“This monograph is concerned with the ethical theories of two of the most influential thinkers in the history of British philosophy, namely Hobbes and Hume. The author offers a clear and comprehensive exposition of their thought and subjects it to critical assessment from the point of view of contemporary analytical philosophy. The issues with which this book deals are of abiding interest and form the subject matter of lively debate amongst modern moral philosophers. When we say that some action is (...) morally right, or that some state of affairs is morally good, what precisely do we mean? Can any adequate definition of moral rightness or goodness be given in non-moral terms? Could we, for example, substitute for morally right some such expression as ‘commanded by the sovereign power’; or could we, without loss or change of meaning, replace ‘This is morally good’ with some such description as ‘This causes a feeling of satisfaction in those who contemplate it’? Ethical naturalists think that the answer is in the affirmative, although they differ in the naturalistic definitions which they give to moral terms. Their opponents accuse them of being insensitive to the logically irreducible character of moral language.Readers will find that this book provides a valuable introduction to ethical naturalism, in both its classic and contemporary settings, and it will enable them to form their own judgement upon the crucial questions involved.”- Publisher. (shrink)

The concepts of pleasure and good, both separately and in their relation to one another, have for centuries been a favourite and fruitful subject of philosophical discussion. The contrasting concepts of pain and evil, however, though by no means entirely neglected, have been, and still are, less popular among philosophers. The reason for this disparity is not altogether clear. The title of a recent autobiography, “Philosophers lead sheltered lives,” might support the explanation that philosophers are reluctant to write on matters (...) of which they have little or no first-hand knowledge. Pleasure and good, it may be said, form part of their own personal experience: but their academic seclusion has little place for either pain or evil. A more serious reason is the assumption, often made but rarely defended, that, since pain and pleasure, evil and good, are in some sense pairs of “opposites,” a full discussion of all four concepts is unnecessary. The nature of pain, it is thought, can easily be inferred from the nature of pleasure, and that of evil from that of good. But even if this were true, it ought not to be taken for granted; the belief that these concepts are symmetrically disposed opposites ought to be held only after an investigation into all of them. And in fact the belief is not true. It does not need profound insight or observation to see that we cannot construct a simple hedonic scale on which pleasure appears as a plus, and pain as a minus quantity. Contemporary hedonists have often paid more attention to the psychological complexities involved in this problem than did their classical predecessors. A. L. Hilliard, for example, distinguishes carefully between pain and unpleasantness. Pain he describes as a sensitivity, “correlated with the excitation of specific receptors in the nervous system”: unpleasantness is an affectivity to which physiological correlates, though they must be assumed to exist, have not yet been discovered. (shrink)

Originally published in 1964, this book critically examines some philosophical theories of the relation between reason and morality, with particular reference to the writings of Cudworth, Locke, Clarke, Hume and Kant. It also discusses the ways in which conduct may be assessed or criticised, and of the extent to which these ways of assessment may amount to, or be connected with, moral assessment. The conclusion shows how far and in what ways rational moral judgment is possible and what are its (...) inevitable limitations. (shrink)