The main aim of this political philosophy study is to analyze the two fundamental ideas developed by Jean Monnet, namely, the idea of a federally united Europe and its sovereignty. This analysis is combined with an attempt to capture at least some of the essential assumptions of his philosophical ideas and their evolution. The source materials on which the article is based are primarily Monnet’s Memories, his notes and official memoranda, the correspondence from the war and postwar period and the (...) speeches he gave as the President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952-1955. They were supplemented with Memorandum of Aristide Briand, the speech of Winston Churchill in Zurich, Convention for European Economic Cooperation and Erinnerungen 1945-1953 by Konrad Adenauer. When it comes to literature, the author referred to the extensive bibliography on the subject contained in Suwerenność by Jacek Czaputowicz. The study uses the method of multidisciplinary analysis of sources and their historical, political and philosophical interpretation. The research conducted allows us to speak of certain philosophical assumptions in Monnet’s thinking about a united Europe and its future. Among the main components of his understanding we can enumerate: necessity, change, specific strength, development in stages and incompleteness which is essentially characteristic to nature. The carried out analysis also allows us to formulate the hypothesis about Monnet’s philosophy of life and action, which can be understood as a certain phenomenology of the community in its becoming, and to situate it, at least partially, within the framework of the phenomenology of Europe as formulated by Erich Przywara in this treatise Idee Europe. (shrink)

Jacek Urbaniec: Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics does not necessarily imply that there are links between the temporal physical world and the eternal world of mathematics..

One of the most vigorously debated issues in attention labs concerns the nature of the coupling between the sensory-motor system and covert spatial attention. Proponents of the Premotor Theory of Attention (PToA) claim that attention should be accounted for in terms of motor preparation for goal-directed actions such as eye or hand movements. For others, it is a supramodal psychological entity that is independent of our sensorimotor machinery. Both parties also seek to articulate this controversy in terms of cognitive science (...) as a question of whether attention is embodied or disembodied cognition. The PToA is thought to advocate the embodiment of attention. We, however, are inclined to think that a more nuanced view of this conceptual framework is needed to yield some insights into how radical it actually is in terms of embodied cognition (EC). We argue that PToA still seems to bear some features of weak embodiment. Yet we suggest that it has the potential to build a stronger concept of attention as EC, but somewhat paradoxically this would require giving attention deflationary treatment and reconstructing it in other terms. We propose that the notion of pre-reflective intentionality might serve as an inspiration to this end. (shrink)

We prove that no logic (i.e. consequence operation) determined by any class of orthomodular lattices admits the deduction theorem (Theorem 2.7). We extend those results to some broader class of logics determined by ortholattices (Corollary 2.6).

Let J be any proper ideal of subsets of the real line R which contains all finite subsets of R. We define an ideal J * ∣B as follows: X ∈ J * ∣B if there exists a Borel set $B \subset R \times R$ such that $X \subset B$ and for any x ∈ R we have $\{y \in R: \langle x,y\rangle \in B\} \in \mathscr{J}$ . We show that there exists a family $\mathscr{A} \subset \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ of power ω (...) 1 such that $\bigcup\mathscr{A} \not\in \mathscr{J}^\ast\mid\mathscr{B}$ . In the last section we investigate properties of ideals of Lebesgue measure zero sets and meager sets in Cohen extensions of models of set theory. (shrink)

In 1968 the authors of the so-called Harvard Report, proposed the recognition of an irreversible coma as a new criterion for death. The proposal was accepted by the medical, legal, religious and political circles in spite of the lack of any explanation why the irreversible coma combined with the absence of brainstem reflexes, including the respiratory reflex might be equated to death. Such an explanation was formulated in the President’s Commission Report published in 1981. This document stated, that the brain (...) is the central integrator of the body, therefore the destruction of the brain results in the lack of that integration and the death of the organism. Therefore, according to that document, the so-called “brain dead” patients are really, biologically dead; strictly speaking they are not any more biological organisms but collections of organs and tissues. Their death was masked by the use of the medical equipment, but it was a real, biological death. Thus, the explanation given by the President’s Commission Report constituted a biological rationale for the new concept of death, known as “brain death.” However, after the long discussion, this rationale was refuted because of the evidence given by many medical authorities, that the bodies of the “brain dead” and “brainstem dead” patients are alive. In the context of the discussion about the neurological criteria for death, some authors follow the idea of Plato, that human being is the soul or mind, and the body does not belong to the human essence. Therefore, the loss of consciousness, which may be identified with the mind, constitutes the loss of personhood and may be interpreted as human death. The other group stresses the Aristotelian and Thomistic concept that the body belongs to the essence of every living creature, including human. Therefore, as long as the body is alive, the human being is alive and we cannot call the given patient dead even if he is deeply comatose. Moreover, in spite of the opinions dominating in the mass-media, these patients should be considered not only alive but also may be conscious to some degree and their state can be reversible. Their brains are lacking the electrical functions, but the neuronal tissue is alive and that state is reversible for at least first 48 hours since the onset of coma; this phenomenon is called “global ischemic penumbra” and is responsible for the regularly happening events interpreted as miracles, when some of the “brain dead” or “brainstem dead” patients turn to be alive and come back to normal life. Therefore, the neurological criteria of death are still lacking generally accepted scientific basis and should not be used in medicine and in the legal systems as a basis for diagnosing comatose/having no brainstem reflexes/apneic patients dead. (shrink)

