In many ways, the African world view and African theology are closer to nature than Euro-American theology is. This can be seen, for example, in its emphasis on holism and interconnectedness, and its inclination to consider all natural objects to be inhabited by the spirit world. This article argues that this closeness to nature should not be confused with a Romantic reverence for nature. Since the 19th century, Romanticism has been very influential in the Euro-American idea of nature. Nature came (...) to be seen as something that is both good and valuable in itself. The conception of nature that is dominant in African ways of thinking is very different: nature is seen as potentially threatening and, at best, ambivalent; and respect for nature and living in balance with nature is judged by the extent to which they help humans to live successfully. In this article, a theological and philosophical clarification of these two contrasting conceptions of nature is combined with qualitative anthropological analysis of the way Zambian pastors speak about nature in their sermons. These two approaches together bring out the often-misinterpreted non-Romantic idea of nature in African theology. Contribution: This article clarifies the important idea of nature within the context of African theology. It brings out how the meaning of holism and sacredness in African settings differs from the meaning of these ideas in Western eco-theological contexts. Hereby, it untangles important confusions in the field of eco-theology. (shrink)

Hans Kamp; IV*—Free Choice Permission, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 74, Issue 1, 1 June 1974, Pages 57–74, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristoteli.

Faith Envy explores the idea that both believers and nonbelievers envy those with more faith. Hermen Kroesbergen shows how philosophers Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and Weil, who each had their own kind of faith envy, can serve as guides to this phenomenon and the contemporary concept of faith.

Preface This book is about semantics and logic. More specifically, it is about the semantics and logic of natural language; and, even more specifically than ...

We do not need ‘the earth’ as the space for encounter and cooperation between world religions in the way Moltmann suggests. Firstly, this fails to do justice to the contemporary situation concerning religious diversity: people from different religions have no problem in working together either for promoting ecological goals or for fighting them together. Within religions, there are often greater divergences between eco-friendly and anti-ecological adherents of that same religion. Secondly, Moltmann’s proposal misguidedly confuses boundaries of beliefs and boundaries of (...) grammar concerning religious diversity. Paying attention to religions as grammar provides a more accurate picture of the reality concerning world religions from an ecological perspective. In the final section of this article, I present some suggestions on moving forward in the debate about ecology from within this new perspective. We need to keep in mind that it is not religions but people who have opinions about ecology. The dialogue that needs to take place is not a high-level bureaucratic one between officials of different religions but one between people. In this grassroots-level discussion, it is important to listen to the other person rather than to consider him or her as a representative of his or her religion. We should not allow people to claim an entire religion for their position, dismissing others as revisionists. Religions are grammars that can express both eco-friendly and anti-ecological messages.Contribution: This article contributes to an in-depth understanding of religious diversity; it proves the usefulness of the distinction between grammar and beliefs in the study of religion and demonstrates this using the case of ecotheology as an example. (shrink)

Far from being non‐realism or antirealism, Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion shows the meaning of practices within which the whole weight is in the picture that God speaks. ‘The authority of the community of believers determines what is the word of God’ does not contradict ‘God himself determines what is the word of God.’ As is shown by an example of Peter Winch, the distinction between inside and outside perspectives on religious practices is already given in those practices themselves. Wittgensteinian philosophy (...) of religion does justice to the independent reality of God, without the adjustments proposed by Stephen Mulhall and Andrew Moore. (shrink)

In mainstream or strong university education, the teacher selects and transmits knowledge and skills that students are to acquire and reproduce. Many researchers of radical embodied cognitive science still adhere to this way of teaching, even though this prescriptive pedagogy deeply contrasts with the theoretical underpinnings of their science. In this paper, we search for alternative ways of teaching that are more aligned with the central non-prescriptive and non-representational tenets of radical embodied cognitive science. To this end, we discuss recent (...) views on education by Tim Ingold and Gert Biesta, which are based on Dewey’s philosophy of pragmatism and Gibsons’ ecological approach. The paper starts by introducing radical embodied cognitive science, particularly as it relates to motor skill learning, one of our prime interests in research and teaching. Next, we provide a synopsis and critique of the still dominant prescriptive and explicating pedagogy of strong education. Following Ingold and Biesta, we search for a weak alternative through a careful consideration of the education of attention and the participating teacher. To illustrate our arguments, we use examples of the first author’s teaching about/of motor skill learning. The paper is concluded by briefly considering the implications of weak education for a radical embodied science of motor skill learning. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 2, Page 296-325, April 2022.

