "¬" as a means to express a term negation: "And negation is term negation, not propositional negation [author's note: as we have just seen, this is not true of all kinds of negation which Phillips refers to in his formalizations, since he uses the "~" in a different sense]; thus, the negative sign '¬' in '¬ϕx' is defined as 'ϕ is absent at x'" (vol. 1, p. 19).Moreover, the use of different kinds of letters for the variables in "¬ϕx" (Greek and Roman) seems to suggest that the absentee should always be the referent of a general term. However, expressions of the form "the absence of a is... (shrink)

We introduce an abstract framework for general rough set theory from a mereological perspective and consider possible concepts of ’a priori’ granules and granulation in the same. The framework is ideal for relaxing many of the relatively superfluous set-theoretic axioms and for improving the semantics of many relation based, cover-based and dialectical rough set theories. This is a relatively simplified presentation of a section in three different recent research papers by the present author.

Ḳarnot tsadiḳ -- Liḳuṭe Eliyahu -- Minhage ḳ.ḳ. 'Bet Ya'aḳ ov' be-Ḥevron.

In Sinners in the Presence of a Loving God, R. Zachary Manis examines in detail the several facets of the problem of hell, considers the reasons why the usual responses to the problem are unsatisfying, and suggests how an adequate solution to the problem can be constructed.