The place of gilds in urban politics has recently attracted considerable interest. Scholars have come to view these organizations, especially those associated with the crafts, as powerful vehicles for influencing municipal affairs. No agreement about the nature of this influence has yet emerged; indeed, gilds have been variously interpreted as promoters of political brotherhood, allies of worker interests, and devices used by urban elites to control artisans and laborers. The prevalence of a different sort of influence has gone largely unnoticed, (...) however. In many English towns of the late Middle Ages a single fraternity came to dominate local government. (shrink)

In this study John W. Elrod demonstrates that Kierkegaard's pseudonymous writings have an ontological foundation that unites the disparate elements of these books. The descriptions of the different stages of human development are not fully understandable, the author argues, without an awareness of the role played by this ontology in Kierkegaard's analysis of human existence. Kierkegaard contends that the self is a synthesis of finitude and infinitude, body and soul, reality and ideality, necessity and possibility, and time and eternity. (...) Each of these syntheses reveals a particular and unique aspect of individual being not disclosed in the others. Part One shows that ontology is central to the discussion of the self in the pseudonyms. The author notes that spirit, as a synthesis of the expressions of the self, develops as consciousness and freedom. In Part Two he indicates the relationship between notions of being and existence. He notes that existence, in Kierkegaard's thought, grows out of the life of the spirit; the different stages of existence are concrete modes that develop in the spirit's striving to unify the self as a synthesis. These existential expressions of spirit are dialectically related, in that each step requires the preceding stages of spiritual development. Originally published in 1975. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Getting everything you want out of life isn't about doing more. It's about becoming more. Hal Elrod and The Miracle Morning have helped millions of people become the person they need to be to create the life they've always wanted. Now, it's your turn.

Aristotle figures significantly in the recent boom of literature on forgiveness, particularly accounts wishing to construe forgiveness as a virtue. While his definition of anger is often invoked, he is also a foil for accounts valuing forgiveness more than did Aristotle. I argue through interpretive exegesis of Aristotle’s texts that, while there are definite limits on forgiveness in his thought, so that his notion of forgiveness does not extend as far as in Christian ethics, it does play a significant role (...) in his ethics. Forgiveness is particularly connected with the emotion and dynamic of anger, and my paper examines Aristotle’s discussions of anger, hatred and righteous indignation, indicating how forgiveness fits into these. Finally, I express my suspicions of recent accounts attempting to construe forgiveness itself as a virtue, arguing it is traditionally and more adequately understood as governed by virtues, in particular mildness (praōtēs) as Aristotle articulates it. (shrink)

This is essentially what I take to be Kierkegaard's ontological foundation of human existence. It is the structure which both makes possible and unifies the different modes of existing which he so fully describes in his pseudonyms. The further task is one of demonstrating concretely the relation of these modes (stages) of existing to his ontology.

Evans has written a different sort of book on Kierkegaard. It is, first of all, one that is intended for, in his words, the "ordinary reader." This undoubtedly does not mean that Evans is not interested in Kierkegaard's philosophical/theological readers; I suspect that he is. It is just that he has not aimed his book at this audience. This book should also be distinguished from most other books on Kierkegaard's thought since it is exclusively on the religious philosophy of Johannes (...) Climacus, Kierkegaard's pseudonym for two major works in his first literature. (shrink)

Thulstrup gives us a radically anti-Hegelian Kierkegaard in a period from 1835 through publication of Concluding Unscientific Postscript in 1845. Whereas other writers on Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel have seen positive Hegelian influences in one aspect or another of the pseudonymous authorship, Thulstrup insists that there are absolutely no positive points of contact between Hegel and the anthropology and theology of the pseudohyms. At every point and turn of any theological or philosophical significance in the unfolding of the pseudonymous writings, (...) Thulstrup finds only a polemical Kierkegaard in relation to the thought of Hegel. This guiding principle in Thulstrup’s interpretation of the Hegel connection is carefully developed in four major theses whose development constitute the full weight of the book. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 407 [Access article in PDF] Reply By Margaret J. Osler and Richard A. Watson In his comments on our historiographical Notes in the October 2002 issue of JHP, A. P. Martinich misrepresents our position by erroneously claiming that we presume a sharp dichotomy between the analytic history of philosophy and the historical history of philosophy. Neither of us accepts such a (...) premise. Once that misreading is eliminated there are few disagreements between each of us and Martinich.We agree that any meaningful history of philosophy must be both philosophically sophisticated and historically grounded. History without philosophy would be nothing but chronicle; history of philosophy without historical context would describe a series of moves, but explain nothing. A desideratum of both history and philosophy is careful reading, exposition, and analysis of texts.... (shrink)