Witze über Eigennamen sind eine heikle Angelegenheit. Der folgende Artikel interpretiert ein solches Sprachspiel mit dem Namen »Isabel«, das sich in Baltasar Graciáns Abhandlung über den Witz findet (»Agudeza y arte de ingenio«, 1648). Durch die Zusammenführung von Graciáns Gedicht und seinem Kommentar mit Sigmund Freuds Überlegungen zu Witzen und ihrer Beziehung zum Unbewussten (»Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten«, 1905) zeigt die Autorin, dass es nicht nur Parallelen in diesen jeweiligen Theorien gibt, sondern dass sie auch helfen, den (...) Witz mit dem Namen Isabel zu verstehen. Mit Freuds Ausführungen zu Zoten legt der Artikel damit die bisher übersehene aggressive Seite dieses Witzes frei. (shrink)

We define mereologically invariant composition as the relation between a whole object and its parts when the object retains the same parts during a time interval. We argue that mereologically invariant composition is identity between a whole and its parts taken collectively. Our reason is that parts and wholes are equivalent measurements of a portion of reality at different scales in the precise sense employed by measurement theory. The purpose of these scales is the numerical representation of primitive relations between (...) quantities of being. To show this, we prove representation and uniqueness theorems for composition. Thus, mereologically invariant composition is trans-scalar identity. (shrink)

Nous ne saurons jamais – selon le célèbre Ignorabimus de Du Bois-Raymond – ce qu’est la conscience ; mais cela ne nous dispense pas de l’impératif théorique de la décrire adéquatement dans ses réalisations, même si cette description nous agace par son caractère inextricable. 1. Introduction Dans ses phénomènes les plus habituels et quotidiens, la vie consciente est traversée d’interruptions, elle se diffracte en ses manifestations, connaît des lacunes et des ruptures. Comment comprendre et dé...

Ten narrative studies involving family histories of 262 children of gay fathers and lesbian mothers were evaluated statistically in response to Morrison's (2007) concerns about Cameron's (2006) research that had involved three narrative studies. Despite numerous attempts to bias the results in favour of the null hypothesis and allowing for up to 20 (of 63, 32%) coding errors, Cameron's (2006) hypothesis that gay and lesbian parents would be more likely to have gay, lesbian, bisexual or unsure (of sexual orientation) sons (...) and daughters was confirmed. Percentages of children of gay and lesbian parents who adopted non-heterosexual identities ranged between 16% and 57%, with odds ratios of 1.7 to 12.1, depending on the mix of child and parent genders. Daughters of lesbian mothers were most likely (33% to 57%; odds ratios from 4.5 to 12.1) to report non-heterosexual identities. Data from ethnographic sources and from previous studies on gay and lesbian parenting were re-examined and found to support the hypothesis that social and parental influences may influence the expression of non-heterosexual identities and/or behaviour. Thus, evidence is presented from three different sources, contrary to most previous scientific opinion, even most previous scientific consensus, that suggests intergenerational transfer of sexual orientation can occur at statistically significant and substantial rates, especially for female parents or female children. In some analyses for sons, intergenerational transfer was not significant. Further research is needed with respect to pathways by which intergenerational transfer of sexual orientation may occur. The results confirm an evolving tendency among scholars to cite the possibility of some degree of intergenerational crossover of sexual orientation. (shrink)

This brief volume supplements Lemmon's classic introductory logic text with almost 200 new exercises, many of them solved, solutions to selected exercises in _Beginning Logic_ itself, a helpful commentary on Lemmon’s use of key technical terms, alternative formulations, and advice to students.

1. The view that beliefs can be characterized solely by their motivational role promises an informative reduction of what it is for a state to be a belief state. It is therefore of import if such a view is wrong. In ‘On the aim of belief’ David Velleman (2000) presents an argument against such a motivational view of belief.1 On Velleman’s construal of the motivational view.

We show that neither the descending chain property nor the finite model property is a necessary condition for a model logic having no minimal proper extension. This answers in the negative two questions raised by G. E. Hughes.

Unanswered questions and ethical issues associated with US biodefence medical research over the past five decades are discussed. Objective scientific standards are essential for making policy decisions that can stand the test of time. For decades, scholars have reported that the human anthrax vaccine field trials conducted in the 1950s by Brachman and his colleagues were single-blind rather than double-blind. Nevertheless, in March 2005, Dr Philip S Brachman reported in a letter to the US Food and Drug Administration that his (...) study had been double-blind. It is here argued that, rather, the field trial of a human anthrax vaccine should continue to be deemed as single-blind unless more detailed information is provided to explain exactly how the investigators were kept unaware of which subjects were in the treatment and control groups. Moreover, a number of other questions about the details of this critically important study have remained unanswered and are discussed. More recently, similar concerns have arisen with respect to more contemporary biodefence research, especially with reference to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s allegations that Dr Bruce Ivins, a US government biodefence researcher, was responsible for the anthrax letter attacks of fall 2001. The medical ethics and related issues involved with continuing to base national biodefence and public health policy on unclear, if not contradictory, research are discussed. (shrink)

Freedom and the subject were guiding themes for Michel Foucault throughout his philosophical career. In this clear and comprehensive analysis of his thought, Johanna Oksala identifies the different interpretations of freedom in his philosophy and examines three major divisions of it: the archaeological, the genealogical, and the ethical. She shows convincingly that in order to appreciate Foucault's project fully we must understand his complex relationship to phenomenology, and she discusses Foucault's treatment of the body in relation to recent feminist (...) work on this topic. Her sophisticated but lucid book illuminates the possibilities that Foucault's philosophy opens up for us in thinking about freedom. (shrink)

A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any (...) of the rationally permissible risk attitudes, is there some specific risk attitude that is required when choosing for others, or are we required to defer to the risk attitudes of the people on whose behalf we are choosing? This article elaborates on this question, explains its wider practical and theoretical significance, provides an overview of existing answers, and explores how to go about providing a more systematic account of how to choose on behalf of others in risky contexts. (shrink)

This article argues that Lara Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility (REU) theory fails to offer a true alternative to expected utility theory. Under commonly held assumptions about dynamic choice and the framing of decision problems, rational agents are guided by their attitudes to temporally extended courses of action. If so, REU theory makes approximately the same recommendations as expected utility theory. Being more permissive about dynamic choice or framing, however, undermines the theory’s claim to capturing a steady choice disposition in the (...) face of risk. I argue that this poses a challenge to alternatives to expected utility theory more generally. (shrink)

Some scientists are happy to follow in the footsteps of others; some like to explore novel approaches. It is tempting to think that herein lies an epistemic division of labor conducive to overall scientific progress: the latter point the way to fruitful areas of research, and the former more fully explore those areas. Weisberg and Muldoon’s model, however, suggests that it would be best if all scientists explored novel approaches. I argue that this is due to implausible modeling choices, and (...) I present an alternative ‘epistemic landscape’ model that demonstrates the alleged benefits from division of labor, with one restriction. (shrink)

The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing conversation on critical phenomenology with reflections on its method. The key argument is that critical phenomenology should be understood as a form of historico-transcendental inquiry and therefore it cannot forgo the phenomenological reduction. Rather, this methodological step should be centered in critical phenomenology, and appropriated in problematized and rethought forms. The methodological assessment of critical phenomenology has implications also for how we read its canon. The paper shows that while Simone de Beauvoir (...) did not adopt the phenomenological reduction in its full Husserlian meaning, her analyses of experience did not remain on the level of personal or experiential description either. The contention is that if we want to read her as a critical phenomenologist, we should focus on her seminal modification of the historico-transcendental method of phenomenology. (shrink)