The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Love offers a wide array of original essays on the nature and value of love. The editors, Christopher Grau and Aaron Smuts, have assembled an esteemed group of thinkers, including both established scholars and younger voices. The volume contains thirty-three essays addressing both issues about love as well as key philosophers who have contributed to the philosophy of love, such as Plato, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Murdoch. The topics range from central issues about (...) the nature and variety of love, the possibility of its rational justification, and whether it is an emotion, to the significance of love for law, economics, morality, and free will. The volume also contains an introduction to the subject as well as essays on love’s relation to jealousy, biotechnology, religion, knowledge, and several other topics. This wide-ranging handbook will be a key resource for specialists working on the philosophy of love, and a helpful guide for those looking to learn more about the area. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the historicity of love requires an appreciation of the irreplaceability of the beloved. I do this through a consideration of ideas that were first put forward by Robert Kraut in “Love De Re” (1986). I also evaluate Amelie Rorty's criticisms of Kraut's thesis in “The Historicity of Psychological Attitudes: Love is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds” (1986). I argue that Rorty fundamentally misunderstands Kraut's Kripkean analogy, and (...) I go on to criticize her claim that concern over the proper object of love should be best understood as a concern over constancy. This leads me to an elaboration of the distinct senses in which love can be seen as historical. I end with a further defense of the irreplaceability of the beloved and a discussion of the relevance of recent debates over the importance of personal identity for an adequate account of the historical dimension of love. (shrink)

The Matrix trilogy is unique among recent popular films in that it is constructed around important philosophical questions--classic questions which have fascinated philosophers and other thinkers for thousands of years. Editor Christopher Grau here presents a collection of new, intriguing essays about some of the powerful and ancient questions broached by The Matrix and its sequels, written by some of the most prominent and reputable philosophers working today. They provide intelligent, accessible, and thought-provoking examinations of the philosophical issues that (...) support the films. Philosophers Explore The Matrix includes an introduction that surveys the use of philosophical ideas in the film. Topics that the contributors tackle include: how a collaborative dream could differ from hallucination, the difference between the Matrix and the "real" world; why living in the Matrix would be considered "bad"; the similarities between the Matrix and Plato's Cave; the moral status of artificially created beings, whether one can behave immorally in illusory circumstances, and the true nature of free will and responsibility. This volume also includes an appendix of classic philosophical writing on these issues by Plato, Berkeley, Descartes, Putnam, and Nozick. Philosophers Explore The Matrix will fascinate any fan of the films who wants to delve deeper into their themes, as well as any student of philosophy who desires an accessible entry into this challenging and profoundly vital world of ideas. (shrink)

This paper offers several criticisms of the account of rightholding laid out in S. Matthew Liao’s recent paper “The Basis of Human Moral Status.” I argue that Liao’s account both does too much and too little: it grants rightholder status to those who may not deserve it, and it does not provide grounds for offering such status to those who arguably do deserve it. Given these troubling aspects of his approach, I encourage Liao to abandon his “physical basis of moral (...) agency” account of moral status and instead adopt a position closer to a traditional “speciesist” view. (shrink)

Robert Kraut has proposed an analogy between valuing a loved one as irreplaceable and the sort of “rigid” attachment that (according to Saul Kripke’s account) occurs with the reference of proper names. We wanted to see if individuals with Kripkean intuitions were indeed more likely to value loved ones (and other persons and things) as irreplaceable. In this empirical study, 162 participants completed an online questionnaire asking them to consider how appropriate it would be to feel the same way about (...) a perfect replica of a loved one, as well as other questions about replaceability. Participants who previously had endorsed Kripkean reference (n = 96) rated loved ones as less replaceable on two different measures than participants who had previously endorsed Descriptivist reference (n = 66, t(160)> 2.27, p <.02, eta2> .03). Additional results suggest that this difference extends to other targets as well and is at least partially dependent on sentimental attachment. (shrink)

