In general agreement with the target article, I relate Vörös and Bitbol’s elucidation of Varelian philosophical roots of enaction to a discussion of enaction put forward by Varela’s co-authors Rosch and Thompson in their introductions to the revised edition of The Embodied Mind. I align Vörös and Bitbol’s multi-layered understanding of enaction to Rosch’s distinction between its “phase 1” and “phase 2” accounts. I consider the implications of the relationship between the pseudo-subject and the meta-subject of the enactive account of (...) mind for the general enactivist conception of science and scientific knowledge. (shrink)

This book argues that, in the development of science, three principles have been used; transparency of results; transparency of procedures; financial transparency. Though the topic of transparency has been researched from various angles by many academics, none have made a comparison between the development of science in the last 350 years and the aforementioned principles. The author uniquely explains how these elements contributed to the rapid development of science and consequently that of technology and human wellbeing and suggests legislation for (...) ensuring transparency in the public sector. In addition, this book provides numerous examples of successful new ways of using these principles in other activities in the public sector as well as possibilities of including the transparency principles from science publishing into general and internet media. (shrink)

Context: Philosophical and - more recently - empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the research of lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with self-referentiality: every attempt at examining the experience seems to change the experience in question. This so-called “excavation fallacy” has been taken by many to undermine the possibility of first-person inquiry as a form of scientific practice. Problem: What is the epistemic character and value of reflectively (...) acquired phenomenological data? Can the study of experience, despite the excavation fallacy, rely on the act of reflection on lived experience and make sense and use of its results? Method: Through a philosophical discourse, informed by empirical first-person inquiry, we explore the experiential structure of the act of reflection and the formation of the corresponding belief about past experience. Results: We present a provisional first-person model of the experiential dynamics of retrospective reflection, in which the reflective act is characterized as enaction of belief about past experience that co-determines - rather than distorts - its results. From a constructivist perspective on the inevitable interdependence between the act of observing and the observed, the excavation “fallacy” is recognized as an intrinsic characteristic of reflection. Reflection is described as an iterative, self-referential process, guided by a context- and subject-specific horizon of expectations. Implications: Knowing the characteristics of the formation of beliefs about experience is essential for understanding first-person data and for the possibility of their acquisition and use in scientific practice, particularly in the context of second-person approaches to the study of experience. Constructivist content: We relate the proposed understanding of reflection to constructivist epistemology and argue that constructivism provides an epistemological foundation for the empirical study of experience more suitable than the traditional epistemological objectivism of cognitive science. We suggest that the constructive nature of the process of reflection calls for a collaboration between the fields of constructivism, phenomenology, and first-person research, and points towards the potential for their mutual enrichment. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical descriptions made by classic Indian philosophical traditions about unusual forms of awareness during sleep. For instance, in the so-called state of witnessing-sleep or luminosity sleep, one is said to reach a state that goes beyond ordinary dreaming and abide in a state (...) of just awareness, a state in which one is not aware of anything else other than one’s own awareness. Moreover, for these traditions, this state is taken to be the essence or background of consciousness. Reports on such a state opens the door to exciting new lines of research in the study of consciousness, such as inquiry into the so-called “objectless” awareness during sleep—states of awareness that lack an ordinary object of awareness. In this two-staged research project, we attempted to find the phenomenological blueprints of such forms of awareness during sleep in 18 participants by conducting phenomenological interviews, informed by a novel tool in qualitative research, the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) method. Following a phenomenological analysis, we isolated a similar phase across 12 reported experiences labelled as ‘nothingness phase’ since it described what participants took to be an experience of ‘nothingness’. his common phase was characterised by minimal sense of self—a bodiless self, yet experienced as being ‘somewhere’—, the presence of non-modal sensations, relatively pleasant emotions, an absence of visual experience, wide and unfocused attention, and an awareness of the state as it unfolded. (shrink)

The present article discusses shared epistemological characteristics of two distinct areas of research: the field of first-person inquiry and the field of quantum mechanics. We outline certain philosophical challenges that arise in each of the two lines of inquiry, and point towards the central similarity of their observational situation: the impossibility of disregarding the interrelatedness of the observed phenomena with the act of observation. We argue that this observational feature delineates a specific category of research that we call the non-trivial (...) domain. Unlike the trivial domain, non-trivial research cannot assume the view from nowhere on which the observed phenomena could be regarded as existing independently of the process of observation. Presenting first-person inquiry and quantum mechanics as two of its examples, we show that non-trivial research violates several fundamental observational presuppositions of the trivial domain, exemplified in the principles of classical physics. Drawing on Niels Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics and the constructivist notion of enaction, we stress the constructive, participatory, and irreversible nature of observation in the non-trivial domain. We discuss the possibility of developing a non-representationalist epistemology of the non-trivial, and consider the implications of our discussion for research in the non-trivial domain, as well as for the general understanding of the scientific inquiry. (shrink)

Context: The enactive approach to cognition affirms the relevance of the study of lived experience within cognitive science. Problem: Taking experience as the phenomenon of investigation, while at ….

