Some very bad old arguments need removing from NICE’s latest reportLet me begin this editorial by reassuring readers that the journal does not hold any deep seated grudge against the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence . However, because the pronouncements of NICE are of great importance to the future of health care in England, and to a lesser extent in the other nations of the United Kingdom, and because NICE is often held up as a model for other (...) countries to follow we feel that we have to comment when these pronouncements are less than ethically excellent. And in 2005 NICE just happened to have a particularly bad year with regard to the cogency of its ethical arguments, and this flow of bad argument extended right to the end of the year.In December 2005 NICE published a report with the title Social Value Judgments—Principles for the Development of NICE Guidance, which considered whether social background, age, or lifestyle choices should ever influence NICE guidance concerning the health care provided by the National Health Service .1 This report was endorsed by the NICE board and its guidelines are binding on all panels developing specific NICE guidance.Here I want to focus on three areas of this report: The relevance of self inflicted conditions The relevance of socioeconomic status The relevance of stigmaI will not comment on NICE’s methodology in coming to these conclusions, since that is the subject of a paper by John McMillan and colleagues, which is published in this issue of the journal.2With regard to self inflicted conditions NICE has now bound itself to the following principle:PRINCIPLE 10Principle 10 states that:"NICE and its advisory bodies should avoid denying care to patients with conditions that are, or may be, self … ". (shrink)

Abstract:Facial transplantation is emerging as a therapeutic option for self-inflicted gunshot wounds. The self-inflicted nature of this injury raises questions about the appropriate role of self-harm in determining patient eligibility. Potential candidates for facial transplantation undergo extensive psychosocial screening. The presence of a self-inflicted gunshot wound warrants special attention to ensure that a patient is prepared to undergo a demanding procedure that poses significant risk, as well as stringent lifelong management. Herein, we explore the ethics of considering mechanism of (...) injury in the patient selection process, referring to the precedent set forth in solid organ transplantation. We also consider the available evidence regarding outcomes of individuals transplanted for self-inflicted mechanisms of injury in both solid organ and facial transplantation. We conclude that while the presence of a self-inflicted gunshot wound is significant in the overall evaluation of the candidate, it does not on its own warrant exclusion from consideration for a facial transplantation. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article focuses on how Buddhist ethics contains ideas and principles that would urge those in a combat situation to minimise the harm they do to others, within the requirements of their military goal. This international humanitarian law principle is in line with both compassion for others and a concern to limit the bad karmic results to the combatant of their intentional killing and maiming. The motive for an act of killing can worsen or lessen its karmic results, (...) and non-combat actions such as helping the wounded can generate good karmic results which can dilute, though not cancel, the bad karma of killing. Harm to both humans and non-humans is to be avoided wherever possible, but killing a human is worse than killing an animal. The Mahāvaṃsa passage on combatants killed by King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi’s army as mostly being less than human, such that killing them produced little or no bad karma, is a totally implausible statement to put in the mouths of monks whom the text says were Arahats, spiritually enlightened ones. (shrink)

This is the third volume of Joel Feinberg's highly regarded The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, a four-volume series in which Feinberg skillfully addresses a complex question: What kinds of conduct may the state make criminal without infringing on the moral autonomy of individual citizens? In Harm to Self, Feinberg offers insightful commentary into various notions attached to self-inflicted harm, covering such topics as legal paternalism, personal sovereignty and its boundaries, voluntariness and assumptions of risk, consent and (...) its counterfeits, coercive force, incapacity, and choice of death. (shrink)

