The Corpus agrimensorum Romanorum is a compilation of treatises on land-surveying which has been passed down to us in a manuscript from the sixth century AD. The best known authors included are Frontinus, Hyginus gromaticus and Siculus Flaccus. This paper addresses 11 passages in the corpus which discuss the origins of technical terms used in the text. Analysis of the content, language and style of these etymologies shows that they are later additions, which mostly originate from Varro, and should be (...) deleted. It is also shown that, on palaeographic grounds, the order of a large body of text as found in modern editions must be reconsidered. (shrink)

According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, and (...) that the preemption problem continues to haunt the counterfactual comparative account. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility of moral conflict in Kant’s ethics. An analysis of the only explicit discussion of the topic in his published writings confirms that there is no room for genuine moral dilemmas. Conflict is limited to nonconclusive ‘grounds’ of obligation. They arise only in the sphere of ethical duty and, though defeasible, ought to be construed as the result of valid arguments an agent correctly judges to apply in the situation at hand. While it is difficult to (...) determine in theory what makes some of them stronger than others, these ‘grounds’ can account for practical residue in conflict cases and for a plausible form of agent regret. The principle that ‘ought implies can’ survives intact. (shrink)

While Kant in his pre-critical work expressed appreciative, albeit reserved, sympathy toward the British moral sense school, in his main works on moral philosophy he harshly rejects the idea that we have a specific moral sense. This change in attitude is, of course, connected to Kant's discovery and formulation of a purely rational moral principle. Still one might ask whether Kant's critique of moral sense theory was really justified. To answer this question, I shall first examine what Kant understands the, (...) or a, moral sense to be. Second, I shall consider which arguments Kant employs to reject any moral sense. Third, I shall explain what Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume meant when discussing moral sense. Finally, I shall show that Kant's moral legalism cannot come to grips with the aspect of moral consciousness, for which the British moral philosophers coined the concept of moral sense, and that therefore Kant's criticism of moral sense theory is unjustified. Während der Kant der vorkritischen Schriften der moral-sense- Schule der Briten zwar nicht ohne Vorbehalte, aber doch mit anerkennender Sympathie gegenübergestanden hat, verwirft er in seinen moralphilosophischen Hauptschriften die Annahme eines spezifischen moralischen Sinnes mit äußerst harschen Worten. Dieser Wandel der Einstellung hängt natürlich mit Kants Entdeckung und Formulierung eines rein rationalen Moralprinzips zusammen. Dennoch stellt sich die Frage, ob Kants Kritik der moral-sense- Theorie wirklich berechtigt ist. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage wird erstens untersucht, was Kant unter dem oder einem moralischen Gefühl versteht, zweitens wird geprüft, mit welchen Argumenten Kant die Annahme eines moral sense verwirft, und drittens wird mit Bezug auf Shaftesbury, Hutcheson und Hume dargelegt, was diese Theoretiker eigentlich unter einem moral sense verstanden haben. Abschließend wird dargetan, daß Kant mit seinem moralischen Legalismus eben den Aspekt des moralischen Bewußtseins nicht erfassen kann, für den die Briten den Begriff des moral sense geprägt haben, und daß seine Kritik der moral-sense- Theorie insofern unberechtigt ist. (shrink)

In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against (...) my critique. (shrink)

Kant’s concept of conscience has been largely neglected by scholars and contemporary moral philosophers alike, as has his concept of “indirect” duty. Admittedly, neither of them is foundational within his ethical theory, but a correct account of both in their own right and in combination can shed some new light on Kant’s moral philosophy as a whole. In this paper, I first examine a key passage in which Kant systematically discusses the role of conscience, then give a systematic account of (...) “indirect” duties and the function of hypothetical imperatives in the course of their generation. I then turn to the possibility of moral error and the part “indirect” duty can play in its prevention. In conclusion, I try to show how clarifying the concept of “indirect” duty can help us to shed light on the nature of Kantian ethics as a whole. (shrink)

In this paper, we interpret a 19th century diagram, which is meant to visualise G.W.F. Hegel’s entire method of the `Science of Logic' on the basis of bitwise operations. For the interpretation of the diagram we use a binary numeral system, and discuss whether the anti-Hegelian argument associated with it is valid or not. The reinterpretation is intended to make more precise rules of construction, a stricter binary code and a review of strengths and weaknesses of the critique.

