This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The first part of this book is a translation of a philosophical work by the Breton philosopher Jules Lequyer, which explores questions of divine justice and human equality. The second part is a biography of Lequyer by Donald Wayne Viney, based on Prosper Hemon's life of Lequyer, and other material.

Cette édition numérique a été réalisée à partir d'un support physique, parfois ancien, conservé au sein du dépôt légal de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, conformément à la loi n° 2012-287 du 1er mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation des Livres indisponibles du XXe siècle. Pages de début Préface La section de la ligne dans la République (VI 509d 26-28) Le problème de la mesure dans la perspective de l'Être et du non-Être Sur les principes des mathématiques chez Aristote et Euclide (...) Sur la définition euclidienne de la droite L'analyse et la synthèse selon Ibn al-Haytham Histoire de la théorie des parallèles Implicit versus explicit geometrical methodologies: The case of construction Descartes and Galileo: The quantification of time and force L'analogie et la pensée mathématique La naissance du projectif L'usage philosophique des mathématiques au XVIIesiècle Pages de fin. (shrink)

This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market (...) account of the rationality of political association and one kind of market-based social choice rule. The market theory of political association I intend to discuss I call “market contractarianism,” and the collective choice rule whose relation to it I intend to explore is the unanimity rule. What, if anything, is the relationship between market contractarianism and the unanimity rule? (shrink)

Jules Janssens a construit une œuvre importante, qui, pour de nombreux chercheurs, a ouvert des perspectives de recherches nouvelles et fécondes. Ses travaux ont fait date. Ils portent principalement sur la philosophie d'Avicenne, ses sources, ses rapports avec la pensée musulmane, son influence sur la théologie ash'arite (al-Ghazālī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī) et sa réception dans le monde latin. Pour lui rendre hommage, quatorze collègues et amis de renommée internationale se sont réunis pour poursuivre ses réflexions sur ces thèmes. L'ouvrage (...) qui en est issu offre un état des lieux de la recherche contemporaine sur Avicenne et sa postérité arabo-latine. (shrink)

Motivating reforms to address discrimination and exclusion is important. But what epistemic practices characterize better or worse ways of doing this? Recently, the phenomena of implicit biases have played a large role in motivating reforms. We argue that this strategy risks perpetuating two kinds of epistemic oppression: the vindication dynamic and contributory injustice. We offer positive proposals for avoiding these forms of epistemic oppression when confronting racism.

Jules Coleman, one of the world's most influential philosophers of law, here expounds his recent views on a range of important issues in legal theory. Coleman offers for the first time an explicit account of the pragmatist method that has long informed his work, and takes on the views of highly respected contemporaries such as Ronald Dworkin and Joseph Raz.

Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our (...) agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities. (shrink)

Our focus here is on whether, when influenced by implicit biases, those behavioural dispositions should be understood as being a part of that person’s character: whether they are part of the agent that can be morally evaluated.[4] We frame this issue in terms of control. If a state, process, or behaviour is not something that the agent can, in the relevant sense, control, then it is not something that counts as part of her character. A number of theorists have argued (...) that individuals do not have control, in the relevant sense, over the operation of implicit bias. We will argue that this claim is mistaken. We articulate and develop a notion of control that individuals have with respect to implicit bias, and argue that this kind of control can ground character-based evaluation of such behavioural dispositions. (shrink)

Research programs in empirical psychology over the past few decades have led scholars to posit implicit biases. This is due to the development of innovative behavioural measures that have revealed aspects of our cognitions which may not be identified on self-report measures requiring individuals to reflect on and report their attitudes and beliefs. But what does it mean to characterise such biases as implicit? Can we satisfactorily articulate the grounds for identifying them as bias? And crucially, what sorts of cognitions (...) are in fact being measured; what mental states or processes underpin such behavioural responses? In this paper, we outline some of the philosophical and empirical issues engaged when attempting to address these three questions. Our aim is to provide a constructive taxonomy of the issues, and how they interrelate. As we will see, any view about what implicit bias is may depend on a range of prior theoretical choices. (shrink)

Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the radar of conscious reflection, out of the control of the deliberating agent, and not rationally revisable in the way many of our reflective beliefs are. I argue that close attention to the findings of empirical psychology, and to the conditions for (...) blameworthiness, does not support these claims. I suggest that the arguments for the claim that individuals are not liable for blame are invalid, and that there is some reason to suppose that individuals are, at least sometimes, liable to blame for the extent to which they are influenced in behaviour and judgment by implicit biases. I also argue against the claim that it is counter-productive to see bias as something for which individuals are blameworthy; rather, understanding implicit bias as something for which we are liable to blame could be constructive. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out some desiderata for a model of implicit cognition. I present test cases and suggest that, when considered in light of them, some recent models of implicit cognition fail to satisfy these desiderata. The test cases also bring to light an important class of cases that have been almost completely ignored in philosophical discussions of implicit cognition and implicit bias. These cases have important work to do in helping us understand both the role of implicit (...) cognition in action and our attempts to combat implicit biases. (shrink)

Recent empirical research has substantiated the finding that very many of us harbour implicit biases: fast, automatic, and difficult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and influence how we think and behave. Since it is difficult to be aware of these processes - they have sometimes been referred to as operating 'unconsciously' - we may not know that we harbour them, nor be alert to their influence on our cognition and action. And since they are difficult to (...) control, considerable work is required to prevent their influence. We here focus on the implications of these findings for epistemology. We first look at ways in which implicit biases thwart our knowledge seeking practices (sections 1 & 2). Then we set out putative epistemic benefits of implicit bias, before considering ways in which epistemic practices might be improved (section 3). Finally, we consider the distinctive challenges that the findings about implicit bias pose to us as philosophers, in the context of feminist philosophy in particular (section 4). (shrink)

Introduction Première partie – Réflexions sur le développement de la théorie des équations algébriques Section première. Les règles de la méthode Chapitre premier. Le théorème de Lagrange Chapitre II. Le théorème de Gauss Chapitre III. La « méthode générale » d'Abel : preuves « pures » et démonstrations d'impossibilité Chapitre IV. La théorie de Galois Section deuxième – Mathématique universelle Chapitre V. La théorie de Klein Chapitre VI. La théorie de Lie Conclusion. La mathématique universelle Notes Note I. Sur la (...) notion mathématique de l'infini Note II. Sur les constructions géométriques dans les Eléments d'Euclide Note III. Le « principe des relations internes » Bibliographie. (shrink)

In the present paper it is shown that al-Ämidî has tried to integrate somehow pilosophy into theology in way that reveals closer to al-Ghazâlî's than to F.D. al-Râzî's way of combining both currents of thought. Based on an analysis of several ideas taken from different works it is shown that al-Ämidî not only accepts the logic of the philosophers, but also their views that may be considered as scientifically established beyond any reasonable doubt.

Philosophers have had a lot to say about blame, much less about praise. In this paper, I follow some recent authors in arguing that this is a mistake. However, unlike these recent authors, the reasons I identify for scrutinising praise are to do with the ways in which praise is, systematically, unjustly apportioned. Specifically, drawing on testimony and findings from social psychology, I argue that praise is often apportioned in ways that reflect and entrench existing structures of oppression. Articulating what (...) is going wrong here helps us to see what to do about it. (shrink)

Suppose the prevailing distribution of property rights is unjust as determined by the relevant conception of distributive justice. You have far more than you should have under that theory and I have far less. Then I defraud you and in doing so reallocate resources so that our holdings ex post more closely approximate what distributive justice requires. Do I have a duty to return the property to you? There are many good reasons for requiring me to return to you what (...) I have taken. One is that while you may have no right in justice to all that you own, it does not follow that I do, or that I have a right to take it. Thus, requiring me to return the property to you is a way of recognizing that I had no right to take it from you in the first place. (shrink)

Next SectionIn emphasizing the importance of the separability thesis, legal philosophers have inadequately appreciated other philosophically important ways in which law and morality are or might be connected with one another. In this article, I argue that the separability thesis cannot shoulder the philosophical burdens that it has been asked to bear. I then turn to two issues of greater importance to jurisprudence. These are ‘the moral semantics of law’ and ‘the normativity of theory construction in jurisprudence’. The moral semantics (...) claim is that legal content is best understood as moral directives about what is to be done and who is to decide what is to be done. The problem is that legal positivists typically hold that only social facts contribute to the content of law, and it is hard to see how a positivist can hold both the social-facts claim and the moral-semantics claim. I argue that not only are the two claims consistent with one another, but that legal positivists must hold some version of the moral semantics claim if they are to make sense of the claim that legal reasons purport to be content-independent moral reasons for acting. In Section 3 of the article, I take up the question of whether theory construction in jurisprudence is normative or descriptive. This is hard to do in part because so little attention has been paid to correctly formulating the issue. I suggest a demanding test for descriptivism; namely, that an adequate analysis of law can be provided entirely in terms of its formal features. I then defend this claim against three arguments designed to show because governance by law is necessarily desirable or valuable that, we cannot characterize law without making reference to those values or to other material features of law. This constitutes a limited but powerful defence of descriptive jurisprudence. (shrink)

The Tragedy of the Commons The population prohlem has no technical solution; it requires a fundamental extension in morality. ...

