It’s one thing to do the right thing. It’s another to be creditable for doing the right thing. Being creditable for doing the right thing requires that one does the right thing out of a morally laudable motive and that there is a non-accidental fit between those two elements. This paper argues that the two main views of morally creditable action – the Right Making Features View and the Rightness Itself View – fail to capture that non-accidentality constraint: the first (...) because it morally credits agents who make heavy-duty moral mistakes; the second because it fails to generalise and is too conservative – a point which this paper gives renewed defence. The paper then goes on to defend and develop an alternative according to which moral worth is mediated by the agent’s knowing how to respond to the reasons of the type which make acting in that way right. It’s argued that this view avoids the problems for the alternatives, and it’s shown that in order for the view to avoid collapsing into a problematic form of Reliabilism we’ll have to think of states of knowing how as essentially successful in character. (shrink)

Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being (...) a normative reason to believe that p. The primary objective of this paper is to demonstrate that that style of answer cannot be right, because we must conceive of believing for a normative reason as constitutively involving a kind of rationality-involving relation that can be instantiated at all only if there is a known fact on the scene, which the agent treats as a normative reason. A secondary objective, achieved along the way, is to demonstrate that in their Prime Time Errol Lord and Kurt Sylvan do not succeed in undermining the factoring picture in general, only a simple-minded version of it. (shrink)

It is now standard in the literature on reasons and rationality to distinguish normative reasons from motivating reasons. Two issues have dominated philosophical theorising concerning the latter: (i) whether we should think of them as certain (non-factive) psychological states of the agent – the dispute over Psychologism; and (ii) whether we should say that the agent can Φ for the reason that p only if p – the dispute over Factivism. This paper first introduces a puzzle: these disputes look very (...) much like merely verbal disputes about the meaning of phrases like `S’s reason’ in motivating reasons ascriptions, and yet charity requires us to think that something substantive is afoot. But what? The second aim of the paper is to extract substantive theses from certain natural arguments for Psychologism and Anti-Factivism – theses which are versions of a controversial view of the nature and normative structure of rationality. The paper ends by arguing against these substantive theses on phenomenological and ethical grounds. The upshot is that proponents of Psychologism and Anti-Factivism are either engaged in the project of defending merely verbal theses or they’re engaged in the project of defending false substantive ones. (shrink)

In developing the concept of assemblages, Gilles Deleuze draws at least some inspiration from Gilbert Simondon’s concept of information. While his acknowledgement of Simondon’s influence is almost entirely positive, Deleuze explicitly distances himself from the concept of information in order to avoid its link to the field of cybernetics. However, a Deleuzian informational ontology could instead be leveraged as an alternative to cybernetics. Drawing on the Spinozan link between the work of Deleuze and Simondon, it is possible to develop a (...) hybrid informational ontology. This system can not only offer a different approach to information, data and technology than the essentialist concept of information embraced by cybernetics, but also aligns well with recent research in the biological sciences that has disrupted a long-held concept of individuals as entirely separate and autonomous. Shifting away from the Platonic Form to a Deleuzian/simondonian in-formation furthers the post-human project aimed at understanding processes of subjectivation at multiple scales, including the micro and macro. (shrink)

Abstract Boyle distinguished clearly between the areas which we would call scientific and theological. However, he felt that they overlapped seamlessly, and that the truths we discovered (or which were revealed to us) in one of these areas would be relevant to us in the other. In this paper I outline and discuss Boyle's views on the limitations of human knowing, Boyle's arguments in favour of accepting the revelations of the Christian faith, and his views on the kind of epistomological (...) standing that scientific knowledge claims have. Given this background I then consider the relation between hypotheses, theories and facts in Boyle's work, and consider a particular case, that of Boyle's Law, as an exemplification of the claims made in the rest of the paper. (shrink)

This paper is partly to get rid of some irritation which I have felt at the quite common tendency of philosophers to elucidate ‘is red’ in terms of ‘looks red’. For a relatively recent example see, for example, Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter, ‘An Objectivist′s Guide to Subjectivism about Colour’. However rather than try to make a long list of references, I would rather say ‘No names, no pack drill’. I have even been disturbed to find the use of the (...) words ‘looks red’ that I am opposing ascribed to me by Keith Campbell in his useful article ‘David Armstrong and Realism about Colour’. I am not saying that such talk is necessarily wrong. Talk of ‘looks red’ may be a way of harmlessly referring to the behavioural discriminations with respect to colour of a human percipient. Where it is dangerous, at least to those of us who wish to argue for a broadly physicalist account of the mind, is that it may have concealed overtones of reference to epiphenomenal and irreducibly psychic properties of experiences. Moreover even if it does not do so it may be fence sitting on this issue and liable to misinterpretation. (shrink)

This article is mainly concerned to summarise a fairly well articulated position on the philosophy of science which may be extracted from scattered passages in quine's "word and object." (1) there is no sharp line between philosophy and science, Or between science and mathematics, Or between science and common sense. (2) abstract mathematical entities are theoretical posits just as electrons are. (3) epistemology is a branch of biology. (4) quine's earlier instrumentalism has given way to a scientific realism. (5) quine's (...) philosophy of space-Time is briefly discussed. (6) an extensional language is adequate for science. (shrink)