This essay begins with a consideration of one way in which animals and persons may be valued as “irreplaceable.” Drawing on both Plato and Pascal, I consider reasons for skepticism regarding the legitimacy of this sort of attachment. While I do not offer a complete defense against such skepticism, I do show that worries here may be overblown due to the conflation of distinct metaphysical and normative concerns. I then go on to clarify what sort of value is at issue (...) in cases of irreplaceable attachment. I characterize “unique value” as the kind of value attributed to a thing when we take that thing to be (theoretically, not just practically) irreplaceable. I then consider the relationship between this sort of value and intrinsic value. After considering the positions of Gowans, Moore, Korsgaard, Frankfurt, and others, I conclude that unique value is best understood not as a variety of intrinsic value but rather as one kind of final value that is grounded in the extrinsic properties of the object. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that the film Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind eloquently and powerfully suggests a controversial philosophical position: that the harm caused by voluntary memory removal cannot be entirely understood in terms of harms that are consciously experienced. I explore this possibility through a discussion of the film that includes consideration of Nagel and Nozick on unexperienced harms, Kant on duties to oneself, and Murdoch on the requirements of morality.

Excerpt from Die Entwicklung des Bewusstseinsbegriffes im XVII. Und XVIII. Jahrhundert Dunkelheit der Perzeptionen. Perceptions sans appet ception. Grunde für deren Annahme. Wesen der Apperzeption. Arten der Perzeptionen. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, (...) an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan has long shown himself to be a vigorous and incisive critic of speciesism, and in his essay “Our Fellow Creatures” he has been particularly critical of speciesist arguments that draw inspiration from Wittgenstein. In this essay I consider his arguments against speciesism generally and the species-norm account of deprivation in particular. I argue that McMahan's ethical framework is more nuanced and more open to the incorporation of speciesist intuitions regarding deprivation than he himself suggests. Specifically, I argue that, (...) given his willingness to include a comparative dimension in his “Intrinsic Potential Account” he ought to recognize species as a legitimate comparison class. I also argue that a sensible speciesism can be pluralist and flexible enough to accommodate many of McMahan's arguments in defense of “moral individualist” intuitions. In this way, I hope to make the case for at least a partial reconciliation between McMahan and the “Wittgensteinian speciesists”, e.g. Cora Diamond, Stephen Mulhall, and Raimond Gaita. (shrink)

The sci-fi premise of the 2002 film Solaris allows director Steven Soderbergh to tell a compelling and distinctly philosophical love story. The “visitors” that appear to the characters in the film present us with a vivid thought experiment, and the film naturally prods us to dwell on the following possibility: If confronted with a duplicate (or near duplicate) of someone you love, what would your response be? What should your response be? The tension raised by such a far-fetched situation reflects (...) a tension that exists in real life: that between an attraction to qualities possessed by a person and attraction to the person in a manner that transcends such an attachment to qualities. In short, this cinematic thought-experiment challenges us to reflect on what we really attach to when we fall in love: is it the person, or is it merely the cluster of characteristics the person manifests? Which sort of attachment is appropriate? Which is philosophical defensible? The protagonist Chris Kelvin’s ambivalence at encountering this bizarre possibility is gripping because it tracks our own ambivalence about such matters. Frankly most of us don’t know just how we would react to such a situation. The thought that accepting and embracing such a “visitor” involves a violation to the original person is natural and pervasive, especially if the acceptance comes with a failure to acknowledge the distinction between the original person and the “visitor”. At the same time, a deep attraction to such a person would surely also be entirely natural and perhaps even inescapable. We, like Kelvin, are torn in different directions by this (thankfully) far-fetched possibility. One philosopher who affirms that accepting a duplicate as though it were the original is the rational thing to do is Derek Parfit. His argument for “the unimportance of identity” is both powerful and radical, and though I’ll be critical of his approach, in the final section of the paper I suggest that it does offer up the resources for an intriguing interpretation of the end of this complex and ambiguous film. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Love offers a wide array of original essays on the nature and value of love. The editors, Christopher Grau and Aaron Smuts, have assembled an esteemed group of thinkers, including both established scholars and younger voices. The volume contains thirty-three essays addressing both issues about love as well as key philosophers who have contributed to the philosophy of love, such as Plato, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Murdoch. The topics range from central issues about the (...) nature and variety of love, the possibility of its rational justification, and whether it is an emotion, to the significance of love for law, economics, morality, and free will. The volume also contains an introduction to the subject as well as essays on love’s relation to jealousy, biotechnology, religion, knowledge, and several other topics. This wide-ranging handbook will be a key resource for specialists working on the philosophy of love, and a helpful guide for those looking to learn more about the area. (shrink)