Recent decades have seen a development of a variety of approaches for examining lived experience in the context of cognitive science. However, the field of first-person research has yet to develop a pragmatic epistemological framework that would enable researchers to compare and integrate – as well as understand the epistemic status of – different methods and their findings. In this article, we present the foundation of such a framework, grounded in an epistemological investigation of gestures involved in acquiring data on (...) experience. We examine the acts of turning towards one’s experiential field and attending to experience within the process of reflection. We describe what we call the horizon of attending to experience by analogy to the “experimental arrangement” in quantum observation: this horizon, we argue, co-defines experiential phenomena that end up being observed and reported; at the same time, it itself forms an element of experience and is therefore amenable to phenomenological investigation. Drawing on the constructivist notion of enaction, we show that acknowledging the inherently constructive nature of attending to experience and accepting one’s lack of epistemic access to the “original”, observation-independent pre-reflective experience is not a dead end for first-person research when situated in a constructivist (but not relativist) understanding of the reflective act and its results. Expanding the notion of the horizon to encompass all epistemic acts involved in producing phenomenological data and final results of a first-person study (i.e., horizon of the method), we suggest some lines of inquiry that would allow researchers to identify and articulate horizons of particular methods, opening a way towards integrating past and future findings of different complementary first-person approaches into a comprehensive map of lived experience. (shrink)

In this essay, I first analyze the extension of hermeneutical interpretation in the Heideggerian sense to products of contemporary technology which are components of our “lifeworld”. Products of technology, such as airplanes, laptops, cellular phones, washing machines, or vacuum cleaners might be compared with what Heidegger calls the “Ready-to-hand” (das Zuhandene) with regard to utilitarian objects such as a hammer, planer, needle and door handle in Being and Time. Our life with our equipment, which represents the “Ready-to-hand” in Heidegger's sense (...) of the word, is determined by temporalization (Zeitigung) which cannot be separated and isolated from the wholeness of things in the world. In the second part of my paper, I explore the positive achievement of material hermeneutics (Don Ihde) with regard to its extension to technoscience and the discussion of how such hermeneutics can contribute to the preservation of our threatened lifeworld, but also to explore the possibilities of how technical inventions, medical innovations could improve our way of life. (shrink)

The article explores meditation-based examination of experience as a means for developing a contemplative, nonnaturalized, and existentially meaningful empirical research of consciousness in which the experiencing person is regarded as the primary investigator. As the first phase of a broader project, a group of seven researchers carried out a series of five meditation retreats. We sampled the ongoing experience of the researchers at the same random moments during meditation practice. The acquired data, consisting of more than 500 journal entries, interview (...) transcripts, and participatory analysis records, set the ground for three lines of enquiry: (1) What, if any, kind of meditative practice is suitable for researching experience? How can it be cultivated? (2) Can a group of researchers skilled in meditation systematically investigate selected experiential phenomena? (3) What is the actual lived experience of a group of researchers engaged in a continuous meditation-based examination of experience? In this report, we primarily focus on the third question, offering a concrete ethnographic overview of our research enterprise. We conclude by relating our findings to the discussion of the phenomenological practice of the epoché as an empirical tool for the study of consciousness. (shrink)

Hegels Theorie des äußeren Staatsrechts in seinen "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts" weist ausdrücklich Kants Idee eines Völkerbundes in der Schrift "Zum ewigen Frieden" als unrealistisch zurück; es gebe "keinen Prätor, höchstens Schiedsrichter und Vermittler zwischen Staaten, und auch diese nur zufälligerweise." Beide Konzepte – die Unausweichlichkeit auch gewaltsamer Konfrontationen der Staaten bei Hegel, die Möglichkeit ihrer rechtlichen Integration bei Kant – bilden den Gegenstand dieses Buchs. In den Beiträgen des Bandes geht es nicht nur um die Rekonstruktion der Theorien (...) Hegels und Kants, sondern auch um ihr Weiterdenken unter den heutigen Bedingungen der Globalisierung und asymmetrischer Kriege. Mit Beiträgen von: Samir Arnautovic, Andreas Arndt, Werner Becker, Hans-Georg Bensch, Paul Cruysberghs, Kazimir Drilo, Walter Jaeschke, Jean-François Kervegan, Heinz Kimmerle, Igor Mikecin, Vladimir Milisavljevic, Zvonko Posavec, Vahidin Preljevic, Andrzej Przylebski, Davor Rodin, Leo Šešerko und Jure Zovko. (shrink)

