Political theory is a field that finds nourishment in others. From economics, history, sociology, psychology, and political science, theorists have drawn a rich repertoire of schemas to parse the social world and make sense of it. With each of these encounters, new subjects are brought into focus as others recede into the background, ushering a change not only in how questions are tackled but also in what questions are thought worth asking.

Pain is an unwanted mental state that is often considered a sufficient ground for moral status. However, current science and philosophy of mind suggest that pains, like other perceptual states, might be nonconscious. This raises the questions of whether the notion of nonconscious pain is coherent and what its moral significance might be. In this paper I argue that the existence of nonconscious pain is conceptually coherent; however as a matter of fact our brains might always represent pains consciously. I (...) then characterize the concept of suffering from a naturalistic perspective, distinguishing it from pain. I offer an account of suffering based on some current theories of consciousness, in which suffering consists in the global broadcasting of representations with overall net negative valence. I argue this can explain most of suffering’s properties, such as its wholeness, significance for welfare, and conscious character. Finally, I contend that suffering, but not pain, provides sufficient grounds for moral status. (shrink)

Tem-se como objetivo analisar o esporte moderno, compreendendo que o mesmo é um dos conteúdos que compõe o objeto de conhecimento da Educação Física escolar. Para essa análise utilizou-se como aporte teórico o materialismo histórico-dialético, realizando um aprofundamento das categorias objetivação, apropriação, humanização e alienação. Com base nessas categorias conclui-se que o esporte moderno é um fenômeno social composto por inúmeras riquezas materiais e imateriais produzidas pelo ser humano no decorrer da história. Entretanto, no âmbito do modo de produção capitalista, (...) essas riquezas são expropriadas dos seres humanos e esse fenômeno social, por sua vez, assumi um caráter alienador. (shrink)

COMUNICANDO SOBRE O DIREITO A PARTIR DA COMUNICAÇÃO.

In this paper, the radical view that transparent equipment is the result of an ecological assembly between tool users and physical aspects of the world is critically assessed. According to this perspective, tool users are normally viewed as plastically organized hybrid agents. In this view, such agents are able to interact with tools (artefacts or technologies) in ways that are opportunistic and fully locked to the local task environment. This intimate and flexible interaction would provide grounds for the thesis that (...) cognitive agents and tools constitute literal extended cognitive systems. By contrast, a revised understanding of tool use transparency will be attempted. In this perspective, the interplay between on-line and off-line thinking is understood in terms of a socially reified cognitive delegation that subsumes the advantages normally associated to the so-called ‘open-ended ecological controllers.’ Thus, the notion of transparent technologies can be explored on the basis of a derived or mediated cognitive delegation. This view will be complemented by the notion of communities of practice (CoP). Special sorts of CoP will be proposed as suitable and flexible cognitive environments for the development of tool transparency. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo examina la recepción y las distintas lecturas que tuvo La Araucana en Chile, en las últimas décadas del siglo XIX. También la modalidad de esas lecturas que obedecen a un nacionalismo distinto al nacionalismo liberal decimonónico. Describe las características de un nuevo imaginario de la nación y la incidencia que él tuvo en la recepción de la obra de Ercilla. Ejemplifica este proceso en su chilenización tanto en la historiografía literaria como en el campo editorial, también en (...) el nacionalismo musical y en los debates del llamado araucanismo científico y en la idea de una supuesta Raza Chilena. Por último, establece una vinculación con otros artículos del mismo autor que contribuyen al estudio de la recepción y la resemantización de La Araucana desde el siglo XVI hasta el XIX. Abstract: The article examines the reception and different readings that La Araucana had in Chile, in the last decades of the 19th century and first decades of the 20th century. At the same time, the modality in which these readings are part of a nationalism that differs from the liberal nationalism of the 19th Century. It outlines the characteristics of the new imaginary of the nation and the impact it had in the reception of Ercilla's work. The article follows the chilenization of La Araucana in literary historiography and in the publishing field, also in musical nationalism and in the debates of the so called scientific Araucanismo and in the idea of a supposed Chilean Race. Finally, it establishes a link with other articles by the same author that contribute to the study of the reception and resemantization of La Araucana. (shrink)