According to Epicurus (1966a,b), neither death, nor anything that occurs later, can harm those who die, because people who die are not made to suffer as a result of either. In response, many philosophers (e.g., Nagel 1970, Feinberg 1984, and Pitcher 1984) have argued that Epicurus is wrong on both counts. They have defended the mortem thesis: death may harm those who die. They have also defended the post-mortem thesis: posthumous events may harm people who die. Their (...) arguments for this joint view are by now quite familiar, and there is no need to rehearse them here (for a summary, see Luper 2002). Instead, our topic is a third position, which carves out intermediate ground between the other two. The intermediate view takes the mortem thesis for granted, like the critics of Epicurus, but rejects the post-mortem thesis, like Epicurus himself. For Epicurus’ project—the attainment of ataraxia, or equanimity—the intermediate view is almost useless (we are not tranquil if we regard death as a tragedy whose peculiarity is that it frees us from the possibility of any further misfortune); however, it is far more plausible than Epicurus’ own position since it avoids his absurd claim that death cannot harm us, while retaining his view that events occurring while we are dead and gone cannot harm us. According to the proponent of the intermediate view, when we understand the harm death inflicts, we must reject the idea that events following death can be bad for us. The damage death itself does is so severe that people are not subject to harm by any subsequent events. Thus the intermediate view rests on the mortem thesis together with the immunity thesis: death leaves its victims immune from posthumous harm. (shrink)

The paper explores how harm must be understood if intuitively attractive deontological principles concerning the infliction and prevention of harm are to be vindicated. It focuses especially upon how harm must be understood if it is to be plausible that preventing people from undergoing harm takes priority over improving the conditions of badly-off people who have not suffered harm.

Inflicting harm is generally preferable to inflicting death. If you must choose between the two, you should generally choose to harm. But prenatal harm seems different. If a mother must choose between harming her fetus or aborting it, she may choose either, at least in many cases. So it seems that prenatal harm is particularly objectionable, sometimes on a par with death. This paper offers an explanation of why prenatal harm seems particularly objectionable by drawing (...) an analogy to the all-or-nothing problem. It then argues that this analogy offers independent support for the ‘voluntarist’ view that at least some parental role obligations are grounded in the choice to be a parent. (shrink)

The nonidentity problem is a deep puzzle challenging the moral intuition that what is bad must be bad for someone. The first part of the paper constructs a new theory of harming, whereas the second part builds on the conclusions of the first to offer a new solution to the NIP. The first part discusses the neglected question of when a burden inflicted in the context of overall benefitting can be discretized as a separate entity—only when it can, is it (...) possible to identify the burden as harm, and only then is it possible to harm in bringing into overall good existence. The second part explains how, in those cases where creating is indeed harming, we can use the logic of concept expansion to construct a concept of wronging that applies to creation cases. (shrink)

Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving (...) her of the goods life would’ve afforded had she continued living. This deprivation view of death’s harm (DV) derives some of its credibility from the general deprivation theory of which it is an instance: mortal harm is subject to the same kind of analysis plausibly given of other non-mortal harms. Furthermore, note that the weak formulation of HT—asserting only that death can inflict harm, not that it always or necessarily does—accommodates the intuition that instances of rational suicide and justifiable euthanasia present cases in which death fails to harm. DV is equipped to explain how in these cases the harms involved in continued existence outweigh the goods of which death deprives the subject. I agree that suicide can be rational and that euthanasia can be justifiable. Likewise I accept both HT and DV as far as they go. But they do not go far enough. Specifically, I argue here that death harms even those who die as a result of rational suicide or justifiable euthanasia; that death’s harm is neither undifferentiated nor wholly contingent, but multifaceted and partly necessary; that the necessary part of death’s harm is distinctive, inflicting a peculiar restriction on the autonomy of one who dies; and, regarding the timing and subject issues, that this restriction harm is inflicted on the antemortem subject prior to her death. (shrink)

Businesses cause social harm, meaning harm to society at large and not just to those with whom a business is contractually linked. Evidence introduced: normative claims that businesses should be "socially responsible"; positive claims that they contribute to social well-being; and negative claims that they are sometimes military-like, causing extensive harm for which no one is held personally responsible. The latter point to corporate survivalism, which acknowledges no mandatory civil responsibilities. Neither law nor social pressure has yet (...) counteracted this mind set. Business ethics might, but not if its practitioners examine only narrowly contractual relationships. (shrink)