This first supplement to my An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sînâ , published in 1991, informs the reader about all new studies on Ibn Sînâ published in the period 1990-1994, and also offers corrigenda and addenda to the former bibliography. Also in the supplement, attention is paid to Western, and to non-Western publications. Moreover, it has been tried to be even more exhaustive by including publications, which have not Ibn Sînâ in the title, but which nevertheless are offering important and (...) innovative information about his life or thought. First, an overview is given of the new editions and/or translations of Ibn Sînâ's works, which are once more identified according to the classic bibliographies of G.C. Anawati and M.Mehdavî. Hereafter, separate chapters are dedicated to studies of a biographical and a bibliographical nature. No less than ten chapters are devoted to materials dealing with Ibn Sînâ's philosophical thought . Finally, materials dealing with in two separate chapters. It has to be noted that almost all publications are annotated with a summary of their most original points and a short critical evaluation. An index, which includes the names of all authors, ancient, medieval and contemporary, has been added. In sum, this work aims at providing a clear, concise and comprehensive work- instrument for all future Avicenna research. It is not only of great interest for all scholars working in Arabic-Islamic philosophy, science and medicine, but also for historians of philosophy and mediaevalists. "Hay que felicitar al autor de este minucioso trabajo que, como su anterior bibliografía, es de un valor incalculable para todos aquellos que nos consagramos al estudio del pensamiento del gran filósofo islámico, al ser instrumento necesario con el que contar para futuras investigaciones sobre Avicena". (shrink)

Ibn Sina, long known in the West as Avicenna, was at the center of the school of Islamic philosophy that inherited and adapted Greek thinking from pre-Socratic to late Hellenic times, says Jansson. The 17 essays he has collected here discuss such aspects as his heritage in the Islamic world and the Latin West, the problem of human freedom, al-Gazzali and his use of Avicennian texts, and some elements of Avicennian influence on Henry of Ghent's psychology. One is published here (...) for the first time; the others are reproduced--with original page numbers--from publication since 1987, but mostly the late 1990s. (shrink)

Une lettre inédite de Karl Marx à Jules Guesde sur la France, l’«Orient» et l’« Occident » (1879). Actuel Marx, v. 73, n. 1, pp. 109-14. Disponível em:. Traduzido do francês por Gabriella M. S. Souza (graduada e mestranda em direito pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG). E-mail: [email protected]. Revisão técnica de Ester Vaisman.

Lo studio verte sulla terminologia avicenniana utilizzata per richiamare l'idea di «emanazione» e quella di «creazione». Il vocabolario avicenniano è comparato in particolare alla terminologia della Theologia Aristotelis.

This collection of essays by one of America's leading legal theorists is unique in its scope: It shows how traditional problems of philosophy can be understood more clearly when considered in terms of law, economics and political science.

Begehren, Sexualität, Intimität und Affektivität sind feinmaschig in die spätkapitalistische Matrix des Sozialen eingewebt. Die Studie untersucht die politische Ökonomie des Begehrens nach 1968. Sie unternimmt einen Streifzug quer durch die Philosophiegeschichte – von Platon über die Psychoanalyse zum Poststrukturalismus. Dabei geht sie von der Annahme aus, dass Ökonomie einen konstitutiven Faktor darstellt, wenn man Begehren begreifen will. Umgekehrt lassen sich sozioökonomische Strukturen nicht ohne die Rolle des Begehrens verstehen. Begehren wirkt sozialmobilisierend, indem es normative Ordnungen sowohl errichten und aufrechterhalten (...) als auch überschreiten kann. Neben paradigmatischen Positionen von Platon, Georg W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche und Sigmund Freud werden begehrensökonomische Thesen von Gilles Deleuze und Félix Guattari und der im Paris von Mai ’68 aufkommenden Philosophie des Begehrens betrachtet. (shrink)