This book is a multi-faceted exploration and critique of the human condition as it is presently manifested. It addresses science and philosophy, explores the underlying nature of reality, the state of our society and culture, the influence of the mainstream media, the nature of free will and a number of other topics. Each of these examinations contributes an angle to an emerging idea gestalt that challenges present mainstream views and behaviors and offers a sane alternative. The book is organized as (...) a series of short and self-contained essays, most of which can be read in under one hour. (shrink)

In this article it is defended that the notion known as “The mark of the cognitive” is better characterized as a process that performs the function of generating intelligent behavior, in a flexible and adaptive way, capable of adapting to circumstances, given it is a context sensitive process. For that, some relevant definitions of cognition are examined. In the end, it is pointed out that the definition of the mark of cognition as a context-sensitive process takes into account several factors (...) that were added as constitutive parts of cognitive phenomena over the years, especially the 4E Cognition, which cannot be satisfactorily accommodated alongside the preceding notions of cognition. Accordingly, this essay shouldn’t be mistaken merely as an exercise in intellectual history, but as a brief and accessible attempt to advance the debate. (shrink)

In this paper I explored three well-known cases that seem to cast doubt on the notion that a speaker is always at the place of the utterance when the utterance occurs. I gave a few examples produced in Second Life environment, which cannot be handled correctly by evaluating the expression at issue with respect to the traditional view, i.e., the kaplanian framework—where the agent and the utterer will always be identical, and the referent of “I” will always be the utterer. (...) The same happens to “here” and “now”; in each case the character of the indexical is a function from a contextual parameter to the referent of the expression. An example of logical truth peculiar to indexicals is the sentence “I am here now”, since, according to that view, no utterance can take place in a context whose agent is not in its location in its time. Finally I concluded by claiming that particular kinds of utterances produced in virtual environments (VE) break with the logical truth status of “I am here now”. (shrink)

In order to perceive the world, we need more than just raw sensory input: a subliminal paradigm of thought is required to interpret raw sensory data and, thereby, create the objects and events we perceive around ourselves. As such, the world we see reflects our own unexamined, culture-bound assumptions and expectations, which explains why every generation in history has believed that it more or less understood the world. Today, we perceive a world of objects and events outside and independent of (...) mind, which merely reflects our current paradigm of thought. Anomalies that contradict this paradigm have been accumulated by physicists over the past couple of decades, which will eventually force our culture to move to a new paradigm. Under this new paradigm, a form of universal mind will be viewed as nature’s sole fundamental entity. In this paper, I offer a sketch of what the new paradigm may look like. (shrink)

Turing’s much debated test has turned 70 and is still fairly controversial. His 1950 paper is seen as a complex and multilayered text, and key questions about it remain largely unanswered. Why did Turing select learning from experience as the best approach to achieve machine intelligence? Why did he spend several years working with chess playing as a task to illustrate and test for machine intelligence only to trade it out for conversational question-answering in 1950? Why did Turing refer to (...) gender imitation in a test for machine intelligence? In this article, I shall address these questions by unveiling social, historical and epistemological roots of the so-called Turing test. I will draw attention to a historical fact that has been only scarcely observed in the secondary literature thus far, namely that Turing’s 1950 test emerged out of a controversy over the cognitive capabilities of digital computers, most notably out of debates with physicist and computer pioneer Douglas Hartree, chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi, and neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson. Seen in its historical context, Turing’s 1950 paper can be understood as essentially a reply to a series of challenges posed to him by these thinkers arguing against his view that machines can think. Turing did propose gender learning and imitation as one of his various imitation tests for machine intelligence, and I argue here that this was done in response to Jefferson's suggestion that gendered behavior is causally related to the physiology of sex hormones. (shrink)

We conducted a scoping review to map and critically examine the knowledge, perceptions and utilization of generics and biosimilars, among physicians, pharmacists, patients, the general population, and other stakeholders from LAC.