For the majority of scholars concerned with the ethics of living organ donation, inflicting moderate harms on competent volunteers in order to save the lives or increase the life chances of others is held to be justifiable provided certain conditions are met. These conditions tend to include one, or more commonly, some combination of the following: The living donor provides valid consent to donation. Living donation produces an overall positive balance of harm–benefit for donors and recipients which cannot be (...) obtained in a less harmful manner. Donation is not liable to cause significant and long-term morbidity to, or the death of, the donor. This paper critically examines the suggestion that these criteria are not sufficient to offer a general account of justified living organ donation in the context of competent volunteers and that key to justified living organ donation is that donors receive sufficient benefits from their donation that these outweigh the harms they suffer. However, although this view—termed here ‘The Donor Benefit Standard’—directs welcome attention to the many and complex motives which may underlie living organ donation, this paper ultimately concludes that given the threats this position poses to individual autonomy and the lives of those in need of organ transplants ‘The Donor Benefit Standard’ should ultimately be rejected. (shrink)

Although researchers generally take great care to ensure that human subjects do not suffer very serious harms from their involvement in research, the situation is different for nonhuman animal subjects. Significant progress has been made in reducing unnecessary animal suffering in research, yet researchers still inflict severe pain and distress on tens of thousands of animals every year for scientific purposes. Some bioethicists, scientists, and animal welfare advocates argue for placing an upper limit on the suffering researchers may impose on (...) animal subjects, with rare exceptions for research that promises critical social benefits. In this article, I argue against such an upper limit on harm on the grounds that researchers often can compensate animal subjects for their suffering, even severe and long-lasting suffering. If animal subjects receive adequate compensation for the harms they suffer, then there is no general limit on how much suffering researchers may impose on them for scientific purposes. (shrink)

Trisomy 18 is a condition with a very high mortality rate and the fetus usually dies in utero or shortly after birth. Parents are usually advised to terminate the pregnancy but in Liam's 1 situation the parents did not want this. They understood that the baby would not survive; however, they wanted to ensure that their baby had all the life that was possible, even in utero. The aim of this paper is to highlight how a lack of communication, inadequate (...) information, thoughtless words and actions resulted in a family experiencing preventable harm. Beneficence is a core value of health professionals; doing good is the foundation of care. However, in certain circumstances this value is challenged by the competing value of non-maleficence ; first, do no harm. The case of Liam is one such situation; the following is a brief discussion on some of the complex issues raised by this case. Medical ethicists often refer to the principle of primum nil nocere as finding a balance of benefits over harms of treatment. Beauchamp and Childress2 state that the obligation of non-maleficence is that one ought not to inflict harm.What was ‘harm’ in this situation? An invasion of rights without justifying useful consequences is one type of ethical harm. If we also take into consideration the Buddhist view of ethical harm where the concept of intentionality emerges, the intent behind clinical actions taken need to be considered. The case of Liam clearly demonstrates that the parents had the right to have compassionate care, understanding of their decisions and adequate information; confusion over these issues caused ethical harm as well as significant physical distress. In the situation of a non-viable pregnancy, it is the patient's value on life that matters not the health professional's. From the beginning …. (shrink)

Intrusive agricultural experimentspublished in New Zealand in the last five yearsare reviewed in terms of the degree of animalsuffering involved, and the necessity for thissuffering in relation to research findings.When measured against animal welfare criteriaof the Ministry of Agriculture, thirty-sixstudies inflicted ``severe'' or ``very severe''suffering. Many of these experiments hadquestionable short-term applications, had anapplication restricted to agriculturalproduction or economic growth, or could havebeen modified to prevent or reduce suffering.