This article argues for acknowledging the existence of an absolute distinction between faith and science. It is often assumed in the science and religion debate that such a distinction would be ahistorical and uncontextual. After discussing this critique, the analogy with love and facts will be used to explain how an absolute distinction between faith and science may exist nonetheless. This contrast, however, does not imply compartmentalization. It is shown that the absolute distinction between faith and science is of crucial (...) importance to understand the historical contexts that so many contributors to the science and religion debate refer to in their argument against the approaches of Independence or Contrast. The article concludes that within our messy and complex practices there is an absolute distinction between faith and science—our historical contexts cannot be understood without it. (shrink)

Dies ist der erste Teil einer zweibändigen Studie zur Genese unseres heutigen, vom Anspruch her den chronologischen Verlauf der gesamten Menschheitsgeschichte strukturierenden „Epochen“-Systems. Der Band skizziert zunächst die geistesgeschichtlichen Prämissen. Von der rudimentären paläolithischen Zeiteinteilung führt er über die ältesten schriftlich dokumentierten Ordnungsversuche in den sumerischen bzw. ägyptischen „Königlisten“, griechische und römische Autoren, Petrarca, Bruni und Vasari bis zu Cellarius, der am Ende des 17. Jahrhunderts die Drei-Zeitalter-Distinktion „Antike-Mittelalter-Neuzeit“ zum zentralen chronologischen Gliederungsprinzip der Weltgeschichte erhob. Anschließend stehen die drei klassischen, (...) von Pyrrhon, Polybios bzw. Ptolemaios entwickelten „Epoché“-Konzepte sowie deren Auftauchen und Rezeption im lateinischen Europa im Fokus. Sodann wird die erstaunlich spät, nämlich erst nach Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts einsetzende Transformation der „Epoché“ zur fundamentalen historiographischen Ordnungskategorie thematisiert. Schließlich verfolgen wir anhand zahlreicher Autoren sowie der kontemporären Lexikographie ihren auf Latein wie in den relevanten europäischen „Volkssprachen“ (Englisch, Französisch, Deutsch, Spanisch, Portugiesisch, Italienisch) stattfindenden Divulgationsprozeß. Dabei erweist sich der Ausgang des 17. Jahrhunderts erneut als Wasserscheide. Der erste Band endet deshalb an dieser Stelle, der zweite wird dann die weitere Entwicklung von 1700 bis zur Gegenwart analysieren. This is the first part of a two-volume study of the genesis of our modern-day system of epochs, which claims to structure the chronology of the entire history of mankind. The volume sets out by sketching the intellectual premises. It leads from the rudimentary Palaeolithic division of time via the oldest attempts at structuring to have been documented in written form, through to the Sumerian and Egyptian “King Lists”, to Greek and Roman authors, to Petrarch, Bruni, and Vasari, and finally to Cellarius, who in the late 17th century introduced the distinction between the three epochs of “Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Modern Era” as the basic chronological principle of organising the history of the world. This is followed by a closer look at the three classical concepts of “Epoché” as defined by Pyrrhon, Polybios and Ptolemaios, respectively, as well as their surfacing and reception in Latin Europe. Not until the second half of the 16th century, which is an astonishingly late point in time, can the transformation of “Epoché” into a fundamental category of historiographic structuring be detected. Finally, by studying numerous writers as well as the contemporary lexicography, we will outline the process of divulgation that took place both in Latin as well as in the relevant European “vernaculars” (English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian). In the process, the late 17th century again proves to be a kind of divide. As a consequence, volume one ends here; a second volume (forthc.) will analyse the further development to the present day. (shrink)

Leadership in Africa is inextricably connected to the spirit world. Leaders may be chosen through elections or other human processes, but ultimately, they are seen as appointed by God. Leaders may base their decisions upon science or intuition, but ultimately, they let themselves be inspired by revelations from the spiritual realm. Yet, what is meant by the spirit world in this respect? In this article, a new way is explored for investigating what references to the spirit world mean. Instead of (...) discussing which theoretical concept applies to the kind of reality spirits have, or what analogy fits spirits, I demonstrate that we can discover what it means to speak of the spirit world by investigating what we already know about it before theoretical labels and comparisons. Such a Wittgensteinian approach in line with the re-emerging brand of ethnographically informed philosophy of religion enhances our understanding of what kind of reality the spirit world has. If you see leadership as being empowered by the spirit world, this is not a choice, option or interpretation, but you cannot see it any other way. Contribution: This article contributes to a better understanding of the kind of reality that the spirit world has, in particular in an African context. The topic of leadership in Africa is used here to illustrate how this kind of reality is often misunderstood. A clear understanding of the kind of reality of the spirit world is indispensable for a proper investigation of Christianity in Africa and religion in general. (shrink)

