Are evolution and creation irreconcilably opposed? Is 'intelligent design' theory an unhappy compromise? Is there another way of approaching the present-day divide between religious and so-called secular views of the origins of life? Jacob Klapwijk offers a philosophical analysis of the relation of evolutionary biology to religion, and addresses the question of whether the evolution of life is exclusively a matter of chance or is better understood as including the notion of purpose. Writing from a Christian point of view, (...) he criticizes creationism and intelligent design theory as well as opposing reductive naturalism. He offers an alternative to both and an attempt to bridge the gap between them, via the idea of 'emergent evolution'. In this theory the process of evolution has an emergent or innovative character resulting in a living world of ingenious, multifaceted complexity. (shrink)

This volume is a study of the relationship between philosophy and faith in Søren Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments. It is also the first book to examine the role of Socrates in this body of writings, illuminating the significance of Socrates for Kierkegaard's thought. Jacob Howland argues that in the Fragments, philosophy and faith are closely related passions. A careful examination of the role of Socrates demonstrates that Socratic, philosophical eros opens up a path to faith. At the same time, the (...) work of faith - which holds the self together with that which transcends it - is essentially erotic in the Socratic sense of the term. Chapters on Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus and on Plato's Apology shed light on the Socratic character of the pseudonymous author of the Fragments and the role of 'the god' in Socrates' pursuit of wisdom. Howland also analyzes the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Kierkegaard's reflections on Socrates and Christ. (shrink)

Talmudic history, understood as how events are organized and narrated to teach, cannot be said to deal with great affairs; it simply tells what those responsible for compiling it thought about the world around them. But if manifest history is scarcely present, a rich and complex world of latent history does lie ready at hand. The Talmud and related literature contain two sorts of historical information: stories about events within an estate of clerks, and data on the debates of those (...) who produced the Talmud. The authors of the Mishnah found no reason to narrate history because what was important in Israel's existence was sanctification, an ongoing process. Its framers recognized the pastness of the past and hence, by definition, laid out a conception of the past that constitutes an historical doctrine. The Talmud of the Land of Israel, spurred by the story of the suffering of Israel and efforts to explain the tragedy, moves toward an interest in the periodization of history and a willingness to include events of far greater diversity than the Mishnah. A teleology lacking all eschatological dimension - the Mishnah - here gives way to an explicitly messianic statement that the purpose of the law is to attain Israel's salvation -the Talmud of the Land of Israel. (shrink)

The non-identity problem arises when our actions in the present could change which people will exist in the future, for better or worse. Is it morally better to improve the lives of specific future people, as compared to changing which people exist for the better? Affecting the timing of fetuses being conceived is one case where present actions change the identity of future people. This is relevant to questions of public health policy, as exemplified in some responses to the Zika (...) epidemic. There is philosophical disagreement about the relevance of non-identity: some hold that non-identity is not relevant, while others think that the only morally relevant actions are those that affect specific people. Given this disagreement, we investigated the intuitions about the moral relevance of non-identity within an educated sample of the public, because there was previously little empirical data on the public’s views on the non-identity problem. We performed an online survey with a sample of the educated general public. The survey assessed participants’ preferences between person-affecting and impersonal interventions for Zika, and their views on other non-identity thought experiments, once the non-identity problem had been explained. It aimed to directly measure the importance of non-identity in participants’ moral decision-making. We collected 763 valid responses from the survey. Half of the participants (50%) had a graduate degree, 47% had studied philosophy at a university level, and 20% had read about the non-identity problem before. Most participants favoured person-affecting interventions for Zika over impersonal ones, but the majority claimed that non-identity did not influence their decision (66% of those preferring person-affecting interventions, 95% of those preferring impersonal ones). In one non-identity thought experiment participants were divided, but in another they primarily answered that impersonally reducing the quality of life of future people would be wrong, harmful and blameworthy, even though no specific individuals would be worse off. Non-identity appeared to play a minor role in participants’ moral decision-making. Moreover, participants seem to either misunderstand the non-identity problem, or hold non-counterfactual views of harm that do not define harm as making someone worse off than they would have been otherwise. (shrink)

