According to epistemic instrumentalism, epistemically rational beliefs are beliefs that are produced in ways that are conducive to certain ends that one wants to attain. In “Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique,” Thomas Kelly advances various objections to epistemic instrumentalism. While I agree with the general thrust of Kelly’s objections, he does not distinguish between two forms of epistemic instrumentalism. Intellectualist forms maintain that epistemically rational beliefs are beliefs arrived at in compliance with rules that are conducive to epistemic (...) ends, such as believing true propositions and not believing false propositions. Pragmatist forms maintain that rational beliefs are those that are formed, maintained, and revised in accordance with rules that are conducive to whatever ends one wants to attain. In this paper, I argue against both forms of epistemic instrumentalism and suggest that epistemic instrumentalism grows out of a mistaken conception of what it means to say that the standards of epistemic rationality are ‘normative.’. (shrink)

In this article, I explore some harms that emerge from the call for charity in academic philosophy. A charitability gap, I suggest, exists both between who we tend to read charitably and who we tend to expect charitability from. This gap shores up the disciplinary status quo and (re)produces epistemic oppression, which helps preserve philosophy's status as a discipline that is, to use Charles Mills's language, conceptually and demographically dominated by whiteness and maleness (Mills 1998, 2). I am particularly interested (...) in calls for charity made in response to critiques of racist or sexist authors/texts. I suggest that in these cases, interpretive charity perpetuates epistemic violence by creating conditions for testimonial smothering (Dotson 2011); that it functions as an orientation device (Ahmed 2006) designed to bring “unruly” philosophers back in line with disciplinary practices and traditions; and that it requires resistant philosophers to remain in oppressive worlds (Lugones 2003a; Pohlhaus 2011). Although charitability is risky—and charity is disproportionately demanded from already marginalized philosophers—I am hesitant to abandon charity entirely. The outright rejection of charitable orientations toward texts or others commits philosophers to a purity politics that, following Alexis Shotwell, I suggest we resist (Shotwell 2016). (shrink)

This book shines a spotlight on two missing foci of authentic leadership research: international and follower perspectives. The concept of ‘authenticity’ has been in vogue since the times of Greek philosophy, but it wasn’t until the 1990s that leadership scholars seriously began to study the topic of authentic leadership. This new collection brings together empirical research and theoretical contributions to provide insights into the follower perspectives of authentic leadership around the world. Covering topics such as leader self-awareness, gender, psychological capital, (...) embodied leadership and followership, and unethical conduct, the book features a Foreword written by William L. Gardner, one of the original scholars on authentic leadership. (shrink)

Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.

In his essay, “Making Music Together,” Schutz provided insight into the social interactions between all participants in the musical process, including composer, performers, and listeners. The key concept in Schutz’s essay is the “mutual tuning-in relationship,” which encompasses the relationship between I and Thou, to form a We Presence. Schutz examined the structure of the mutual tuning-in relationship, which he said, “originates in the possibility of living together simultaneously in specific dimensions of time”. During the mutual tuning-in process, members of (...) an ensemble merge into each other’s stream of consciousness. This paper is based on phenomenologically-influenced research conducted at the Cleveland Institute of Music in collaboration with the Cavani String Quartet. The members of the Cavani Quartet teach several specific rehearsal techniques to their students which enable formation of a We Presence. The paper summarizes Schutz’s structures of the mutual tuning-in process and provides illustrations from the research findings which deepen our understanding of the mutual tuning-in process. (shrink)

Closure principles loom large in recent internalist critiques of epistemic externalism. Cohen (Philos Phenomenol Res 65:309–329, 2002, Philos Phenomenol Res 70:417–430, 2005), Vogel (J Philos 97:602–623, 2000), and Fumerton (Meta-Epistemology and skepticism. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 1995) argue that, given closure, epistemic externalism is committed to the possibility of implausibly easy knowledge. By contrast, Zalabardo (Philos Rev 114:33–61, 2005) proposes that epistemic closure actually precludes the possibility of easy knowledge, and appeals to closure principles to solve the problem of easy (...) knowledge. In my view, disagreement over closure’s bearing on externalism and the problem of easy knowledge is rooted in a failure to bear in mind the familiar distinction between ex ante and ex post forms of epistemic justification and warrant. When this distinction is kept in focus, the result is clear: epistemic closure provides no relief from the problem of easy knowledge. (shrink)

There is little fear that the concept of motivational bias as proposed by Mele is likely to dampen the current academic ferment (see Mele's Introduction) with respect to self-deception for several reasons: (a) like philosophy, science has more recently abandoned the heuristic of a rational human mind; (b) the concept is parsimonious, applicable to many research topics other than self-deception, and, therefore, scientifically serviceable; (c) as a proximal mechanism it addresses process rather than function, that is, how rather than why (...) questions; (d) it is not as interesting a question as why there is a high prevalence of “real” self-deception (i.e., “garden-variety self-deception” as described by Mele, see sect. 6); and (e) a more penetrating issue is whether “real” self-deception is adaptive. (shrink)

This paper is part of a larger project designed to examine and ameliorate the underrepresentation of female-identified students in the philosophy department at Elon University. The larger project involved a variety of research methods, including statistical analysis of extant registration and grade distribution data from our department as well as the administration of multiple surveys. Here, we provide a description and analysis of one aspect of our research: focus groups. We ran three focus groups of female-identified undergraduate students: one group (...) consisted of students who had taken more than one philosophy class, one consisted of students who had taken only one philosophy class, and one consisted of students who had taken no philosophy classes. After analyzing the results of the focus groups, we find evidence that: one philosophy class alone did not cultivate a growth mindset among female-identified students of philosophy, professors have the potential to ameliorate students’ perceptions of philosophy; and students who have not taken philosophy are likely to see their manner of thinking as being at odds with that required by philosophy. We conclude by articulating a series of questions worthy of further study. (shrink)

This paper proposes that the major national/cultural states of consciousness in the world today are characterized by an addictive epistemology — the corruption of will into willfulness. The essence of addiction is seen to reside in the issue of control While World War II had a singularly "intoxicating" effect on the world's consciousness, the war in Vietnam was an occasion when this consciousness "hit bottom." The hitting bottom event is not a function of objective circumstances, but of consciousness; of the (...) subjective interpretation and experience of phenomena. To resolve this addictive consciousness we need to learn, as individuals and en masse, to surrender control and accept responsibility. Because addiction, and its resolution, hinge on transformations of the experience of self, wefind that questions regarding the nature of selfhood and identity once considered philosophical recreations have become urgently pragmatic. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Book-carrying styles of 1,133 school-age children (kindergarten through high school) were observed, and anatomical measurements (hips, waist, and underarm) of the space between the trunk and fall line of the arm in 735 of the students was recorded. With the exception of handedness, the results replicated those of earlier studies of sexual differences in bookcarrying styles and implicated the protrusion of female hips as instrumental in this phenomenon.