According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of luck egalitarianism which only (...) holds people responsible for creating disadvantage. This revision enables luck egalitarianism to offer compensation to those who are disadvantaged by preventing disadvantage to others, like dependent caretakers, without compromising the responsibility–sensitivity at the heart of luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

Some forms of argumentation are best performed through words. However, there are also some forms of argumentation that may be best presented visually. Thus, this paper examines the virtues of visual argumentation. What makes visual argumentation distinct from verbal argumentation? What aspects of visual argumentation may be considered especially beneficial?

John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, (...) I have objected that it is irrelevant what it is in fact rational for the person to care about. Fischer and Brueckner have replied to my critique. In this paper I respond to their latest pair of replies. (shrink)

Normative discussions about modern health care often revolve around principles stating what must not be done or how to ration scarce resources in the name of justice. These are important discussions. However, in order to have an impact on clinical roles, ethical reflection must be able to describe and address the complexities and challenges of modern nursing and doctoring, and maybe even the patient role. A multi-principled approach, such as the one suggested by Beauchamp and Childress, can obviously address almost (...) any such issue, but a great deal of translation is often required in order to address role-related issues. I shall here argue that an ethics of caring is better suited to grasping the big picture when the question is how to create value-informed clinical roles in an era of rapid development. (shrink)

What kind of political order would there be in the absence of the state? Jens Bartelson argues that we are currently unable to imagine what might lurk 'beyond', because our basic concepts of political order are conditioned by our experience of statehood. In this study, he investigates the concept of the state historically as well as philosophically, considering a range of thinkers and theories. He also considers the vexed issue of authority: modern political discourse questions the form and content (...) of authority, but makes it all but impossible to talk about the foundations of authority. Largely due to the existing practices of political and scientific criticism, authority appears to be unquestionable. Bartelson's wide-ranging and readable discussion of the suppositions and presuppositions of statehood will be of interest to scholars and upper-level students of political theory and social theory, and philosophy of social science. (shrink)

In a possible world framework, an agent can be said to know a proposition just in case the proposition is true at all worlds that are epistemically possible for the agent. Roughly, a world is epistemically possible for an agent just in case the world is not ruled out by anything the agent knows. If a proposition is true at some epistemically possible world for an agent, the proposition is epistemically possible for the agent. If a proposition is true at (...) all epistemically possible worlds for an agent, the proposition is epistemically necessary for the agent, and as such, the agent knows the proposition. -/- This framework presupposes an underlying space of worlds that we can call epistemic space. Traditionally, worlds in epistemic space are identified with possible worlds, where possible worlds are the kinds of entities that at least verify all logical truths. If so, given that epistemic space consists solely of possible worlds, it follows that any world that may remain epistemically possible for an agent verifies all logical truths. As a result, all logical truths are epistemically necessary for any agent, and the corresponding framework only allows us to model logically omniscient agents. This is a well-known consequence of the standard possible world framework, and it is generally taken to imply that the framework cannot be used to model non-ideal agents that fall short of logical omniscience. -/- A familiar attempt to model non-ideal agents within a broadly world involving framework centers around the use of impossible worlds where the truths of logic can be false. As we shall see, if we admit impossible worlds where “anything goes” in epistemic space, it is easy to avoid logical omniscience. If any logical falsehood is true at some impossible world, then any logical falsehood may remain epistemically possible for some agent. As a result, we can use an impossible world involving framework to model extremely non-ideal agents that do not know any logical truths. -/- A much harder, and considerably less investigated challenge is to ensure that the resulting epistemic space can also be used to model moderately ideal agents that are not logically omniscient but nevertheless logically competent. Intuitively, while such agents may fail to rule out impossible worlds that verify complex logical falsehoods, they are nevertheless able to rule out impossible worlds that verify obvious logical falsehoods. To model such agents, we need a construction of a non-trivial epistemic space that partly consists of impossible worlds where not "anything goes". This involves imposing substantive constraints on impossible worlds to eliminate from epistemic space, say, trivially impossible worlds that verify obvious logical falsehoods. -/- The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate the nature of such non-trivially impossible worlds and the corresponding epistemic spaces. To flag my conclusions, I argue that successful constructions of epistemic spaces that can safely navigate between the Charybdis of logical omniscience and the Scylla of of “anything goes” are hard, if not impossible to find. (shrink)

