We conducted in-depth interviews to investigate maternal- fetal medicine (MFM) physicians’ feelings about their moral thoughts and dilemmas related to providing feticide for lateterm abortion in Israel. We interviewed 14 MFM physicians (who constitute approximately 40 percent of MFM physicians who perform feticide in the countr y) from five hospitals in Israel during 2018 and 2019. They were recruited via personal acquaintance and snowball sampling. Findings reveal that despite their clear recognition that feticide is a necessary procedure, all describe themselves (...) as suffering from some features of moral distress related to the process. The reasons for these difficulties are rooted in the Israeli law regarding late abortions, as well as in some of the organizational procedures for making this kind of medical decision. They also come from professional and emotional dilemmas that the physicians encounter. The findings reveal a strong need for more open discussions and sharing of doubts with colleagues regarding each case of feticide. These findings build on existing knowledge and may be useful in developing strategies to support clinicians who provide these essential but sometimes difficult services. (shrink)

This paper explores cosmopsychism’s explanatory aspirations from a programmatic perspective. The bulk of the text consists of an argument in favor of the conclusion that cosmopsychism suffers from no insurmountable individuation problem. I argue that the widespread tendency to view IND as a mirror-image of micropsychism’s combination problem is mistaken. In particular, what renders CP insolvable, namely, the commitment to the coupling of phenomenal constitution with phenomenal inclusion, is, from the standpoint of cosmopsychism, an entirely nonmandatory assumption. I proceed to (...) show that severing this unhappy coupling is the key for defending cosmopsychism against the charge of theoretical incoherence. Moreover, I argue that successful defense against such accusation could be mounted regardless of whether or not we assume cosmic consciousness to be perspectival in nature. In addition, the paper touches upon another foundational issue: cautioning against the popular tendency to identify cosmopsychism’s monism with a mereological unity-in-diversity, and motivating an alternative conception which I call generative monism. Finally, as befitting this volume, I pause to reflect upon the question of which schools of Hindu philosophy might tally best, and connect most fruitfully, with cosmopsychism as I understand it. (shrink)

Iris Marion Young (1949-2006) was one of the most influential and innovative political theorists of her generation who had a significant impact on a wide range of topics such as democratic theory, feminist theory, and justice. She bridged many longstanding divides among political theorists, engaging in Continental and critical theory, but also insisting on the importance of normative argument: her corpus stands as a testament to the fruitfulness of engaging in both abstract theory and the 'real world' of everyday (...) politics. This volume spans the several decades of her work, illustrating her intellectual development over time through three major areas of innovation: Gender: Maintaining that gender is both conceptually and politically meaningful, Young theorized gender in terms of structures that, in combination, position different people we call "women" in different ways, such that some women have some structures in common, without all women sharing all gendered structures in common. Justice: Young's early writings on a critical theory of justice evolved in her later and posthumously published works where she developed an account of justice that brought together her theorization of structure with her concern to respond to contemporary claims of injustice. The Politics of Difference: Young rejected universal and abstract theories of justice and maintained that justice instead required attending to the experiences of people marked by difference. (shrink)

This paper introduces cosmopsychism as a holistic alternative to atomistic panpsychism, and as a general perspective on the metaphysics of consciousness. I begin with some necessary background details concerning contemporary panpsychism and the problems it faces, and then proceed to the theory itself. The starting point of the theory is the assumption that an all pervading cosmic consciousness is the single ontological ultimate. From this assumption, a panpsychist ontology of mind with distinct holistic overtones is developed. In particular, I argue (...) that such universal consciousness serves as the ground for the emergence of individual conscious creatures. The result is a theory with significant conceptual resources which presents novel means for confronting some of the most recalcitrant problems facing contemporary panpsychism: in particular, the subject combination problem, and the problem of entailment associated with it. In so doing, cosmopsychism places itself as an viable alternative to atomi... (shrink)

Dooley provides background information for each of the interviews, along with a thorough index.