In this paper we present a characterization of hyper-connexivity by means of a relating semantics for Boolean connexive logics. We also show that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is Abelardian, strongly consistent, Kapsner strong and antiparadox. We give an example showing that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not simplificative. This shows that the minimal Boolean connexive logic is not totally connexive.

Jacek Filek criticizes the modern “nonethical” ethics. He points out its break with philosophy, lack of self-criticism, inanity, undue and fruitless formalism, and academism. His article makes a general request for the restitution of ethics as the independent and dignified scholarly discipline closely connected with world and life.

In a recently published paper, Patrick Todd (2016, 'Future contingents are all false! On behalf of a Russellian open future') advocates a novel treatment of future contingents. On his view, all statements concerning the contingent future are false. He motivates his semantic postulates by considerations in philosophy of time and modality, in particular by the claim that there is no actual future. I present a number of highly controversial consequences of Todd’s theory. Inadequacy of his semantics might indirectly serve as (...) an argument against the philosophical view underpinning his proposal. (shrink)

The present text “Paul of Tarsus in the eyes of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek” presents opinions of two philosophers, Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, concerning founder of Christianity Paul of Tarsus. For Badiou Paul was theologian of universalism, for Žižek apostle of exclusion. But when their views are analyzed carefully, one can see that both skipped fragments of Paul’s letters which deny assumptions of their own theories. Badiou see in Paul spokesman of one and only truth. He does not (...) want to see that such attitude leads to exclusion of those who reject his truth. At the same time Badiou sees in him precursor of modern society which guarantee laws to minorities, though Paul himself excluded it. Paul’s vision excludes voluntary choose and leads to coercion in religion. Žižek who stigmatize Paul’s intolerance, did not mention his tolerance concerning vegetarians and sexual life of clergy. (shrink)

This paper is a study of similarities and differences between strong and weak quantum consequence operations determined by a given class of ortholattices. We prove that the only strong orthologics which admits the deduction theorem (the only strong orthologics with algebraic semantics, the only equivalential strong orthologics, respectively) is the classical logic.

Intentionality is one of the most frequently discussed topics in contemporary phenomenology and analytic philosophy. This book investigates intentionality from the point of view of intentional objects. According to the classical approach to this concept, whatever can be consciously experienced is regarded as an intentional object. Thus, not only ordinary existing individuals but also various kinds of non-existents and non-individuals are considered as intentional. Alexius Meinong, an Austrian philosopher, is particularly well-known as the `inventor' of an abundant ontology of objects (...) among which even incomplete and impossible ones, like `the round square', find their place. Drawing inspirations from Meinong's ideas, the author develops a simple logic of intentional objects, M-logic. M-logic closely resembles classical first-order logic and, as opposed to the formally complicated contemporary theories of non-existent objects, it is much more friendly in apprehending and applications. However, despite this resemblance, the ontological content of M-logic far exceeds that of classical logic. In this book formal investigations are intertwined with philosophical analyses. On the one hand, M-logic is used as a tool for investigating formal features of intentional objects. On the other hand, the study of intentionality phenomena suggests further ways of extending and modifying M-logic. Audience: The book is addressed to logicians, cognitive scientists, philosophers of language and metaphysics with either a phenomenological or an analytic background. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, (...) it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics. (shrink)

The paper briefly presents a genesis of the research project called the theology of science initiated by Michał Heller in early 1980s, but also enriched by the remarks of Józef Życiński. Then the main features of the new Heller’s book Science and theology – not necessarily exclusively on one planet are discussed. The book develops and strengthens the early ideas of theology of science. The paper draws also attention to another author—C.B. Kaiser who—since a dozen years—has been developing a similar (...) project: theology of scientific endeavor. It is also suggested that the Heller’s project, especially in its axiological and praxeological aspects, could take advantage of the achievements of several Francophone authors who once developed a field of the so-called theology of earthly realities. (shrink)