Pour Proust, on le sait, la mémoire fouille dans les ruines ce que le Temps a détruit, et ce que l’Art peut parfois sublimer. Face à un traumatisme soudain et dévastateur, le passé récent “convertit” (dans le sens alchimique, religieux, hystérique du terme) sa banale quotidienneté pour s’investir après-coup en paradis à jamais perdu. (Or les paradis ne sont-ils pas toujours des paradis perdus –Milton, Proust, Freud, et al.)? Anticipant par une dizaine d’années le vécu de notre présent mondialement pandémique, (...) le film de Soderbergh met en scène la monstruosité inexorable du virus, avec le chaos, la dépression universelle et l’agressivité qui en résultent, – illustrant ainsi comment le quotidien se transforme en une invivable dystopie. Cependant /u-topie/ et /dys-topie/ s’entrelacent et se reconfigurent dans une dynamique dialectique : De même que le passé (rétrospectivement) utopique contenait déjà le code de sa propre auto-destruction, de même le présent (prospectivement) dystopique engendre endurance et lutte à mort pour sur-vivre, ne serait-ce que dans un mode d’être différent du passé perdu et du présent mortel. Ce faisant, comme le montre notre analyse, Soderbergh surprend par la dimension féministe de son film. (shrink)

Het Leids-Haags Allegorieënlexicon toont nieuwe perspectieven op de maatschappelijke werkelijkheid met een actuele duiding van vijftig kernthema’s uit de wetenschap. De auteurs zijn de duale promovendi en hun promotores van Leiden University Dual PhD Centre The Hague. Ze worden daarbij geïnspireerd door de metafoor van de grot van Plato: Waar ben ik? Waar sta ik? Welk beeld zie ik? Hoe kan ik dat begrijpen? Er ontstaan beeldende voorstellingen van begrippen waarin op zoek wordt gegaan naar de centrale gedachten die ten (...) grondslag liggen aan die begrippen. Zo wordt de veranderende wereld waargenomen met het besef dat we nooit kunnen weten of we de gehele werkelijkheid kunnen zien of begrijpen. De waarneming is afhankelijk van de zichtpositie die de waarnemer inneemt. Zo ontstaan verbeeldingen van waarnemingen van ons menselijk bestaan. Zoals: assimilatie, creativiteit, gender, kunstenaarschap, magistraat, participatie, regels, tragedie en verzorgingsstaat. Eerst wordt actuele literatuur besproken. Daarna volgt discussie. Tenslotte neemt de auteur positie in. Met bijdragen van promotores Wilfried Admiraal, Ingrid van Biezen, Hans Borgman, Paul Cliteur, Jaap van den Herik, Rikki Holtmaat, Willem Otterspeer, Jos Raadschelders, Robert Tijssen, Wim Willems en promovendi. (shrink)

Thomas J.J. Altizer is one of the most important theologians of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, and all radical theology must pass through and be conversant with his work and the historical significance of his earlier contributions. This chapter presents Altizer’s essential ideas in a straightforward and accessible manner and provides a guide for the beginning reader.

The title is somewhat misleading in the current situation, since these essays stem from a Neoscholastic rather than a Neopositivistic background, and are chiefly concerned with suggesting in a rough way some relations between Aristotelian or Scholastic and contemporary scientific methods. The volume includes "Questions Science Cannot Answer" by Mortimer Adler, "The Logic of Induction" by Roland Houde, "Physico-chemical Methods and the Philosophy of Nature" by Léon Lortie, and "The Evolution of Scientific Method" by James A. Weisheipl.—J. J.

The origins of the unrest among the Pannonian legions in A.D. 14 are easily discerned. The great war in Illyricum of A.D. 6–9 involved the legions in a series of extremely arduous campaigns extending across the western half of the Balkan Peninsula, in particular the impenetrable forests of Bosnia and the rugged karst of Dalmatia. The nearness of this area to Italy made the war a great crisis in the reign of Augustus: conquest of Illyricum was the keystone of Augustus' (...) northern frontier policy and no efforts were spared to achieve this. Advances in Germany could be determined from expediency but the subjugation of the Bosnian tribes was a necessity. During the war the need for men was so great that conscription was introduced in Italy and even freedmen were enlisted when ordinary citizen volunteers were not forthcoming. Cassius Dio speaks of the low morale and outbreaks of mutiny in the army of Tiberius during the last season of the war. (shrink)

The development of theories of global cortical dynamics, using linear wave theory, owes much to the pioneering work of Nunez. His work leads to clear predictions on relations of brain size, axonal conduction velocity, and the frequencies of the cerebral rhythms. These predictions do not appear to be fulfilled, but their falsification constrains the range of parameters applicable in further formulations.