I offer here a new hypothesis about the nature of implicit attitudes. Psy- chologists and philosophers alike often distinguish implicit from explicit attitudes by maintaining that we are aware of the latter, but not aware of the former. Recent experimental evidence, however, seems to challenge this account. It would seem, for example, that participants are frequently quite adept at predicting their own perfor- mances on measures of implicit attitudes. I propose here that most theorists in this area have nonetheless overlooked (...) a commonsense distinction regarding how we can be aware of attitudes, a difference that fundamentally distinguishes implicit and explicit attitudes. Along the way, I discuss the implications that this distinction may hold for future debates about and experimental investigations into the nature of implicit attitudes. (shrink)

This article reframes our understanding of French structural anthropology by considering the work of André Leroi-Gourhan alongside that of Claude Lévi-Strauss. These two anthropologists worked at opposite poles of the discipline, Lévi-Strauss studying cultural objects, like myths and kinship relations; Leroi-Gourhan looking at material artifacts, such as stone tools, bones, arrowheads, and cave paintings. In spite of their difference in focus, these thinkers shared a similar approach to the interpretation of their sources: Each individual object was meaningful only as part (...) of a larger whole. For Lévi-Strauss, structuralism was designed to unlock features of the human mind; for Leroi-Gourhan, to uncover the material processes that underlay human life. Again, in spite of their difference in orientation, both structuralisms produced similar theories of human society. Whether ‘primitive’ or ‘advanced’, all societies functioned the same way: Their institutions worked harmoniously, beyond the intentions of any individual actors, to preserve the stability of the group. This eliminated the basis for thinking one society was superior to another. Finally, the article argues that both Lévi-Strauss and Leroi-Gourhan believed that structural anthropology could found a ‘new humanism’, and thereby rescue modernity from moral degeneration. This ‘new humanism’ could not only produce a universal description of human nature, but also help rethink French colonialism, broker new geopolitical alliances, and prevent the erasure of world cultures. Structural anthropology thus imagined a tight relationship between its social-scientific work and its political-moral mission. (shrink)

Early-Modern Irish Catholics exiled on the European continent are known to have often held prominent academic positions in various important colleges and universities. This paper investigates the hitherto unknown Scholastic legacy of the Dublin-born Jesuit John Austin (1717–84), a famous Irish educator who started his career teaching philosophy at the Jesuit college of Rheims in 1746–47, before returning to the country of his birth as part of the Irish Mission. These manuscript lecture notes provides us first-hand knowledge about the content (...) of French Jesuit education in the middle of the eighteenth century, which does not correspond to its classical reputation of ‘Aristotelian’ scholasticism opposed to philosophical novelties. While stitching to a traditional way of teaching, Austin introduces positively elements from Descartes, Malebranche, Locke and Newton into the curriculum. The present paper focuses on his conception of philosophical certitude (certitudo), which he considered a necessary condition for the possibility of philosophical knowledge. (shrink)

Dans les dernières années de sa vie, il arrivait à Michel Henry de s’inquiéter du destin posthume de sa pensée, de la possibilité de sa transmission par-delà sa mort. Il faut reconnaître que, dans la période qui a suivi, l’audience de cette pensée a semblé décroître et l’on pouvait redouter qu’elle ne s’efface durablement de notre paysage intellectuel. Il est difficile de comprendre les raisons de ce reflux : était-il dû à la rigueur conceptuelle et à la difficulté d’une pensée (...) trop exigeante... (shrink)

If Kant’s theory of justice is known for one thing, it is for offering a vision of a perfectly just society that is utterly disconnected from the imperfect societies that we occupy. The purity of Kant’s account has attracted criticism from those who claim that if a theory of justice is to be practical, it must offer more than a vision of a perfectly just society. It must also explain how existing societies mired in injustice are to be brought into (...) ever-closer conformity with the ideal that justice prescribes. In this essay, I will argue that this is exactly what Kant’s mature legal and political theory offers. To discern this feature of Kant’s theory, a neglected component must be integrated into his broader framework. This component is what Kant refers to in Toward Perpetual Peace as a permissive law of public right. (shrink)