WORK, GENDER AND POWER IN ANCIENT GREECE - EXAMPLES FORM ATHENS IN THE CLASSICAL PERIODThis article asks how different forms of work were associated with varying forms of status, class and gender in Classical Athens. Moreover, the author seeks to clarify how the male citizen collective in particular controlled society by enforcement of general ideas about what types of work were suitable for citizens, metics and slaves alike. Also, the article challenges the ideal work discourse allocating farming, politics and warfare (...) to male citizens, whereas female citizens confined to oversee the household and perform work to do with processing of food and wool. (shrink)

Leibniz is often cited as an authority when it comes to the formulation and answer strategy of the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Yet much current research assumes that Leibniz advocates an unambiguous question and strategy for the answer. In this respect, one repeatedly finds the argument in the literature that alternative explanatory approaches to this question violate Leibniz’s intention, since he derives the question from the principle of sufficient reason and also demands a causal explanation to (...) the question. In particular, the new research on non-causal explanatory strategies to the Leibniz question seems to concern this counter-argument. In this paper, however, I will argue that while Leibniz raises the question by means of the principle of sufficient reason, he even favours a non-causal explanatory strategy to the question. Thus, a more accurate Leibniz interpretation seems not only to legitimise but also to support non-causal explanations to the Leibniz question. (shrink)

Die Welt ist alles, was wir in unseren naturwissenschaftlichen Theorien beschreiben können – so eine weit verbreitete Überzeugung, die seit den Tagen des Positivismus unser Weltbild bestimmt. Aber reicht das tatsächlich schon aus? Wer sich am Ideal der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis orientiert, neigt dazu, viele nicht-begriffliche Erfahrungsformen zu unterschlagen, die uns aus dem Alltag vertraut sind: Symbolsysteme wie Musik, Literatur oder Bilder, Instanzen der unmittelbaren Erfahrung wie Anschauung, Wahrnehmung oder Gefühl und den Bereich des praktischen Könnens. In der Regel sind wir (...) nicht in der Lage, den Gehalt dieser Phänomene vollständig begrifflich wiederzugeben. Dennoch ist das weite Feld des Nichtbegrifflichen eine unverzichtbare Voraussetzung unserer Sätze und Gedanken: Ohne Kunst, Wahrnehmung und Handeln gibt es kein Denken, keine Wissenschaft, keine Philosophie. Der Band geht der Vielfalt des Nicht-Begrifflichen in ästhetischen, symboltheoretischen und semantischen Untersuchungen nach. Aus ihnen ergibt sich ein umfassender systematischer Überblick über eines der spannendsten und offensten Problemfelder der aktuellen philosophischen Debatte. Mit Beiträgen von: Andreas Bartels, Uwe Baumann, Volker Beeh, Gottfried Boehm, Olaf Breidbach, Joachim Bromand, Gottfried Gabriel, Markus Gabriel, Ernest Wolf Gazo, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, Jürgen Goldstein, Jens Halfwassen, Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Wolfgang Harms, Jochen Hörisch, Peter Janich, Guilherme F. R. Kisteumacher, Jakub Kloc-Konkolowicz, Imi Knoebel, Theo Kobusch, Klaus-M. Kodalle, Sibylle Krämer, Guido Kreis, Wolfgang Kubin, Sönke Lorenz, Antonio Cota Marçal, Aliasghar Mosleh, Theodoros Penolidis, Dominik Perler, Hans-Joachim Pieper, Andrzej Przylebski, Birgit Sandkaulen, Matthias Schmoeckel, Oswald Schwemmer, Josef Simon, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Dieter Teichert, Kai Vogeley, Gottfried Willems und Gereon Wolters. (shrink)

