Discussions of reproducibility are casting doubts on the credibility of experimental outcomes in the life sciences. Although experimental evolution is not typically included in these discussions, this field is also subject to low reproducibility, partly because of the inherent contingencies affecting the evolutionary process. A received view in experimental studies more generally is that standardization (i.e., rigorous homogenization of experimental conditions) is a solution to some issues of significance and internal validity. However, this solution hides several difficulties, including a reduction (...) of external validity and reproducibility. After explaining the meaning of these two notions in the context of experimental evolution, we import from the fields of animal research and ecology and suggests that systematic heterogenization of experimental factors could prove a promising alternative. We also incorporate into our analysis some philosophical reflections on the nature and diversity of research objectives in experimental evolution. (shrink)

There is a line of reasoning in metaepistemology that is congenial to naturalism and hard to resist, yet ultimately misguided: that knowledge might be a natural kind, and that this would undermine the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. In this paper, I first bring out various problems with Hilary Kornblith’s argument from the causal–explanatory indispensability of knowledge to the natural kindhood of knowledge. I then criticize the argument from the natural kindhood of knowledge against the method (...) of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. A natural motivation for this argument is the following seemingly plausible principle: if knowledge is a natural kind, then the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept. Since this principle lacks adequate support, the crucial semantic claim that the concept of knowledge is a natural kind concept must be defended in some more direct way. However, there are two striking epistemic disanalogies between the concept of knowledge and paradigmatic natural kind concepts that militate against this semantic claim. Conceptual analyses of knowledge are not affected by total error, and the proponents of such analyses are not subject to a priori conceptual obliviousness. I conclude that the argument from natural kindhood does not succeed in undermining the use of conceptual analysis in the theory of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a general constraint on theories of knowledge that we call ‘normalism’. Normalism is a view about the epistemic threshold that separates knowledge from mere true belief; its basic claim is that one knows only if one has at least a normal amount of epistemic support for one’s belief. We argue that something like normalism is required to do full justice to the normative role of knowledge in many key everyday practices, such as assertion, inquiry, and (...) testimony. The view of normality we employ to flesh out this claim is inspired by experimental work on the folk notion of normality, which suggests that folk judgments of what is ‘normal’ are based upon both statistical averages as well as normative ideals within the relevant target domain. Adopting this notion of normality to set the threshold for knowledge results in a view upon which knowledge is routinely available on an everyday basis without being a merely trivial achievement. We explore several interesting consequences of this view, including the implication that the threshold for knowing may change as, e.g., the ease of availability of information in an epistemic community changes over time. The result is a ‘shifty’ view of knowledge which nonetheless retains more stability than standard contextualist or pragmatic encroachment approaches. (shrink)

The notion of the highest good used to occupy a primary role in ethical theorising, but has largely disappeared from the contemporary landscape. The notion was central to both Aristotle's and Kant's ethical theories, however--a surprising observation given that their approaches to ethics are commonly conceived as being diametrically opposed. The essays in this collection provide a comprehensive treatment of the highest good in Aristotle and Kant and show that, even though there are important differences in terms of content, there (...) are also important similarities in terms of the structural features of Aristotle's and Kant's value theories. By carefully analysing Aristotle's and Kant's theories of the highest good, a team of experts in the field shed light on their respective ethical theories and highlight the richness, complexity, and fruitfulness of the notion of the highest good. (shrink)

Unlike other branches of science, the scientific products of synthetic chemistry are not only ideas but also new substances that change our material world, for the benefit or harm of living beings. This paper provides for the first time a systematical analysis of moral issues arising from chemical synthesis, based on concepts of responsibility and general morality. Topics include the questioning of moral neutrality of chemical synthesis as an end in itself, chemical weapons research, moral objections against improving material conditions (...) of life by chemical means, and freedom of research. The paper aims at providing both a sound basis for moral judgements of chemistry in a public discourse and a framework for chemists to reflect on the moral relevance of their activity. (shrink)