In the marketplace of opinions concerning the metaphysics of mind and consciousness panqualityism (PQ) occupies an interesting position. It is a distinct variant of neutral monism, as well as of protophenomenalism, and as such it strives to carve out a conceptual niche midway between physicalism and mentalism. It is also a brand of Russellian monism, advocated by its supporters as a less costly and less extravagant alternative to panpsychism. Being clearly articulated and relatively well-developed it constitutes an intriguing view. Nonetheless, (...) the present paper takes a decisively critical stance towards PQ. In particular, it challenges it on two principal grounds. First, I argue that PQ's analysis of experience, and of the qualities tasked with constituting the phenomenal character of experience, is fundamentally flawed. Second, I argue that PQ's attempt to explain phenomenal consciousness as a function of reflective awareness is equally misguided. Along the way, the paper also points the shortcomings of previously established critiques of PQ. All in all, the discussion identifies some difficulties that are likely to generalize beyond PQ's specific circumstances, raising concerns regarding the viability of a "middle of the road" solution to the mind–body problem. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 3, March 2022.

Fred Dretske's theory of indicatory functions (Dretske 1988 & 1994)is undoubtedly one of the more ambitious attempts to articulate a sound naturalistic foundation for an adequate theory of intentional content. In what follows I argue that, contrary to Dretske's explicit intentions, his theory fails a crucial adequacy test - that of accounting for mental content as a system-intrinsic property. Once examined in light of the first-person perspective of an embodied psy- chological agent, I argue, it becomes clear that neither 'indication', (...) nor 'function', as used by Dretske, can be consistently applied. Dre- tske's theory of indicatory functions is, thus, doubly incoherent. It is then argued that the problems identified here stretch far beyond Dretske's specific theory - covering the better part of contemporary attempts to naturalize content. I conclude by suggesting that these general problems of representation, exemplified so vividly in Dretske's theory, also testify to the inadequacy of the quest to reduce tel- eological phenomena (function and purpose) to predominantly mechanistic variables. (shrink)

This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend across brain, body, and world—a conclusion which follows from a theory (...) I develop in “Synergic Coordination: an argument for cognitive process externalism.” Yet, in contradistinction with radical externalism, and in agreement with the internalist orthodoxy, MAE defends the view that mental states are situated invariably inside our heads. This is done, inter alia, by developing a novel hypothesis regarding the vehicles of content (in “Extended cognition without externalized mental states”, and by criticizing arguments in support of mental states externalism (in “Reflections and objections”). The result, I believe, is a coherent theoretical alternative worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)

Recent financial fraud legislation such as the Dodd–Frank Act and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (U.S. House of Representatives, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, [H.R. 4173], 2010 ; U.S. House of Representatives, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763], 2002 ) relies heavily on whistleblowers for enforcement, and offers protection and incentives for whistleblowers. However, little is known about many aspects of the whistleblowing decision, especially the effects of contextual and wrongdoing attributes on organizational (...) members’ willingness to report fraud. We extend the ethics literature by experimentally investigating how the nature of the wrongdoing and the awareness of those surrounding the whistleblower can influence whistleblowing. As predicted, we find that employees are less likely to report: (1) financial statement fraud than theft; (2) immaterial than material financial statement fraud; (3) when the wrongdoer is aware that the potential whistleblower has knowledge of the fraud; and (4) when others in addition to the wrongdoer are not aware of the fraud. Our findings extend whistleblowing research in several ways. For instance, prior research provides little evidence concerning the effects of fraud type, wrongdoer awareness, and others’ awareness on whistleblowing intentions. We also provide evidence that whistleblowing settings represent an exception to the well-accepted theory of diffusion of responsibility. Our participants are professionals who represent the likely pool of potential whistleblowers in organizations. (shrink)

Panpsychism is now a bona fide potential solution to the metaphysical quandary of consciousness. Much of the debate concerning the viability of panpsychism is centered on the combination problem. Intriguingly, the literature analyzing this problem displays two competing interpretations which differ in their modal force. According to the first, which we call the ‘no-necessitation view', CP consists in the absence of a priori necessitation of macro-level phenomenal facts from micro-level phenomenal facts. In contrast, the second interpretation, which we label the (...) ‘incoherence charge’, goes further by insisting that it can be positively demonstrated that micro-experiences cannot combine to yield integral macro-experiences. While conceivability arguments are vulnerable to debates over conflicting intuitions, as well as to the claim that a more complete picture will grant the desired necessitation, IC has the advantage that, if true, it removes these concerns and approaches a more final verdict. Nevertheless, while conceivability arguments are widely discussed IC has not been equally well understood or recognized. In this paper we conduct a systematic investigation and reevaluation of IC, as it applies to constitutive micropsychism. We argue that the problem is real and therefore that constitutive micropsychism is a blind alley. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, our purpose is to propose and motivate a novel and scientifically informed variant of cosmopsychism, namely, the view that the experiences of ordinary subjects are ultimately grounded in an all-pervading cosmic consciousness. Second, we will demonstrate that this approach generates promising avenues for addressing familiar problems of phenomenal constitution. We use stochastic electrodynamics (SED) as the physical bedrock of our approach, supplementing it with key insights about the nature of consciousness long emphasized (...) in eastern philosophy and other wisdom traditions. We proceed to show that our approach substantiates an intriguing way of thinking about the dynamical emergence of ordinary consciousness from cosmic consciousness, identifying the latter with the vacuum state of quantum field theory. Finally, we argue that the present approach is well suited to address problems of phenomenal constitution, in particular as they pertain to the qualities and structure of experience and to the generation of subjects. (shrink)

Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.804045.

In this essay I offer a theory of the outward directedness of intentional states, namely, an account of what makes intentional states directed at their respective intentional objects. The theory is meant to be complementary to the canonical interactivist account of mental content in that the latter emphasizes the predicative, intensional, and internal aspects of representation whereas here I shall focus on its denotative, extensional, and external aspects. Thus, the aim is to establish that the two projects are not only (...) consistent but mutually supportive. Further, it is hoped that supplementing the interactivist conception of representation with a theory of intentional directedness along such lines will increase its overall appeal to critical readers. Based on the core idea that the directedness of a representation is a function of the manner in which it is constructed within, and contributes to the ongoing unfolding of a dynamical interactive loop connecting information to focused action, the theory is subsequently extended to cover many problem domains familiarly associated with representation and reference. (shrink)

Consciousness ties together knowledge and feeling, or sapience and sentience. The connection between these two constitutive aspects — the informational and the phenomenal — is deep, but how are we to make sense of it? One influential approach maintains that sentience ultimately reduces to sapience, namely, that phenomenal consciousness is a function of representational relations between mental states which, barring these relations, would not, and could not, be conscious. In this paper I take issue with this line of thought, arguing (...) that neither of these salient aspects of consciousness reduces to the other. Instead, I offer an explanatory framework which takes both sentience and sapience as ontological fundamentals and explore how they co-evolve. In particular, I argue that while epistemic access cannot generate experience from scratch it does play a crucial role in constituting an important form of higher-order experience, namely, the capacity to experience a sense of ownership over one’s experiential domain. (shrink)

This paper challenges a popular thesis which we call the explanatory primitiveness thesis (for short, EPT), namely, the thesis that identities leave no logical space wherein explanatory questions may be formulated and explanatory gaps may reside. We argue that while EPT is, in all likelihood, flawless when the relevant domain consists of identity statements flanked by proper names of individuals it is a mistake to hold that the thesis generalizes to cover all identity statements. In particular, we argue that EPT (...) fails decisively with respect to an important class of identity statements, viz., those in which natural kinds are identified across different theoretical levels (i.e., the so-called inter-level type-identities). If correct, our result shows EPT to be much more limited in scope than is usually supposed. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, it shows that there is no inherent absurdity in the idea that certain type-identity statements, in particular psychophysical type-identity statements, suffer from an explanatory gap. (shrink)

Uniting analytic philosophy with Buddhist, Indian, and Chinese traditions, this collection marks the first systematic cross-cultural examination of one of philosophy of mind's most fascinating questions : can consciousness be conceived as metaphysically fundamental? Engaging in debates concerning consciousness and ultimate reality, emergence and mental causation, realism, idealism, panpsychism, and illusionism, it understands problems through the philosophies of East and South-East Asia, in particular Buddhism and Vedanta. Each section focuses on a specific aspect or theory of consciousness, and examines a (...) particular subject from different disciplinary perspectives including philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. These different angles allows readers to gain insight into the intellectual challenges and problems of the study of consciousness and its place in the thought traditions of both Eastern and Western philosophy. Raising new questions, it provides a more global and holistic understanding of consciousness, presenting a stimulating and original contribution to contemporary consciousness studies and the metaphysics of mind. (shrink)

Let E be an analytic equivalence relation on a Polish space. We introduce a framework for studying the possible “reasonable” complete classifications and the complexity of possible classifying invariants for E, such that: (1) the standard results and intuitions regarding classifications by countable structures are preserved in this framework; (2) this framework respects Borel reducibility; and (3) this framework allows for a precise study of the possible invariants of certain equivalence relations which are not classifiable by countable structures, such as (...) E1. In this framework we show that E1 can be classified, with classifying invariants which are κ-sequences of E0-classes where κ=b, and it cannot be classified in such a manner if κshrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 7, Page 27-30, July 2012.