From the mid-1600s to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were two main circles of German scholars which focused extensively on diagrammatic reasoning and representation in logic. The first circle was formed around Erhard Weigel in Jena and consists primarily of Johann Christoph Sturm and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; the second circle developed around Christian Weise in Zittau, with the support of his students, particularly Samuel Grosser and Johann Christian Lange. Each of these scholars developed an original form of using (...) geometric diagrams in logic. In this paper, I will trace the historical notes of John Venn and other modern logicians back to the original works published in the Weigel and Weise circles and describe the development of using geometric figures for logical reasoning and representation in that period of time. (shrink)

A recent approach to the problem of logical omniscience holds that belief is question-sensitive: what an agent believes depends on what question they try to answer (Pérez Carballo, 2016; Yalcin, 2018; Hoek, 2022). While the question-sensitive approach can avoid some logical omniscience problems, we argue that it suffers from nearby problems. First, these accounts all validate closure principles that are just as implausible as the ones it was designed to avoid. Second, question-sensitivity by itself isn’t suitable for explaining many kinds (...) of failures of logical omniscience. Recognizing the flaws of this approach, however, naturally leads to a more promising solution. Our account generalizes the question-sensitive approach by appealing to (1) the defeasible nature of dispositions toward action associated with belief and (2) the algorithms an agent uses to make decisions. On our view, then, believing that φ means being disposed to employ an algorithm which outputs acting on the information that φ in normal circumstances associated with φ. We argue that this account naturally generalizes the question-sensitive accounts while avoiding their faults. (shrink)

The way we use terminology matters. There are words, ordinary and philosophical, that we should do without because they are ill-defined, ambiguous or confused. If we use them we will at best be saying little. At worst, they will make us ask the wrong questions and leave the right ones unasked. In this paper, I argue that ‘deontology’ is such a word. It is defined negatively as non-teleological or non-consequentialist, and therefore does not designate a distinct class of moral theories, (...) let alone a single one. Moreover, the question whether Kantian ethics is ‘deontological’ is likely to obscure what is distinctive and interesting about it. The word ‘deontology’ should be banished from the classroom. It may be best to abandon it altogether. (shrink)

If ethics of care deals with the nature of relationships, attentiveness, and understanding particular others, narrativity ought to play a central part. Sometimes, caring simply amounts to working with narratives. In the article I claim that narrativity can even be said to be native to an ethics of care. Through an example, I demonstrate how a narrative ethics of care can discern and grasp some moral problems better than the standard theoretical outlooks.

Advertisers’ increasing use of embedded advertising formats makes it more difficult for consumers to identify persuasive intents in advertiser messages. However, only if consumers identify these intents and categorize messages as advertising, can they activate advertising-specific reception strategies which might result in lessened persuasion effects. The fact that consumers regularly miss persuasive intents in non-traditional advertising environments, we suggest in this article, carries epistemological and methodical implications. To better appreciate these implications, we argue for a more systematic adoption of a (...) constructivist approach in advertising research. Some established concepts in advertising research such as the persuasion knowledge model and advertising literacy already implicitly follow a constructivist rationale. However, to more fully exploit the potential of a constructivist approach, we review communication concepts that inform advertising research, clarify why a constructivist approach increases the explanatory power of advertising research, and discuss challenges for research designs. (shrink)

The recent financial crisis has triggered an intense debate about the role of banks in society, presumably changing the criteria used in the evaluation of organizations. Against this backdrop, we investigate the changing role of banks’ organizational features in shaping different dimensions of banks’ organizational reputation. Using the media as an important evaluator, we measure the reputational dimension of visibility based on the frequency of newspaper articles and the reputational dimension of favorability based on the sentiment of newspaper articles. Drawing (...) on social judgment research for developing our hypotheses, we expect that organizational features such as financial performance and familiarity become more important determinants of organizational reputation in times of crisis. Our results support this expectation, suggesting stronger effects of these organizational features on the visibility and favorability of banks during a crisis. These findings provide novel empirical evidence on how the importance of drivers of organizational reputation changes in times of crisis and highlight areas for managerial attention. (shrink)