Ugledni mislitelji hermeneutičke filozofije Wilhelm Dilthey i Hans-Georg Gadamer okarakterizirali su Matiju Vlačića Ilirika kao klasika hermeneutičkog pristupa filozofiji. Taj sud dodatno dobiva na snazi jer su Dilthey i Gadamer okarakterizirani kao pristaše relativističke hermeneutike, dok je Vlačić inzistirao na adekvatnom razumijevanju i interpretiranju teksta. Uzevši u obzir da je za Vlačića ključno pravilo bilo da tekst treba tumačiti sukladno njegovu imanentnom smislu, razradio je dvije interpretacijske maksime, skop i hermeneutički krug, presudne za daljnji razvoj i konstituiranje hermeneutike kao metode (...) razumijevanja, dok ga se po našemu sudu istodobno može smatrati i anticipatorom načela blagonaklonosti. Za objašnjenje složenog hermeneutičkog odnosa cjeline i dijelova teksta, Vlačić je kombinirao induktivno-sintetičku i deduktivnu metodu. Taj odnos predstavlja zahtjevan proces provedbe hermeneutičkog kruga u kojem je na djelu primjena modela koherentnosti istine u heurističkom postupku razumijevanja. Drugim riječima, radi se o postupnoj rekonstrukciji smisla teksta. Tijekom tog eksplanativnoga procesa postaje razvidno da je značenje pojedinih dijelova i manjih tematskih cjelina razumljivo tek iz strukture i kompozicije cjeline teksta i da postupna induktivno-sintetička rekonstrukcija smisla teksta pretpostavlja primjenu deduktivne analize. Nadalje, u heurističkom procesu iščitavanja teksta nužno je provjeriti kako se konzistentnost pojedinih odlomaka i cjelina teksta koherentno uklapa u širu cjelinu, a interpretacijske maksime, skop i hermeneutički krug, pritom se ispostavljaju kao pouzdan organon u heurističkom procesu razumijevanja i objašnjenja teksta. U tom kontekstu je Vlačićev hermeneutički zahtjev za adekvatnom rekonstrukcijom smisla usporediv s načelom blagonaklonosti kako ga razumijeva Donald Davidson, postavljajući ga kao jedan od osnovnih pojmova svoje filozofije. Naime, Vlačić polazi od pretpostavke razložnosti govora i argumentacije, što podrazumijeva mogućnost hermeneutičke rekonstrukcije teksta i njegovog adekvatnog razumijevanja. Davidson je također, pomoću teorije triangulacije, pokušao pokazati kako objektivni svijet u jeziku komunikacije postaje intersubjektivni svijet razumijevanja i uvažavanja, čime zapravo želi pokazati da je naše razumijevanje izvanjskog svijeta uvjetovano zajedničkim sustavom znanja i modelom komuniciranja koji nikada ne može imati individualistička obilježja jer, jednostavno, participiramo u zajedničkom svijetu. Davidsonov koncept triangulacije na novi način je obilježio model hermeneutičke čestitosti koji je već zagovarao predstavnik prosvjetiteljske hermeneutike Georg Friedrich Meier. S obzirom na to da se problem antirealističkog pristupa ne može riješiti pozivanjem na kruti hermeneutički realizam ili objektivizam, ono što tekstom želimo pokazati jest da bi hermeneutiku, za razliku od npr. Rortyja, trebalo shvatiti kao interpretacijski konsenzus struke koji je uspostavljen u okvirima akademske zajednice. To je u skladu sa stavovima Paula Lorenzena, koje je u, pogledu akademskog konsenzusa s obzirom na interpretativnost, slijedio i Jürgen Habermas u izradi svoje teorije komunikativnog djelovanja. (shrink)

In its early development philosophy of science did not allow the possibility of a relativistic approach with regard to explanation of external phenomena. Relativism was seen as justified exclusively with regard to internal phenomena, for example, in the realm of moral and aesthetic judgment. In the realm of moral judgment, external realism functions as a necessary hypothesis, according to which our moral judgment and moral decisions have a real effect in the external world, for which we can be held responsible. (...) A paradigm shift in the theory of science, inaugurated by Th. S. Kuhn, led to the rise of relativism with regard to judgment in the realm of external phenomena and specifically with regard to the validity of scientific theories. Critics of relativism do not take into account that it is not enough to point out the logical inconsistency of relativism. Most arguments for scientific justification of external realism are doomed to failure, because they do not take into account the role of the judgmental subject. In this article I will show that the role of “second nature” is significant not only for the constitution of moral realism, but also for the implementation of scientific naturalism. (shrink)