Amit's Hebbian model risks being overexplanatory, since it does not depend on specific physiological modelling of cortical ANNs, but concentrates on those phenomena which are modelled by a large class of ANNs. While offering a strong demonstration of the presence of Hebb's “cell assemblies,” it does not offer an equal account of Hebb's “phase sequence” concept.

We outline fresh findings that show that our macroscopic electrocorticographic (ECoG) simulations can account for synchronous multiunit pulse oscillations at separate, simultaneously activated cortical sites and the associated gamma-band ECoG activity. We clarify our views on the approximations of dynamic class applicable to neural events at macroscopic and microscopic scales, and the analogies drawn to classes of ANN behaviour. We accept the need to introduce memory processes and detailed anatomical and physiological information into any future developments of our simulations. On (...) the issue of intrinsic cortical stability and the role of extrinsic fibre systems in maintaining stability, we argue that this position is not in extreme contradiction to those of our commentators, and that the mechanisms implicit in our simulations' properties imply rich computational possibilities. We discuss some of the reasons for and against the existence of significant global resonances in the brain and explain why such behaviour appears absent in our simulations. Last, we discuss other phenomena, such as rhythmic driving of the cortex, which have not yet been introduced into our models, and indicate lines for future development of the simulations. (shrink)

In an earlier paper I argued that time travellers cannot change the past: alleged models of changing the past either fall into contradiction or else involve avoiding, not changing, the past. Goddu has responded to my argument, maintaining that his hypertime model involves time travellers changing (not avoiding) the past. In the present paper I first discuss what would be required to substantiate the claim that a given model involves changing rather than avoiding the past. I then consider Goddu's hypertime (...) model and an earlier model due to Meiland. I argue that neither author does what would be required to substantiate the claim that the model involves changing (not avoiding) the past. I go on to give reasons for the stronger claim that no-one can present a coherent model and also substantiate the claim that it involves changing (not avoiding) the past. (shrink)

In the first section of this paper I offer a necessary condition for members of a particular class of arguments to be acceptable asproofs. In the second section, I point out that a plausible extension of this principle reveals that a number of additional arguments cannot function successfully as proofs. Finally, I note that a number of theological arguments, particularly cosmological and ontological arguments, are suspect in the light of this extended principle. Standardly in the ontological argument, criticism falls on (...) the conditional, modality-enriching premise which involves a move from possibility to actuality. I offer two defences of this premise, and argue that—as the use of Moore's extended maxim shows—the problem lies with the premise that asserts mere possibility. (shrink)

Le névrosé est un homme qui demeure infantile et s'enferme dans un refuge imaginaire. Sans courage, il est prisonnier des angoisses primitives. A partir d'une compréhension de la relation fondamentale entre l'angoisse et le courage s'éclaire la valeur proprement humaine de l'amour humain, de la rencontre, de la confrontation et de la liaison entre le Moi et le Toi comme une existence sous la forme du Nous - la „liebende Wirheit” dont parle Binswanger. Le mysterium tremendum de l'amour personnel pour (...) un ‘étranger’ - qui n'est donc n i la mère n i le père - est un risque existentiel par essence, c'est le franchissement du seuil vers une forme nouvelle de l'existence du Dasein. C'est la raison pour laquelle la route vers le Toi passe par l'angoisse et que l'engagement dans cette voie présuppose un Moi libre, courageux et responsable. C'est ce que nous apprend déjà le dicton : „Qui veut épouser la fille du roi doit d'abord supporter le tremblement de l'angoisse”. Le courage qui est ici nécessaire s'accomplit dans la liberté heureuse de ce qu'on a appelé le „discours-révélant” -par lequel le „langage-du-désir” de notre inconscience originelle est assumé et qu'il accomplit sa signification. (shrink)

In his philosophical works Seneca often refers to the views of his predecessors, and sometimes is the sole or the earliest authority for what he says about them, which makes it important for the student of earlier thought to know whether what he says is likely to be true. This I believe can be roughly assessed–and this paper is an attempt to do it–by considering how reliable he is in places where he can be checked: that is, in places where (...) he refers to earlier writings which survive. I shall be principally concerned with his Naturales Quaestiones and with early meteorology: with considering how accurately Seneca reports Aristotle's Meteorologica , and trying to estimate therefrom the reliability of his statements about pre-Socratic meteorology; but I believe that my conclusions should also be applicable to what Seneca says on later thinkers and other subjects. (shrink)

Patterns resulting from the sole interplay between reaction and diffusion are probably involved in certain stages of morphogenesis in biological systems, as initially proposed by Alan Turing. Self-organization phenomena of this type can only develop in nonlinear systems (i.e. involving positive and negative feedback loops) maintained far from equilibrium. We present Turing patterns experimentally observed in a chemical system. An oscillating chemical reaction, the CIMA reaction, is operated in an open spatial reactor designed in order to obtain a pure reaction-diffusion (...) system. The two types of Turing patterns observed, hexagonal arrays of spots and parallel stripes, are characterized by an intrinsic wavelength. We identify the origin of the necessary difference of diffusivity between activator and inhibitor. We also describe a pattern growth mechanism by spot splitting that recalls cell division. (shrink)