American History X (hereafter AHX) has been accused by numerous critics of a morally dangerous cinematic seduction: using stylish cinematography, editing, and sound, the film manipulates the viewer through glamorizing an immoral and hate-filled neo-nazi protagonist. In addition, there’s the disturbing fact that the film seems to accomplish this manipulation through methods commonly grouped under the category of “fascist aesthetics.” More specifically, AHX promotes its neo-nazi hero through the use of several filmic techniques made famous by Nazi propagandist Leni Riefenstahl. (...) Now most critics admit that, in the end, the film claims to denounce racism and attempts to show us the conversion of the protagonist to the path of righteousness, but they complain that nonetheless the film (perhaps unintentionally) ends up implicitly promoting the immoral worldview it rather superficially professes to reject in its final act. This charge of hypocrisy is connected to another worry: the moral conversion in the film is said to fall flat because the intellectual resources on display to support the character’s racism are not counterbalanced by equally explicit (but superior) arguments for the anti-racist position ultimately embraced by the character. In other words, just as the devil is said to get all the good lines in Milton’s Paradise Lost, in AHX the racists get all the arguments. This has been taken to be a morally problematic flaw of the film. Critics lament that Derek’s conversion seems to result not from relevant logical inferences and valid rational argumentation but from overly simplistic and arguably egoistic insights (e.g., “has anything you've done made your life better?”) combined, perhaps, with a hackneyed cliché (in prison, one of his best friends is a black person!) In this paper I’ll attempt to rebut these charges and defend the film as a powerful, and powerfully moral, work of art. I’ll be suggesting that the seductive techniques employed allow for many viewers a degree of sympathy towards the protagonist that is crucial, both for making that character’s more horrific actions especially unsettling, and also for making his eventual conversion plausible and ultimately compelling. I’ll also argue that the manner in which his conversion is presented is in fact subtler than many critics have allowed: Derek’s transformation is not artificial or implausible but is depicted as resulting from a cumulative series of emotionally powerful life events and personal engagements. It is certainly true that it is not represented in the way some would seemingly have preferred, i.e. as straightforwardly resulting from a process of gradual intellectual improvement in Derek’s reasoning on questions of race and politics. However, I’ll argue that the decidedly emotional basis of his moral evolution is both refreshingly realistic and no hindrance to accepting his conversion as rational. Finally, properly understanding the legitimacy of the emotional foundations of much moral thought will also allow us to appreciate the ways in which our initial worries about this film’s (not insignificant) ability to persuade viewers through the engagement of emotions need not, in itself, be seen as a barrier to endorsing the film as a morally praiseworthy work. (shrink)

Alain Grau | : Au légiste qui l’interroge sur ce qu’il faut faire, Jésus répond : « Comment lis-tu? » À nous qui lisons, la question n’est pas sans poser le problème de savoir quel corps nous formons par cette lecture. La « personnalité corporative » pourrait constituer une réponse, pourvu toutefois qu’elle soit dépouillée de tous ses attributs classiques : psychologique, religieux, ou encore littéraire. Sans contenu objectif, elle n’en est pas moins opératoire. Mais en figure seulement, qui (...) attend d’être comblée par la chair pour devenir vraie. La Chair de Jésus, et la nôtre. L’avenir de cette vieille notion ne serait-il pas la grâce divine? | : To the expert in the law who asks Him what to do, Jesus replies: “How do you read?” For us who do read, the question is not without posing the problem of knowing what body we form by this reading. The “corporate personality” could provide an answer, but on the condition that it be stripped of all its classical attributes : psychological, religious, or literary. Even deprived of any objective content, it is none the less operational. Yet only figuratively, waiting to be fulfilled by the flesh to become true. The Flesh of Jesus, and ours. Might not the future of that old notion be divine grace? (shrink)

Grau reconsiders the relationship between "logos" and "mythos" as a precondition to opening theological hermeneutics to discourse from other cultures and genres, other modes of telling and retelling.