In der Literatur zur Wirkungsgeschichte der Farbenlehre Goethes aus dem Jahr 1810 grassieren zwei Vorurteile: (1) Nur ein einziger Physiker von Rang (Seebeck) habe sich auf Goethes Projekt wissenschaftlich eingelassen. (2) Schon zu Goethes Lebzeiten habe sich die Fachwissenschaft mit überwältigender Mehrheit gegen den Dichter ausgesprochen. Beide Behauptungen sind falsch. ad (1): Der bedeutende Physiker und Chemiker Johann Ritter hat zwischen 1800 und 1801 eng mit Goethe kooperiert, dieselbe Forschungsmethode eingesetzt wie Goethe und aufgrund dieser Kooperation das UV-Licht entdeckt. Bis (...) zu seinem Lebensende war er der Ansicht, dass die newtonische Theorie durch Fortführung der Experimente Goethes unterminiert werden könne. ad (2): Wie sich bei einer Kampfabstimmung unter den MINT-Forschern der Goethe-Zeit ergibt (bei der sämtliche veröffentlichte Voten von 1810 bis 1832 gezählt werden), stimmten gegen Goethe die Hälfte der Naturwissenschaftler, für ihn ein Drittel, bei 15 Prozent Stimmenthaltungen. Goethe hat die Abstimmung in der Tat verloren, doch eine verheerende Niederlage sähe anders aus. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to enquire into neuroscientific research on memory and relate it to topics of skill, knowledge and consciousness. The article outlines some contemporary theories on procedural and working memory, and discusses what contributions they give to sport science and philosophy of sport. It is argued that memory research gives important insights to the neuronal structures and events involved in knowledge and consciousness contributing to sport skills, but that these explanations are not exhaustive. The article argues (...) that phenomenal consciousness in skills is not explained by the neuroscience of memory, and hence neither are skills. (shrink)

In the history of philosophy, Arthur Schopenhauer’s system appears to bethe first one which is concerned with Christian as well as Buddhist saintsand claims that there is an association between them. In recent research,this association has been the source of many special problems,but it actually has never been discussed in general why this association is so important, or why it was necessary for Schopenhauer to relate to Buddhistor Hinduist as well as to Christian saints. Moreover, this issue seems toreveal other (...) problems which are topics in recent discussion. The paper addresses these problems and argues for a descriptive interpretation of Schopenhauer's concept of the denial of the Will-to-live. (shrink)

According to the modal account of propositional apriority, a proposition is a priori if it is possible to know it with a priori justification. Assuming that modal truths are necessarily true and that there are contingent a priori truths, this account has the undesirable consequence that a proposition can be a priori in a world in which it is false. Epistemic two-dimensionalism faces the same problem, since on its standard interpretation, it also entails that a priori propositions are necessarily a (...) priori. In response to this problem, Chalmers and Rabern propose an alternative conception of propositional apriority as well as two-dimensional truth-conditions for apriority statements. Their proposal is also supposed to avoid another problem for the modal account, namely that it entails the existence of false instances of ‘φ iff actually φ’. I discuss Chalmers and Rabern’s account and point out a number of problems with it. I then develop my own account of propositional apriority that solves the problems in question, that can be accepted by friends and foes of two-dimensionalism alike, and that is also neutral with respect to the question of how one construes the objects of propositional apriority. (shrink)

Die Skeptikerin fragt, wie wir ausschließen können, dass all unsere Erlebnisse auf einem umfassenden Traum beruhen. Träfe ihre Befürchtung zu, dann wären alle unsere Meinungen über die äußere Welt falsch, und da wir das nicht ausschließen können, haben wir (so folgert sie) keinerlei Wissen über die Welt. Um dem zu begegnen, könnte man der Skeptikerin vorwerfen, dass sie unsere gemeinsame Sprache missbraucht. Welche Wörter missbraucht sie? Welche Wörter gebraucht sie so anders, dass wir uns um ihre Überlegung nicht scheren müssen? (...) Ich spiele das sprachkritische Manöver gegen die Skeptikerin zunächst anhand des Wissensbegriffs durch (und komme zu dem Ergebnis, dass wir nicht klar genug sagen können, worin die unstrittige Bedeutung des Wortes "Wissen" besteht). Dann versuche ich es mit weniger tiefsinnigen Wörtern wie "Tiger". Wer stets träumt, gebraucht solche Wörter anders als wir, so die Überlegung. Dieser Gedanke funktioniert nur, wenn wir die Existenz von Außenwelt-Dingen voraussetzen dürfen; und diese Voraussetzung bestreitet die Skeptikerin. Daher spiele ich das sprachkritische Manöver zuguterletzt anhand des Traumbegriffs durch. Jemand kann das Wort "Traum" überhaupt nur dann gelernt haben, wenn er manchmal, aber nicht immer geträumt hat. Ergebnis: Entweder ich verstehe das Wort "Traum". Dann träume ich nicht seit jeher. Oder ich verstehe das Wort nicht. Dann brauche ich mich vom Traum-Argument auch nicht an meinen Wissens-Ansprüchen irre machen zu lassen. (shrink)