This article illustrates how Japanese national identity continues to be imagined along ethnic lines in the aftermath of the ‘triple disasters’ of March 11, 2011 (hereafter 3/11). It critically examines the ‘new’ discourse of tabunka kyōsei which seeks to incorporate migrants and other ethnic minorities in the nation through an emphasis on cultural difference and argues that the stress on the insurmountability of cultural difference reifies the identities of migrant and minority populations. This in turn allows the State to treat (...) them as homogenous groups with different interests which can be accommodated through the provision of public services at a local level, while effectively excluding them from the national level. In a post-3/11 context, the myth of an ethnically ‘homogenous’ nation is reproduced through the discourse of Ganbarō Nippon with profund implications for the human security of migrant and minority populations. (shrink)

Understanding the meaning of land–water entanglement is increasingly important today, in an age of climate change and desertification. Despite the close ties between water and land, literature largely focuses on each of them separately or ignores the attempts to disconnect them. This paper examines the connections and disconnections between water and land in the southern desert of Israel in the shadow of political use and environmental disaster. Drawing on ethnographic research, the paper explores the challenges and successes of intensive agriculture (...) in arid regions, and how water allocation plays a crucial role in making the desert bloom. Weaving between the theoretical framework of 'agricultural infrastructure' and 'water-land imaginations', the paper separates between the different imaginations that enable the various dimensions of the water-land entanglement, the efforts made to expand the connection or disconnect them, and between their political, environmental and cultural realization as infrastructures. Overall, this paper provides insights into the ways by which Imaginations, infrastructures and land–water entanglement shape human-environmental interactions in arid regions and agriculture projects in the Anthropocene era. (shrink)

The prevailing message of this volume lies in the claim that psychology ought to come to terms with the irreducible cultural dimensions of mind. Though this is an important message, the author argues that an uncritical shift in favor of a cultural approach runs the risk of imposing uniquely human characteristics on the general study of the mind. Moreover, by treating the nature-nurture dichotomy as an axiom, the bulk of the articles in this collection fail to consider the possibility of (...) transcending this basic dualism. Nevertheless, this is a rewarding read and the book's plea for a greater emphasis on the cultural aspects of mind makes it both timely and unique. Key Words: culturalism • dualism • naturalism • normativity • systems theory. (shrink)

This paper seeks to bring cosmopsychism, a contemporary metaphysical position on the nature of mind and consciousness, into contact with the philosophical tradition of Hinduism. Behind this exercise lies the motivation to examine how ideas developed within this rich tradition could aid in the effort to think constructively and creatively about issues which occupy the contemporary literature on panpsychism, and in particular cosmopsychism. I argue that, within the Hindu philosophical corpus, contemporary cosmopsychism finds its most natural allies in two world-affirming (...) views: Kashmir Śaivism, and the integral Advaita of Sri Aurobindo. After discussing these views, and their affinities to cosmopsychism, I argue that one important potential contributions of such perspectives lies in the fact that they present us with a form of priority monism little developed within contemporary philosophy. I call this neglected perspective generative monism, and I offer a preliminary exposition of the view and of its explanatory potential. (shrink)

According to John Searle's connection principle (CP) all intentional states are, necessarily, potentially conscious (Searle 1992). Thus formulated, CP implies that intentionality is ontologically dependent on consciousness. Searle's argument in favour of CP is based on the assumption that, while every intentional state is endowed with an aspectual shape, only conscious intentional states are intrinsically so endowed. In turn, the contention that only conscious intentional states are intrinsically aspectual and perspectival is based on what I call the Cartesian view of (...) subjectivity (CS), according to which subjectivity implies consciousness. I argue that, though intuitive, CS is ultimately untenable. A plea is made for an alternative, `Aristotelian' view of subjectivity (AS), on which the roots of subjectivity lie not in consciousness per se, but in the more basic capacity for autonomous conduct. Searle's failure to appreciate this point, I argue, accounts for the unresolved dualistic tension over- shadowing his conception of mind. (shrink)

Muḥammad Mahdī ibn Abī Z̲arr Narāqī, -1794 or 1795. Jāmiʻ al-saʻādāt - Criticism and interpretation; Islamic ethics.