In this paper, I argue that a constitutionalized Harm Principle could ensure that people are not jailed unless they deserve it. I do not aim to outline every possible type of bad consequence beyond harm that might be sufficiently serious to justify criminalization. Instead, I focus on criminalization that is backed up with jail terms and I argue that wrongful harm to others provides the only moral and constitutional justification for sending people to jail. Imprisonment harms the (...) prisoner, so she should not be imprisoned unless she has caused proportionate harm to others. I argue that the sufficient conditions for sending an offender to jail are: (1) that the offender's actions have (or risk) bad consequences that are sufficiently harmful to make her commensurately deserving of penal detention; and (2) that the offender culpably (that is, with a state of mind somewhere along the intentional/reckless/gross negligence continuum) chose (aimed or attempted) to bring about those bad consequences or did so with reckless indifference. The lawmaker would need to demonstrate from the ex ante perspective that proposed offenses carrying jail sentences are a proportionate and fair way of dealing with the wrongs involved. Because jail (including short sentences of a few days) involves hard treatment (seriously harmful consequences for the prisoner) harm to others would be the only bad consequence of sufficient weight to justify a jail sentence. Jailing people for wrongful behavior that has harmless consequences would be an unjust and disproportionate response. In terms of understanding imprisonment (a physical deprivation of liberty) in the United States, it is better to refer to the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution than to the Due Process Clause. The Eighth Amendment, if read morally, could be invoked to strike down laws that carry prison sentences for wrongs that do not result in harm to others. This is because harming a person by subjecting her to the hard treatment that is involved in serving a jail term would be a disproportionate response unless the wrongdoer inflicted equivalent harm on others. I argue, that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in a way that accords with its overall moral aim or purpose. The Amendment's overall moral aim is to ensure that the state does not inflict unjust, oppressive, or disproportional punishments on its citizens. (shrink)

The problem of justified harm is the problem of explaining why it is permissible to inflict harm for the sake of future benefits in some cases but not in others. In this paper I first motivate the problem by comparing a case in which a lifeguard breaks a swimmer’s arm in order to save her life to a case in which Nazis imprison a man who later grows wiser as a result of the experience. I consider other philosophers’ (...) attempts to explain why the lifeguard’s action was permissible but the Nazis’ action was not. After arguing that principles having to do with consent, expected utility, and the types of harms and benefits at issue do not fully solve the problem, I argue for a causal solution to the problem. The causal solution includes both a causal account of harming and a distinction between causes and mere conditions. It then distinguishes between the lifeguard and Nazi cases with following principle: A harmful action that causes greater benefits can sometimes be justified by those benefits, but a harmful action that does not cause greater benefits cannot be justified by any subsequent benefits that the action, itself, does not cause. (shrink)

States are not only claiming the right to grant or deny entry to their territories but also enforcing this right against non-citizens in ways that cause significant harm to these individuals. In this article, I argue that endorsing the presumptive right to restrict immigration does not settle the question of when or how it may permissibly inflict harm on individuals to enforce this right. I examine three distinct justifications for causing harm to individuals. First, the justification of (...) defensive harm holds that harming individuals is morally permissible when they pose an unjustified threat to others. Second, the justification of protecting property states that harming individuals is morally permissible when they pose an unjustified threat to others’ property interests. Third, I consider the state punishment justification, which maintains that harming individuals is morally permissible when punishment is an appropriate response to their previous conduct. I conclude that any immigration enforcement measure that involves lethal force or the infliction of severe bodily harm is morally impermissible, whether it is used to defend the state or its property. Moreover, criminal sanctions for immigration violations are difficult to justify. (shrink)

In _The Morality of Defensive Force_, Quong defends a powerful account of the grounds and conditions under which an agent may justifiably inflict serious harm on another person. In this paper, I examine Quong's account of the necessity constraint on permissible harming—the RESCUE account. I argue that RESCUE does not succeed. Section 2 describes RESCUE. Section 3 raises some worries about Quong's conceptual construal of the right to be rescued and its attendant duties. Section 4 argues that RESCUE does (...) not deliver the verdicts that Quong wants. In those sections, I assume that the attacker is culpable for the threat he poses. Section 5 considers cases where the attacker, though responsible for the wrongful threat he poses and therefore liable to defensive force, has an epistemic justification for acting as he does and thus is not morally culpable. In his discussion of necessity, Quong does not explicitly deal with such cases. I suggest that RESCUE does not operate in the same way when attackers are mistaken as when they are morally culpable. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom has it that evolution makes a sham of morality, even if morality is an adaptation. I disagree. I argue that our best current adaptationist theory of meaning offers objective truth conditionsfor signaling systems of all sorts. The objectivity is, however, relative to species – specifically to the adaptive history of the signaling system in question. While evolution may not provide the kind of species independent objective standards that (e.g.) Kantians desire, this should be enough for the practical work (...) of justifying our confidence in the objectivity of moral standards. If you believe morality is an adaptation, you should be a moral realist. (shrink)