Dance anthropologists and ethnomusicologists are trained to treat the labels ‘dance’ and ‘music’ with caution, because the terms carry preconceptions that may mask significant aspects of the structured movement/sound systems they study. Yet many talk about ‘the body’ – the medium through which these systems come into being – as something given and ‘true’, without investigating its emic conceptualizations or looking into the implications these may have in terms of how music and dance are experienced. The article investigates the dancing (...) bodies of western ballet dancers and of Tiwi dancers of northern Australia. The latter have an extensive vocabulary for body parts, but no word for ‘body’ as a bounded entity, comparable to the ‘body’ conceptualized by ballet dancers. The article argues that for the Tiwi landscape and human bodies are unavoidably tied together and that the dancers incarnate both land and cosmology. While specific parts have a concrete practical existence, the whole body expands into the landscape so that the landscape becomes flesh. Through the aesthetic transformation of dancing, dancers and land become one, and life is sustained and the land revitalized. (shrink)

This is a draft of a talk I have given at several venues. At one point I planned to revise it for inclusion in the Oxford Handbook I co-edited, but for various reasons I decided against that. Since I still think it contains some useful material, I have uploaded it here. Feedback welcome.

Resumen:El texto tiene como inspiración el tratamiento que hiciera Humberto Giannini (1997) de los llamados “pecados capitales” en su negatividad, en tanto “espíritus del mal”, a partir de los sentidos de la tradición cristiana. Daremos cuenta de la interpretación que hace de esos “espíritus del mal”, centrándonos en los “pecados” de la lujuria y la gula, poniendo esta interpretación en relación con otros meandros de interés propio que hacen sentido para una reflexión sobre el placer, de la que siempre estaremos (...) en deuda por ser este esquivo a su comprensión recortada, dadas sus posibilidades relacionales ilimitadas que sobrepasan la experiencia o la imaginación particulares y restringidas que cada cual tiene.Palabras clave: apetito; vicios; mal; bien; transgresión; placer; gula; lujuria. (shrink)

Las discusiones sobre la intencionalidad en la Filosofía de la mente contemporánea se plantean en un marco un tanto ajeno al de la Fenomenología, bajo la suposición, de modo bastante generalizado, de que hay una separación entre intencionalidad y consciencia . Mi objetivo en este artículo es, en primer lugar, exponer tal supuesto. En segundo lugar, presentar los elementos clave de la teoría de la intencionalidad en las Investigaciones Lógicas de Husserl para presentar una visión que se opone a tal (...) separación. Y, en tercer lugar, finalizar con un tema común a ambos espacios de discusión, el de una experiencia o vivencia propia del pensamiento, que surge como un problema para muchas visiones analíticascontemporáneas y que tiene una explicación que puede derivarse de la concepción de Husserl.In contemporary Philosophy of mind, discussions about intentionality areset up in a quite different framework from the phenomenological one, assuming, in general, a separation between intentionality and consciousness. My aim in this paper is, firstly, to present this assumption. Secondly, I will put forward the key elements of Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations in order to present a view which is opposed to this assumption. And thirdly, I will end up with a common topic for both frameworks, that is, the topic of a specific experience of thinking, which emerges as a problem for many contemporary analytic views and which has an explanation that can be derived from Husserl's conception. (shrink)

The topic of this paper concerns the relation between thinking and phenomenality as it is discussed in the Philosophy of Mind. Thus, I am addressing the following questions: does the domain of phenomenal consciousness include thinking? And if so, is the phenomenality of thinking (PT) proprietary or not? I will firstly present the debate and the main notions involved in it, by contrasting a certain mainstream picture of the mind with the one offered by Phenomenology. Second, I will consider the (...) particular question of a proprietary phenomenology of conscious thought through the examination of the reductionist and antireductionist positions, concluding with a sceptical remark towards this dialectics. (shrink)

This is the first book to explore and address the philosophical aspects of Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind. Beginning with a helpful introduction that places each essay in context, specially commissioned chapters examine the following topics: -/- * Philosophical issues surrounding love, friendship, affirmation and repetition * The role of memory (and the emotions) in personal identity and decision-making * The morality of imagination and ethical importance of memory * Philosophical questions about self-knowledge and knowing the minds of others (...) * The aesthetics of the film considered in relation to Gondry’s other works and issues in the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