In this article, a novel Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy of religion is presented which uses autobiographical exposition as a way of clarifying religious concepts. After analyzing what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in his philosophical approach, Wittgenstein’s type of grammatical inquiry into concept formation is applied to religion in this very straightforward manner. How a child learns to use religious concepts and how people check whether the child is using these concepts correctly, reminds us of the actual role these concepts (...) play in our discourses. In the third and fourth sections, the Wittgensteinian investigation of concept formation into religion conducted in this article is used to establish that the two common criticisms, namely that a Wittgensteinian approach fails to acknowledge that for believers God is real and that religious conflicts exist, are misplaced. It is shown that a Wittgensteinian approach in philosophy of religion merits renewed attention. (shrink)

With this article, I wish to introduce the concept of ‘faith envy’. From time to time, both believers and non-believers envy those who have faith or more faith. People envy, for example, Muslims or Charismatics for the significance and certainty of their convictions in their lives. I propose using ‘faith envy’ as an angle to investigate faith and religious language. This perspective opens up important new questions about faith. If we look at faith from this angle, we see aspects of (...) faith that remain obscure in many debates on religion, aspects beyond historical or factual matters. Firstly, I explore what it is exactly that is envied in faith envy. Secondly, I argue for the use of the concept ‘envy’ rather than ‘jealousy’ or ‘admiration’ in this context. Thirdly, I indicate how using the concept of faith envy may open up new theoretical perspectives on faith and in particular the nature of religious language. I show how the lives and works of Sören Kierkegaard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Simone Weil are illuminated by looking at them as people who envy faith. I conclude this article by providing some impressions of what novel perspectives using the concept of faith envy may bring to light. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 58 Heft: 1 Seiten: 76-95.

This paper studies the uses of proper names within a communication-theoretic setting, looking at both the conditions that govern the use of a name by a speaker and those involved in the correct interpretation of the name by her audience. The setting in which these conditions are investigated is provided by an extension of Discourse Representation Theory, MSDRT, in which mental states are represented as combinations of propositional attitudes and entity representations . The first half of the paper presents the (...) features of this framework that are needed to understand its application to the account of names that follows. N-labelled entity representations, where N is a proper name, play a pivotal part in this account: A speaker must have an N-labelled ER in order to be in a position to use a name N, and the interpreter must either have such a representation, or else construct one as part of his interpretation. The paper distinguishes different types of name uses in terms of what they presuppose about the role of N-labelled ERs on the side of the interpreter. (shrink)

Hans Kamp; XIII*—Context, Thought and Communication, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 85, Issue 1, 1 June 1985, Pages 239–262, https://doi.org/10.

What makes video games unique as an audiovisual medium is not just that they are interactive, but that this interactivity is rule bound and goal oriented. This means that player experience, including experience of the music, is somehow shaped or structured by these characteristics. Because of its emphasis on action in perception, James Gibson’s ecological approach to psychology—particularly his concept of affordances—is well suited to theorise the role of music in player experience. In a game, players perceive the environment and (...) gameplay situations in terms of the goal-oriented actions they afford. Nondiegetic music, not tied to any place in the digital game world, can play a unique role in the structuring of these affordances. Through a series of case studies, I will show that music creates and structures situations both in the game environment (such as the appearance of enemies in Unreal) and beyond the game environment (such as the death of an avatar and the restart of a level in Super Mario Bros.). (shrink)

A beetle's wing. A hood ornament. Dew shimmering on a petal. With this essential book, you'll learn to make magnificent photos of little things and small portions of bigger things.