In seiner Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes hat Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel die Grundlagen einer Anthropologie und Psychologie entwickelt, die den Menschen im Blick auf Vernunft und Freiheit bestimmt. Was auf den ersten Blick hoffnungslos antiquiert zu sein scheint, gewinnt Brisanz und Aktualität dadurch, dass Hegel seine Auffassung in eindringlichen Auseinandersetzungen mit scheinbar widersprechenden Phänomenen begründet und den subjektiven Geist im Zusammenhang seiner natürlichen, gesellschaftlichen sowie geschichtlichen Bestimmtheit reflektiert. Die Beiträge des vorliegenden Bandes gehen auf eine Tagung zurück, welche von der (...) Hegel-Gesellschaft Zadar in Verbindung mit der Internationalen Hegel-Gesellschaft e.V. vom 23. bis 27. Februar 2011 an der Universität Zadar organisiert wurde. Auf der Grundlage einer historischen und systematischen Rekonstruktion der Hegelschen Anthropologie und Psychologie wird Hegels Konzept auch im Blick auf aktuelle philosophische Problematiken diskutiert, um Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes in ihrer thematischen Vielfalt für die gegenwärtigen Diskussionen zu erschließen. (shrink)

In our paper, we explore the question of what is wrong with Neurath’s “plank-by-plank” method, which Quine later also adopted with enthusiasm. Shipbuilding experts will confirm that plank-byplank replacement is only possible in the dock and never on the open sea. This is simply empty talk, flatus vocis, often attributed to philosophers. The main problem with Neurath’s ship metaphor is that it is completely alien to the seafarers’ way of life, or even in stark contradiction to it. If it is (...) the task of philosophy to bring order into the house of concepts, the use of metaphors should also be scrutinized. Any practical test of the plank-by-plank methodology would prove unsuccessful, for as soon as one would remove a plank from the ship, the ship would sink very quickly due to the onslaught of the water. If the philosophers argue for empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should not use such utopian metaphors in which the practical life world is completely ignored. When philosophers argue for an empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should be more careful in their use of metaphors that exclude empiricism, practice, and the practical world of life. It is rather a vivid example of abstract armchair philosophy to explain how science works. Finally, it remains a problem to elaborate a concept of epistemology by “philosophizing” abstractly about empiricism and empiricist epistemology without referring to concrete life experiences. Neurath’s boat metaphor, praised by Quine, is, unfortunately, an example of epistemology without reference to concrete forms of life, and it is still questionable whether we can achieve anything factually with such non-functional metaphors, let alone make the process of cognition scientifically plausible. The whole thing is reminiscent of the scholastic witty remark about how someone convincingly tries to talk about swimming without jumping into the water. Every sailor knows that a ship could only be serviced and repaired in a dock. Seafaring as a way of life, all the turbulence associated with this form of life, obviously remained unknown to Neurath, who spent most of his life in a continental, mountainous country, so it is fair to say that he used a very unusual metaphor not grounded in the practice of life, which, to make the paradox even greater, is meant to represent a naturalistic-empiricist concept of knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, I would like to give some reasons why we absolutely need a philosophical approach to tourism. Hegel understood philosophy as “its own time, comprehended in thoughts” (Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of the Right [1821] TWA 7: 26, cf. Hegel 1991, 21). We are presently living under conditions of constant uncertainty in a fluid, globalized society which lacks thoroughgoing and homogenous ethical norms, but which is nevertheless characterized by universal wants and needs. Tourism is one of the (...) crucial features of our global society of consumerism. Postmodern global citizens affirm their identity as tourists by hedonistically pursuing the fulfilment of their excessive desires at popular vacation resorts. Others increase their reputation by booking flights to elite or esoteric destinations and accommodation in expensive hotels. Travel, tourism, and leisure are considered basic human rights – although a large part of the world’s population has no access to these amenities and hardly any prospect of ever benefiting from them. These contradictory phenomena of our contemporary human existence require closer examination. If we want to grasp our time in thoughts or form an appropriate judgment about our epoch, then we need to reflect also on tourism, because it is one of the fundamental, inescapable determinants of our present life-world. (shrink)

Against recent criticisms of idealism coming from the camp of the so-called New Realists, this volume shows that there is (and always has been) more to idealism than mind-centered ontology. The chapters by a group of both leading and up-and-coming scholars show that idealism can be approached from a plethora of angles, both contemporary and historically inspired, and that this broader view is precisely what may save its reputation in the 21st century.

