Geoffrey Chaucer pose dans The Canterbury Tales un regard unique sur l’évolution de la poésie anglaise durant le Moyen Âge. L’alternance de genres et de styles poétiques différents lui permet de refléter tout le potentiel de la littérature par le biais d’un réagencement des images, symboles et conventions qui la définissent. Néanmoins, ce qui fait la force de Chaucer dans The Canterbury Tales, est sa capacité à développer un dialogue entre les différents récits constituant l’œuvre, ainsi que sa facilité à (...) renverser nos attentes en extrayant son public d’un roman de chevalerie pour le propulser dans l’univers carnavalesque du fabliau, comme c’est le cas dans The Merchant’s Tale. En jouant avec l’imaginaire de l’arbre et du fruit, Chaucer nous prive dans ce conte de toute élévation et fait de son poirier un arbre inversé. In The Canterbury Tales, Geoffrey Chaucer takes a unique look at the evolution of English poetry during the Middle Ages. The interplay of different poetical styles and genres allows him to reflect the potential of literature through a reorganization of the images, symbols, and conventions that define it. Nonetheless, Chaucer’s real strength in The Canterbury Tales is his capacity to develop a dialogue between the different stories told in the work and also the ease with which he reverses his audience’s expectation, taking us out of traditional romance and throwing us into the burlesque world of a fabliau. In The Merchant’s Tale, Chaucer plays with the imagery of trees and fruits in order to deprive us of any possible elevation and ends by turning his pear tree upside down. (shrink)

La série Doctor Who est parvenue, en cinquante ans d’existence, à mettre en place une mythologie dans laquelle technologie et mythes des origines ont donné vie à un univers que la majorité des personnages perçoit comme étant « magique ». Tout comme le magicien ou la figure du sage dans le monomythe campbellien, le Docteur apparaît toujours au bon moment et provoque l’appel de l’aventure qui guide ses compagnons humains dans un monde merveilleux. Offrant souvent des explications pseudo-scientifiques incompréhensibles pour (...) le commun des mortels, le Docteur ressemble ainsi au magicien d’Oz dont les pouvoirs magiques viennent d’une maîtrise scientifique supérieure à celle de ses interlocuteurs. Mais la représentation de ce magicien spatio-temporel a pris une toute nouvelle tournure lorsqu’il est devenu évident que le Docteur et Merlin avaient une histoire et des origines communes. In fifty years, Doctor Who managed to develop a mythology in which technology and origin myths gave birth to a universe that most characters perceive as “magical”. Just like the wizard or the wise in the Campbellian monomyth, the Doctor systematically appears at the right moment and provokes the call to adventure that will lead his human companions in a wonderful world. His pseudo-scientific explanations, often incomprehensible for us mortals, thus create a certain connection between the Doctor and the Wizard of Oz, whose magic powers result from a superior knowledge of science. But the representation of this spatiotemporal magician became quite different when the Doctor and Merlin started to have a common history and a same origin. (shrink)

Neither full belief nor partial belief is more fundamental, ontologically speaking. A survey of some relevant cognitive psychology supports a dualist ontology instead. Beliefs come in two kinds, categorical and graded, neither more fundamental than the other. In particular, the graded kind is no more fundamental. When we discuss belief in on/off terms, we are not speaking coarsely or informally about states that are ultimately credal.

Evidence is univocal, not equivocal. Its implications don't depend on our beliefs or values, the evidence says what it says. But that doesn't mean there's no room for rational disagreement between people with the same evidence. Evaluating evidence is a lot like polling an electorate: getting an accurate reading requires a bit of luck, and even the best pollsters are bound to get slightly different results. So, even though evidence is univocal, rationality's requirements are not "unique." Understanding this resolves several (...) puzzles to do with uniqueness and disagreement. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept a response constraint on normative reasons: that p is a reason for you to φ only if you are able to φ for the reason that p. This constraint offers a natural way to cash out the familiar and intuitive thought that reasons must be able to guide us, and has been put to work as a premise in a range of influential arguments in ethics and epistemology. However, the constraint requires interpretation and faces putative counter-examples due (...) to Julia Markovits, Mark Schroeder, and others. This paper develops and motivates an interpretation of the response constraint that avoids the putative counter-examples. (shrink)

The mind-body problem: background and history -- Dualist theories of mind and body -- Physicalist theories of mind -- Anti-materialism about the mind -- Science and the mind-body problem: consciousness -- Three neutral theories of mind and body -- Neutral monism.