Abstract: Laudan (1984) distinguishes between two senses of success for scientific theories: (i) that a particular theory is successful, and (ii) that the methods for picking out approximately true theories are successful. These two senses of success are reflected in two different ways that the no miracles argument for scientific realism (NMA) may be set out. First, I set out a (traditional) version of NMA that considers the success of particular theories. I then consider a more recent formulation of NMA (...) (Psillos, 1999). This version of NMA is aimed at making us believe that our methods for picking out approximately true theories are reliable. I shall argue that the success of the latter argument is dependent on the success of the first. Therefore, even though Psillos presents a new formulation of NMA, the evidential support for it is no stronger than the evidential support for the original version. (shrink)

There are presently three broad approaches the project of naturalizing intentionality: a purely informational approach (Dretske and Fodor), a purely teleological approach (Millikan and Papineau), and a mixed informationally-based teleological approach (Dretske again). I will argue that the last teleosemantic theory offers the most promising approach. I also think, however, that the most explicit version of a pure teleosemantic theory of content, namely Millikan’s admirable theory, faces a pair of objections. My goal in this paper is to spell out Millikan’s (...) pure teleosemantic theory; then to present two objections; and finally to ask the question whether a teleosemantic framework can be saved from the objections. (shrink)

This book is developed from a study of an inner city, urban elementary school that has undergone serial comprehensive school reforms. This book is intended for a fuller understanding of school improvement and effectiveness, providing commonsense recommendations for the future direction of American education that aim to promote student success.

In legal orders around the world, commitments to democracy, liberalism and constitutionalism are increasingly eroding. Although political and constitutional theorists often lament this trend, they invariably adopt frameworks that are indifferent to these commitments. My aims in this article are both critical and constructive. As a critical matter, I will expose the indifference of the leading political and constitutional theories to the emergence, maintenance and refinement of liberal democratic constitutional orders. As a constructive matter, I will draw on Immanuel Kant’s (...) constitutional theory to explain why realizing such a form of governance is a public duty and why receding from it is a public wrong. (shrink)

As a naturalistically inclined philosopher, I reject the thesis that meaning is intrinsically normative. I consider the deflationary proposal that meaning is not normative at all and I find it unacceptable. I argue from the difficulties met by the deflationary proposal in favor of the teleosemantic view that the normativity of meaning arises from biological functions.

In his ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’ Kant makes the astonishing claim that one is not entitled to lie even to save a friend from a murderer. This claim has been an embarrassment for Kant's defenders and an indication of Kant's excessive rigour for his detractors. Responses to SRL fall into three main groups. The first of these groups, that of Kant's critics, claim that SRL demonstrates that Kant's ethical views are so rigorous that they become abhorrent (...) in practice. The second group, Kant's defenders, argues that Kant's conclusions in SRL do not follow from his own ethical principles. The third group, made up of scholars who are generally sympathetic to Kant's position, attempts to explain why a liar is responsible for all the bad consequences that follow from his act by providing an account of Kant's theory of imputation. (shrink)

This article discusses recent legal conflicts between state universities and conservative religious students in the United States, focusing on Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. In recent years, several universities have denied recognition to religious student organizations that discriminate on the basis of religion or sexual orientation. I argue that scholars on both sides of the issue have failed to recognize the full scope of the privilege that the universities demand. If the courts accept the universities' demands, then the courts dangerously (...) expand the government's authority to suppress dissenters. No proponent of civil liberties should welcome this change. (shrink)