It is common in attempts to extend the theory of evolution to culture to generalize from the causal basis of biological evolution, so that evolutionary theory becomes the theory of copying processes. Generalizing from the formal dynamics of evolution allows greater leeway in what kinds of things cultural entities can be, if they are to evolve. By understanding the phenomenon of cultural transmission in terms of coordinated phenotypic variability, we can have a theory of cultural evolution which allows us to (...) avoid the various difficulties with the elaboration of informational entities such as the cultural replicator, or meme. Such an account is a boon to the project of evolutionary epistemology since it confirms the presumption in favor of the general adaptiveness of culture, illuminating rather than obscuring the inherent intimacy of our relationship to (e.g.) our ideas. (shrink)

Early in _The Atrocity Paradigm_, Claudia Card briefly defends the idea that one can inflict evil on oneself. In this paper, I extend the work Card begins on self-inflicted evils, especially with attention to self-forgiveness. Following the work of philosophers of trauma, I argue that the fragmented nature of the self, especially the traumatized self, is one which supports and enables the possibilities of self-inflicted evil and self-forgiveness. The fragmented self is also the source of obstacles to self-forgiveness, which Card's (...) considerations of interpersonal forgiveness are helpful in elucidating. (shrink)

In August 2019, the fifth international congress of the 'International Association for the Study of the Philosophy of Edith Stein' (IASPES) took place at the University of Cologne. Of the 57 papers presented at this prominent conference prepared and chaired by the historian and theologian Harm Klueting, 54 were accepted for publication in revised versions. Professor Klueting was able to add three other contributions -- among them by the director of the Research Institute of the German Province of the (...) Carmelites at Bamberg, the historian and theologian Edeltraud Klueting, who acts as co-editor. The congress volume, published only a little more than a year after the congress despite significant constraints due to the Corona pandemic, contains 29 contributions in English, 21 in German, and seven in Spanish or French on the subjects 'Biographical questions', 'Edith Stein and thinkers of the past', 'Edith Stein and other contemporary thinkers', 'Anthropology -- Women and men', 'Philosophy -- phenomenology and Christian philosophy', 'Society and politics', 'Theology and spirituality', and 'Experiences with Edith Stein'. (shrink)

Empirical research has discovered that experimental subjects in ultimatum bargaining situations generally fail to play the decision-theoretic optimum strategy, and instead play something between that strategy and a fair split. In evolutionary dynamics, fair division and nearly fair division strategies often go to fixation and weakly dominated strategies can do quite well. Computer simulations were done using three different ultimatum bargaining games as determinates of fitness. (1) No tendency toward the elimination of weakly dominated strategies was observed, with or without (...) mutation. (2) Strategies making fair demands had sizable basins of attraction. (3) In a system where five different demands can be made, demands closest to (approximately) 91% had the largest basins of attraction. (4) If the strategies have thresholds for acceptable demands, rather than individuated responses to each demand, the apparent optimum demand may be quite low: 64% for one set of trials. (shrink)

Pour éclaircir problème de la science fondamentale, on doit s’assurer qu’il n’y a pas, dans le champ actuel de la science, de science spéciale qui puisse faire fonction, pour toutes les autres, de science fondamentale. Une vraie science fondamentale générale pourrait se développer à partir de la théorie actuelle des sciences, si cette théorie était méthodiquement construite. А côté, il у a une science fondamentale partielle qui consiste dans la pénétration réciproque des diverses sciences spéciales et de leur méthode. II (...) у a encore un aspect ontologique et un aspect pédagogique du problème. La valeur n’est pas une base pour la science fondamentale. (shrink)