In the citizen–candidate approach each citizen chooses whether or not to run as candidate. In a single-peaked preference domain, we find that the strategic entry decision of the candidates eliminates one of the most undesirable properties of Plurality rule, namely to elect a poor candidate in three-candidate elections since as we show, the Condorcet winner among the self-declared candidates is always elected. We find that the equilibria with three candidates are basically 2-fold, either there are two right-wing candidates and a (...) left-wing candidate who wins the elections (or its symmetric), or there is a right-wing candidate, a left-wing candidate, and a candidate located in between the two others who becomes winner. We also show that when four or more candidates enter the contest, Plurality rule can elect the Condorcet-loser among the self-declared candidates. (shrink)

Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called “meta-consciousness” in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an “unconscious.” The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for (...) gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren’t re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function. (shrink)

I propose an idealist ontology that makes sense of reality in a more parsimonious and empirically rigorous manner than mainstream physicalism, bottom-up panpsychism, and cosmopsychism. The proposed ontology also offers more explanatory power than these three alternatives, in that it does not fall prey to the hard problem of consciousness, the combination problem, or the decombination problem, respectively. It can be summarized as follows: there is only cosmic consciousness. We, as well as all other living organisms, are but dissociated alters (...) of cosmic consciousness, surrounded by its thoughts. The inanimate world we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of these thoughts. The living organisms we share the world with are the extrinsic appearances of other dissociated alters. (shrink)

In Warrant and Proper Function Plantinga argues that his natural view of warrant is best understood within a supernatural ontology. A central reason why anaturalistic ontology cannot accommodate his version of natural epistemology is that it cannot explain the reliability of cognitive functions. He presents argumentsfor the following two conclusions: (1) that naturalism is probably false; and (2) that naturalism is irrational. He considers the latter to be his main argument. Theobjective of this paper is to refute Plantinga’s arguments for (...) the conclusion that naturalism is irrational. I will demonstrate that given naturalistic evolution, we havereason to believe that it is likely that we would develop reliable cognitive theoretical faculties. As a result, a naturalist has sufficient epistemic ground to maintain the reasonableness of the view that her theoretical cognitive faculties are reliable and her theoretical beliefs true. It is, therefore, not irrational to be a naturalist. (shrink)

In his paper, Vardoulakis traces a genealogy of the concept of the ‘ineffectual’ that dominates many discussions in continental political philosophy back to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the early 1920s. Although I sympathize with Vardoulakis’s suspicions concerning the ‘ineffectual’, I think his genealogy misses the main aspects of Heidegger’s analysis of praxis. In particular, Vardoulakis’s reading relies on two fundamentally ill-conceived assumptions: (a) that Heidegger’s thought can be read as a continuous endorsement of a series of fundamental claims, in (...) particular, the rejection of instrumentality, the critique of modern technical thinking, and a praise of a certain form of ineffectual meditative thought as an alternative; and (b) that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in general and of the Nichomachean Ethics in particular has, as its main aim, to ground in Greek thinking such form of ineffectual meditative thought. In this comment, I will challenge both these assumptions. I will claim that Heidegger’s project in the 1920s is oriented to provide an answer to the question that shaped the debate between Marburg Neo-Kantians, on the one hand, and Husserl, on the other: namely, how is it possible to account for lived experience and its categorial articulation. For Neo-Kantians such as Natorp (e.g. [1912: 28]), all conceptual understanding is an understanding of objects. Subjectivity as the pure form of activity—the Kantian I think—could not be understood but merely postulated. Hence, it is in principle impossible to account for subjectivity without objectifying it. This was a serious and potentially devastating objection to phenomenology’s fundamental project. It is in this context that Heidegger turns his attention to Aristotle’s ethics, precisely as a way of accounting for the kind of relationship between my understanding of experience and experience itself. Aristotelian praxis (and phronesis as the kind of ‘knowledge’ associated with praxis) provides a model for such understanding. Therefore, Heidegger has no interest in ethics or in developing a theory of action in the 1920s in general or when reading Aristotle in particular. Vardoulakis’s understanding of Heidegger’s mistranslation—even if there is one—can only make sense in hindsight, when reading those texts in the light of the later Heidegger’s interest in avoiding technical calculation and promoting a meditative thinking. If we abandon Vardoulakis’s assumptions, Heidegger’s analysis of praxis and, in particular, his reading of Aristotle’s hou heneka can be understood under a different light. Understanding the meaningful structure of the world as existing for the sake (hou heneka, umwillen) of Dasein is not so much a reflection on the role of ends in action—technical or otherwise—but an analysis of the way in which any understanding of the world and of our actions within it is an understanding of who we are and of the structures that constitute the very being of our subjectivity. This may suggest that there is in the early Heidegger a way out of the dilemma between ineffectuality and instrumentalism, a path that, perhaps, provides an alternative for contemporary ethics and political thinking. (shrink)

