This work introduces the English-speaking reader to the theoretical foundations of Kng's popular works; an indispensable prolegomena for every future Christology.

Beliefs come in degrees, and we often represent those degrees with numbers. We might say, for example, that we are 90% confident in the truth of some scientific hypothesis, or only 30% confident in the success of some risky endeavour. But what do these numbers mean? What, in other words, is the underlying psychological reality to which the numbers correspond? And what constitutes a meaningful difference between numerically distinct representations of belief? In this Element, we discuss the main approaches to (...) the measurement of belief. These fall into two broad categories—epistemic and decision-theoretic—with divergent foundations in the theory of measurement. Epistemic approaches explain the measurement of belief by appeal to relations between belief states themselves, whereas decision-theoretic approaches appeal to relations between beliefs and desires in the production of choice and preferences. -/- (This book is part of the Cambridge Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy series.). (shrink)

The present study tests a gestalt explanation for the gambler's fallacy which posits that runs in random events will be expected to reverse only when the run is open or ongoing. This is contrasted with the law of small numbers explanation suggesting that people expect random outcomes to balance out generally. Sixty-one university students placed hypothetical guesses and bets on a series of coin tosses. Either heads or tails were dominant . In a closed run condition the run ended prior (...) to the critical trial , and in an open run condition the run remained open . As hypothesised, participants showed the gambler's fallacy in the open run condition, but not in the closed run condition. This difference is not due to differential memory for the outcomes. Men, and people with more previous experience gambling, were also found to be more prone to the gambler's fallacy. It is argued that the gestalt explanation best explains the results. (shrink)

XLRI, in association with a few Tata Group companies, established the XLRI-JRD Tata Foundation in Business Ethics in 1991 to mark their long-standing commitment and contribution to business ethics in India. The foundation seeks to address this by publicly affirming the urgent need for ethics in business and the need to bring about a conducive culture in which it can thrive.

This paper examines the impact that recent advances in clinical neurology, introspectionist psychology and neuroscience have upon the philosophical psycho?neural Identity Theory. Topics covered include (i) the nature and properties of phenomenal consciousness based on a study of the ?basic? visual field, i.e. that obtained in the complete dark, the Ganzfeld, and during recovery from occipital lobe injuries; (ii) the nature of the ?body?image? of neurology and its relation to the physical body; (iii) Descartes? error in choosing extension in space (...) as the criterion for distinguishing the physical and the mental; (iv) the technical distinction between sensing and perceiving; (v) why phenomenal Direct Realism is incorrect whereas epistemic DR and the representative theory are correct; (vi) the ontological and topological status of phenomenal space and physical space. This leads to considerations of the current ?binding problems? in neuroscience; the role of the brain mechanisms that construct the sensory fields of phenomenal consciousness; the ?homunculus? fallacy; the key difference between epistemic and non?epistemic perception as revealed by brain injury studies; and how the brain codes information, contrasting topological and vectorial coding, with particular reference to the binding problem. My conclusion is that the Identity Theory is incompatible with the scientific evidence from an integrated approach to modern introspectionist psychology, clinical neurology, and neuroscience. However, Cartesian Dualism is even more incompatible with the evidence. This leaves only two viable theories. The first is Bohr's theory of brain?consciousness complementarity. The second is the Broad?Price?Smythies theory of extension, which is a topological theory of the relation between phenomenal space and physical space. (shrink)

J. R. Jones; VI.—The Two Contexts of Mental Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 105–124, https://doi.org/1.

O objetivo deste ensaio é examinar a recente crítica de Maria Lasonen-Aarnio à solução anulabilista do paradoxo do dogmatismo. Tal paradoxo consiste no argumento de que certos princípios epistêmicos autorizam qualquer sujeito cognoscente a desconsiderar contraevidências para o que ele sabe. Porém, esta atitude dogmática é comumente julgada como injustificada e o sujeito que a toma é comumente julgado como irracional. A solução anulabilista do paradoxo do dogmatismo foi posta em circulação por Gilbert Harman e sugere que o problema é (...) resolvido assim que se abandona a suposição de que o conhecimento não pode ser derrotado por contraevidências. Lasonen-Aarnio acredita que tal solução é insatisfatória porque ainda haveria, em certas circunstâncias, justificação para ser dogmático mesmo admitindo e sofrendo derrota epistêmica. Desse modo, a solução anulabilista deixa ainda alguma medida de dogmatismo autorizada para o sujeito. Iniciaremos com uma introdução ao problema, explicando em que consiste o paradoxo do dogmatismo e expondo as diferentes versões nas quais foi apresentado. Em seguida, vamos nos voltar para uma versão do argumento pró-dogmatismo. Consideraremos, então, a solução anulabilista proposta por Harman e a crítica de Lasonen-Aarnio. Por fim, apresentaremos três objeções à eficácia da crítica de Lasonen-Aarnio. (shrink)