How do we know what's (metaphysically) possible and impossible? Arguments from Kripke and Putnam suggest that possibility is not merely a matter of (coherent) conceivability/imaginability. For example, we can coherently imagine that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct objects even though they are not possibly distinct. Despite this apparent problem, we suggest, nevertheless, that imagination plays an important role in an adequate modal epistemology. When we discover what is possible or what is impossible, we generally exploit important connections between what is (...) possible and what we can coherently imagine. We can often come to knowledge of metaphysical modality a priori. (shrink)

Elliott Sober has recently argued that the cosmological design argument is unsound, since our observation of cosmic fine-tuning is subject to an observation selection effect (OSE). I argue that this view commits Sober to rejecting patently correct design inferences in more mundane scenarios. I show that Sober's view, that there are OSEs in those mundane cases, rests on a confusion about what information an agent ought to treat as background when evaluating likelihoods. Applying this analysis to the design argument shows (...) that our observation of fine-tuning is not rendered uninformative by an OSE. Design and the Anthropic Objection Previous responses to the Anthropic Objection Variations: experimental squads and survivor reunions Why there is no OSE in firing squad cases Application to the design argument. (shrink)

A major work in moral philosophy by the noted Puritan divine.

Theodore Sider has recently produced an argument which he takes to show that three-dimensionalism is incompatible with the possibility of time travel. I wish to argue that there is indeed a problem for the three-dimensionalist who wishes to countenance time travel, but that Sider has misdiagnosed it. I show why his putative challenge fails, and furthermore that if it were to succeed this would be as problematic for a wide class of four-dimensionalist positions, including Sider’s own, as it would be (...) for three-dimensionalism. Finally, I present the problem that the possibility of time travel genuinely poses for the three-dimensionalist. (shrink)

Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004) critique the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001), but the model that they critique is a stripped-down version that should be called the “possum” model. They make three charges about the possum model that are not true about the social intuitionist model: that it includes no role for reasoning, that it reduces social influence to compliance, and that it does not take a developmental perspective. After I defend the honor of the social intuitionist model, I raise two (...) areas of legitimate dispute: the scope and nature of moral reasoning, and the usefulness of appealing to innate ideas, rather than to learning and reasoning, as the origin of moral knowledge. I present three clusters of innate moral intuitions, related to sympathy, hierarchy, and reciprocity. (shrink)

Introduction : ethical economics? -- The sovereign consumer -- Two myths about economic growth -- The politics of pay -- Happiness -- Pricing life and nature -- New worlds of money : public services and beyond -- Conclusion.

Jonathan Bennett engages with the thought of six great thinkers of the early modern period: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. While not neglecting the historical setting of each, his chief focus is on the words they wrote. What problem is being tackled? How exactly is the solution meant to work? Does it succeed? If not, why not? What can be learned from its success or failure? For newcomers to the early modern scene, this clearly written work is (...) an excellent introduction to it. Those already in the know can learn how to argue with the great philosophers of the past, treating them as colleagues, antagonists, students, teachers. In this second volume, Bennett focuses on the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. (shrink)