Existing research demonstrates a positive connection between psychedelics and increased nature relatedness. Enhanced affective ties toward nature are widely framed as being built into the pharmakon itself, and the relevance of experiences remains little understood. This paper turns to neoshamanic ayahuasca ceremonies in Europe, exploring the way specialists and attendants refer to nature in speech and performance. I argue that ritual framings performed during these ceremonies provide fertile ground for affective ties to emerge through substance‐induced experiences. I trace such framings (...) by exploring how medicine and healers are being coded; how specific materialities are rendered meaningful; and how individual experiences are discussed at such retreats. I argue that even while participants prioritize individual healing, personal development, or the satisfaction of psychonautical curiosity, environmentalism appears to be anchored by the proceedings themselves. Thus, this paper opens up for analysis ceremonial substance use as a contact zone where coherence is produced intersubjectively. (shrink)

Stories about near-death experiences draw much attention from the general public and are extensively discussed by medical doctors and neuroscientists. However, though eschatology belongs to their core business, only few theologians participate in the debate. This article proposes a theological interpretation of NDEs as ‘private revelations’. I first give a critical analysis of the development of the modern, allegedly ‘scientific’, concept of NDE. This concept changes concrete personal testimonies into statistical data that are used as scientific evidence for the existence (...) of an immortal soul. Next, the main criticisms against this concept from neurosciences, study of mysticism and philosophy of mind are discussed. Finally, I argue that ‘private revelation’ is a useful model for a theological understanding of NDEs and that an analogy from Thomas Aquinas’ view on prophetic dreams can help to account for the specific circumstance of imminent death. The interpretation I propose can do justice to the impression NDEs make on people, but can also accept and meet some of the most important criticisms raised against the modern concept of NDEs. (shrink)

Telenomic Agency: Towards a proper functions theory of normativity (pdf) is a recent paper on the biological basis of normativity. This paper attempts to show that the notion of biological function/malfunction has more to offer our understanding of genuine agency than is usually acknowledged. It is suggested that moral and rational normativity attach to signals in very specific biological regulatory systems, and that the complexity of these systems accounts for much of the phenomenological richness of agency, as well as showing (...) the error in standard counterexamples. If this is correct, it turns out that the incommensurability between "is" and "ought" may be due to the requirements of the systems within which descriptive and overtly normative language have their biologically normative roles, rather than to any incompleteness in naturalistic accounts. One consequence is that moral language can have objective (and naturalistically specifiable) truth conditions, without special moral facts and without reducibility to naturalistic description. (shrink)

Evolutionary theory offers the possibility of building an epistemology that requires neither a theory of truth nor a definition of knowledge, thus bypassing some of the more notable difficulties with standard approaches to epistemology. Following a critique of one of the most popular approaches to thinking about cultural evolution I argue for a frequentist approach to evolutionary epistemology, and that cultural transmission should be understood as coordinated phenotypic variability within groups of closely related organisms. I construct a formal system which (...) allows the analysis of the evolution of networks of multiple interacting populations. Of particular epistemological interest is the relationship between genetic evolution and the evolution of cultural entities. The information-theoretic notion of "mutual information" is employed to quantify the transfer of information from the environment as it determines genetic fitnesses into the distribution of acquired traits Two simple models are constructed and analyzed. A two-level model of the navigation of a colony of bacteria demonstrates how selection on inherited traits affects the acquisition of information on the level of transient behavioral traits. A three-level model of bumblebee foraging shows how information about the environment is caught up in distributions of acquired foraging preferences--a bee-analog of human cognitive states. The Appendix contains an analytic proof of information gain under selection. (shrink)

Part II: Modeling Chapter 3: Single Populations Chapter 4: Multiple Populations Chapter 5: Information [ “The Use of Information Theory in Epistemology”, Philosophy of Science ...] Chapter 6: A two level model for Bacterial Epistemology Chapter 7: A three level model for Bumblebee Epistemology [ “Reliability and Novelty”.