The experience of feeling safe even in the midst of trials and temptations seems to be a central feature of the Christian faith. In this article I will try to solve some possible difficulties in understanding this kind of absolute safety by discussing some problems noted by philosophers in connection with the related statements by Socrates that a good man cannot be harmed, and by Wittgenstein that he sometimes feels absolutely safe, that nothing can injure him whatever happens. First, I (...) will investigate whether there is an invalid prediction implied in this feeling of absolute safety: how can someone know that nothing will hurt him or her? Second, I will examine whether this experience of complete safety is dependent upon impossible requirements, such as to be a good man or an impeccable Christian. Third, I will consider the character of the people who claim absolute safety as portrayed by different philosophers: do these people really need to be so cold and inhumanly detached from the world for them to be able to say that nothing can hurt them? I will argue that if, instead of asking how someone can claim absolute safety, we ask to what someone commits him- or her-self in making this claim, these difficulties disappear. (shrink)

This paper presents a sound and complete proof system for the first order fragment of Discourse Representation Theory. Since the inferences that human language users draw from the verbal input they receive for the most transcend the capacities of such a system, it can be no more than a basis on which more powerful systems, which are capable of producing those inferences, may then be built. Nevertheless, even within the general setting of first order logic the structure of the formulas (...) of DRS-languages, i.e. of the Discourse Representation Structures suggest for the components of such a system inference rules that differ somewhat from those usually found in proof systems for the first order predicate calculus and which are, we believe, more in keeping with inference patterns that are actually employed in common sense reasoning.This is why we have decided to publish the present exercise, in spite of the fact that it is not one for which a great deal of originality could be claimed. In fact, it could be argued that the problem addressed in this paper was solved when Gödel first established the completeness of the system of Principia Mathematica for first order logic. For the DRS-languages we consider here are straightforwardly intertranslatable with standard formulations of the predicate calculus; in fact the translations are so straightforward that any sound and complete proof system for first order logic can be used as a sound and complete proof system for DRSs: simply translate the DRSs into formulas of predicate logic and then proceed as usual. As a matter of fact, this is how one has chosen to proceed in some implementations of DRT, which involve inferencing as well as semantic representation; an example is the Lex system developed jointly by IBM and the University of Tübingen ). (shrink)

Can a contemplative philosopher describe a particular religious practice as superstitious, or is he thereby overstepping his boundaries? I will discuss the way in which the Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips uses ‘Superstition’ as a contemplative term. His use of the distinction between genuine religion and superstition is not a weakness as is often supposed, but a necessity. Without contemplating ‘Superstition’ and ‘genuine religion’ Phillips would not have been able to elucidate the meaning that religious beliefs have in (...) the lives of both the faithful and their critics. I will defend the aptness of Phillips’s use of this term and illustrate his approach using examples such as the concept of genuine friendship or gratitude, and then I apply this approach to the question whether, from a philosophical point of view, particular Christian practices such as the prosperity gospel are genuinely religious or should be called superstitious. (shrink)

Academia-intelligence agency collaborations are on the rise for a variety of reasons. These can take many forms, one of which is in the classroom, using students to stand in for intelligence analysts. Classrooms, however, are ethically complex spaces, with students considered vulnerable populations, and become even more complex when layering multiple goals, activities, tools, and stakeholders over those traditionally present. This does not necessarily mean one must shy away from academia-intelligence agency partnerships in classrooms, but that these must be conducted (...) carefully and reflexively. This paper hopes to contribute to this conversation by describing one purposeful classroom encounter that occurred between a professor, students, and intelligence practitioners in the fall of 2015 at North Carolina State University: an experiment conducted as part of a graduate-level political science class that involved students working with a prototype analytic technology, a type of participatory sensing/self-tracking device, developed by the National Security Agency. This experiment opened up the following questions that this paper will explore: What social, ethical, and pedagogical considerations arise with the deployment of a prototype intelligence technology in the college classroom, and how can they be addressed? How can academia-intelligence agency collaboration in the classroom be conducted in ways that provide benefits to all parties, while minimizing disruptions and negative consequences? This paper will discuss the experimental findings in the context of ethical perspectives involved in values in design and participatory/self-tracking data practices, and discuss lessons learned for the ethics of future academia-intelligence agency partnerships in the classroom. (shrink)

Recent studies have revamped the conceptual geography of nationalism and posited the new "cultural" conception of the notion that avoids the two stools of theethnic and civic conceptions. Cultural nationalism is distinct from ethnic nationalism and is morally innocent of the evils perpetrated in the name of nationalism. Indeed, it is a positive form of social organization that recognizes social identity and individual dignity very much in line with Charles Taylor's thought. The paper illustrates such theoretical studies of nationalism with (...) reference to the concrete manifestations of nationalism in Canada and the Baltic States and argues that there are strong elements of cultural nationalism that can be identilied in the cultural policies and the political life of these nations. (shrink)