Alexis de Tocqueville mantuvo una muy abundante correspondencia a lo largo de su vida. Familiares y relevantes contemporáneos, no sólo franceses, figuran entre sus destinatarios. Sus cartas ofrecen una parte esencial de su pensamiento, expuesto con la libertad propia del género epistolar, y representan una componente de primera importancia dentro de su obra literaria. Las Cartas Americanas, escritas entre abril de 1831 y febrero de 1832 con ocasión de su viaje al Nuevo Mundo, son un buen ejemplo. Además, por servir (...) de referencia inmediata a su gran obra, La democracia en América, cobran un valor excepcional. Cabe pensar que este apartado de la correspondencia tocquevillana, acotado en el tiempo a la perfección, está bien estudiado al día de hoy. Sin embargo una carta, dirigida a su hermano Edouard 3 el 20 de junio de 1831 desde Nueva York e inédita hasta este momento, evidencia que no es así. A ello nos referimos en este trabajo. (shrink)

The double homoousia, confessed by the Council of Chalcedon, is certainly one of the most difficult concepts transmitted by the dogmatic tradition. What can be signified by the affirmation that Christ is homoouion to us, and to each of us? Is it possible to shift a trinitarian understanding, classical since Nicaea, into anthropological meaning in an univocal way, without reason’s injury? If it is the case, we must give the second homoousia an intelligibility right at the intersection of theology and (...) economy, which geometric center is He 5:8 so that Christology can not be understood from the two natures, purportedly known, even metaphysically (God and man), as if it should be enough to understand the mode of conjunction in Christ. This can be done uniquely in an hypostatic way, following the double definition. The hypothesis of the univocity of Chalcedonian faith offers a significance to divinization by clearing its proper location, if, and only if, we engage a new definition of (human) hypostasis, considering that this hypostasis is the one of the Word in that “perfect” man called Jesus. (shrink)

In order to explore the political and transformative potential of bodies in relation to gender and affects, I discuss how bodies, gender and politics are entangled through the figuration of ‘overflown bodies’. Departing from a material-discursive feminist conceptualisation of bodies, ‘overflown bodies’ are assemblages embedded in complex relationships of matter, discourse, emotions, affects, ideologies, protest, norms, values, relations, practices, expectations and other possibilities of (for) social and political action. Three ethnographic cases illustrate how ‘overflown bodies’ assemble matter and discourse, and (...) how matter, bodies and gender matter. They are used to explore the political possibilities of gendered bodies and show how matter is entangled, embedded and assembled with our politics of being. The three cases interrogate the limits and boundaries of bodies and the modes and modalities of (political) agency. Finally, the article argues that it is through visibility and recognition that ‘overflown bodies’ become critically and creatively transforming, which can be useful for addressing issues related to exclusion, domination, political emancipation and social transformation. (shrink)

Modernity has made identity impossible because of its exigency of a per-fection that is not compatible with human finitude. This is the reason why since Romanticism it has been generalized the attempt of establishing scopes in which man is freed from this duty. There arises also many phenomena that can be understood as aesthetic instances that defend the in-dividual particularity and promote the cultural variety.

Este artículo analiza un grupo de producciones audiovisuales latinoamericanas a la luz del problema de lo “necropolítico” de Achile Mbembe. Estas películas y series de televisión se han producido desde los años noventa del siglo xx hasta la actualidad, y tienen como universo temático el mundo delincuencial de ciudades latinoamericanas, corpus que he conceptualizado anteriormente dentro de la estética audiovisual como Noir Lumpen latinoamericano. Dentro de esto, nos posibilitará pensar un problema extracinematográfico: cómo las formas “necropolíticas” son el régimen biopolítico (...) en que viven vastos sectores de las sociedades latinoamericanas y que sus espacios urbanos no toman las formas de la cárcel panóptica foucaultiana, sino las formas de los pabellones penitenciarios latinoamericanos. (shrink)