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 2003, given by Iris Marion Young, an American philosopher.

Iris Murdoch once observed: 'philosophy is often a matter of finding occasions on which to say the obvious'. What was obvious to Murdoch, and to all those who read her work, is that Good transcends everything - even God. Throughout her distinguished and prolific writing career, she explored questions of Good and Bad, myth and morality. The framework for Murdoch's questions - and her own conclusions - can be found here.

The acclaimed author of The Good Apprentice draws on the entire history of philosophy--and particularly on Plato and Kant--to formulate her own model of morality and demonstrate how thoroughly it is bound up with our daily lives. "An utterly absorbing book".--The Wall Street Journal.

This paper is a critique of the radical enactivism of Daniel Hutto, Erik Myin, and their collaborators, insofar as their approach pertains to the hard problem of consciousness. I argue that their valiant attempt to discard the hard problem is ultimately unsuccessful. More specifically, I argue that the hard problem of consciousness is best construed as a transcendental challenge and that no phenomeno-physical identity theory, and no “logic of identity”, successfully eliminate this challenge. Finally, I argue that the theoretical stance (...) adopted by Hutto, Myin, and their colleagues is inherently unstable in that it inadvertently blends strong deflationary currents with an implicit commitment to substantive metaphysical revisionism. Since deflationism and revisionism are discordant partners their forced union results in a position whose overall coherence is compromised. Such disequilibrium, I believe, is a general characteristic of radical enactivist approaches to consciousness, of which the position discussed on the present occasion is one prominent representative. (shrink)

Chronic stroke survivors with severe contralesional arm paresis face numerous challenges to performing activities of daily living, which largely rely on the use of the less-affected ipsilesional arm. While use of the ipsilesional arm is often encouraged as a compensatory strategy in rehabilitation, substantial evidence indicates that motor control deficits in this arm can be functionally limiting, suggesting a role for remediation of this arm. Previous research has indicated that the nature of ipsilesional motor control deficits vary with hemisphere of (...) damage and with the severity of contralesional paresis. Thus, in order to design rehabilitation that accounts for these deficits in promoting function, it is critical to understand the relative contributions of both ipsilesional and contralesional arm motor deficits to functional independence in stroke survivors with severe contralesional paresis. We now examine motor deficits in each arm of severely paretic chronic stroke survivors with unilateral damage to determine whether hemisphere-dependent deficits are correlated with functional independence. Clinical evaluation of contralesional, paretic arm impairment was conducted with the upper extremity portion of the Fugl-Meyer assessment. Ipsilesional arm motor performance was evaluated using the Jebsen-Taylor Hand Function Test, grip strength, and ipsilesional high-resolution kinematic analysis during a visually targeted reaching task. Functional independence was measured with the Barthel Index. Functional independence was better correlated with ipsilesional than contralesional arm motor performance in the left hemisphere damage group [JTHFT: [r = −0.73, p = 0.017]; grip strength: [r = 0.64, p = 0.047]], and by contralesional arm impairment in the right hemisphere damage group [UEFM: [r = 0.66, p = 0.040]]. Ipsilesional arm kinematics were correlated with functional independence in the left hemisphere damage group only. Examination of hemisphere-dependent motor correlates of functional independence showed that ipsilesional arm deficits were important in determining functional outcomes in individuals with left hemisphere damage only, suggesting that functional independence in right hemisphere damaged participants was affected by other factors. (shrink)

The neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral reasoning development maintains that intermediate concepts lie between bedrock moral schemas and professional codes of ethics and deal with issues of confidentiality, competence, informed consent, allocation of resources and professional autonomy (Rest et. al, 1999b Rest, J., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M., & Thoma, S. J. (1999b). Postconventional moral thinking: A neo-Kohlbergian approach. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.[Crossref], [Google Scholar]). Intermediate concepts provide concrete guides for behavior, they contrast general moral schemas that are concerned with issues of fairness, (...) justice and equality. This paper outlines the development and testing of a prototype Intermediate Concept Measure for teachers (TICM). Results indicate that the TICM has respectable psychometric properties and assesses a construct in the moral domain. (shrink)