This article deals with the contributions to the psychology of religion made by Dr. Marianne Beth , an almost totally forgotten pioneer of the psychology of religion. The article especially contextualizes her initiative to turn “unbelief” into a topic for research in psychology of religion, and describes the tragic end the Nazi reign made to her development and career. Born as the daughter of a prominent Austrian Jewish lawyer living in Vienna, Marianne von Weisl received excellent intellectual training. Initially, her (...) wish to become active in the same field as her father was frustrated by the injunction against women studying law. When this injunction was lifted, she went for a second doctorate in law, her first doctorate having been in the humanities. Marianne Beth became very active in public life ; she travelled and gave lectures and developed a large radius as a prolific author in newspapers and periodicals. Although clearly committed women’s rights, she did not belong to any feminist movement.Her interest in psychology was certainly stimulated by her husband Karl Beth , a professor of systematic theology, who developed an increasing interest in both history and the psychology of religion. In fact, psychology of religion seems to have become the field in which the couple collaborated intellectually most. They were both involved in the founding of a “research institute” for the psychology of religion, of an international society for the psychology of religion, and of a journal for the psychology of religion. All these activities took place from the apartment of the Beths in Vienna, where the preparations for the First International Congress for the Psychology of Religion also occurred. That congress had as its theme; “the psychic causes of unbelief”. Even earlier than her husband, Marianne Beth had published on the topic of unbelief. Her interest may have been triggered by a call for papers by the internationally renowned Kant-Society. The Society issued a prize for a treatise on “the psychology of belief” in 1928, which Marianne Beth then won. It is also possible, however, that the call for papers had been triggered after her initial publications on the subject. Her paper was published in the well-known journal Kant-Studien.There was a plan to publish the contributions to the 1931 congress in Vienna in book form in a series of three volumes, but only one was published, probably due to financial problems. The rest of the papers presented were published in the Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie, edited by the Beths. As her publications since then show, she grew increasingly interested in empirical topics and approaches, and was broadly read in contemporary psychology. She authored numerous contributions to the Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie. However, when Nazi-Germany annexed Austria in 1938, she left the country for the United States, taking both her children with her. Shortly afterwards, Karl Beth was also obliged to follow his family into exile. In the US, neither had any opportunity to pursue their interests in the psychology of religion; Marianne taught sociology briefly and German; Karl taught “comparative theology”.Nevertheless, Marianne Beth’s impulse to turn “unbelief” into a research topic in the psychology of religion did have some lasting influence: the work of better-known psychologists of religion such as Rümke, Pruyser and Vergote are indebted to her, at least indirectly, as this article tries to show. (shrink)

En este trabajo, el autor tiene la intención de defender la genuinidad del νοῦς y, por tanto,del λόγος, como fundamento de la ley moral natural. Esta genuinidad puede encontrarseen la infinitud como horizonte hermenéutico que le brinda al hombre la noción de ente enuniversal. Algunas corrientes contemporáneas de corte cientificista niegan que el hombretenga dicho elemento infinito y, por tanto, una facultad así considerada. Por esto, elautor discute una de ellas, a saber, con la sociobiología, a la que contrasta con (...) la visióniusnaturalista de la ley moral. (shrink)

There is a tension between Laudato si's consistent emphasis on relationships and interconnectedness and its acceptance of anthropocentrism. While Laudato si’ does reject certain problematic forms of anthropocentrism, the encyclical does not assert an alternative to this traditional framework. This article contends that “relatiocentrism” provides the best avenue for developing the convictions expressed within Laudato si’ while moving beyond the limitations of the encyclical itself. In so doing, this essay explores the use of narrative as a means of shaping identity (...) by mapping significant relationships and points of meaning. It examines the central anthropological claims of the encyclical and the tensions these create with anthropocentric narratives. And it examines relatiocentrism in light of the biblical creation accounts, the eschatological perspective of Laudato si’, and virtue ethics. The essay concludes by suggesting further theological and moral implications of this shift in perspective. (shrink)

It takes courage to characterize feminist writings on tort law as "thin." Indeed, Professor Schwartz in his provocative and challenging article examines feminist writings in a unique and innovative way. In his analysis of a number of such writings, he attempts to demonstrate that they either have not done enough or could have done better. His provocative analysis of many issues invites vigorous discussion. One could write a separate comment on each and every one of the issues he raises; however, (...) I will limit my comment to two: the tension between the "reasonable man" and the "reasonable woman" standard and the duty to rescue rule. It takes courage to characterize feminist writings on tort law as "thin." Indeed, Professor Schwartz in his provocative and challenging article examines feminist writings in a unique and innovative way. In his analysis of a number of such writings, he attempts to demonstrate that they either have not done enough or could have done better. His provocative analysis of many issues invites vigorous discussion. One could write a separate comment on each and every one of the issues he raises; however, I will limit my comment to two: the tension between the "reasonable man" and the "reasonable woman" standard and the duty to rescue rule. (shrink)