Forms of failure in later Beethoven.- In the later style of Beethoven can be seen certain modes of expression which could be understood as a criticism of absolute idealism. The way in which the sonata-form breaks up is what best illustrates the failure of hegemonic subjecti-vity.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

En 2015, la ONU aprobó 17 Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible (ODS) integrados en la Agenda 2030. Siguiendo esta línea, y dada su relevancia, las universidades europeas están integrando el desarrollo sostenible en sus planes de estudio. El objetivo de esta propuesta consistirá en desarrollar una experiencia piloto donde nuestros estudiantes a través del aprendizaje cooperativo formen equipos de trabajo agrupados según el test Riso-Hudson (1999) garantice el máximo rendimiento. Como resultado se ofrecerá una medida de la rentabilidad que aporta la (...) incorporación de la sostenibilidad en los proyectos de inversión empresariales a la par que la creación de valor sostenible. (shrink)

La interpretaci¢n del derecho tiene un car cter constitutivo -y no meramente declarativo- y consiste en la producci¢n por el int‚rprete (a partir de textos normativos y de los hechos relativos a un caso determinado) de normas jur¡dicas ...

The aim of this article is to show the relationships between philosophy and literature that may derive from Simone de Beauvoir writing who makes a contribution to contemporary reflection regarding these relationships. Her own writing, which could be named as “ambiguous writing” due to its particularities, constitutes a proposal and a commitment to overcome or to exceed the limits that either literature or philosophy might impose to comply with the accomplishment of the specific features inherent to these discursive genres. I (...) suggest the concept of “reflective genre” to denote the peculiarity of Simone de Beauvoir’s option when applying, at times simultaneously or sequentially, the discursive genres of fiction, autobiographical stories and essays writing that express more systematically her speculations of a philosophical nature. In this text, I consider her conception of the novel which she gives a high pre-eminence, in a period of her production. (shrink)

La extraña presencia de la idea de destino en la filosofía moderna puede explicarse como el movimiento de una dialéctica peculiar: 1. Desfatalización; 2. Refatalización; 3. Neutralización indirecta del destino: el heroísmo trascendental. Estos tres pasos ilustran la dialéctica de una despedida que se creyó definitiva. El destino parece asistir complacido a su propio enterramiento. Pero la astucia de la libertad trata de derrotar al destino llevándolo a un campo de batalla más propicio: su aprovechamiento moral.

Nietzsche understood philosophy as an activity wich arises from a profound passion for truth. This article examines such pathos and tries to show its inconsistencies thus terminating in a philosophy of appearances.

Suarez's psychology starts from the triple Aristotelian distinction of the soul: vegetative, sensitive and rational. Having appreciated the need and function of the agent and possible intellects in the human knowledge, especially in the universal ones, we have proceeded to analyse its essential characteristics. The agent intellect is presented as a noncognizant faculty limited to the lighting of images and the production of species.

With the resumption of the quest for the Jesus of history in the second half of the twentieth century, the various portraits of Jesus drawn by exegesis raise new questions for Christology. Since it cannot abandon the confession of Jesus as being « true man », Christology must take them into account. But the discordant results of the « third quest » force a reversal of perspective, for they presuppose the anthropological question. Hence it is that Christology can no longer (...) seek help from anthropological criteria taken for granted, but must instead integrate into its own epistemic field the question of man as such, starting from a singular humanity, namely that of Jesus, which is revealed to the exegete as well as to the theologian by the gift of Spirit alone. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to provisionally put forward a definition of “system” as a mode of reflection that, as its Greek etymology suggests, “holds together” and rests upon a conception of philosophical discourse as a kind of arborescence. From a common trunk, as it were, the branches delimiting the domains of philosophy would emanate. Fundamentally, the system would then be the form taken by the action called “philosophizing” and would constitute the material form of “Philosophy” – which would (...) assume, to a certain extent, the role of structure. (shrink)

La queja contra el exceso es tan antigua como la misma cultura. pero el saber no se rige únicamente por una ley de acumulación cuantitativa ; saber significa también reducir. Una teoría hermenéutica del conocimiento escapa mejor a las aporias del exceso que una descripción positivista de la realidad. Desde esta economía de la significación cabe defender la interdisciplinariedad de los saberes como un ahorro y no como una suerte de complicación de las perspectivas sobre la realidad.