Positieve uitlokking van ethisch hacken. Een onderzoek naar responsible-disclosurebeleid In this contribution, the Dutch government’s acceptance of ethical hacking, by implementing a policy of responsible disclosure, is considered to be a beneficent development. Ethical hacking contributes to cybersecurity and is intrinsically desirable. The term positive incitement is proposed to describe the relatively new phenomenon of encouraging ethical hacking. Positive incitement will be analysed by making a comparison to the Dutch toleration policy regarding soft drugs, and to incitement by law enforcement. (...) Positive incitement should not change into negative incitement, which would result in a serious breach of the rights of ethical hackers. Furthermore, it is argued that the intrinsic value of ethical hacking can justify searching for vulnerabilities in systems of organisations who do not approve of this in advance. (shrink)

This book is intended to help transform epistemology - the traditional study of knowledge - into a rigorous discipline by removing conceptual roadblocks and developing formal tools required for a fully naturalized epistemology. The evolutionary approach which Harms favours begins with the common observation that if our senses and reasoning were not reliable, then natural selection would have eliminated them long ago. The challenge for some time has been how to transform these informal musings about evolutionary epistemology into a rigorous (...) theoretical discipline capable of complementing current scientific studies of the evolution of cognition with a philosophically defensible account of meaning and justification. (shrink)

The evolution of economic altruism is one of the most vigorous areas of study at the intersection of biology, economics, and philosophy. The basic problem is easily understood. Biological organisms, be they people or paramecia, have ample opportunity to confer benefits on others at relatively low cost to themselves. If conferring such benefits becomes common, the overall productivity of the population in which it occurs is increased. Presumably, there is no advantage to refusing such benefits, but it is also the (...) case that there is considerable advantage to pursuing a strategy according to which such benefits are accepted, but not conferred. In populations where individuals interact at random with others and when individuals play pure strategies (i.e., they always confer or do not confer benefits), the inevitable outcome is that altruistic behavior is driven to extinction. (Axelrod 1984) Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that self-sacrificing behavior is common in nature. (Sober and Wilson 1998) Consequently, individuals must not be interacting at random. The pressing question is then: what patterns of non-random interaction are responsible for the prevalence of altruistic behavior, and more theoretically, what sorts of plausible mechanisms exist that could generate the right kind of non- 1 The research reported here was supported by Canada ????? grant # ????? and the Centre for Applied Ethics at the University of British Columbia. (shrink)

Information about the environment is captured in human biological systems on a variety of interacting levels – in distributions of genes, linguistic particulars, concepts, methods, theories, preferences, and overt behaviors. I investigate some of the basic principles which govern such a hierarchy by constructing a comparatively simple three-level selection model of bee foraging preferences and behaviors. The information-theoretic notion of ''''mutual information'''' is employed as a measure of efficiency in tracking a changing environment, and its appropriateness in epistemological applications is (...) discussed at some length. In particular, information accumulated in mid-level preference distributions exhibits suggestive properties for the purposes of naturalistic epistemology. It also appears that the novelty of scientific objects and representations and the rapidity of scientific change relative to genetic change need present no obstacle to the use of such models in explanations of scientific progress and the reliability of scientific judgement. (shrink)

The most common view of suicide today is that it is intentional self-killing. 1 Because of the self-killing component, suicide is often described as self-inflicted death or as dying by one's own hand, and the victim is in turn often described as having done himself to death or as having taken his own life. But must one's death be self-inflicted in order to be suicide? The answer, I want to suggest, is arguably no.