In this chapter, I first outline the public health workflow from assessment via goal definition and intervention to evaluation. Further, I discuss the types and subtypes of explanation used in public health research and practice: scientific, justificatory, methodological, and prospective. In doing this, I take the discussion far beyond the usual focus in philosophy of science as answers to “why?”-questions. The chapter ends with a few comments on my proposal.

Under the influence of groundbreaking work by John Meyer and Brian Rowen, as well as Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, over the last 30 years research in the new sociological institutionalism has focused on processes of isomorphism. I argue that this is a one-sided focus that leaves out many insights from other institutional and macrosociological approaches and does not do justice to actual social change because it overlooks the role played by divergent institutional development. While the suggestion of divergent trends (...) is not new, there have been few attempts to integrate divergence into the theoretical premises of the new sociological institutionalism. Based on the typology proposed by DiMaggio and Powell, I show that the mechanisms identified by them as sources of isomorphic change can support processes of divergent change as well. The theoretical challenge is to identify conditions under which these mechanisms push institutional change toward homogenization or divergence. (shrink)

Positivism, the predominant philosophy of Latin America’s elites at the end of the nineteenth century, found its exemplary expression in Brazil’s castilhismo and Mexico’s porfiriato. Argentina, in contrast, seemed to have deviated from the norm of ‘enlightened dictatorships’. After the end of the Rosas tyranny in 1852, authoritarianism had been discredited. Early positivism, as embodied by Teacher-President Sarmiento, could barely be distinguished from liberalism and no single political philosophy was able to exert hegemony. However, the significance of ‘scientific politics’ should (...) not be downplayed. As this article argues, the merger, in the 1880s, of Comtean positivism and teacher training revolutionised education policies that aimed at erasing frontier backwardness and inserting future generations into an export-led economy, oligarchic polity, and homogenous national organism. Normal schools, especially Sarmiento’s Escuela de Parana´, acted as laboratories for the assimilation, merger, and contestation of European, North American, and autochthonous scientific, philosophical, and pedagogical traditions. (shrink)

The author argues that polity and policies of Getúlio Vargas’s Estado Novo cannot be fully understood without exploring the legacy of Rio Grande do Sul. The southern state’s first republican governor, Júlio de Castilhos, had taken inspiration in Auguste Comte’s multifaceted political philosophy and inculcated its authoritarian traits into political institutions. Yet, he and his followers substantially adapted Comte’s positivism to the specific economic and political circumstances in their republiqueta sui generis. In contrast to Comte, the State merged temporal and (...) spiritual powers to pursue evolutionary political changes, a balanced socioeconomic modernisation, and the incorporation of the populus qua paternalistic public policies, and all this with a strong focus on education. Changing contexts resulted in further adjustments, when Vargas became governor in 1928: an ‘orderly’ inclusion of the opposition into the polity, a stronger state interventionism in the economy and labor market, and an experimentation with state corporatism. These experiences paved the way for this comtismo-turned-castilhismo-turning-varguismo to enter the national stage two years later. Despite all the compromises with other contenders for power that Vargas had to make thereafter, he and his gaúcho and other co-opted protégés remained united in the strong belief in technical solutions to social problems and a quest for rational institutions to carry out transformative policies. For them, the State was to be agent of development, tutor of corporate interest groups, and now also guarantor of national security. While highlighting the significant, and still underestimated, impact of French positivism on Vargas’s first 15 years in government, the article places emphasis on the pragmatic dimensions of its appropriation, propagation, and reinterpretation by two generations of state-builders. (shrink)