Developments in the sociology of the body and the sociology of health impel us to investigate embodiment resistances against hegemonic biomedical definitions of normativity. Bearing in mind that the body is a social object defined by institutions, the analysis of body itineraries leads us to glimpse modes of subversion, resistance and destabilization of biomedical definitions. This article deals with the role of modern science and technology in the observation and diagnosis of the body and its consequences in the definition of (...) health and disease, the normal and the pathological. Second, biomedicine is analysed as an institution that orders gender and underpins sexual dimorphism through debates on depathologization and dysnormality. The implications of technology and medicine in the processes of neoliberal subjectivation promoted by body optimization practices are also discussed. (shrink)

If we understand modernity as the construction of a distinction -i.e. sub-jectivity vs. objectivity- postmodernity can be considered the abolition of that distinction, after the experience of its apories. In this paper the interest points towards a non disjunctive direction, towards a kind of thought that may embrace both ambigüity and the relative indiscerni-bility of the opposites.

Résumé La notion de la « personne » est devenue aujourd’hui une notion très floue. D’une certaine manière, il s’agit d’une notion qui paraît n’avoir d’autre pertinence que l’usage qui en est fait pour légitimer, ou invalider, telle ou telle position concernant des problèmes éthiques contemporains. Mais un tel usage s’avère insatisfaisant, faute de pouvoir interroger vraiment la relation que cette notion entretient avec celle de « nature », que l’on précise au besoin comme étant humaine. Or, dans l’histoire du (...) monde, il existe un étant, Jésus de Nazareth, dont il est affirmé que, pour lui, le rapport entre nature et personne ne va pas de soi, comme cela semble être le cas pour les autre hommes. Ce rapport est posé d’une manière très singulière par la théologie catholique, plus précisément par le Concile tenu à Chalcédoine en 451. L’interrogation de ce texte conciliaire peut, dans un premier temps, inquiéter la philosophie en rendant délicat, voire incertain, le rapport entre « nature » et « personne ». Mais nous pensons qu’en se laissant inquiéter de la sorte, la philosophie peut trouver une voie nouvelle pour penser la « personne », au-delà des masques qui, traditionnellement, en tiennent lieu. (shrink)

Over the last few decades, multiple studies have examined the understanding of participants in clinical research. They show variable and often poor understanding of key elements of disclosure, such as expected risks and the experimental nature of treatments. Did the participants in these studies give valid consent? According to the standard view of informed consent they did not. The standard view holds that the recipient of consent has a duty to disclose certain information to the profferer of consent because valid (...) consent requires that information to be understood. The contents of the understanding and disclosure requirements are therefore conceptually linked. In this paper, we argue that the standard view is mistaken. The disclosure and understanding requirements have distinct grounds tied to two different ways in which a token of consent can be rendered invalid. Analysis of these grounds allows us to derive the contents of the two requirements. It also implies that it is sometimes permissible to enroll willing participants who have not understood everything that they ought to be told about their clinical trials. (shrink)

This article is a sequel to a previous study which analysed the function that the idea of destiny plays in the genesis of German Idealism. This article focuses on the concept of destiny in Hölderlin, the idea of freedom incarnated in the dramas of Schiller and the hegelian concept of univer-sal history.

Si algo caracteriza a los valores es que no son algo que tengamos almacenado a nuestra disposición, por lo que, propiamente hablando, tampoco se pueden despilfarrar. En el acto de valorar, todo individuo o generación se encuentra ante una situación inédita ; el arsenal de argumentos de la tradición no le ahorrará el esfuerzo de enjuiciar y decidir. En éste artículo me propongo analizar las nuevas realidades de nuestra cultura tratando de encontrar en ella su propia constelación de valores, la (...) lógica que gobierna sus prioridades. Y el punto de partida para dicha incursión es que las dimisiones morales específicas de nuestro tiempo han de ser entendidas y juzgadas desde la estructura extremadamente compleja de un nuevo individualismo. (shrink)