Job performance and job stress are widely studied phenomena in occupational research. However, most of the literature on the relationship between work stress and job performance conceptualizes job stress as an antecedent of performance, in line with the stress-performance framework, and does not examine what happens to the well-being of the employees after the performance was appraised as poor. In the current theoretical paper, I argue that task underperformance is a source of stress (i.e., stressor) for the employee, and as (...) such can affect a wide range of employee outcomes. Task underperformance is conceptualized as comprised of two main types: acute/episodic underperformance such as a mistake or an accident (e.g., medical error, service failure), and chronic task underperformance such as not achieving the expected work products over time, with an interplay between these types. The source of the appraisal (objective, supervisor-rated, and self-rated underperformance) is also considered. Several disjoint literatures are then integrated in order to explain how underperformance is expected to result in subsequent decrements to employee well-being. At the chronic underperformance level, the following literatures are included: self-efficacy, negative effects of performance feedback, stress experienced when the basic need for competency is frustrated or when underperformance presents a threat to the self-image. At the acute/episodic level, affective and cognitive outcomes are explored and examples are drawn from several industries including service failures and medical errors. The interplay between the two types of underperformance, acute/episodic and chronic, is discussed, and then relevant moderators are offered. One notable moderator is the occupation-level consequences of error which likely affects most if not all outcomes. Finally, the discussion includes potential theoretical and practical implications for this conceptualization, as well as some methodological considerations for future research in this area. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Conflatingion with Empirical Observation: The False Mind-Matter Dichotomy” by Bernardo Kastrup. Upshot: Kastrup’s attempt to undermine the dichotomy between mind and matter is interesting but it leaves much to be desired. In particular, it suffers from the following three difficulties. First, it is predicated on a misguided working definition of dichotomy. Second, it conflates the concept of matter with the putative denotation of that concept. Lastly, it effectively presupposes the refutation of materialism, making it (...) pointless to argue that materialism is epistemically more costly than idealism. (shrink)

Around the world, many liberal democracies are facing in recent years serious challenges and threats emanating inter alia from the rise of political populism. Such challenges and threats are feeding an almost existential discourse about the crisis of democracy, and recent legal and political developments in Israel aimed at weakening the power of the Supreme Court and other rule of law institutions have also been described in such terms. This Article primarily intends to explore the relevance of the discourse surrounding (...) the decline of liberal democracy, and its possible relevance for Israeli democracy, by examining the principal similarities and differences between specific legislative and administrative measures recently taken or contemplated in Israel and in two Central European states: Poland and Hungary. We focus on three sets of illiberal measures adopted or contemplated in Hungary, Poland, and Israel: (i) measures directed at limiting the power of the judiciary; (ii) measures intended to restrict the operation of civil society organizations; and (iii) measures directed at curbing dissent to governmental policies and at influencing the discourse in the media and academia. Although Israeli democratic institutions still retain much of their independence and vitality, we nonetheless find some degree of similarity between measures taken or contemplated by Hungary, Poland, and Israel, despite the many differences between their legal systems, historical contexts, political cultures, and the distinct stages of backsliding they seem to experience. (shrink)

In his recent book Reinventing the Sacred, renowned biologist and systems theorist Stuart Kauffman offers an avenue for the revival of the sacred and for reconciling sacredness with a robust scientific outlook. According to Kauffman, God is a human cultural invention, and he urges us to reinvent the sacred as the ceaseless creativity in nature. I argue that Kauffman's proposal suffers from a major shortcoming, namely, being at odds with the nature, and content, of authentic experiences of the sacred, experiences (...) which point invariably in the direction of a reality which transcends human imagination and capacity for cultural innovation. Correspondingly, I point in the direction of an alternative approach to the revival of the sacred rooted in what I call the path of direct spiritual awareness. I argue that, while being in better accord with the phenomenology of religious experience, this realist alternative to Kauffman's constructivism also avoids the unpleasant symptoms which often accompany traditional theism, namely, dogmatism, irrationalism, and incompatibility with a scientifically minded metaphysics. (shrink)