Part I presents a quantitative-empirical outline of chemistry, esp. preparative chemistry, concerning its dominant role in today's science, its dynamics, and its methods and aims. Emphasis is laid on the poietical character of chemistry for which a methodological model is derived. Part II discusses standard distinction between science and technology, from Aristotle (whose theses are reconsidered in the light of modern sciences) to modern philosophy of technology. Against the background of results of Part I, it is argued that all these (...) distinctions fail, because the underlying concepts of science are either out-dated, one-sided, or arbitrary. A deeper understanding of today's sciences requires, in particular, a philosopical investigation of chemistry. (shrink)

Zwischen Goethes Morphologiebegriff und Wittgensteins philosophischer Methode bestehen deutliche Parallelen, insofern man sie als Verfahren oder Anleitungen zur Erklärung und Darstellung natürlicher Phänomene (Goethe) bzw. der Begriffsbildung und -Verwendung (Wittgenstein) betrachtet. Den von Goethe als Entwicklungsmodelle und Vergleichshilfen gedeuteten Begriffen "Typus" und "Urbild" entsprechen Wittgensteins "Paradigmen" und "Muster"; beiden geht es um "übersichtliche" Darstellungen, und beide betonen die erklärungsrelevante Rolle der "Urphänomene".

Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument , against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. (...) But I maintain that our beliefs about metaphysical necessities still cannot be justified empirically. Furthermore, I reject Casullo's deflationary thesis about the significance of such justification. Kitcher's most troublesome objection is that we can gain any modal justification whatsoever through testimony , i.e. in an experiential way. This can be countered by distinguishing between productive sources of justification, like perception, and merely reproductive sources, like testimony. Thus, some productive a priori source will always be needed somewhere. (shrink)

Zwischen Goethes Morphologiebegriff und Wittgensteins philosophischer Methode bestehen deutliche Parallelen, insofern man sie als Verfahren oder Anleitungen zur Erklärung und Darstellung natürlicher Phänomene (Goethe) bzw. der Begriffsbildung und -Verwendung (Wittgenstein) betrachtet. Den von Goethe als Entwicklungsmodelle und Vergleichshilfen gedeuteten Begriffen "Typus" und "Urbild" entsprechen Wittgensteins "Paradigmen" und "Muster"; beiden geht es um "übersichtliche" Darstellungen, und beide betonen die erklärungsrelevante Rolle der "Urphänomene".

This paper investigates the development of nanotechnology from three different points of view: as a new technology, as social dynamics, and as an ideology. It argues that nanotechnology is not a new technology but a new social dynamics guided by programmatic ideas and situated at the interface between science and the public. Rather than being determined by social constructivism, the main argument is based on the poor scientific and technological identity of nanotechnology. Finally the paper concludes that nanotechnology is to (...) be considered an extension and increase of materials science and engineering, not only scientifically but in particular socially and ideologically, by pointing out common characteristics and differences. (shrink)

Robert Burch describes Peircean Algebraic Logic as a language to express Peirce's “unitary logical vision” , which Peirce tried to formulate using different logical systems. A “correct” formulation of Peirce's vision then should allow a mathematical proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis, that all relations can be generated from the ensemble of unary, binary, and ternary relations, but that at least some ternary relations cannot be reduced to relations of lower arity.Based on Burch's algebraization, the authors further simplify the mathematical structure (...) of PAL and remove a restriction imposed by Burch, making the resulting system in its expressiveness more similar to Peirce's system of existential graphs. The drawback, however, is that the proof of the Reduction Thesis from Burch no longer holds. A new proof was introduced in Hereth Correia, and Pöschel and was published in full detail in Hereth .In this paper, we provide proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis using a graph notation similar to Peirce's existential graphs. (shrink)

Kant entwickelt im letzten Jahrzehnt des 18. Jahrhunderts als erster den Gedanken des Rechtsstaats, der bei ihm (lateinisch) „status iuridicus“ heißt, was er selbst mit „rechtlicher Zustand“ übersetzt. Einige seiner Anhänger erfinden als Übersetzung von „status iuridicus“ das Wort „Rechtsstaat“, das es bis dahin noch nicht gegeben hatte und das dann im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts Kants eigene Übersetzung verdrängt. Wichtige Regeln werden als Regeln des Rechtsstaats zuerst von Kant formuliert, so die Regel, die wir heute mit dem Rechtssprichwort „Keine (...) Strafe ohne Gesetz“ wiedergeben, oder die Regel, dass die rechtsstaatlichen Organe verpflichtet sind, begangene Straftaten zu verfolgen, was wir heute als „Legalitätsprinzip“ bezeichnen. - In Kants Ethik steht der Begriff der Menschenwürde im Mittelpunkt. Diese Würde setzt voraus, dass der Mensch als ein geistiges Wesen betrachtet wird.0. (shrink)

Bd. 1. Kunst als Lehre vom "Begriff" und von der "Neuen Unmittelbarkeit".