The article raises the issue of ‘the right to be ill’, formulated by Tadeusz Kielanowski, a Polish physician and humanist. According to him, the right to health should be supplemented by the principle which would serve the protection of people with diseases or disabilities. One-sided interpretation of ‘the right to health’ may result in various forms of intolerance and discrimination. This paper presents what dangers Kielanowski recognized and explains why his approach was considered to be a novelty; what the idea (...) of ‘the right to be ill’ is, how the need for it is substantiated. This idea is considered in the context of human rights and it constitutes a starting point for the reflection on social phenomena connected with medicine. Taking into account the changes in medical ethics and culture which have taken place in the recent decades the question has been asked—is it worth talking about the right to be ill these days? Giving positive answers to this question, the spheres and issues that have been presented can be analyzed and assessed from the perspective of the right to be ill. (shrink)

Author: Migasiński Jacek Title: TRANSCENDENTALISM OF LEVINAS (Transcendentalizm Levinasa) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2006, vol:.6, number: 2006/1, pages: 21-41 Keywords: LEVINAS, KANT, TRANSCENDENTALISME, PHÉNOMÉNOLOGIE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:En s’inspirant de l’approche de Natalie Depraz qui defini la position théorique de Husserl tardif comme «l’empirisme transcendental», je propose retrouver aussi dans la philosophie de Emmanuel Levinas une forme specifique du transcendentalisme, transcendentalisme de genese – différente de l’apriorisme transcendental de (...) Kant. Je demontre que – en dépit de l’apparence – on peut interpreter certaines couches de la réalité ou certains phénoménes ou encore événements que Levinas soumet à l’analyse – telles que «il y a», «la mort», «le feminin», «la fecondité», «la jouissance» et «le travail – la demeure» – comme les conditions empirico-transcendentales de la genese du sujet mur et susceptible de nouer «l’intrigue éthique». Je montre ainsi combine Levinas doit aux méthodes classiques de la phénoménologie. Cependant je demontre aussi que ni la transcendence de l’Infini qui se devoile dans «l’épiphanie du visage», ni cette figure du sujet qui est décrite dans la dernière période de Levinas, notamment «le soi» – le sujet dechiré de l’interieur par la diachronie propre a lui, le sujet an – archique, indicible dans un langage prédicatif – ne peuvent plus remplir les functions transcendentales. En fin j’essai de demontrer que la perspective transcendentale chez Levinas trouve ses limitations et qu’elle est remplacée dans la dernière période par une sorte de dialectique apophatique. (shrink)

Since the very dawn of its history, modern philosophical anthropology has been addressing the issue of the human body. As a result of those efforts, Descartes, de Biran, Husserl, Sartre, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty and others have brought forward a variety of conceptions concerning various aspects of human corporeality. Anthropological explorations concerning the question of the human body, appear in a particularly interesting way, when they are considered in the context of those points of view which, in an essential way, refer to (...) the subjective character of the human being. It is a matter of reconstructing and analyzing how the subject's corporeality is given to the subject, originarily, according to the phenomenological rule zu den Sachen selbst. The aim of this paper is thus to put into some order the concerns of a variety of anthropologists with regard to the question of the human body, as it is given to, or experienced by, the subject. A metatheoretical analysis of this field proves it is possible to do so with the use of a tool, which is called here, a dimension of corporeality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Leśniewskian Ontology (LO) is a system in which the basic subject-predicate formula takes the form of a b and express one-argument predication, e.g. John is a student. In LO’s language, there is no many-argument form of predication given that would allow for the structural expression of, for example, the sentence John is Anne’s son. In this article, a simple and natural extension of LO is suggested to encompass many-argument predication. The system thus obtained corresponds to polyadic second-order logic.