Evolving signaling systems can be said to induce partitions on the space of world states as they approach equilibrium. Formalizing this claim provides a general framework for understanding what it means for language to “cut nature at its seams”. In order to avoid taking our current best science as providing the adaptive target for all evolving systems, the state space of the world must be characterized exclusively in terms of the coincidence of stimuli and payoffs that drives the evolution of (...) cognitive complexity. Cognition exploits the reliable clustering of events in this space. Using this framework to analyze our ordinary concepts of truth and justification, it appears that while justification can be a simple matter of conforming to historically entrenched strategies, truth cannot be fully specified on the basis of the system’s causal history, but requires a robust clustering in the larger world state space. (shrink)

Empirical research in the field of legal interpretation shows that, in many cases, analogy argumentation is complex rather than simple. Traditional analytical approaches to analogy argumentation do not explore that complexity. In most cases analogy argumentation is reconstructed as a simple form of argumentation that consists of two premises and a conclusion. This article focuses on the question of how to analyze and evaluate complex analogy argumentation. It is shown how the pragma-dialectical approach provides clues for analyzing complex analogy argumentation (...) and how the criteria for evaluating analogy argumentation can be used to reconstruct these types of complex analogy argumentation in Dutch case law. The critical questions in the argumentation scheme do not only serve as a tool for analyzing arguments justifying analogy argumentation, but are also helpful in analyzing arguments against a specific analogy argumentation. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the similarities betweenthe dialectical procedure in the pragma-dialecticaltheory and dialectical procedures in AI and Law. I dothis by focusing on one specific type of reasoning inlaw: analogy argumentation. I will argue that analogyargumentation is not only a heuristic forfinding new premises, but also a part of thejustification of legal decisions. The relevantcriteria for the evaluation of analogy argumentationare not to be found at the logical level of inference,but at the procedural level of the discussion. I (...) willproceed as follows. I start with an outline ofPrakken's theory of argumentation frameworks andprocedural models. Then, I will discuss Peczenik'sanalysis of analogy argumentation and try to combineit with the descriptive-normative research ofMacCormick and Summers. Finally, I propose asystematization of the criteria for the evaluation ofanalogy argumentation within the framework of apragma-dialectical notion of an argumentation scheme. (shrink)

The concept of information tempts us as a theoretical primitive, partly because of the respectability lent to it by highly successful applications of Shannon’s information theory, partly because of its broad range of applicability in various domains, partly because of its neutrality with respect to what basic sorts of things there are. This versatility, however, is the very reason why information cannot be the theoretical primitive we might like it to be. “Information,” as it is variously used, is systematically ambiguous (...) between whether it involves continuous or discrete quantities, causal or noncausal relationships, and intrinsic or relational properties. Many uses can be firmly grounded in existing theory, however. Continuous quantities of information involving probabilities can be related to information theory proper. Information defined relative to systems of rules or conventions can be understood relative to the theory of meaning . A number of causal notions may possibly be located relative to standard notions in physics. Precise specification of these distinct properties involved in the common notion of information can allow us to map the relationships between them. Consequently, while information is not in itself the kind of single thing that can play a significant unifying role, analyzing its ambiguities may facilitate headway toward that goal. (shrink)

Este ensayo presenta una panorámica general y un análisis de la visión que sustenta el empleo de los métodos cualitativos, incluyéndose su aplicación a la investigación en Administración. Bajo los planteamientos de un monismo metodológico, la aportación de conclusiones no generalizables y de subjetividad inherente de tales métodos se considera limitada; mientras que para los adherentes al constructivismo y al pluralismo, es de gran valía en la exploración de la profundidad de los fenómenos de estas disciplinas. En sí, prevalece en (...) el medio una falta de consensos incluso con respecto a qué son los métodos cualitativos y qué son las técnicas cualitativas de investigación, derivada del uso indistinto que dan algunos autores a esos términos; lo que aunado a la cantidad y diversidad de métodos cualitativos crea dificultades para comprender qué es en realidad la investigación cualitativa.This essay presents a general outlook and an analysis of the rationale behind the use of qualitative methods, including their being applied in research in Management. According to the views of methodological monism, the contribution of the conclusions which these methods yield, which are essentially subjective and not susceptible of being generalized, is considered too limited; while for advocates of constructivism and pluralism they are valuable in probing the depth of the phenomena of these disciplines. In fact, a lack of consensus prevails in these areas even in connection with what are qualitative methods and what are qualitative research techniques, associated to an indistinct use of these terms by some authors; which together with the number and diversity of qualitative methods makes it difficult to understand what actually is qualitative research. (shrink)