Was ist der Mensch? Das ist die Kernfrage dieses Buches, die aus philosophischer Sicht bearbeitet wird. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass der Mensch mehr ist als eine sehr komplexe Ansammlung materieller Elementarteilchen, die einfach nach den normalen Gesetzen der Physik miteinander zusammenwirken. Stattdessen muss man Menschen zusätzlich spezifisch menschliche Eigenschaften zuschreiben, die nicht vollständig aus den körperlichen Eigenschaften heraus erklärbar sind. Sie verfügen über Bewusstsein und können in einem gewissen Umfang frei handeln. Das sind psycho-physische Phänomene, die mit den Gesetzen (...) der Physik nicht vollständig erfasst werden können. Deswegen ist der Materialismus wahrscheinlich falsch, wenngleich er nicht definitiv widerlegbar ist. Die beste Antwort auf das uralte Leib-Seele-Problem ist der Polare Dualismus, ein Eigenschaftsdualismus, der die Welt als grundsätzlich psycho-physisch auffasst. Psycho-physische Zusammenhänge sind keine nachträgliche Verbindung zweier eigenständiger Seinsbereiche, sondern stehen in einem polaren Verhältnis zueinander. Keiner der Bereiche ist ohne den anderen denkbar, aber es kann auch keiner auf den jeweils anderen zurückgeführt werden. (shrink)

Nanotechnology has from its very beginning been surrounded with an aura of novelty. For instance, on the 28 introductory pages of the report that prepared the US National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), Nanotechnology Research Directions (NSTC/IWGN 1999), we read 73 times the term “new”, 15 times “novel”, 7 times “innovation”, and 21 times “revolution”. The authors concede that one should distinguish between different nanotechnologies, because “Many existing technologies do already depend on nanoscale processes. Photography and catalysis are two examples of ‘old’ (...) nanotechnologies” (ibid, p. xxvi). One might conclude here that, if all the existing nanotechnologies are “old” nanotechnologies, “new” nanotechnologies do not yet exists but are only promises of the future. However, without further explanation and distinction between presence and future, they suggest that most nanotechnologies are or will be new. Furthermore, they claim that nanotechnology (in singular) is a generator of further new technologies, since “Nanotechnology will give birth to new fields that at present are only visions of leading researchers” (ibid., p. xviii). Whenever science managers speak of nanotechnology (in singular), sophisticated distinctions seem to give way to plain claims about the present and future novelty of nanotechnology. As the NNI director Mihail Roco wrote in a 2001 report, “A revolution is occurring in science and technology […] Nanotechnology will fundamentally transform science, technology, and society. In 10 to 20 years, a significant proportion of industrial production, healthcare practice, and environmental management will be changed by the new technology.” (Roco & Bainbridge, pp. 1, 19) When they put on their hats as science managers, scientists rarely reject but mostly support such novelty claim, as did for instance the chemists George Whitesides and Paul Alivisatos in the earlier report: “Nanostructures are the entry into a new realm in physical and biological science.” (NSTC/IWGN 1999, p.. (shrink)

A book review of Emmanuel Alloa, Looking through Images: A Phenomenology of Visual Media. Translated by Nils F. Schott. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021, xiv + 392 pp. ISBN 9780231187923.

Partly by way of contrast with a conception described by Kleist, Wittgenstein's notions of world?picture and mythology are explained and three types of statement playing a particularly important role with respect to our world?picture or pictures distinguished. Problems concerning sentences which contain normative elements are discussed and a test for what to count as a statement giving information about our world?picture is proposed. A mythology in Wittgenstein's sense is characterized as a structured, systematic set of models permitting analogical development and (...) the gradual change of previous paradigms. (shrink)