In “The Blessing of Departure—Exchange of Populated Territories The Lieberman Plan as anExercise in Demographic Transformation,” Prof. Timothy Waters offers a strong endorsement of the right of ethnic majorities within a state to redefine their state's boundaries in ways consistent with the majority's right to self-determination and to opt out of a political union with minority groups, regardless of the latter's' political preferences. Applied to the Israeli context, Waters concludes that parts of the Lieberman Plan—a plan advocating the redrawing of (...) Israel borders, inter alia, in ways which exclude some areas populated by Israeli citizens belonging to the Arab-Palestinian minority —does not run afoul of international law . This short response challenges two points that are central to Waters’s analysis. First, that the right to self-determination of peoples—in particular, the right to external self-determination —is subject to temporal or contextual limitations. The right is fully applicable only in exceptional and formative moments in the life of a nation—e.g., during the formation of a new polity or the collapse of an existing political arrangement , and when states systematically fail to respect the basic interest of some of the groups that comprise its populace—i.e., in response to extraordinary situations of groups exclusion or oppression. Second, even if Waters is correct and an ongoing right to self-determination—including, a right to secede from existing states—is available to ethnic groups comprising diverse national societies, the invocation of such a right must necessarily be limited by other positive rules of international law designed to protect group and individual interests. Specifically, Waters’s concept of self-determination as a right of a preliminary nature, that overrides other human rights , is debatable. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a novel analysis of Quine's indeterminacy puzzle and an unorthodox approach to its resolution. It is argued that the ultimate roots of indeterminacy lie not in behaviorism per se, but rather in Quine's commitment to a fundamental assumption about the nature of perceptual input, namely, the assumption that sensory information is strictly extensional. Calling this assumption the 'principle of input extensionalism' (PIE) I first demonstrate the fundamental role that it plays in generating Quine's argument for (...) the indeterminacy of translation. It is then argued that a tacit acceptance of PIE is prevalent among contemporary theories of cognition and representation, making Quine's puzzle a living challenge for cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. A standard way of responding to the challenge consists of the idea that the indeterminacy generated at the perceptual level is canceled out courtesy of the contribution of higher cognitive processes. However, I argue that such a top-down solution leaves much to be desired. As an alternative, I offer a bottom-up solution, which consists of a systematic rejection of PIE in favor of an intensional view of perceptual input rooted in contemporary action-based theories of perception, and in particular in the notion of perceptual invariants. (shrink)

This latest work from one of the world's leading political philosophers will appeal to audiences from a variety of fields, including philosophy, political science, women's studies, ethnic studies, sociology, and communications studies.

This paper defends a conceptualist answer to the question how objects come by their modal properties. It isolates the controversial metaphysical assumptions that are needed to get ontological conceptualism off the ground, outlines the conceptualist answer to the question and shows that conceptualism is not in as bad a shape as some critics have maintained.

The paper begins with the assumption that in order to explain the efficacy of harmony as an organizing force in human and natural affairs we must pay attention to the dynamic features characteristic of the growth and maintenance of harmonious forms. Two dynamic features are highlighted for their especial significance: revitalization, and self-surpassing. It is then argued that the two are substantively connected through the agency of creativity which, when given free reign, tends to preserve and fortify harmony by surpassing (...) existing harmonious configurations. It follows that the impetus towards self-transcendence is a vital aspect of the growth, the sustenance, and the flourishing of harmony. I then argue that this urge towards self-transcendence can be broadly identified with Plato's notion of Eros. Nevertheless, I also argue that this affinity does not commit us to a rigid Platonic scheme of the sort criticized by Chenyang Li (2014) as harmony by conformity. (shrink)

Objective: This study explores the impact of corporate social responsibility on tax avoidance with the moderating role of corporate governance in Iraq. Research Method: The researcher selected a sample of companies listed on the Iraqi Stock Exchange, numbering (33). Data was taken from 2012 to 2022, and the data was analyzed using the Eviews 9 program. Findings: Iraqi companies suffer from slight levels of tax avoidance by adopting social responsibility practices and disclosing corporate governance. Companies' commitment to corporate social responsibility (...) would add value to the company. Commitment to corporate social responsibility leads to reducing tax avoidance. Conclusion: We note from the study that there is a weakness in applying social responsibility accounting. Corporate governance and the application of its principles impact paying taxes and preventing avoidance and evasion of paying them. CSR and taxation have the same goal of improving the well-being of society The results of this study indicate that the higher the level of CSR activities, the higher the company's responsibility for its tax obligations. Corporate social responsibility is the taking of responsibility by a company for its actions as well as encouraging the creation of a positive impact through its activities on the environment, customers, employees, communities, stakeholders and all members of the public who can be considered stakeholders. (shrink)