The first part (‘Some Parts’) deals with Corpus, by Nancy, in contrast with Artaud's experience of his ‘own’ death in the psychiatric hospital in Rodez. The second part, (‘A corpus is not a discourse …, and it is not a narrative’) develops a quasi-narrative which points toward a greater corpus, at once ‘mad’ and undeniably true. ‘Interferon’, ‘Dragon Naturally Speaking’, the (Egyptian) ‘Book of the Dead’, all of these names embody powerful techniques to alter the self and displace the limits (...) of experience ‘itself’. Corpus ‘is’ a writing without writing, or a writing from with/out. *. (shrink)

The author reads Rimbaud, Mallarme. Holderlin, and Trakl in relation to philosophy, and in particular to Heidegger.

This first book-length study of what Heidegger called "thinking poetics" expounds the sense of language from the perspective of fundamental ontology.

A variety of cognitive biases are known to compromise ethical deliberation and decision-making processes. However, little is known about their role in clinical ethics supports (CES). We searched five electronic databases (Pubmed, PsychINFO, the Web of Science, CINAHL, and Medline) to identify articles describing cognitive bias in the context of committees that deliberate on ethical issues concerning patients, at all levels of care. We charted the data from the retrieved articles including the authors and year of publication, title, CES reference, (...) the reported cognitive bias, paper type, and approach. Of an initial 572 records retrieved, we screened the titles and abstracts of 128 articles, and identified 58 articles for full review. Four articles were selected for inclusion. Two are empirical investigations of bias in two CES, and two are theoretical, conceptual papers that discuss cognitive bias during CES deliberations. Our main result first shows an overview of bias related to the working human environment and to information gathering that concerns different types of CES. Second, several determinants of cognitive bias were highlighted. Especially, stressful environments could be at risk of cognitive bias, whatever the clinical dilemma. Whether a need for a better taxonomy of cognitive bias in CES is highlighted, a proposal is made to focus on individual, group, institutional and professional biases that can be present during clinical ethics deliberation. However, future studies need to focus on an ecological evaluation of CES deliberations, in order to better-characterize cognitive biases and to study how they impact the quality of ethical decision-making. This information would be useful in considering countermeasures to ensure that deliberation is as unbiased as possible, and allow the most appropriate ethical decision to emerge in response to the dilemma at hand. (shrink)

J.S. Mill's plural voting proposal in Considerations on Representative Government presents political theorists with a puzzle: the elitist proposal that some individuals deserve a greater voice than others seems at odds with Mill's repeated arguments for the value of full participation in government. This essay looks at Mill's arguments for plural voting, arguing that, far from being motivated solely by elitism, Mill's account is actually driven by a commitment to both competence and participation. It goes on to argue that, for (...) Mill, much of the value of political participation lies in its unique ability to educate the participants. That ability to educate is not, however, a product of participation alone; rather, for Mill, the true educative benefits of participation obtain only when competence and participation work together in the political sphere. Plural voting, then, is a mechanism for allowing Mill to take advantage of the educative benefits that arise from the intersection of competence and participation. (shrink)

J M Tarrant; J. Wilson and B. Cowell on the Democratic Myth, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 123–127, https://doi.org.

Thomas J.J. Altizer is one of the most important theologians of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and all radical theology must pass through and be conversant with his work and the historical significance of his earlier contributions. This chapter presents Altizer’s essential ideas in a straightforward and accessible manner and provides a guide for the beginning reader.

The first English translation of Fichte’s second set of 1804 lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre.

This essay is written on the following premises and argues for them. “Enlightenment” is a word or signifier, and not a single or unifiable phenomenon which it consistently signifies. There is no single or unifiable phenomenon describable as “the Enlightenment,” but it is the definite article rather than the noun which is to be avoided. In studying the intellectual history of the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth, we encounter a variety of statements made, and assumptions proposed, to which the (...) term “Enlightenment” may usefully be applied, but the meanings of the term shift as we apply it. The things are connected, but not continuous; they cannot be reduced to a single narrative; and we find ourselves using the word “Enlightenment” in a family of ways and talking about a family of phenomena, resembling and related to one another in a variety of ways that permit of various generalizations about them. We are not, however, committed to a single root meaning of the word “Enlightenment,” and we do not need to reduce the phenomena of which we treat to a single process or entity to be termed “the” Enlightenment. It is a reification that we wish to avoid, but the structure of our language is such that this is difficult, and we will find ourselves talking of “the French” or “the Scottish,” “the Newtonian” or the “the Arminian” Enlightenments, and hoping that by employing qualifying adjectives we may constantly remind ourselves that the keyword “Enlightenment” is ours to use and should not master us. (shrink)

The texts collected in this volume, which was originally published in 1969, contain Herder's most original and stimulating ideas on politics, history and language. They had for the most part not been previously available in English. In his introduction, Professor Barnard analyses the basic premises of Herder's political thought against the background of the Enlightenment. He examines Herder's concepts of language, community and culture, his theory of historical interaction, and his approach to the problem of change and progress. Finally, he (...) provides a brief comparative analysis of traditionalist thought following the French Revolution, showing how substantive writers like Burke differed from Herder despite the close similarity of political vocabulary. (shrink)

In the paper I offer a brief sketch of one of the sources of utilitarianism. Our biological ancestry is a matter of fact that is not altered by the way we describe ourselves. With philosophical theories it is otherwise. Utilitarianism can be described in ways that make it look as if it is as old as moral philosophy – as J. S. Mill thought it was. For my historical purposes, it is more useful to have an account that brings out (...) what is specific about Benthamism and its descendants. Let us try to make do with the following. First, utilitarianism asserts that the fundamental requirement of morality is that we are to maximize good, for everyone and not just for the agent. This basic principle presupposes that it makes sense to think of aggregating goods to make a total, and of comparing amounts of good thus aggregated. Second, the good to be brought about is located in feelings of pleasure, and the evil to be avoided in feelings of pain. These feelings have inherent value or disvalue regardless of how they are caused to exist and regardless of their own consequences. Third, all moral principles can be derived from the requirement that good be maximized. The principles involved in evaluating agents as well as in giving moral direction to action are nothing but applications of the basic principle. (shrink)

J.N. Findlay was a South African philosopher who published from the late 1940s into the 1980s. He had a prestigious international academic career, holding many academic posts around the world. This article uses a textual comparative approach and focuses on Findlay’s Gifford Lecture at St Andrews University between 1965 and 1970. The objective of the article is to highlight the extent to which Findlay’s philosophical writings were influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism. Although predominantly a Platonist, Findlay drew influence from Asian philosophy (...) and religion, particularly Mahāyāna Buddhism. In these lectures, he applies the metaphor of the Platonic Cave to investigate Hegelian and Husserlian approaches to knowledge. Though he was a leading Hegel and Husserl scholar, his reading of these two philosophers is strongly influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism, resulting in a unique mystical interpretation of these two philosophers. Revisiting Findlay’s writings is significant for two reasons; firstly, he investigated Buddhism prior to the Asian religions being included in Religious Studies departments’ purview in South African universities, and secondly, his interpretation of two prominent Western philosophers along Buddhist lines provides an early attempt at decolonising the predominance of Western philosophical views of knowledge.Contribution: This contribution forms part of a larger collection of essays investigating philosophical works that have had a significant impact on the study of religion. This contribution investigates the Buddhist influence on J.N. Findlay’s philosophical readings of Husserl and Hegel. (shrink)