Richard Moran’s theory of first-person authority as the agential authority to make up one’s own mind rests on a form of mind-body dualism that does not allow for habituation as part of normal psychological functioning. We have good intuitive and empirical reason to accept that habituation is central to the normal functioning of desire. There is some empirical support for the idea that habituation plays a parallel role in belief. In particular, at least one form of implicit bias seems better (...) understood as a case of habituated belief than as a mere association or an example of what Tamar Gendler calls ‘alief’. If there is to be genuine first-person epistemic authority over persisting mental states, therefore, an alternative account to Moran’s is required in the case of desire and perhaps in the case of belief. More generally, the neglect of habituation in recent philosophy of mind is a symptom of the need for philosophers to take the temporal structure of rational agency more seriously. (shrink)

Adorno’s subtle utopianism is often overshadowed by the sombreness of his work. In this article, I explore Adorno’s concept of utopia by reading him alongside Ernst Bloch, whose The Spirit of Utopia (1918) had a lasting influence on Adorno. Not least due to the unsteady nature of their friendship, the intellectual relationship between Bloch and Adorno has often been overlooked. I propose that Bloch’s utopianism can help us make sense of Adorno’s rare but distinct remarks on utopia and argue that (...) instead of being a pure negativist, Adorno entertains a “minimal utopianism” that is constitutive to his notion of critique. I conclude that reading Adorno with Bloch reveals utopia as an ineliminable focal point in Adorno’s work and urges us to rethink the importance of utopianism for any critical project. (shrink)

Discovering someone disagrees with you is a common occurrence. The question of epistemic significance of disagreement concerns how discovering that another disagrees with you affects the rationality of your beliefs on that topic. This book examines the answers that have been proposed to this question, and presents and defends its own answer.

This article argues against the case for regarding bodies and parts of bodies to be property. It claims that doing so assumes an individualistic conception of the body. It fails to acknowledge that our bodies are made up of non-human material; are unbounded; constantly changing and deeply interconnected with other bodies. It also argues that holding that our bodies are property does not recognise the fact that we have different attitudes towards different parts of our removed bodies and the contexts (...) of their removal. The appropriate legal reform should, therefore, be to produce a statute which can provide a balance between the competing personal, social and interpersonal interests in different body parts. (shrink)

Full-length studies of individual books of Nietzsche have been lacking until now both because of the immaturity of the field and because Nietzsche's style itself seems to contraindicate them. Close reading, however, reveals a great deal of literary and philosophical unity. This holds good even of Human, All-Too-Human, Nietzsche's longest and most unwieldy work. The book represents Nietzsche's break with Schopenhauer and Wagner, as well as the birth of Nietzsche as we know him in the later works. The book's embrace (...) of science as conducive to culture follows the early works' vilification of science as anathema to culture. This reassessment is possible because science is now seen as a method and a discipline rather than an insatiable drive for knowledge, and culture is now a broad set of symbols and activities rather than a narrowly focussed "unity of artistic style." Both changes were motivated by Nietzsche's rejection of Wagner. Part of the help science provides culture is its release from restrictive metaphysical beliefs. Nietzsche battles metaphysics, principally that of Schopenhauer, by means of scientific arguments meant both to provide alternative explanations of phenomena and to expose the origin of countervailing metaphysical beliefs. However, even when combined in a two-pronged attack, these arguments still fall short of their goal of refuting metaphysics. The scientific world-view may nonetheless aid the development of "free spirits," whose unalloyed devotion to knowledge makes them science's paragons. The free spirits are the prototypes for the later works' strong individuals, yet here they are viewed as crucial elements in the cultural development of general society. Nietzsche seeks both to create them and to encourage their devotion to the needs of culture. Part of his effort to do this is the deployment of a terse, elliptical style which will involve the reader more thoroughly than can be done by means of argument alone. Study of the book's structure reveals that its core, Parts 1, 5, and 9, outlines the relation between science, culture, and free spirits. (shrink)

