Philosophical analysis was the central preoccupation of 20th-century analytic philosophy. In the contemporary methodological debate, however, it faces a number of pressing external and internal challenges. While external challenges, like those from experimental philosophy or semantic externalism, have been extensively discussed, internal challenges to philosophical analysis have received much less attention. One especially vexing internal challenge is that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are deeply unclear. According to the standard textbook view, a philosophical analysis aims at a strict biconditional (...) that captures the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the relevant category. The textbook view arguably identifies a necessary condition on successful philosophical analyses, but understood as a sufficient condition it is untenable, as I will argue in this paper. To this end, I first uncover eight conditions of adequacy on successful philosophical analyses, some of which have rarely been spelled out in detail. As we shall see, even sophisticated alternatives to the textbook view fail to accommodate some of these conditions. I then propose the concept grounding view as a more promising account of philosophical analysis. According to this view, successful philosophical analyses require necessary biconditionals that are constrained by grounding relations among the concepts involved. Apart from providing a satisfactory account of philosophical analysis in its own right, the concept grounding view is also able to meet the challenge that the success conditions of philosophical analysis are problematically unclear. (shrink)

According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion (...) of 'independence of (extralinguistic) facts'. If one distinguishes between variation independence and existence independence, the unwelcome view about the truthmakers of analytic truths no longer follows. Thus, there is at best a challenge, but no conclusive argument. The door to the metaphysical conception of analyticity is still open. (shrink)

This book does not only attempt to clarify concepts used in the context of dialectical reasoning but also develops an epistemological theory by answering the question: What does it mean to possess a language? The epistemological theory then is used to ground the basis of social science in the logic of our common-sense language. This logic is viewed as more comprehensive than traditional formalized logic, which is viewed as only one though an important aspect of the more general and basic (...) logic of our common-sense language. (shrink)

Abstract.In this paper we show that the theory of fields together with an integrally closed subring, the theory of formally real fields with a real holomorphy ring and the theory of formally \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $p$\end{document}-adic fields with a \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $p$\end{document}-adic holomorphy ring have no model companions in the language of fields augmented by a unary predicate for the corresponding ring.

This paper is an attempt at presenting a convincing reading of the first sentences of PI § 109, especially of its third sentence. There Wittgenstein mentions what he calls "the pneumatic conception of thought", which by Miss Anscombe is translated as "the conception of thought as a gaseous medium". By comparing the relevant sentences with their sources in Wittgenstein's manuscripts and additional parallels it is found that Anscombe's rendering is liable to be misleading. Wittgenstein's notion of "pneuma" is likely to (...) be inspired by a conception of the kind elucidated by Oswald Spengler, for instance, according to whose account pneuma is to be understood as a sort of body (Seelenkörper). If you take this as your central image, the pneumatic conception alluded to in PI § 109 is one which can be tracked down in Wittgenstein's early as well as in his middle-period work. In this remark (PI § 109), Wittgenstein tries to mention both helpful and misleading features of his earlier ways of thinking, and what he now calls the "pneumatic conception" can be seen to be the foil for both sorts of features. The central idea is that the core of language contains a scaffolding of rules whose ("pneumatic") substance is the same as that of our thought. In accordance with this view the logical structure of thought is held to be identical with that of language and reality—a notion which fits parts of the Tractatus as well as parts of the original "grammatical" conception developed in the early 1930ies. (shrink)

Welcker was the first to develop the concept "Rechtsstaat" . Kant's concept of freedom, however, provides the background for Welcker's concept of the Rechtsstaat. This article investigates the question of how the concept "respect toward others" is related to the concepts "Rechtsstaat" and "right of freedom". According to Kant, "respect" is not a duty of law but rather a duty of virtue. Still we owe others fulfillment of this duty in a manner that is similar to the way we owe (...) them the fulfillment of a duty of law. Furthermore this duty of virtue corresponds to a moral right of others to respect. Although mutual respect among citizens is not constitutive of a Rechtsstaat, still it is in fact necessary for the survival of a Rechtsstaat. (shrink)

In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology ( 23.3 and 23.4 ) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.

In the 1970s, a multifaceted alternative scene developed in West Germany. At the core of this leftist scene was a struggle for feelings in a capitalist world that seemed to be devoid of any emotions. Joachim C. Häberlen offers here a vivid account of these emotional politics. The book discusses critiques of rationality and celebrations of insanity as an alternative. It explores why capitalism made people feel afraid and modern cities made people feel lonely. Readers are taken to consciousness (...) raising groups, nude swimming at alternative vacation camps, and into the squatted houses of the early 1980s. Häberlen draws on a kaleidoscope of different voices to explore how West Germans became more concerned with their selves, their feelings, and their bodies. By investigating how leftists tried to transform themselves through emotional practices, Häberlen gives us a fresh perspective on a fascinating aspect of West German history. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 24 Heft: 1 Seiten: 341-352.

Starting from a political controversy and a wide-ranging media-discussion, the article examines the evolution of German national holidays from the "Kaiserreich" to the reunited Federal Republic. The author lists the dates and attributes of the national festivities and asks to what extent national days can contribute to a collective identification with the given state and its political system. In the process of change one identifies a long run from emotional festivity towards a rather rational attitude in celebrating the National Day. (...) The future of the current German national holiday in the frame of a 'democratic culture' is far away from being settled. (shrink)

Grammar can be formulated as a kind of substructural propositional logic. In support of this claim, we survey bare Gentzen style deductive systems and two kinds of non-commutative linear logic: intuitionistic and compact bilinear logic. We also glance at their categorical refinements.