This article investigates how we should understand the prayer ‘But thy will not mine be done’, using Wittgenstein’s ordinary language approach. The later Wittgenstein argued that philosophy’s task is to assemble reminders of how language is used in daily life for a particular purpose. This approach offers a way to understand how, despite what theologians have argued, ‘Thy will be done’ is neither making prayer useless, nor is it fundamental to all petitionary prayers. Firstly, the framework and method of Wittgenstein’s (...) ordinary language will be explained. Secondly, reminders will be assembled for the purpose of showing that the prayer ‘Thy will be done’ does not need to make praying useless. Thirdly, the appropriate reminders to refute the statement that ‘Thy will be done’ is fundamental to all petitionary prayers will be presented. And, finally, these two sets of reminders will be connected to one another to provide a more truthful understanding of the prayer ‘Thy will be done’. (shrink)

A revision of the author's thesis, Dèusseldorf, 1975.

No single theoretician provoked a greater tradition of the reception of his thought throughout changing times and across diverse cultures than did Aristotle, and so Hegel, who calls him the 'teacher of the human race', well describes the man known for ages simply as 'the philosopher'. The present volume examines from a philosophical-historical standpoint the intellect-theory of De Anima III 4-5, which stands in the center of the Aristotelian system and composes one of the most provocative Aristotelian theories. It concentrates (...) on the critical engagement with Aristotle's conception of nous in Theophrastus and his colleagues (Dicaearchus, Aristoxenus) and students (Demetrius of Phaleron, Menander, Erasistratus) in the Peripatos as well as in the Academic, Socratic, Epicurean and Stoic schools. The analysis of the relevant texts leads to a new assessment of Theophrastus's philosophical-historical significance in the Aristotelian tradition and documents that in early Hellenism the Aristotelian theory itself played a surprisingly limited role, so that the loss of the original Aristotelian manuscripts as reported by Strabo and Plutarch — a matter hotly debated in recent studies — was of only marginal importance.Kein Theoretiker provozierte über eine ähnlich lange Zeitspanne eine so intensive, kontinuierliche und multikulturelle Rezeption wie Aristoteles. Die Geschichte der Philosophie verlangt es daher geradezu, unter der Perspektive der ebenso konstanten wie vielgestaltigen Auseinandersetzung mit “dem Philosophen” analysiert zu werden. Den geeignetsten Kristallisationspunkt hierfür stellt die in “De Anima” G 4-5 präsentierte Nous-Theorie dar, denn zum einen stand sie im Zentrum des aristotelischen “Systems”, zum anderen handelt es sich bei ihr um die mit gröîter Kontinuität, höchster Intensität und unterschiedlichsten Resultaten rezipierte philosophische Theorie überhaupt. Der vorliegende Band thematisiert, im Anschluî am die “Topographie” der aristotelischen Noetik, die frühhellenistische Resonanz. Den ersten Schwerpunkt bildet Theophrasts philosophisch-kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der Nous-Konzeption seines Lehrers, den zweiten die “De Anima”-Rezeption in der damaligen Philosophie-Szene, die im wesentlichen durch drie Gruppen konstituiert wurde: Theophrasts Kollegen im “Peripatos” (Dikaiarch, Aristoxenos); Theophrasts eingene Hörerschaft (Demetrios v. Phaleron, Menander, Erasistratos); und die zahlreichte philosophische Konkurrenz: die “Akademiker”, “Sokratiker”, und die Schulen Epikurs bzw. Zenons. Die Analyse der relevanten Texte führt erstens zu einder grundsätzlichen Neubewertung der philosophiehistorischen Position Theophrasts. Zweitens dokumentiert sie, daî die aristotelische Theorie entgegen der heutigen opinio communis gerade im Frühhellenismus eine erstaunlich bescheidene Rolle spielte. Rezeptionsgeschichtlich kommt dem von Strabon/Plutarch berichteten und in der neueren Forschung heiîdiskutierten Verlust der aristotelischen Originalmanuscripte deshalb allenfalls eine sekondäre Bedeutung zu. (shrink)