Dziewiętnaste stulecie to jeden z najbogatszych w wydarzenia i treści okresów historii myśli ludzkiej. Jeśli popatrzymy na ten czas pod kątem wydarzeń o znaczeniu ideowym, to uzmysłowimy sobie, że symbolicznie otwiera je wielka rewolucja francuska, a kończy wybuch I wojny światowej. Naukowe teorie i filozoficzne przesłania, jakie zrodziły się w tym okresie – kantyzm, heglizm, materializm, marksizm, społeczny i biologiczny ewolucjonizm, pozytywizm, radykalny ateizm – wypełniły uniwersyteckie sale wykładowe, gabinety polityczne i izby parlamentów. Nie wszyscy żyjący wówczas intelektualiści zdawali sobie (...) sprawę z przemożnej siły filozoficznych nowinek czy przełomowego znaczenia ideowych propozycji. Tylko uważny namysł nad tym, co wtedy dokonywało się w europejskiej myśli, co działo się w kulturze, nauce, historii, filozofii i religii, pozwalał zauważyć, że nadchodzą bardzo poważne zmiany. Jedną z kluczowych postaci, która dostrzegła moc filozoficznych idei, rozbrzmiewających w dyskusjach tego stulecia, był włoski duchowny Gioacchino Vincenzo Raphaelo Luigi Pecci, późniejszy papież Leon XIII. Właśnie świadomy wagi i mocy ideowych skutków nowych prądów pod koniec XIX wieku, w bardzo trudnych dla Kościoła katolickiego czasach, we wrogiej chrześcijaństwu światopoglądowej atmosferze, spowodowanej wpływem idealistycznych filozofii i fascynacją rodzącym się marksizmem, ogłosił w 1879 roku encyklikę Aeterni Patris. Papież wskazywał sposoby intelektualnego wspomagania i odbudowywania znaczenia teologii i religii w życiu społecznym, zachwianego przez nurty postoświeceniowe i modernistyczne. Leon XIII przekonywał, że jeśli misją Kościoła jest nauczanie, to jest on odpowiedzialny także za ocenę treści, jakie pojawiają się w życiu społecznym i politycznym. Narody, państwa i wspólnoty nie żyją jedynie sprawami ekonomicznymi czy bytowymi, ale przede wszystkim tym, co dokonuje się w kulturze, sztuce, filozofii. Papież proroczo dostrzegł, jak wiele zależy od filozofii. W świetle wciąż powracającego pytania o zasadność i potrzebę filozofii chrześcijańskiej warto spojrzeć retrospektywnie na znaczenie wspomnianej encykliki i zawartej w niej wizji roli filozofii w ludzkim poszukiwaniu odpowiedzi na pytania, wynikające z aktualnego postępu cywilizacyjnego, naukowego i kulturowego. -------------- Zgłoszono: 26/07/2020. Zrecenzowano: 18/09/2020. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 27/10/2020. (shrink)

The paper depicts the philosophical views of F. Bochwic (1799-1856) which are as follows: ontology, anthropology, epistemology, ethics, and education. The world, according to Bochwic, was created by God (creationism) and is divided into two spheres: spiritual and carnal (ontological dualism). The factor that unites them is man. His purpose, as a free creature, is his tendency to perfection. The sources of human knowledge are the following: unreliable senses and reliable conscience (intuitionism). Conscience is the source of our presentiments with (...) regard to: the existence of God, immortality of the soul, God\'s justice, and moral orders obligatory for all people (axiological absolutism): the order to make good and avoid evil, the order to love oneself and the neighbour, and the order to obey one\'s parents and superiors. The philosophical views of Bochwic lay at the grounds of his educational doctrine. According to it, education should instil civil virtues in adolescents and be versatile, balanced, varied, imitative, kind, and permanent. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend the ontological Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR-O). I analyse various versions of this principle and various ways of justifying it. Then I attempt to challenge some counterexamples allegedly refuting a universal application of the PSR-O. There are standard and non-standard versions of the PSR-O. The PSR-Ostand can only be valid if there are no chains of contingent reasons and outcomes with first modules, i.e. all chains are actually infinite. However, there are serious (...) arguments against this possibility. The necessary condition of the PSR-Onon-stand is the existence of a necessary substance: that substance would be a direct reason of certain contingent states of affairs obtaining in its domain, and those states of affairs would then be indirect reasons for all other contingent states of affairs and things. There are two advantages of the PSR-Onon-stand: a nomological unity of the world and explanatory simplicity. (shrink)

The quest for effective medicines is very old. In modern times two important tools have been developed to evaluate efficacy of drugs: superiority and non-inferiority types of clinical trials. The former tests the null hypothesis of μ (the difference between a tested drug and comparator) ≤ 0 against μ > 0; the latter tests the null hypothesis of μ ≤ - Δ against, μ > - Δ, where Δ is the clinical difference from the comparator. In a superiority trial, a (...) new drug is tested against a placebo; in a non-inferiority trial, a new drug is tested against active treatment. In this paper, arguments are presented to show that a superiority trial against a placebo is scientifically sound but ethically unacceptable, whereas a non-inferiority trial against active treatment is ethically sound but scientifically not reliable. Switching from a superiority type of trial with placebo to a non-inferiority trial with an active-control — following the latest revision of Declaration of Helsinki — is in practice switching from the violation of the uncertainty principle to uncertainty of results. Given human and financial resources, it appears an academic question as to which is more unethical: to violate patients’ rights or to produce results without scientific value. All presented considerations lead to the conclusion that the use of a superiority trial of design with an active control instead of placebo will satisfy scientific needs, expectation of patients, and the ancient quest for effective medicines. In the era of Good (Clinical, Laboratory, Manufacture) Practice, the attention of those performing clinical trials is focused on the procedure, not always on its essence. However even the excellent performance of a trial which is not worth doing is fruitless. (shrink)