1. Svet -- 2. Preizkušanje meja izrekljivega.

The article challenges the first premise of?speculative realism?, according to which, with Kant, the contact with the outside world was lost. Instead, it will be shown that the possibility of realism received its major impulse from two grand figures of German Idealism, from Kant as a precursor of the Romantic period and from Hegel as its, albeit critical, philosophical culmination. Based on three possible relations of knowledge to its outside, three ontologies will be distinguished, the ontology of immediacy, stretching from (...) rationalists to the last empiricists, Kant?s ontology of totalization, and, finally, Hegel?s?ontology of release? or?de-totalization?. As opposed to Descartes?s thing being constantly doubted in its existence, as opposed to Malebranche?s occasion being invariably induced by God, as opposed to Leibniz?s monad being an immediate embodiment of an idea, as opposed to Berkeley?s object vanishing when not perceived, and as opposed to Hume?s world lacking necessity, Kant philosophically warranted a world that does not have to be perpetually verified and can, hence, exist devoid of ideas produced by God and outside the constancy of the human gaze. Kant secured the normal and necessary existence of the world behind our backs and procured us with the common-sense normality of the world, but it was only Hegel?s absolute subjectivism that granted us the first glimpses into the radical meaninglesness of the facticity. It was not until Hegel?s logic of indifference of the notion to its immediate content that an egress of the circle of Kant?s totalization was made possible. nema. (shrink)

As an alternative to speculative realism, this book claims that realism is not a stance that became impossible with Kant but instead represents a concomitant phenomenon of modern reason, however obscure. The realist stance can be claimed only at the precarious pinnacle of the dialectic of totalization and release, where the overarching activity of the subject switches into a mode of de-totalizing release of the world from the constraints of consciousness and language.

A travers la métaphore du " Narcisse " du Caravage, l'auteur nous retrace les dérives de la culture visuelle et numérique contemporaine, en nous livrant les principales matrices philosophiques, sociales et métapolitiques de l'" occidentalo-scopie ", à savoir le mental scopique de l'Occident hypermoderne, dans lequel s'est opéré depuis la Renaissance jusqu'à nos jours une vaste mutation du "regardant" collectif et individuel. Selon l'auteur, il s'agit bien ici de la grimace du regard "occidental" contemporain, à savoir l'image spéculaire et déformante (...) qui a de la sorte aliéné et soumis l'ensemble de l'épistémè de la modernité occidentale à une pulsion scopique généralisée. (shrink)

Concept and interpretation are key philosophical terms that have played a major part in shaping modern thinking from the beginning of the modern age through post-modernity. The papers in this volume examine the historical dimensions of concept and interpretation as an approach, method, and thinking process, and also inquire critically about their relevance today, thereby taking general inventory of thinking in the modern age.

At the heart of Hegel s Aesthetics is the idea of the beautiful as unity. This unity turns fragile once the mind's self-awareness becomes conceptual and extends beyond sensory illusion. Focusing the philosophy of art on the idea of the beautiful raises a set of systematic problems, which are discussed with regard to Hegel s Aesthetics, its historical contexts, and its reception.".

This article explores Hegels concept of education within the context of his idea of ‘second nature’. Hegel believes that institutional life forms, which have been formed through education, culture, technical and social progress, constitute the ‘second nature’ of human beings. The immediacy of institutional forms which act as humans’ ‘second nature’ is the product of social and cultural mediation. The phenomenon of morality is here of central importance, because through morality the natural arbitrariness of the will is transformed and the (...) substantial spirit of freedom prevails. In Hegel’s opinion, human individuals differ from animals on account of education ; only through education does the human being become that which he should be. Bildung is a ‘formatio’ of the personality, which transcends particular knowledge, because it enables one to make a judgment concerning relationships and objects of our experience. By education human beings achieve the ability to raise themselves up from the concrete to the universal. We become conscious thereby that we exist within the ‘realm of the spirit’ and educate ourselves from its abundance. (shrink)

In the present volume, the significance of judgment for the understanding and evaluation of the interpretandum is analyzed. It is a complex endeavor in which existing forms of interpretation are examined and improved from the standpoint of the current state of research. Subjective interpretative approaches are corrected by recourse to a commonly understood truth and are judged from the standpoint of the commitment and consensus of scholars. Even if a work or an interpretandum has been understood and interpreted differently and (...) pluralistically, this does not mean that all presented and existing interpretations are equally valid, acceptable, and defensible. Therefore, it is important and necessary in any process of understanding to strive for a proper assessment of the work or interpretandum. The contributions are from the conference held at the University of Zadar, Relevance of Hermeneutic Judgment. (shrink)