This paper defends the relevance of philosophy in the contemporary study of concepts. With the advent of cognitive science, naturalistic and interdisciplinary theorizing about concepts has gained momentum. In this context, it has been recently argued that philosophers’ theories of concepts are not aimed at answering the issues that psychologists are interested in, thus dismissing the mentioned philosophical contribution as scientifically otiose. We present and discuss two cases in point suggesting otherwise, as an attempt to vindicate the crucial role of (...) philosophy in the development of empirical theories of concepts. (shrink)

Riassunto: Il presente contributo esamina il concetto di esperienza cosciente da una prospettiva epistemologica evoluzionista, ispirata ad un approccio naturalistico non riduzionista. Il lavoro si inserisce nel quadro concettuale delle ricerche nel campo della filosofia della mente, avanzando delle ipotesi circa i possibili processi che hanno determinato la comparsa e lo sviluppo nella nostra biosfera di una mente specificatamente umana sia dal punto di vista filogenetico che da quello ontogenetico. In quest’ottica, vengono rivisitati in chiave epigenetica alcuni tratti salienti della (...) teoria della coscienza di Edelman alla luce delle più recenti ricerche sulla misurazione dell’esperienza cosciente, condotte da Tononi e da altri studiosi nell’ambito della Integrated Information Theory. In un quadro siffatto, l’articolo analizza alcune criticità dell’approccio algoritmico della IIT, evidenziando la necessità di individuare nuove misure della complessità per quanto riguarda lo studio dei processi semantici di trasmissione dell’informazione biologica. Parole chiave: Coscienza; Evoluzione naturale; Neuroplasticità; Informazione intenzionale; Seconda natura Reflections on conscious experience. The perspectives of the integrated information theory: This paper examines the concept of conscious experience from an evolutionary epistemological perspective, inspired by a non-reductionist naturalistic approach. Situated in the conceptual framework of philosophy of mind, it considers what processes could have led to the appearance and development of a specifically human mind in our biosphere, both from a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic point of view. Salient features of Edelman’s theory of consciousness are revisited from an epigenetic perspective, in light of some of the most recent measurements of conscious experience proposed by Tononi and other scholars in the field of Integrated Information Theory. The paper analyzes some criticalities in the algorithmic approach of the IIT, highlighting the need to identify new measures of complexity for the study of semantic processes of transmission of biological information. Keywords: Consciousness; Natural Evolution; Neuroplasticity; Intentional Information; Second Nature. (shrink)

Philosophy’s engagement with mass media has often been ambiguous: many critical theorists, from Benjamin to Bourdieu, recognised the emancipatory potential of modern communication technologies, but they also denounced the economic, political and ideological forces at work in the creation and dissemination of public opinion. Looking at different media, these authors emphasised the dialectical tension between the plurality of the public sphere and different forms of control and manipulation. In the present paper, I argue that this line of criticism, albeit important, (...) is no longer sufficient. I claim that contemporary forms of communication, defined by a unique emphasis on interactivity, cannot be analysed simply in terms of the opposition between dominant and marginalised agents or discourses. In its most extreme form, interactivity leads to an implosion of the distinction between the sources and the targets of the information flow, which calls into question the very possibility of a meaningful communicative exchange. To clarify the nature of this phenomenon, I retrace the evolution of modern political communication, from live speeches to digital platforms and social networks, and discuss its implications for recent debates on political authority, participation and representation. (shrink)

Este estudo versa sobre o poder das empresas transnacionais e a produção da elisão fiscal, com base no caso da Coca-Cola no mundo contemporâneo. A pesquisa é realizada adotando-se o método dedutivo e a técnica de pesquisa bibliográfica. O objetivo geral busca verificar o poder das empresas transnacionais e como elas podem produzir elisão fiscal. Considerada uma das marcas mais influentes do mundo, a Coca-Cola efetua manobras fiscais, como a elisão fiscal, consistente na redução do pagamento de tributos, procurando se (...) instalar em países em que os regimes fiscais sejam privilegiados, utilizando indevidamente os destinos fiscais em seu próprio benefício. (shrink)