What motives underlie the ways humans interact socially? Are these the same for all societies? Are these part of our nature, or influenced by our environments?Over the last decade, research in experimental economics has emphatically falsified the textbook representation of Homo economicus. Literally hundreds of experiments suggest that people care not only about their own material payoffs, but also about such things as fairness, equity and reciprocity. However, this research left fundamental questions unanswered: Are such social preferences stable components of (...) human nature; or, are they modulated by economic, social and cultural environments? Until now, experimental research could not address this question because virtually all subjects had been university students, and while there are cultural differences among student populations throughout the world, these differences are small compared to the full range of human social and cultural environments. A vast amount of ethnographic and historical research suggests that people's motives are influenced by economic, social, and cultural environments, yet such methods can only yield circumstantial evidence about human motives. Combining ethnographic and experimental approaches to fill this gap, this book breaks new ground in reporting the results of a large cross-cultural study aimed at determining the sources of social preferences that underlie the diversity of human sociality. The same experiments which provided evidence for social preferences among university students were performed in fifteen small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of social, economic and cultural conditions by experienced field researchers who had also done long-term ethnographic field work in these societies. The findings of these experiments demonstrated that no society in which experimental behaviour is consistent with the canonical model of self-interest. Indeed, results showed that the variation in behaviour is far greater than previously thought, and that the differences between societies in market integration and the importance of cooperation explain a substantial portion of this variation, which individual-level economic and demographic variables could not. Finally, the extent to which experimental play mirrors patterns of interaction found in everyday life is traced.The book starts with a succinct but substantive introduction to the use of game theory as an analytical tool and its use in the social sciences for the rigorous testing of hypotheses about fundamental aspects of social behaviour outside artificially constructed laboratories. The results of the fifteen case studies are summarized in a suggestive chapter about the scope of the project. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the means to our ends. It further argues that there is no distinct form of instrumental reasoning or of instrumental rationality. In part the argument proceeds through a sympathetic examination of suggestions made by M. Bratman, J. Broome, and J. Wallace, though the accounts of instrumental rationality offered by the last two are criticised.

We argue that there is a conflict among classical theism's commitments to divine simplicity, divine creative freedom, and omniscience. We start by defining key terms for the debate related to classical theism. Then we articulate a new argument, the Aloneness Argument, aiming to establish a conflict among these attributes. In broad outline, the argument proceeds as follows. Under classical theism, it's possible that God exists without anything apart from Him. Any knowledge God has in such a world would be wholly (...) intrinsic. But there are contingent truths in every world, including the world in which God exists alone. So, it's possible that God contingently has wholly intrinsic knowledge. But whatever is contingent and wholly intrinsic is an accident. So, God possibly has an accident. This is incompatible with classical theism. Finally, we consider and rebut several objections. (shrink)

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of (...) small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life. Key Words: altruism; cooperation; cross-cultural research; experimental economics; game theory; ultimatum game; public goods game; self-interest. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:There is considerable overlap between the interests of business ethicists and those of political philosophers. Questions about the moral justifiability of the capitalist system, the basis of property rights, and the problem of inequality in the distribution of income have been of central importance in both fields. However, political philosophers have developed, especially over the past four decades, a set of tools and concepts for addressing these questions that are in many ways quite distinctive. Most business ethicists, on the other (...) hand, consider their field to be primarily a domain of applied ethics, and so adopt methods and conceptual frameworks developed by moral philosophers. In this paper, we discuss some of the salient differences between these two approaches, and suggest some ways in which business ethicists could benefit from taking a more “political philosophy” approach to these questions. Throughout, we underline the importance of seeking greater compatibility among the principles used in normative theorizing about markets, regulations, corporate governance, and business practices. (shrink)

We draw out significant consequences of a relatively popular theory of metaphysical modality—branching actualism—for cosmological arguments for God’s existence. According to branching actualism, every possible world shares an initial history with the actual world and diverges only because causal powers (or dispositions, or some such) are differentially exercised. We argue that branching actualism undergirds successful responses to two recent cosmological arguments: the Grim Reaper Kalam argument and a modal argument from contingency. We also argue that branching actualism affords a response (...) to one popular defense of the classic contingency argument. What results are new difficulties for several cosmological arguments arising from the metaphysics of modality. (shrink)