§ 1. “To the mind of the philosopher”, according to Plato,1 “there belongs a vision of all time and all being"; and certainly many of the great thinkers have made it their business to speculate about the omnitudo realitatis or the ens realissimum—about the universe as a whole and in its wholeness, or about that which is supremely real—in short about ‘ the Absolute ‘. It may be that this interest in the Whole lies at the heart of all genuine (...) philosophy, giving to it its distinctive inspiration and character. It may be, on the other hand, that it is a misdirected solicitude—an anxiety to solve the inherently insoluble. The Absolute, we shall perhaps be told, is a vox nihili—a name for that which, being nothing, has no attributes ; or we, at least, can never hope to characterize it. All our available predicates, being drawn of necessity from a limited field, must ‘ come short‘must prove inadequate for so immense and so august a subject. (shrink)

One way of shedding light on the distinctions drawn between various crimes against property - all involving the deprivation of possession of a movable object - is by considering the victim's participation in the deprivation. First, it may be the case that the victim does not participate in this deprivation at all, for example, because he is not present when it occurs. Second, it may be that the victim is in a situation of necessitas simplex seu absoluta at the time (...) of the deprivation, because he is physically unable to prevent it, even though he may be present and actually observing it occur. Or, he may assist or tolerate the deprivation in an ignorantia facti , not recognizing that he is being depossessed of his own property. Third, the victim, though actually participating in the deprivation, may be either in a situation of necessitas cum adiunctione or acting under ignorance parallel to ignorantia iuris , because he is deceived as to the economic reasonableness of transferring the object to the depossessor. Leaving out the uninteresting first group of cases, the article claims that the differences drawn between the crimes committed by the depossessor depend upon why the victim's participation cannot be imputed to him. In the second group of cases, the victim's presence or his apparent participation cannot be imputed to him on the first level of imputation, because he has not willfully tolerated or participated in the depossession. In the third group of cases, the victim's participation in the depossession can be imputed to him on the first level of imputation but not on the second level, because, although the victim has willfully participated in the depossession, he has not acted voluntarily. The article first discusses the structures of imputation, which were primarily developed during the eighteenth century. It sketches the differences between two levels of imputation and between ordinary and extraordinary imputation, indicating the reasons for excluding ordinary imputation. The article then considers various types of property crimes, all involving the deprivation of possession of a movable object. The claim is made that these crimes can be distinguished on the basis of whether the victim's participation can be imputed to him on the first or second level of imputation. Contemporary German law differentiates between Diebstahl, Erpressung and Betrug thus covering most of the relevant cases in the three groups. Diebstahl generally covers the cases in groups one and two. Erpressung and Betrug cover most of the relevant cases in the third group. Yet the offense definitions of these crimes are historically accidental. Accordingly, they are neither systematically complete, nor do they cover all of the relevant cases. In addition, the article includes a discussion of the differentiation between Raub and räuberische Erpressung. (shrink)

Robert Burch describes Peircean Algebraic Logic as a language to express Peirce's “unitary logical vision” , which Peirce tried to formulate using different logical systems. A “correct” formulation of Peirce's vision then should allow a mathematical proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis, that all relations can be generated from the ensemble of unary, binary, and ternary relations, but that at least some ternary relations cannot be reduced to relations of lower arity.Based on Burch's algebraization, the authors further simplify the mathematical structure (...) of PAL and remove a restriction imposed by Burch, making the resulting system in its expressiveness more similar to Peirce's system of existential graphs. The drawback, however, is that the proof of the Reduction Thesis from Burch no longer holds. A new proof was introduced in Hereth Correia, and Pöschel and was published in full detail in Hereth .In this paper, we provide proof of Peirce's Reduction Thesis using a graph notation similar to Peirce's existential graphs. (shrink)

Was ist der Mensch? Das ist die Kernfrage dieses Buches, die aus philosophischer Sicht bearbeitet wird. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass der Mensch mehr ist als eine sehr komplexe Ansammlung materieller Elementarteilchen, die einfach nach den normalen Gesetzen der Physik miteinander zusammenwirken. Stattdessen muss man Menschen zusätzlich spezifisch menschliche Eigenschaften zuschreiben, die nicht vollständig aus den körperlichen Eigenschaften heraus erklärbar sind. Sie verfügen über Bewusstsein und können in einem gewissen Umfang frei handeln. Das sind psycho-physische Phänomene, die mit den Gesetzen (...) der Physik nicht vollständig erfasst werden können. Deswegen ist der Materialismus wahrscheinlich falsch, wenngleich er nicht definitiv widerlegbar ist. Die beste Antwort auf das uralte Leib-Seele-Problem ist der Polare Dualismus, ein Eigenschaftsdualismus, der die Welt als grundsätzlich psycho-physisch auffasst. Psycho-physische Zusammenhänge sind keine nachträgliche Verbindung zweier eigenständiger Seinsbereiche, sondern stehen in einem polaren Verhältnis zueinander. Keiner der Bereiche ist ohne den anderen denkbar, aber es kann auch keiner auf den jeweils anderen zurückgeführt werden. (shrink)