The article argues that the growth of religious service provision directed at the Muslim diaspora in Europe has led to greater professionalization and pluralism within the Islam state in Muslim countries. Contemporary Muslim governments have claimed a monopoly over public prayer and religious education and have heavily invested in a network of infrastructure and services – the Islam state. The recent breakthrough of Islamist parties into governments in Turkey and across North Africa poses a challenge to the continued ‘civilian control’ (...) over religion. What will become of the enormous Islamic Affairs ministries that Islamist parties have inherited – the hundreds of thousands of public servants of state Islam across the region, the tens of thousands of mosques and thousands of religious schools? Liberals demand the abolition of the Islam state because it violates the separation of religion and state; Islamists detest it for its repressive qualities. Despite progressive liberalization, governments in the past decade have not sought disestablishment, and have instead increased the resources and policing of state-run religion. I draw on the experience of Muslim governments in the competitive field of state–Islam relations in European countries to explain the modest beginnings of reform of the official religion apparatus in Muslim-majority countries. (shrink)

Of the many genes mutated on the road to tumor formation, few have received as much attention as p53. The gene has come to occupy center stage for the simple reason that it is more frequently altered in human tumors than any other known gene, undergoing mutation at a significant rate in almost every tumor type in which it has been studied. This association between p53 mutation and tumorigenesis has spurred a flurry of research attempting to delineate the normal function (...) of p53 and, by extension, the role of p53 mutation in tumor formation. At the cellular level, p53 has been shown to suppress growth. Recent efforts to further discern the function of p53 have centered on the underlying molecular basis for this growth suppression. In particular, research has focused on the identification of cellular molecules (specifically DNA and proteins) with which the p53 protein associates. p53 has now been shown to bind DNA in a sequence‐specific manner, and mounting evidence suggests that p53 acts as a transcription factor, perhaps regulating the expression levels of genes involved in the inhibition of cell growth. The logical next step in understanding p53 function involves the resolution of two questions: (1) what are the physiological transcriptional targets of p53, and (2) what cellular proteins regulate or mediate the ability of p53 to modulate transcription? Some initial clues to these puzzles are now emerging, and these form the subject of this review. (shrink)

This chapter addresses questions about commodification in the sphere of security and prisons. It surveys potential forms of commodification and considers arguments that aim to show that they are morally wrong or unjust. The chapter considers the relationship between commodification and privatization. It examines economic, legal and moral commodification arguments against private prisons and prison labor. The economic arguments against private prisons considered here focus on efficiency and perverse incentives. The legal arguments focus on dignity and the commodification of the (...) person. The moral arguments focus on human equality and corruption of important goods. The arguments against prison labor begin with the question of whether prison labor is market activity and then consider the possibility that prison labor may contribute to mass incarceration. The moral arguments focus on exploitation. The chapter also considers the relevance of the racial dimension of mass incarceration to arguments about commodification. (shrink)

It would be very desirable to have an account of the relation between mind and world that sustained the integrity of each. In this paper, we will argue that a theory of cognition which is broadly Thomistic can do just that. Many commentators recognize that cognitio is Aquinas’s basic epistemic concept, and that it designates knowledge in the broadest and most basic sense, as distinguished from scientia, or knowledge in the paradigmatic sense. There are several important consequences of this distinction (...) which are relevant to a proper understanding of the way in which a theory of knowledge which is in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition approaches the issue of the relation between the mind and the world. First and foremost, knowledge cannot be construed as a univocal concept in the A/t context. There are different senses of knowledge and we should not expect there to be a theory which supplies necessary and sufficient conditions for “S knows that p” that satisfies all the different senses of knowledge. It is perplexing that the contemporary discussion seems to miss this point, for the same sort of systematic ambiguity of the term ‘knowledge’ seems to hold in English. Second, the A/t theory of knowledge is not an epistemological theory in the modern sense, if by “epistemological” we mean one which is clearly demarcated from a metaphysical, psychological, or even semantical theory. The A/t theory is a metaphysics of knowledge. Third, a Thomistic theory of knowledge begins with a theory of cognition which provides the grounds of knowledge across the board, including even that of scientia. (shrink)